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encounters between foreign relations law
and international law
Foreign relations law and public international law are two closely related
academic fields that tend to speak past each other. As this innovative volume
shows, the two are closely interrelated and depend on each other for their mutual
construction and identity. A better understanding of this relationship is of vital
importance for upholding important constitutional values like democracy, the rule
of law and the protection of human rights, while enabling states to engage in
meaningful forms of international cooperation. The book takes a close look at the
encounters between the two fields and offers perspectives for a constructive
engagement between the two. Collectively, the contributions argue that the
delimitation between the two fields occurs in a hybrid zone of interaction which
requires both bridges and boundaries: bridges for the construction of the
relationship between the two fields, and boundaries for preserving key normative
expectations of both domestic and international law.
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History of International Legal Thought (2017, with Stefan Kadelbach and David
Roth-Isigkeit).
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Preface
Academic discourses on closely related issues sometimes develop in parallel,
withoutmuch interaction between either track. To some extent, this is the case
in the parallel universes of foreign relations law and public international law.
Both fields can only exist with due acknowledgment of the other, but at times
it appears as if differences and divergences between the two are overstated for
the sake of solidifying one’s own perspective. This present volume departs
from the assumption that we need bridges as well as boundaries between
foreign relations law and public international law: bridges in order to better
understand the mutual dependency of the two fields, boundaries so as not to
collapse one field into the other. As editors, we think that the encounters
between the two fields assembled in the following pages are of a productive
nature. They will hopefully contribute to a further flourishing engagement
with the bridges and boundaries between foreign relations law and public
international law.
Putting together this volume was made possible first and foremost by the
enthusiasm with which our authors joined us on this journey, which started at
the Old Castle in Dornburg close to Jena in May 2019 with an informal
research workshop. Back then the first ideas for this volume developed. Our
group of authors made our task as editors easy and we are grateful for various
andmutual learning processes in which we engaged in the run-up to this book.
At Cambridge University Press we would like to thank Finola O’Sullivan
and Marianne Nield who have steered the volume expertly to production. We
are grateful to four anonymous reviewers for valuable insights which have
helped to further improve the conceptual structure of the volume.
The production of this book was made possible with the financial support of
various institutions. The 2019 authors’ workshop was supported by the
Friedrich Schiller University Jena (FSU Jena) and Freie Universität Berlin
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(FU Berlin). The open access publication of this volume is enabled by support
from the University Library of FU Berlin, the Faculty of Law of the FSU Jena
and the Department of Law of FU Berlin.
Finally, we would like to thank our teams in Berlin and Jena for the
dedicated support in preparing the manuscript for publication. Susanne
Prater and Felix Schott were heavily involved in the project from the very
beginning and we would like to thank them warmly for their active support.
We would also like to thank Denys Forshayt, Annika Franz, Alexandra
Konecny, Gundula Maxwill, Kerstin Oelstrom, Alexander Silke and
Annemarie Wagner for their commitment.
Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein
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Kalinić and Bilbija v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Appl. Nos. 45541/04 and
16587/07), Admissibility Decision (Fourth Section), 13 May 2008, p. 280
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1
Introduction
Bridges under Construction and Shifting Boundaries
Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein
Foreign relations law is developing very dynamically and expanding its hori-
zons while its relationship with public international law is notoriously com-
plex. Like an interface, foreign relations law addresses multiple and diverse
questions about how the ‘domestic’ relates to the ‘international’ sphere. This
volume takes a fresh look at the ‘bridges’ and ‘boundaries’ between public
international law and foreign relations law. It registers the manifold encoun-
ters between the two fields in a systematic and comparative manner and
addresses pressing conceptual and practical questions. Its authors analyse
both traditional and more recent functions, areas and contexts considered
relevant for foreign relations law and the places where foreign relations law
interacts with international law. In this introduction, we develop the questions
that guide their analysis of the various encounters between public inter-
national law and foreign relations law (Section I), reflect onmissed encounters
between the two fields (Section II), introduce the core concepts and the
approach of the book (Section III), and expose its overall structure as well as
contents of individual chapters (Section IV).
I THE VARIOUS ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
GUIDING QUESTIONS
New encounters between foreign relations law and international law reflect
a variety of interactions between the two fields. Essentially, the places of inter-
action are ‘hybrid’ in nature and defined by both international and domestic law.1
1 For an account of hybrid international/national norms, see Anthea Roberts, ‘Comparative
International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’
(2011) 60 ICLQ 57 at 74–81.
1
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Foreign relations law not only ‘bridges’ international and domestic law or sets
‘boundaries’ to international law. Rather, in both capacities – as a ‘bridge’ and as
a ‘boundary’ – foreign relations law is also responsive to developments in inter-
national and domestic law and, recently, subject to dynamic transformations.
Due to these dynamics, the ‘bridges’ are constantly under (re-)construction and
the boundaries keep shifting. Neither foreign relations law nor international law
are fixed and stable notions.
The ‘hybridity’ of international and domestic law created by foreign rela-
tions law is ambivalent. If foreign relations law combines elements of both
international and domestic law, this might strengthen as well as dilute the
normativity of international law. On the other hand, similar concerns can be
raised from the perspective of the integrity of constitutional law. Bridges
significantly change landscapes, and boundaries can also considerably impact
on the physical earth. In order to measure these landscapes and their trans-
formations, the contributions to this volume address two questions: to what
extent is the field of foreign relations law shaped by the normative expectations
and structures of international law? Conversely, in how far is international law
a product of the combined processes governed by foreign relations law and
construed in the light of domestic law?
In public international law, the distinction between international and
domestic law is certainly still firmly rooted in the law of treaties and the law
of state responsibility. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties (VCLT)2 unequivocally stipulates that states cannot rely on their own
domestic law in order to justify non-compliance with their obligations under
international law. Yet, Article 46 VCLT is a slight opening in this regard by
providing for the possibility of invalidity of an international agreement where
there was a manifest violation of a provision of fundamental importance
in a state party’s internal law regarding the competence to conclude treaties.
Article 3 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State
Responsibility3makes a similar distinction between international and internal
law, stating that the ‘[c]haracterization of an act of a State as internationally
wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not
affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law’.
International law traditionally leaves it to states how to implement their
international legal obligations and, in this regard, relies to a great extent on the
2 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155
UNTS 331.
3 UNGA, ‘Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts’, UNGARes. 56/83, UNDoc.
A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001.
2 Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein
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machinery of domestic law.4 This leeway is one of the core sites for foreign
relations law, to the extent that the rules in a given constitution can grant
international law a certain domestic rank and effect.5 However, international
law increasingly harbours expectations about its domestic implementation.
Such expectations can impact considerably on the organization of state power.
An example is the customary law requirement to hold environmental impact
assessments when industrial sites are likely to produce transboundary effects.6
Even if this might seem to be just a further obligation under international law,
compliance with the ‘no harm principle’ under international environmental
law includes a procedural element.
International institutions in charge of compliance, mostly courts, pay
increasing attention to domestic procedures. In the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, scholars have even traced a ‘procedural
turn’.7 One aspect of this development is that the Court takes into account
domestic procedures when pronouncing on the substantive merits. This
means that the quality of domestic decision-making processes influences
the intensity of the Court’s substantive review. A number of UN bodies like
the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the
Child promote implementation by domestic parliaments and parliamentary
oversight as a complementary instrument for human rights realisation.8
4 Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis, 3rd ed.
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1984), para. 848.
5 Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘The Democratic Challenge to Foreign Relations Law in Transatlantic
Perspective’ in Jacco Bomhoff, David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-
Facing Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 345 at 350–1.
6 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14
at 82–3.
7 See, amongst others, Janneke Gerards and Eva Brems (eds.), Procedural Review in European
Fundamental Rights Cases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017);
Thomas Kleinlein, ‘The Procedural Approach of the European Court of Human Rights:
Between Subsidiarity and Dynamic Evolution’ (2019) 68 ICLQ 91 (with further references);
see also for a critical analysis of this development Başak Çalı and Kristina Hatas, ‘History as an
Afterthought: The (Re)Discovery of Article 18 in the Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Esra Demir-Gürsel (eds.), The European Court of
Human Rights: Current Challenges in Historical Perspective (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2021), p. 158.
8 On the role of parliaments in the protection and realisation of human rights, seeMatthew Saul,
‘How and When Can the International Human Rights Judiciary Promote the Human Rights
Role of National Parliaments?’ in Matthew Saul, Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein (eds.),
The International Human Rights Judiciary and National Parliaments: Europe and Beyond,
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Beyond human rights law,9 a ‘proceduralisation’ of the interface of inter-
national and domestic law can be discerned, particularly in WTO Dispute
Settlement and, to a lesser extent, in international investment arbitration.10
Arguably, this has broader implications for the interaction of foreign relations
law and international law, at least in those areas of international law that are
strongly ‘judicialised’. Here, it is difficult to analyse the reach and authority of
international law – and especially of provisions that are fairly open-ended –
over domestic law independently of the authority of judicial institutions and
their pronouncements.
Novel encounters like these suggest rethinking the relationship between
international and domestic law and their ‘site of encounter’, foreign relations
law. In fact, international law scholars have come to realize quite some time
ago that the clear separation of international law and domestic law cannot
explain phenomena of foreign administration as well as processes of integra-
tion and disintegration of states in the course of decolonization.11 These
inherently dynamic phenomena and processes presuppose the concurrent
existence of international law and foreign relations law.
Public debates about the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between Canada and the EU (CETA)12 and the aborted project of
a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are only two examples
9 Irrespective of the procedural approach, see, for the notion that the ECtHR’sHirst case raises
the general issue of the authority of international law over domestic state officials, Başak Çalı,
The Authority of International Law: Obedience, Respect, and Rebuttal (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), p. 1ff.
10 For a procedural approach to necessity and proportionality stricto sensu, see
Caroline Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration: Balancing
Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy, Cambridge Studies in International and
Comparative Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 149, at 149–50,
161–2; for a comparison of WTO law and international investment arbitration, see
Lukasz Gruszczynski and Valentina Vadi, ‘Standard of Review and Scientific Evidence in
WTO Law and International Investment Arbitration: Converging Parallels?’ in
Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner (eds.), Deference in International Courts and
Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014); for a synopsis of developments in international huma rights adjudication and WTO
dispute settlement, see Thomas Kleinlein, ‘The Procedural Approach in InternationalHuman
Rights Law and Fundamental Values: Towards a Proceduralization of the Interface of
International and Domestic Law?’ (2017) 14 ESIL Conference Paper Series, pp. 1–22.
11 Albert Bleckmann, Das französische Kolonialreich und die Gründung neuer Staaten: Die
Rechtsentwicklung in Syrien/Libanon, Indochina und Schwarzafrika, Beiträge zum auslän-
dischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht (Köln: Heymann, 1969), vol. 50; Albert Bleckmann,
‘Fremdherrschaft und Dekolonisierung in rechtlicher Sicht’ (1971) 4 Verfassung und Recht in
Übersee 237.
12 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU (CETA),
Brussels, 30 October 2016, not in force (parts are provisionally applied), (2017) OJ L11/23.
4 Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein
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for how deeply the ‘international’ is penetrating domestic legal orders. It is
a truism that international law and international institutions have far-reaching
implications for everybody’s life. One of the prominent concerns raised by these
‘mega-regionals’ was about the regulatory autonomy remaining for democratic
states to govern in the public interest.13
From the perspective of individuals, the consequences of some inter-
national legal instruments do not always differ categorically from the effects
of domestic laws or executivemeasures, although the repercussions are usually
weaker and less direct. Targeted sanctions imposed by the UN Security
Council are only the most obvious example for this phenomenon.14
The impact of international law is not limited to the traditional sources of
international treaties and customary international law (which provides for
problems of democratic legitimacy of its own). It includes the secondary law
produced by international organizations and many forms of what is often
called ‘soft law’ but can also be described as informal processes of norm
generation. Contrary to the actual impact of secondary law and informal
instruments, which reinforces the need for democratic legitimacy, the role
of domestic parliaments in their adoption and implementation is often
neglected.15
Consequently, if ever, the claim that a clear distinction can be made
between internal and external forms of state action is no longer easily
tenable.16 Rather, the strict distinction between international and internal
law seems to be no more than a doctrinal remnant of the nineteenth century.
The approach of this book is to analyse not just these developments in
detail, but to also take stock of the overarching narratives about foreign
relations law and its relation to international law. Are there any overarching
narratives which can be relied upon to look at these questions? If so, do they
refer to individual jurisdictions or do they fit into more comprehensive trends?
13 Thomas Kleinlein, ‘TTIP and the Challenges of Investor-State-Arbitration: An Exercise in
Comparative Foreign Relations Law’ in Anna-Bettina Kaiser, Niels Petersen and
Johannes Saurer (eds.), US Constitutional Law in the Obama Era: A Transatlantic
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2018); see also the contributions in Benedict Kingsbury
et al. (eds.), Megaregulation Contested – Global Economic Ordering After TPP (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019).
14 Anne Peters, ‘Foreign Relations Law and Global Constitutionalism’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound
331 at 331.
15 For a critique, see Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, Developments in
International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), vol. 22.
16 See already Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 6.
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From a bird’s eye view, the course of foreign relations law is rather obscured
by seemingly opposite developments: In some jurisdictions, like the United
States, an established foreign affairs ‘exceptionalism’ (with regard to justicia-
bility or executive power) is subject to a process of ‘normalisation’.17 At least
to some extent, this development is triggered by international trends (or a new
perception of these trends). At the same time, and also as a consequence of
international trends, other jurisdictions are just ‘discovering’ or developing
foreign relations law as a distinct field. This raises the question whether this
discovery will lead to new forms of foreign affairs exceptionalism.
II FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
MISSED ENCOUNTERS?
While the encounters of foreign relations law and international law are
manifold and a careful analysis serves a better understanding of both fields,
scholars in the past have often focused on either foreign relations law or
international law. Indeed, parts of the history of both fields can be summarised
as a history of missed encounters. At times, academics from either discipline,
international law and foreign relations law respectively, look at the other with
a degree of scepticism. On the one hand, some international lawyers tend to
view foreign relations law as a construct which primarily serves to dilute
international law’s normativity through domestic law categories.18 The US
pedigree of the field only further nurtures the impression of foreign relations
law as a manifestation of ‘American exceptionalism’. A more inward-looking
approach to foreign relations law took hold in the US literature since the mid-
1990s, often in the name of domestic democracy.19 This move has been
influential also outside the United States. Accordingly, on the other hand,
some foreign relations law scholars, often hailing from the background of
domestic constitutional law, harbour the opposite suspicion about the poten-
tially damaging impact of international law’s more lofty and looser categories
which could work to the detriment of domestic constitutional principles like
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of individual rights.20
17 Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth, ‘The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’ (2015)
128 Harvard Law Review 1897.
18 Cf. Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), pp. 104–5.
19 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 815.
20 See, for instance, Frank Schorkopf, ‘Von Bonn über Berlin nach Brüssel und Den Haag.
Europa- und Völkerrechtswissenschaft in der Berliner Republik’ in Thomas Duve and
6 Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein
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On the whole, the history of the field reveals that foreign relations law is
not simply the domestic – and parochial – counter-perspective to public
international law. Even in the United States, the history of the field has
been shaped in the beginning by staunch internationalists: Quincy Wright
and Louis Henkin.21 At any rate, recent years have seen a growing amount of
interaction between the two fields of expertise. International lawyers are
increasingly interested in the domestic contexts of international law. This
trend has nurtured the emergence of ‘comparative international law’ as
a research project. This new field of study is interested in the domestic contexts
of international law, that is, in the ‘similarities and differences in how actors in
different legal systems understand, interpret, apply, and approach inter-
national law’.22 Foreign relations law scholars demonstrate increasing aware-
ness of how foreign relations law shapes international law.23 Despite these
developments in both fields, a gap in the literature remains with respect to an
exploration of how the two fields relate to each other, how categories, concepts
and principles are informed by debates and developments in the respective
other field and how differences persist.
Recent years have also witnessed a growing fascination of international
lawyers with the role that domestic courts can play for a more effective
implementation of international law,24 hence to some extent returning to
thoughts of a ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’ articulated by Georges Scelle in
the interwar era.25 In other words, international law needs bridges as well as
boundaries towards foreign relations law in order to become and remain
workable. Similar observations are true from the perspective of foreign rela-
tions law: if the autonomy of constitutional orders is to be protected – and
their central values upheld – this field of the law cannot allow for a direct
and unconditional reception of categories of international law into its own
Stefan Ruppert (eds.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Berliner Republik (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2018),
p. 327 at 347–8.
21 Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1922);
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, New York: The Foundation
Press, 1972).
22 Anthea Roberts et al. (eds.), Comparative International Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2018).
23 Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), parts II, IV and V.
24 For a recent casebook, see André Nollkaemper et al. (eds.), International Law in Domestic
Courts: A Casebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
25 Georges Scelle, Précis de droit des gens: Principes et systématique; Tome 1. Introduction: le
milieu intersocial (Paris: Sirey, 1932), p. 50; see also Antonio Cassese, ‘Remarks on Scelle’s
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normative order. Some act of translation is needed, if only to assert the
authority of domestic legal orders vis-à-vis ‘the international’.26 While this,
from the perspective of international law, involves the establishment of
boundaries, the sheer existence of foreign relations law also points to the fact
that no state is an island and exists in isolation from the international commu-
nity (of states) of which it forms part. If looked at from a sociological perspec-
tive focusing on the actors of the academic debate, it becomes also apparent
that foreign relations law scholars need to simultaneously rely on both the
bridges and the boundaries – otherwise their field of expertise would become
meaningless, at least if it should not collapse into an exercise of resistance
against ‘foreign’ elements entering the domestic legal order.
By focusing on the bridges and boundaries between the two fields, this
volume also wishes to challenge too one-sided understandings of either field. It
is precisely the by now established narrative of an ‘Ersatz international law’27
that should be challenged critically. ‘Comparative foreign relations law’ does
not have to become a counter-project to ‘comparative international law’ or
even to public international law itself. For both fields, the treatment of bridges
and boundaries raises distinct identity questions. International lawyers are
notoriously sceptical of attributing too great a role to domestic law.
International law scholarship might be characterised by a certain fear that its
autonomy might be at risk if the role of domestic law is made too prominent.
Accordingly, this volume aims at making a conceptual as well as a practical
contribution. Its conceptual contribution lies in the various attempts of the
chapters in this book to sound out the complicated relationship between
foreign relations law and public international law in a more context-
sensitive and diverse manner than it has been undertaken so far. While this
is a contribution to the world of ideas, its import is more than just theoretical.
Whereas hard-nosed scholars of political science or adherents of a realist
school of international relations might frown upon the relevance of public
international law, various contributions to this volume – especially, but not
limited to those in Part III of the volume on powers and processes – point to the
pressing real world issues which are negotiated through the categories of
foreign relations law and public international law. Depending on which
frame is referenced, the one analytical category and legal field may weigh
heavier than the other one. Yet, they always point to each other and need to be
26 On processes of translation see Karen Knop, ‘Here and There: International Law in Domestic
Courts’ (1999–2000) 32 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 501.
27 Originally, this phrase was coined by Dionisio Anzilotti, Studi critici di Diritto internazionale
privato (Bologna: Cappelli, 1898), p. 104 to characterise private international law.
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seen in some form of stereovision so as to portray the whole picture.
Perspectives from the ‘Global South’ or semi-peripheral states like Bosnia
and Herzegovina included in our volume show that many of their constitu-
tional systems are heavily shaped by international law. International law is
considered not just as a tool to advance the foreign policy agenda of a given
state, but as a factor to be reckoned with for basic questions of the organisation
of the polity.
III CORE CONCEPTS AND THE APPROACH OF THE BOOK
The approach of this volume is pluralistic. It includes various jurisdictions,
perspectives and positions. However, contributors have developed their
chapters against the background of a set of core concepts and notions. The
plurality of approaches entails that some authors may harbour different
understandings of such concepts or may even reject them in the first place.
We consider this an asset rather than a liability of this collection, as it helps
to reveal the essentially contested nature of notions such as ‘foreign rela-
tions law’.
A Foreign Relations Law
‘Foreign relations law’ is neither a legal term of art nor is it a category of the law
with wide acceptance across national legal systems. The notion refers to the
part of domestic law that is generally concerned with the relationship between
the outside of a state and its interior28 and focuses on the interaction between
international and domestic norms. While a proper field of foreign relations
law has not materialised in all legal systems, we presuppose that any given state
will have some kind of foreign relations law, at least to the extent that its
constitution or other relevant legal sources provide for guidance on these
issues. Most jurisdictions share rules and related case law that fulfil compar-
able basic functions in governing the status of international law and foreign
affairs powers. Therefore, it is plausible that foreign relations law has been
discovered (although relatively recently) as a field of comparative research.29
28 CampbellMcLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law’ in Curtis
A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019).
29 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Study’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 316;
Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’ in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). For
earlier comparative work in this area, see the references in Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Book Review:
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The function of the respective body of law or cases is both to separate
the internal from the external and to mediate the inward reception of inter-
national law into the domestic legal system. It is also concerned with separ-
ation of powers and the rule of law and with facilitating the external relations
of the State. A further function of this body of law is to establish rules of
jurisdiction and applicable law.30 While relying on this analytical lens of
‘foreign relations law’, it is not our intention to contribute to a further global
spread of yet another category of US law. Rather, this volume acknowledges
the important tradition that foreign relations law has had in the United States
and formulates invitations to rethink this category in different contexts.
B Public International Law
Difficult as it is to define foreign relations law, it is even more problematic to
capture the meaning of public international law in a nutshell. However, some
features of modern international law are of particular importance for this
book. Public international law is today obviously more than a set of rules
that ‘governs the relations between independent states’, as the Permanent
Court of International Justice famously held in its Lotus case.31 The horizons
of international law have greatly expanded and, while international law has
become a ‘comprehensive blueprint for social life’,32 this expansion affected
the two most foundational organizing concepts of this body of law: sources
and subjects.33 New participants have entered the international arena and the
list of the recognized subjects of international law now extends beyond
states to international organizations and the individual. Many other candi-
dates for legal personality are discussed, ranging from transnational corpor-
ations to subnational actors like entities of federal states and cities.34 This
expanding list of ‘actors’ in the international legal system also impacts on the
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law. Edited by Curtis A. Bradley’ (2020)
114 AJIL 539 at 539, footnote 1.
30 McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law’, p. 21.
31 Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’, Judgment, Series A No. 10, p. 18.
32 Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of
a New Century’ (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours 9 at 63–72.
33 On the importance of foundational doctrines for the operation of international law as
a ‘belief system’, see Jean d’Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System, Cambridge
Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2018), chapters 3 and 4.
34 For an overview see Christian Walter, ‘Subjects of International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum
(ed.),Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), p. 634; Jan Klabbers, International Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2020), p. 74.
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forms of lawmaking. The newer and less established actors tend to engage in
the production of normativity on the international level, yet they still find
themselves – to varying degrees – excluded from the realm of formal inter-
national lawmaking in the fields of treaty and customary international law.35
Also states often do not opt for the conclusion of binding international
agreements but see merit in more flexible instruments of a non-binding
character. The old debates about ‘soft law’ do not fully capture this develop-
ment as many important elements of contemporary international practice
are situated in an ambiguous grey zone between bindingness and mere
political commitment. This is the case, for instance, with respect to the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change36 and its rather novel way of setting forth
obligations which leave it to the parties to define in a first step ‘nationally
determined contributions’ (NDCs). The ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action’ (JCPOA) between Iran and the six powers involved in its
negotiation,37 while not binding as such, was referred to in a Security
Council Resolution.38 Hence, the ‘Iran deal’ was made partly binding.
A third example pertains to the ‘Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration’,39 which explicitly states that it is a non-binding political
framework that at the same time synthesizes many existing obligations in the
fields of human rights and migration.40
Taken together, international law is in a process of deformalisation.41 For
foreign relations law, this has significant impacts as the key categories of the
foreign relations law of most jurisdictions seem to be premised on certain
35 This has generated interest in so-called ‘informal international lawmaking’, see the contribu-
tions in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessels and Jan Wouters (eds.), Informal International
Lawmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
36 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, New York, 22 April 2016, in force 4November 2016, not
yet in UNTS.
37 For the text of the JCPOA see UN Doc. S/RES/2231 (2015), Annex A.
38 UNSC, ‘Resolution on Iran Nuclear Issue’, UNSC Res. 2231, UN Doc. S/RES/2231 (2015),
20 July 2015.
39 UNGA, ‘Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration’, UNGA Res. 73/195, UN
Doc. A/RES/73/195, 11 January 2019.
40 On the relationship of the Compact with the existing legal framework see Jürgen Bast, ‘Der
Global Compact forMigration und das internationaleMigrationsregime’ (2019) Zeitschrift für
Ausländerrecht 96; Daniel Thym, ‘Viel Lärm um nichts? Das Potential des UN-
Migrationsrechts zur dynamischen Fortentwicklung der Menschenrechte’ (2019) Zeitschrift
für Ausländerrecht 131.
41 See already Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Politics of Deformalization in International Law’ (2011) 3
Goettingen Journal of International Law 503; Alejandro Rodiles,Coalitions of the Willing and
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more or less formal understandings of the established actors and forms of
international cooperation and lawmaking.
C Hybridity As an Effect of Foreign Relations Law
As we have seen, the growing mutual enmeshment between international law
and foreign relations law creates a hybrid zone where the two meet. This
hybridity takes centre stage for this book on the various encounters between
foreign relations law and international law. Yet, it is important to note that we
do not argue that either international law or foreign relations law respectively
are hybrid in nature. While, as explained above, the strict distinction between
international and internal law is of limited explanatory power today, we see
great merit in upholding the rather traditional view that international law is
indeed international and that foreign relations law is part of a given domestic
legal system.42 Properly understood, ‘hybridity’ is not a characteristic but an
effect of foreign relations law. As defined above, foreign relations law encap-
sulates the rules of domestic law about the reception of international law and
about the participation of the state and its organs in the international sphere.
Asserting a hybridity of foreign relations law might indeed create the risk of
diluting the normativity of one of the two or even of both fields of law.
International law operates on the assumption that it is distinct from domestic
law. Understanding foreign relations law as a hybrid between the international
and the domestic invites the construction of an ‘Ersatz international law’ for
domestic purposes; a tendency that is at times identified with respect to US
approaches to foreign relations law.43
Reliance on this distinction between public international law and foreign
relations law might strike some readers as rather static in nature. Yet, uphold-
ing the traditional criteria – and, if you will, the boundaries between the two –
does not preclude investigating the hybrid zone that is created by the encoun-
ters of public international law and foreign relations law. At times, the same
legal question can be assessed from both perspectives. Whereas traditional
dualists would defend the view that one can give starkly differing answers
depending on the perspective from which the question is assessed, we argue
that it is a function of both international law and foreign relations law to come
42 Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’ in Rainer Grote, Frauke Lachenmann and
Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), para. 10.
43 For a critical view in this regard see Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), para. 1.30.
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to a solution that mediates between the two without undermining the specifi-
cities of each perspective.
This rather abstract consideration can be illustrated by reference to the ever-
ongoing saga of the reach of state immunity in the Italian-German relation-
ship. When the International Court of Justice decided in favour of Germany
in the Jurisdictional Immunities case in 2012, it upheld a strict reading of the
reach of state immunity and did not hint at the possibility of future legal
developments which might accommodate the concerns of Italian courts that
immunity might not be appropriate for German crimes committed in World
War II.44 While the case seemed to have been settled then, the Italian
Constitutional Court struck back with its by now well-known Sentenza 238/
2014. It found compliance with the ICJ judgment to stand in conflict with the
supreme constitutional principles of the Italian constitutional order, namely
the right of access to court and the right to a remedy.45 The approach of
the Sentenza was as categorical as the reasoning of the ICJ. The Italian
Constitutional Court relied on a doctrine of ‘counter-limits’ (controlimiti)
and limited its analysis to the level of Italian constitutional law, not without
expressing its ambition to also influence the development of international law.
One might say that this ‘dialogue of courts’ has created a hybrid zone where
arguments from international law and foreign relations law intersect and clash
with each other. While both positions seem to have opted for a ‘closure’ of
their normative system,46 a mutual openness for the position of the other
perspective might have allowed for the construction of more bridges and the
erection of fewer boundaries.
D Dimensions of Encounters: Fields, Substance and Procedure
Where and how do such encounters play out? For analytical purposes, we
have identified three distinct yet interrelated dimensions of encounters
along which the enquiry of this book is structured. This triad of fields,
substance and procedure lends itself to structuring our collective endeavour
in the following way.
44 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2012, p. 99.
45 DecisionNo. 238/2014 of 22October 2014 (English version available at: www.cortecostituzionale.it
/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf, last accessed 22 January 2021).
46 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities, Constitutional Values, and System Closures’ in
Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 685.
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With respect to ‘fields’, this book develops a number of different perspec-
tives on how the two fields of foreign relations and public international law
interact. How do the two fields perceive each other? Is the emphasis more on
bridges or on boundaries? Are arguments from one field relied upon to change
the law in the other? Might foreign relations law questions even be used as
bargaining tools in international negotiation processes? And how do dynamics
in the development of the two fields develop, for instance with respect to the
overarching narrative of a foreign affairs exceptionalism versus the alleged
normalisation of this field?
‘Substance’ allows us to catch a glimpse on the outcome of the various
encounters between public international law and foreign relations law. To
what ends do states and other actors pursue international cooperation? Are
they conditioned by their domestic constitutions also in substantive terms?
Which limits do the national constitutional framework and foreign relations
law impose on the organisation of international cooperation? Does foreign
relations law undergo a development of ‘normalisation’, meaning that the
conduct of foreign relations is increasingly subjected to the constitutional and
other legal standards that apply to other governmental action? If this is the
case, foreign relations law will decreasingly be regarded as ‘exceptional’ and
‘normal’ constitutional standards must apply.47
Finally, a shift of attention to institutions and procedures also in foreign
relations law is not only justified by the ‘proceduralisation’ of the interface of
international and domestic law outlined above. The focus on ‘procedure’ is also
warranted as large parts of foreign relations law are precisely about procedure.
We argue that significant changes in the relationship between public inter-
national law and foreign relations lawwill materialise with respect to procedures
under foreign relations law. Foreign relations law regulates the division of
competences between different state organs in the field of foreign affairs and
how they interact. A typical focus of this debate is the necessary amount of
parliamentary participation in foreign affairs. Yet, parliamentary participation
does notmean the same in a presidential system like the one of theUnited States
and a parliamentary system as in Germany. Rather, the balance of power in
foreign affairs and domestic procedures are embedded in constitutional struc-
tures and domestic legal cultures, which need to be studied carefully.
A more activist approach by some domestic courts in their control of both
the executive and the legislative in foreign affairs leads to more demanding
procedures. For example, the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-
Westphalia, in March 2019, ordered the Federal Republic of Germany to take
47 Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, para. 1.
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appropriate measures to ascertain whether the use by the United States of
America of the Ramstein Air Base for the deployment of armed drones in
Yemen takes place in accordance with international law. This decision was set
aside on appeal in November 2020. While the Federal Administrative Court
stressed the margin of assessment and action of the Federal Government
(‘Einschätzungs-, Wertungs- und Gestaltungsbereich’) and decided in its
favour, it did not deny that the state’s duty to protect includes a procedural
component which relates to ensuring conformity with international law.More
generally, it certainly remains the case that for both courts the question of
whether international law permits armed drone missions in Yemen was not a
political question, but rather a legal question, to be assessed by the judiciary.48
IV THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The volume is structured into three main parts that analyse the three dimen-
sions of encounters between foreign relations law and international law
developed in the previous section. A first part (‘Identities and Interactions’)
looks at varieties and variations of the field of foreign relations law and
how it relates to public international law. A second part (‘Sovereignty and
Cooperation’) analyses substantive limits to international cooperation which
often stem from domestic constitutional principles. A final main part (‘Powers
and Processes’) turns to the processing of international law obligations through
domestic categories like separation of powers. These categories fulfil an
important heuristic function for the structuring of our volume. They are
each characterised by built-in tensions – between the identity of the respective
field and its interactions with its respective ‘others’, between absolute sover-
eignty and forms of international cooperation that lead to substantial commit-
ments and between unchecked powers and their taming in processes. The
book will be concluded by some cross-cutting observations on the bridges and
boundaries between public international law and foreign relations law.
A Identities and Interaction
The first Part, on identities and interaction, studies diverging conceptualisa-
tions of the field of foreign relations law and looks at places where one would
48 For the decision of the OVGMünster see Bin Ali Jaber v.Germany, Judgment, 19March 2019,
4 A 1361/15; the decision of the Federal Administrative Court is Bin Ali Jaber v. Germany,
Judgment, 25 November 2020, 6 C 7.19; see further on the decision by the OVG Münster
Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘US-Drohneneinsätze und die grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht für das
Recht auf Leben: “German exceptionalism”?’ (2020) 75 JuristenZeitung 303.
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not, from a traditional perspective, expect any foreign relations law. It develops
a contextual account of how the various identities of the field have been
shaped in encounters with different legal traditions and theoretical concerns.
Furthermore, this part studies several linkages between and mutual effects of
foreign relations law and international law. It analyses how foreign relations
law affects the making of international law and how, vice versa, international
law influences domestic rules on treaty making powers.
Felix Lange analyses the more informal and contextual influence of foreign
relations law on the making of international law and, in particular, its use as
a bargaining tool in treaty negotiations. With reference to the US position on
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the chapter argues that domestic
foreign relations law at times shapes the negotiation process by limiting
possible outcomes. The example demonstrates potential effects of domestic
constitutional design for the international legal structure.
Edward Swaine discusses how international law has homogenised foreign
relations law relating to the creation and elimination of international treaty
obligations – encouraging even those states that possess other constitutional
agents to regard executive power as sufficient. This tendency has been fully
expressed in the international law regarding ratification and is increasingly
apparent in emerging practices of treaty withdrawal.
While these two contributions analyse modes of interaction between for-
eign relations law and international law and how this affects their respective
identities,Michael Riegner poses the identity question on a different level. He
contrasts two different perspectives on foreign relations law, one that devel-
oped in liberal democracies at the centre of geopolitical gravity and one
shaped by the postcolonial contexts and historical experiences of countries
at the periphery of the global political economy. The peripheral perspective is
not exclusive to an essentialised ‘South’ but has increasing resonance and
heuristic value in the ‘North’, highlighting contemporary transformations in
liberal-democratic foreign relations law.
This insight is further corroborated by Prabhakar Singh’s chapter, which
offers a critique of the notion of foreign relations law, formulated from an
Indian perspective. The chapter traces the development of the case law of
Indian courts on the resonance of international law in the domestic legal
system and concludes with reflections on whether it is desirable to frame these
cases as manifestations of ‘foreign relations law’ or whether this conceptual
transplant would ignore the special situation of India as a postcolonial country.
The chapter points to the difficulties in determining whether a given legal
system has a field of foreign relations law and what the implications of such
a finding are.
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This question is also reflected on in the contribution by Frédéric Mégret,
who asks whether there is a French variant of foreign relations law. By
revisiting the idiosyncratic work of the French international law scholar and
practitioner Guy de la Charrière,Mégret brings to the fore a starkly contrasting
understanding of foreign relations law which both takes international law
seriously and connects it with wider geopolitical power games. Uncovering
such early and non-Anglophone voices in the effort to formulate the concep-
tual framework of foreign relations law can help further problematise the very
notion.
The first part of the volume concludes with the contribution by Angelo
Jr. Golia, who suggests to understand foreign relations law as a form of global
administrative law. Already the categorisation as administrative law is subver-
sive as it plays with the traditional assumption that much of foreign relations
law is about high politics. Using the theoretical approach of ‘Global
Administrative Law’ (GAL), Goliamakes a contribution which can be under-
stood as a particular facet of the normalisation of foreign relations law through
administrative law.
B Sovereignty and Cooperation
Part II of the volume deals with issues of sovereignty and cooperation, two
notions which are at the heart of international law and find themselves in
constant tension. Sovereignty often also serves as a placeholder for consti-
tutional values, in particular domestic democratic self-determination.
Foreign relations law can mediate between these concerns and the values
of international cooperation, but it can also exacerbate conflict. The
theoretical debates of the beginning of the twentieth century on the
tension between sovereignty and the binding force of international treaties
and between monism and dualism nowadays reappear in the concepts of
foreign relations law and respective case law of domestic courts. Recent
years have also demonstrated that foreign relations law itself is a politically
contested field, and it is exactly this field where the right balance between
these conflicting values is to be struck in a dynamically developing global-
ised world.
Niki Aloupi sheds light on concrete examples of how this tension and the
mutual imbrications can be mediated. She analyses the case law of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel on ‘Limitations of Sovereignty’. Since this doctrine
has not the least allowed the Conseil itself to take an active role in the field of
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Anna Petrig’s contribution turns to another factor complicating the relation-
ship between sovereignty and cooperation: the growing deformalisation and
privatisation in international law and the impact that these developments
have on the framework of democratic participation in Swiss Foreign
Relations law. The chapter submits that the ‘democratic participation frame-
work’ of Swiss foreign relations law is predicated on a very traditional under-
standing of sources and actors of international law. The chapter warns against
a hollowing out of these traditional mechanisms of generating democratic
legitimacy.
C Powers and Processes
The third and final main Part of the volume turns to powers and processes in
the proverbial field where foreign relations law and international law meet.
The transformations of procedures in foreign affairs and their reverberations
for international law are specific examples of the interaction between foreign
relations law and international law. In some legal orders, a trend towards
earlier information of parliaments about imminent foreign policy decisions
can be pursued. Moreover, the role of courts in foreign relations law is
subject to change. In some jurisdictions, there is at least an emerging trend
towards a greater role of courts in controlling the executive in foreign affairs.
However, these trends do not seem to be robust but rather depend on
individual subject matters and jurisdictions. While domestic procedures
are themselves subject to transformation, they also impact on or transform
the substance of international law foreign relations and drive innovations
and change.
Dire Tladi revisits the normalisation story through the perspective of
South African constitutional law. In particular, he traces how successively
the role of executive discretion in this field has been diminished through
case law of the courts. Tladi argues that the post-Apartheid constitution was
a constitution made for Mandela – while subsequent case law was born out
of the frustrating experience of the Zuma years. His chapter offers hence
a particular perspective on the adaptability of foreign relations law to chan-
ging political circumstances – which is an important and at times overlooked
factor for the implementation of international law.
The chapter by Jean Galbraith follows with observations on a turn
from scope to process as limits to executive power in US foreign relations
law. In particular, she traces how the Presidential power has undergone
changes – substantive checks on the foreign affairs power were removed
18 Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein
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but at the same time substituted by procedural checks and limits. The
chapter argues that international law has played a key role in this
development.
In his contribution, Stanisław Biernat looks at the division of compe-
tences in Polish foreign relations law. He analyses how different parts of
the executive – the Council of Ministers and the President – can clash
with respect to their foreign affairs power and how this clash has been
addressed in Polish constitutional practice.
Ajla Škrbić, in turn, focuses on the role of parliaments in creating and
enforcing Foreign Relations Law from the perspective of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH). BiH is a unique case for the foundation of its constitu-
tional framework in an international treaty, the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Consequently, its foreign relations law, nascent as it is, is inextricably tied up
in the various connections between international law and foreign relations
law from the outset. In this sense, the contribution connects back to insights
from the first part of the volume which highlighted the dependency of foreign
relations law on international law for some states, in particular in the ‘Global
South’.
The contribution by Veronika Fikfak details how concepts of international
law become appropriated in parliamentary discourses. Her case study focuses
on UK parliamentary practice with respect to the use of force. She shows how
the role of parliament has increased in decisions about the use of force in the
UK context. At the same time, the role of international law has become
ambiguous. Her chapter unearths the development that domestic approval
for the use of force might be seen as a substitute for legitimation under
international law. The chapter hence points to potentially troubled appropri-
ations of international law categories in domestic contexts with uneasy reper-
cussions for international law.
The third part of the volume is concluded by a contribution by Ji Hua,
who looks at environmental governance and the role it plays in Chinese
foreign relations law. In particular, this chapter takes the field of environ-
mental governance as a case study to probe whether a field of foreign
relations law exists in China or whether questions usually associated with
foreign relations law inWestern jurisdictions are processed through different
categories. The chapter can hence also be read as a variation of Prabhakar
Singh’s explorations on the existence (or not) of an Indian foreign relations
law in Part I of the volume. At the same time, it tackles these questions from
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D Final Reflections
Part IV of the volume offers two sets of final reflections from Curtis A. Bradley
and Campbell McLachlan. Both contributions reflect on the overarching
questions of the volume presented in this introduction through a reading of
and reaction to the individual chapters.
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2
Foreign Relations Law As a Bargaining Tool?
Felix Lange
I INTRODUCTION
To perceive foreign relations law as a self-standing academic subfield,
perspective or theme which enlightens our understanding of the linkages
between national and international law is a rather novel phenomenon.1 In
most jurisdictions an academic tradition of foreign relations law as
a separate field or theme does not exist. Issues of foreign relations law
such as the separation of powers in foreign affairs or the integration of
international law into the domestic order are often either discussed in
treatises of constitutional or international law, or in both. For instance,
not only the Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution contains a chapter
on the case law of the Indian Supreme Court dealing with the status of
international law in the Indian legal system2 but also the edited volume
Comparative International Law includes a contribution addressing how
the Indian Supreme Court integrates human rights law into the domestic
order.3 Moreover, if, like in the United States, a foreign relations law
tradition exists, the norms of the US Constitution and the case law of
the Supreme Court which relate to foreign affairs are often taught and
analyzed by scholars who teach and write on international and domestic
1 Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
2 The chapter also addresses the division of competences between the executive and legislature,
Lavanya Rajamani, ‘International Law and the Constitutional Schema’, in Sujit Choudhry,
Madhav Khosla and Pratab Bhani Mehta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 143.
3 Neha Jain, ‘The Democratizing Force of International Law: Human Rights Adjudication by
the Indian Supreme Court’, in Anthea Roberts et al. (eds.), Comparative International Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 319.
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(constitutional) law.4 As the editors of this volume rightly emphasize,
foreign relations law thus concerns the relationship between domestic
(constitutional) law and international law. The hybrid character of foreign
relations law invites us to ponder about the repercussions of domestic
(constitutional) law for international law and vice versa.5
This contribution attempts to shed some light onto the issue of the place of
foreign relations law and the bridges and boundaries it builds between
constitutional and international law. It starts by studying the emergence of
foreign relations law in various jurisdictions and its relationship to domestic
(constitutional) law and international law. It argues that foreign relations law
is best understood as a subfield or theme of domestic (constitutional) law
with close linkages to international law.
But seeing the locus of foreign relations law in the domestic is only the
starting point for a broader engagement with its effects on international law
and vice versa. In general, the separation of foreign relations law from inter-
national law should not make us blind for studying the interlinkages and
impacts of the respective fields on each other. For instance, the study of the
informal and contextual influence of foreign relations law on international
treaty-making seems to be worthwhile.
Therefore, this contribution analyzes one aspect of the informal use of
foreign relations law in relation to international law: it discusses the possibility
to rely on domestic foreign relations law as a bargaining tool in international
negotiations to persuade the other negotiating parties of one’s own perspective.
Domestic foreign relations law might shape the negotiation process and limit
possible outcomes if one actor successfully flags a certain negotiating outcome
as leading to nonparticipation because of domestic veto powers. If the historic
role of veto powers in treaty-making makes the threat of nonparticipation
credible, the other negotiating parties might be tempted to give in and sign
onto the other side’s negotiating goal.
In particular, I study the evolution of the bargaining position of the United
States in relation to the Paris Agreement on climate change and its connection
to US foreign relations law. In the debate about the Paris Agreement, the
Obama administration highlighted that the domestic constitutional rules on
treaty-making call for negotiating a treaty with nonbinding provisions on
climate change mitigation. Notably, the US delegation successfully stopped
4 See for instance bio of Curtis Bradley, https://law.duke.edu/fac/bradleyc/; Jack Goldsmith,
https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10320/Goldsmith; Oona Hathaway, https://law
.yale.edu/oona-hathaway, accessed September 30, 2020.
5 Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, this volume.
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the adoption of a pre-negotiated final document containing language which
sounded like binding commitments on climate mitigation by pointing to its
foreign relations law. As I demonstrate, US foreign relations law indeed places
considerable constraints on executive treaty-making without involvement of
the Senate or Congress. The history of the discussions on the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol shows
that various actors regarded Senate involvement for treaties concerning cli-
mate change mitigation as obligatory.6 However, it is also important to be
aware of the ambivalence of the foreign relations law on the matter and the
restraint of US courts to judicialize foreign affairs. Arguably, the Obama
administration did not exhaust interpretations of its foreign relations law
allowing more binding-sounding language on climate mitigation because
the negotiating team itself was not eager to commit to binding language.7
US negotiators also favored nonbinding commitments on climate mitigation
for developed countries because they intended to prevent a scheme differenti-
ating between developed and developing countries.8 In this sense, US foreign
relations law became the bargaining tool which limited the space of potential
negotiating outcomes on the international plane and allowed the Obama
administration to achieve the result it wanted. Even though foreign relations
law can unfold this power only under very specific circumstances, the example
demonstrates the potential effects of domestic constitutional design for the
international legal structure.
II THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
The design of the constitutional rules addressing foreign affairs has always
been an important issue during the constitution-making processes in constitu-
tional democracies. Building on enlightenment philosophers like John
Locke,9 the founding fathers of the US Constitution debated how to allocate
the competences between the branches of government in foreign affairs and
the role of international treaty and customary law in the domestic legal order.10
In the British public law tradition, William Blackstone and Albert VennDicey
6 See below III.B and C.
7 See below III.C.
8 See below III.C.
9 John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690), s. 147.
10 For instance, The Federalist Papers No. 75, Publius (Alexander Hamilton), ‘The Treaty-
Making Power of the Executive’, 1788, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed75.asp,
accessed September 30, 2020.
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contributed to an understanding of foreign affairs law as an area of executive
dominance and discretion by highlighting the powers of the Crown.11 Also, in
the constitution-making processes of the nineteenth century, the emerging
constitutional democracies opted for different models concerning the alloca-
tion of the foreign affairs power.12
The legal sciences, however, did not start to become systematically inter-
ested in issues of foreign relations law until the early twentieth century. In the
United States, QuincyWright’s 1922 study on The Control of American Foreign
Relations set the tone for the US debate on the constitutional implications
for foreign affairs.13 His discussion of the enforcement of international law in
domestic courts and the powers of the President and Congress on inter-
national treaty-making and implementation, is still today regarded as an
important predecessor of the contemporary debate in the United States.14
One year later, Ernst Wolgast published his in-depth analysis of the ‘Foreign
Power’ (Auswärtige Gewalt) of the German Reich addressing similar issues for
the Weimar constitutional system.15
After the Second World War, the topic continued to stay relevant in
particular in the US debate. During the 1940s, the increasing international
engagement of the United States led to the emergence of congressional-
executive agreements in constitutional practice causing a scholarly boom
on the topic.16 The term ‘foreign relations law’ developed to distinguish
a separate field of study from international law and constitutional law stricto
sensu analyzing the separation of powers in foreign affairs, the integration of
international law in the US legal system and the international law applicable
to the United States.17 In 1965, the American Law Institute published the
11 William Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1765), vol. I, p. 245; Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
(London: Macmillan, 1885), p. 465.
12 See Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 361.
13 Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1922).
14 Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System, 2nd ed., (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015), Preface.
15 Ernst Wolgast, ‘Die auswärtige Gewalt des Deutschen Reiches unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung des Auswärtigen Amtes’ (1923) 44 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 1.
16 See for instance Quincy Wright, ‘The United States and International Agreements’ (1944) 38
AJIL 341; Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, ‘Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. I and II)’ (1945)
54 Yale Law Journal 181 and 534; Edwin Borchard, ‘Treaties and Executive Agreements –
A Reply’ (1945) 54 Yale Law Journal 616.
17 On the history of the concept see Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, in
Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 1 at 5–8.
26 Felix Lange
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States with a
focus on these topics and thus contributed to the successful establishment of the
theme as a disparate scholarly field.18 Around thirty years later, the scholarly
consensus on issues of foreign affairs which had been enshrined in the 1987
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States with Louis
Henkin as Chief Rapporteur was put into question.19 Some scholars challenged
assumptions about the internationalization of the US legal system and triggered
a flood of positive and hostile reactions in scholarship.20
In other constitutional democracies, the relationship between the constitu-
tion and the international legal order has also been a popular topic of
academic debates. For instance, in 1954, Western German public law profes-
sors debated the division of competences between parliament and the execu-
tive in foreign affairs as well as between the federal and state level shaping the
constitutional practice of the young German Federal Republic for years to
come.21 Moreover, Klaus Vogel’s 1964 programmatic essay on the internation-
alization of German constitutional law became a common reference point for
future generations of scholars.22 The recent establishment of Staatsrecht III
as a distinct class of the constitutional law curriculum then triggered
a substantial increase in publications on the topic.23 In South Africa, the
constitution-making in the 1990s spurred a debate about the relationship of
the post-apartheid Constitution with international law.24 The theme is fre-
quently taken up in reaction to international law-friendly judgments of South
African courts.25 Also, the foreign relations law of supranational entities like
18 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965).
19 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
20 Seminal: Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of theModern Position’ (1997) 110Harvard Law Review 815; for the
new consensus see the partial revision in Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States (2018).
21 Wilhelm Grewe and EberhardMenzel, ‘Die auswärtige Gewalt der Bundesrepublik’ (1954) 12
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 129.
22 Klaus Vogel, Die Verfassungsentscheidung des Grundgesetzes für eine internationale
Zusammenarbeit (Tübingen: Mohr, 1964).
23 See for instance Frank Schorkopf, Staatsrecht der internationalen Beziehungen (München:
Beck, 2017); Heiko Sauer, Staatsrecht III: Auswärtige Gewalt, Bezüge des Grundgesetzes zu
Völker- und Europarecht (München: Beck, 2011); Christian Calliess, Staatsrecht III: Bezüge
zumVölker- und Europarecht, 2nd ed. (München: Beck, 2018); Andreas Paulus, Staatsrecht III:
Mit Bezügen zum Völker- und Europarecht (München: Beck, 2010).
24 John Dugard, ‘International Law and the South African Constitution’ (1997) 8 EJIL 77;
Neville Botha, ‘Treaty Making in South Africa: a Reassessment’ (2000) 25 South African
Yearbook of International Law 69.
25 Erika de Wet, ‘The “Friendly but Cautious” Reception of International Law in the
Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some Critical Remarks’ (2004) 28
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the European Union now receives academic attention.26 Even though the
understanding that foreign relations law is a separate field in the legal sciences
is rather the exception than the rule in constitutional democracies, scholarly
attention has clearly been growing.
Furthermore, a recent comparative turn sparked the interest in foreign
relations law in various jurisdictions. In 2011, Campbell McLachlan’s study
of foreign relations law in various Commonwealth states became a key build-
ing block for the scholarly field or theme.27 Also, the various chapters on
manifold jurisdiction in the 2019 Oxford Handbook on Comparative Foreign
Relations Law illustrate the rising scholarly interest.28
The maturation of foreign relations law as a disparate scholarly field or
theme is accompanied by debates about its definition, place and function. In
particular, various authors address the tricky relationship of foreign relations
law to constitutional law and international law. The editor of the Oxford
Handbook, Curtis Bradley, defines foreign relations law as ‘the domestic law
of each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the
world’.29 For him, the theme encompasses the allocation of authority on the
vertical and horizontal level of a state and the role of international law before
domestic courts, but not ‘“pure” questions’ of international law.30 Similarly, in
the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law, Helmut
Aust regards the separation of powers in foreign affairs, the rights of the
individual when foreign relations are affected and the relationship between
foreign affairs and democracy as key themes of foreign affairs law in the
constitutional state.31 Thomas Giegerich stresses in his contribution for
the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law that ‘[a]lthough
the foreign relations law forms that part of internal law which is most closely
interlinked with international law, it remains internal law’. For him, ‘there is
not one worldwide foreign relations law but there are many, however, that
Fordham International Law Journal 1529; Max du Plessis and Guénaël Mettraux, ‘South Africa’s
Failed Withdrawal from the Rome Statute: Politics, Law, and Judicial Accountability’ (2017) 15
Journal of International Criminal Justice 361; Dire Tladi, ‘A Constitution Made for Mandela,
A Constitutional Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma’, this volume.
26 Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional
Fundamentals (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008); Schütze, Foreign Affairs.
27 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014).
28 Bradley, Comparative Foreign Relations Law.
29 Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, 3–4.
30 Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, 3–4.
31 Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative
Constitutional Law, August 2017, para. 5, https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/home/MPECCOL.
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share certain common principles’.32 Moreover, when foreign relations law is
distinguished from related subfields like comparative international law, its
domestic dimension is emphasized. As Anthea Roberts, Paul Stephan, Pierre-
Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg stress, comparative foreign relations law
examines ‘the rules, institutions, and practices in different states with respect
to how that state conducts relations with foreign states and other actors’,
whereas comparative international law assesses the different national and
regional approaches to and applications of international law.33
Despite the grounding in domestic (constitutional) law, foreign relations
law scholars are well aware of the links to international law. For some,
international law is even part of foreign affairs law. In the US tradition,
treatises of foreign relations law often contain chapters on the international
legal rules relevant for the United States. According to Restatement the Third,
foreign relations law draws its sources both from international law as applic-
able to the relevant state and national law, in particular constitutional law,
governing that state’s foreign relations.34 Therefore, Louis Henkin situates the
subject of foreign affairs law as a scholarly endeavor ‘somewhere between the
constitutional lawyer and the international lawyer’.35 Similarly, Campbell
McLachlan emphasizes that foreign relations law sits at the ‘interface of
international and municipal law’ allocating jurisdiction between domestic
or international courts and determining the division of competences between
the three branches.36
The connections between international law and foreign relations law are
manifold indeed, even if one assumes that foreign relations law is a subfield of
domestic (constitutional) law in the respective jurisdictions and separate from
international law. Doctrinal conjunctions as in article 46 VCLT37 and as in
the opening clauses of many constitutions (for instance article 51 c of the
Indian Constitution; section 39 (1b) of the South African Constitution) are
evidence for the close interlinkages. In some sense, foreign relations law is the
bridge builder between domestic law and international law.
32 Thomas Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, January 2011, https://opil.ouplaw.com/home/mpil, para. 1.
33 Anthea Roberts et al., ‘Conceptualizing Comparative International Law’, in Anthea Roberts
et al. (eds.), Comparative International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 9.
34 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 1 (1987).
35 Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996),
p. viii.
36 McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, pp. xxi, 18–30.
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 23, 1969, in force January 27, 1980,
1155 UNTS 331; (1969) 8 ILM 679; UKTS (1980) 58. See Aust and Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’,
Section I; Edward T. Swaine, ‘International Foreign Relations Law’, this volume, Section I.
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III FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AS A BARGAINING TOOL?
Besides these doctrinal interconnections, an indirect and informal nexus
between foreign relations law and international law exists. For instance, the
domestic rules on treaty-making may shape how certain states negotiate
international treaties and may have a substantial impact on the substantive
content of a treaty. These contextual and informal linkages between foreign
relations law and international law become evident when foreign relations law
is used as a bargaining tool in international negotiations.
Theoretically, the possible usage of foreign relations law as a bargaining tool
has been alluded to already at the end of the 1980s. The political scientist
Robert Putnam is well-known for his two-level game theory in which he
assesses the impact of domestic politics on international negotiations.38 On
the basis of a study of G7 summits, Putnam demonstrates how domestic
interest groups affect the positions of the respective national governments in
negotiations on the international level.39 In passing, Putnam suggests
a promising negotiating strategy which links domestic politics with the inter-
national negotiations. A delegation should try to convince the other negotiat-
ing parties that its suggested draft will certainly be ratified in its own national
legal system while a draft more favorable to the opponent will fail in the
domestic ratification procedure.40 Putnam thus theoretically preconceives
how foreign relations law could be used as a bargaining tool in international
relations. A government should point to the risk of a potential veto from
a domestic actor on an agreement which is in the general interest of all
negotiating partners. If the government can make a credible claim that its
domestic laws enable an actor to block the ratification and that the domestic
actor is skeptical of the treaty arrangement, the other negotiating parties
interested in collective participation in the treaty regime might accept the
government’s suggested draft as the only possible compromise.
Empirically, the impact of foreign relations law on international treaty
negotiations is however not obvious. Because article 46 VCLT has never
been successfully pleaded before an international court,41 the domestic con-
stitutional design does not seem to have major relevance for the legality of
38 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’
(1988) 42 International Organization 427.
39 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, 427.
40 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics’, 453.
41 Hannah Woolaver, ‘State Engagement with Treaties: Interactions between International and
Domestic Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign
Relations Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 431 at 435; see for example Land
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equitorial
30 Felix Lange
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
a treaty on the international level. Moreover, even if one assumes that negoti-
ating partners are concerned about the prospects of ratification by the respect-
ive opposite side, it is hard to assess the credibility of the argument about
foreign relations law. Competing accounts about the exact contours of
a domestic foreign relations law in a particular country make the assessment
of limits for domestic ratification rather challenging.42 Also, one has to touch
unstable ground by making assumptions about future actions in the domestic
ratification processes and envisaging a certain behavior by parliamentary veto
players.
Nonetheless, this contribution argues that there exists some evidence that
Putnam’s envisioned strategy played a role in the context of the Paris climate
change negotiations. The Obama administration successfully talked other
states into adopting the US negotiating position on nonbinding commitments
for climate change mitigation by pointing to its foreign relations law and
potential veto players in the domestic context. Given the history of the
UNFCCC and Kyoto negotiations, the Obama administration’s argument
about the necessity of senatorial involvement for subscribing to binding
mitigation commitments was credible. However, this contribution also points
to the ambivalences of US foreign relations law and highlights the reluctance
of the US courts to weigh into foreign affairs. Against this background, the
Obama administration arguably opted for a risk averse strategy when it comes
to the nonbinding legal character of climate mitigation commitments because
this was in line with another US negotiating goal to prevent a scheme which
differentiates between developed and developing countries.
A Treaty-Making under the US Constitution
The foreign relations law of the United States establishes high hurdles for
treaty participation. The US Constitution of 1789 heavily involves the Senate
in the treaty-making process entailing a ‘threshold [for approval of a treaty]
higher than that in nearly all other advanced industrial democracies’.43
According to US Constitution, Article II § 2, Clause 2, the President has the
Guinea Intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, 430–31, para. 265; on this see
Swaine, this volume, Section I.
42 For instance, the debate on foreign relations law in theUnited States is characterized by strong
divisions among the protagonists, for instance Peter J. Spiro, ‘The New Sovereigntists:
American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets’ (2000) 79 Foreign Affairs 9.
43 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy’, in Michael Ignatieff (ed.),
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005),
p. 187.
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power to conclude treaties with the ‘Advice and Consent of the Senate’ as long
as ‘two thirds of the Senators present concur’. The Founding Fathers bestowed
the numerically smaller, expectedly more secretive Senate instead of the
House of Representatives with this competence, also because Southern states
regarded the senatorial blocking minority as safeguarding the US monopoly
on navigation rights on the Mississippi River.44 On the basis of the article II
procedure, administration officials usually negotiate the treaty and then ask
the Senate for approval of the negotiated document.45 Some of the most
important international agreements like the United Nations Charter, the
NATO defence agreement, the Geneva Conventions, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and a few human rights conventions have been con-
cluded in this way.46
There exist various examples of international treaties which did not receive
the consent of the Senate. Famously, the Senate did not support President
Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to join the Versailles Treaty after the First World
War.47 Moreover, even though the Clinton and Obama administrations
endorsed human rights treaties like the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women and the Convention on the Rights of Disabled People, none of
these treaties received the required senatorial consent.48 These experiences
of domestic ratification failure make the threat of nonratification credible. It is
quite realistic that an administration will not receive the required two-thirds
majority in the Senate which has been called the ‘graveyard’49 or ‘cold
storage’50 for international treaties.
However, according to US constitutional practice not every agreement
negotiated at the international plane needs to follow the article II procedure
in order to be ratified. Since the 1940s, so-called congressional-executive
agreements emerged allowing for treaty participation of the United States
44 On this Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States’ (2008) 117 Yale Law Journal 1236 at 1278–86.
45 On the demise of the advice-criterion in the early US constitutional history, see Curtis
A. Bradley and Martin S. Flaherty, ‘Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs’
(2004) 102 Michigan Law Review 545 at 626–31.
46 See Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System, p. 84.
47 Thirty-nine senators voted in favor, fifty-five against.
48 For the US record on human rights see United Nations, Human Rights, Office of the High
Commissioner, Ratification Status for United States of America, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org
/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx, accessed September 30, 2020.
49 Covey T. Oliver, ‘Getting the Senators to Accept the Reference of Treaties to Both Houses for
Approval by Simple Majorities’ (1980) 74 AJIL 142 at 143.
50 Louis Henkin, ‘Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy’ (1989) 10 Michigan Journal of
International Law 406 at 411.
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without requiring the high threshold in the Senate. For such congressional-
executive agreements, the President needs advance authorization or subse-
quent approval of a simple majority in Congress.51 A rising number of
congressional-executive agreements have been completed in issue areas like
trade, commerce and finance.52 Moreover, sole executive agreements,
which concern more technical issues, can be concluded by the President
alone. Even though the US Constitution does not explicitly refer to executive
agreements,53 the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the President has ‘the
power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in
the constitutional sense’54 and implicitly held such agreements to be valid.55
According to the Case-Zablocki Act, the Secretary of State needs to submit
every international agreement except for article II treaties within sixty days to
Congress.56
How to distinguish between article II treaties, congressional-executive
agreements and executive agreements remains a controversial question. The
position enshrined in Restatement the Third ‘[t]he prevailing view is that the
Congressional-Executive agreement may be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance’57 found some support, but has also been challenged
by various authors.58 The State Department relies on the Circular 175 proced-
ure evaluating the agreement’s impact on the US as a whole and on state laws,
past US and international practice in relation to similar agreements, the
preference of Congress, the duration as well as the desired formal character
and expediency of the agreement.59 These criteria are not entirely clear-cut,
lend themselves to interpretation and thus allow for some political discretion
51 Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System, pp. 79–83.
52 See John Yoo, ‘Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and
International Bargaining’ (2011) 97 Cornell Law Review 1 at 2.
53 The Constitution refers to treaties, agreements and compacts, see for instance US
Constitution Article I Section 10; Article II Section 2, Clause 2.
54 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304, 318 (1936).
55 See for instance United States v. Guy W. Capps., Inc., 348 US 296 (1955); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 US 654 (1981); American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003).
56 1 USC § 112b (1994).
57 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303, Comment
e (1987).
58 For support see Hathaway, ‘Treaties’ End’, 1236; David M. Golove, ‘Against Free-Form
Formalism’ (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 1791; for critique see Laurence
H. Tribe, ‘Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation’ (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 1221 at 1249–78; John C. Yoo,
‘Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements’ (2001) 99
Michigan Law Review 757 at 776.
59 11 FAM 720, Negotiation and Conclusion, September 25, 2006, https://fam.state.gov/fam/11f
am/11fam0720.html, accessed September 30, 2020.
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for each administration. More importantly, the US Supreme Court has been
rather reluctant to adjudicate in foreign relations leaving it to Congress and
the President to solve the dispute politically. For instance, the Court denied
granting certiorari to the case challenging the conclusion of NAFTA as
a congressional-executive agreement after the US Court of Appeals of the
11th circuit had dismissed the case as nonjusticiable on the basis of the political
question doctrine.60 Therefore, US courts did not develop strict limits on
how to categorize certain agreements negotiated at the international level.
This means that as long as there is no adjudicator to check the classification
of the administration, the respective administrations possess some leeway on
whether a certain agreement is an article II treaty, a congressional-executive
agreement or a sole executive agreement.
B The Obama Administration and Nonbindingness
of Climate Mitigation Commitments
The classifications of different types of agreements had a strong impact on the
US position on the Paris Agreement. From the beginning of the negotiations,
the administration posited that it intended an agreement with nonbinding
language on climate change mitigation. More than a year before COP 21 in
Paris, Todd Stern, the chief US negotiator of the Paris Agreement, stressed that
‘the new agreement will be a legally binding one in at least some respects, but
doesn’t specify which ones’. He highlighted that the US supported a proposal
by New Zealand according to which ‘there would be a legally binding obliga-
tion to submit a “schedule” for reducing emissions, plus various legally
binding provisions for accounting, reporting, review, periodic updating of
the schedules, etc. But the content of the schedule itself would not be legally
binding at an international level’.61 One month prior to the Paris meeting,
Secretary of State John Kerry told the Financial Times that the Paris climate
negotiations would not lead to a treaty legally requiring reductions of carbon
emissions and would be different from the Kyoto Protocol.62 Moreover, when
the US submitted its intended nationally determined contributions to
60 Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F 3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
US 1039 (2001).
61 Todd D. Stern, ‘Seizing the Opportunity for Progress on Climate’, US Department of State,
October 14, 2014, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/climate/releases/2014/232962.htm, accessed
September 30, 2020.
62 Demetri Sevastopulo and Pilita Clark, ‘Paris Climate Deal Will Not Be a Legally Binding
Treaty’, Financial Times, November 11, 2015, www.ft.com/content/79daf872-8894-11e5-90de-
f44762bf9896, accessed September 30, 2020.
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demonstrate its commitment to climate change mitigation before COP 21 in
Paris, it did not refer to these contributions as being legally binding.63 The US
delegation even explicitly rejected proposals by the European Union and
small island states calling for the legal bindingness of nationally determined
contributions. According to US negotiators, this would prevent high participa-
tion with and ambition within the agreement.64
The US delegation was even willing to risk the adoption of the negotiated
document over the issue of the legal character of climate change mitigation
commitments. Article 4 (4) of the final circulating draft held that ‘[d]eveloped
country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide
absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should con-
tinue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over
time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the
light of different national circumstances.’65 Article 4 (4) thus clearly distin-
guished between the obligations of developed and developing countries.
This version of the Paris Agreement was not acceptable for the US delegation.
John Kerry threatened that the US would not support the deal if the ‘shall’ would
not be changed to ‘should’.66 According to the US delegation, the wording was
smuggled into the final draft at the last minute despite the US rejection of such
proposals in earlier drafts.67 In contrast, the delegations of some developing
countries claimed that the ‘shall’ was the agreed language and the US challenge
represented an unfair last minute move to better the US position crossing a red
63 United States, Intended National Determined Contributions, March 31, 2015, www4
.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20A
merica/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf,
accessed September 30, 2020.
64 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110 AJIL 288
at 297.
65 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal of the President, Draft Decision, FCCC/CP/2015/
L.9, December 12, 2015, p. 21, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf,
accessed September 30, 2020. Emphasis added.
66 John Kerry, Press Availability, US Department of State, December 12, 2015, https://2009-2017
.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/12/250590.htm, accessed September 30, 2020; see also
Lisa Friedman, ‘How the World Solved the “Shall” Crisis and Reached a New Climate
Accord,’ E&E News, December 14, 2015, www.eenews.net/stories/1060029452, accessed
September 30, 2020; Melissa Eddy, ‘At Climate Talks, a Few Letters That Almost Sank the
Deal’, The New York Times, December 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/
climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/at-climate-talks-three-letters-almost-sunk-the-deal, accessed
September 30, 2020; John Vidal, ‘How a “Typo” Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal’,
The Guardian, December 16, 2015, www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/ho
w-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal, accessed September 30, 2020.
67 On this Daniel Bodansky, ‘Reflections on the Paris Conference’, Opinio Juris, December 15,
2015, http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/15/reflections-on-the-paris-conference/, accessed September
30, 2020.
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line on differentiation between developing and developed countries.68 In any
case, the French Presidency around Laurent Fabius yielded to the American
concerns in order to save the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The Secretariat
declared the ‘shall’ to stem from a typographical error. States thus could vote on
the basis of a corrected final version incorporating the ‘should’ and no new
negotiating around delaying the adoption had to be opened.69
According to the Obama administration, the key reason for why the US
insisted on (re-)introducing the nonbinding ‘should’ into article 4 (4) of the
Paris Agreement was US foreign relations law. In this view, the wording of
article 4 (4) determined which actors had to be involved in the treaty-making
process on the domestic level. After the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Kerry
linked the drafting of article 4 (4) to the treaty-making procedure at home. In
a press release, he celebrated having ‘a binding agreement with respect to
transparency and not having binding targets with respect to emissions or
finance’ as the achievement of key US negotiating goals. Otherwise ‘a different
kind of agreement’ would have been necessary.70 Kerry also emphasized
that by correcting the perceived mistake in relation to the drafting of
article 4 (4), the US ‘kept faith with our own negotiating standards and what
we promised to Congress and the American people’.71 In an interview, Kerry
adopted the argument of a US senator that ‘this [agreement] doesn’t need to be
approved by the Congress because it doesn’t have mandatory targets for
reduction, and it doesn’t have an enforcement-compliance mechanism’.72
Other senior administration officials became even more explicit about the
link with US foreign relations law. In a background briefing on the Paris
Agreement, officials of the State Department stressed that ‘the notion of the
targets not being binding was really a fundamental part of our approach from
early on’ because only such an agreement does not need to be submitted to the
Senate.73 According to press reports, US diplomats were confident that the
Senate did not need to be involved because the targets are nonbinding and
68 Vidal, ‘How a “Typo” Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal’; Meena Raman and Hilary
Chiew, ‘Paris Agreement Adopted after Last Minute “Technical Corrections”’, Third World
Network, December 15, 2015, https://twnetwork.org/climate-change/paris-agreement-adopted-
after-last-minute-%e2%80%98technical-corrections%e2%80%99-0, accessed September 30,
2020.
69 Vidal, ‘How a “Typo” Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal.’
70 Kerry, Press Availability.
71 Kerry, Press Availability.
72 John Kerry, Interview with Chris Wallace of FOX, US Department of State, December 12, 2015,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/12/250595.htm, accessed September 30, 2020.
73 Background Briefing on the Paris Climate Agreement, USDepartment of State, December 12,
2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/12/250592.htm, accessed September 30, 2020.
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‘[t]he elements that are binding are consistent with already approved previous
agreements’.74 In this reading, only by replacing the ‘shall’ with the ‘should’,
the Senate did not have to be involved in the treaty-making process.
Moreover, the US negotiators successfully inserted the foreign relations law
argument in the international debate and thus limited the potential outcome
of the negotiations. Some months before COP 21, French Minister of Foreign
Affairs Laurent Fabius stated in a discussion with African delegates at UN
climate talks that ‘we know the politics in the US. Whether we like it or not, if
it comes to the Congress, they will refuse’. Fabius added that ‘[w]e must find
a formula which is valuable for everybody and valuable for the US without
going to the Congress’.75 In the run-up to the final negotiations in Paris, EU
Climate Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete stressed that ‘[w]e need the
United States on board, and we have to find a solution. . . . We understand
the concerns they have because of the political situation they have in the
Congress’.76 Also in the context of the language on article 4 (4) Paris
Agreement, the foreign relations law argument was crucial. According to the
spokesperson for the Like-Minded Developing Countries, the EU approached
the Group of Like-Minded Developing Countries and lobbied for acceptance
of the last minute change citing US concerns about the involvement of the
US Congress.77 The EU apparently internalized the US foreign relations law
argument and relied on it in order to keep the US in the agreement. According
to some observers, the US negotiators thereby made ‘the world accept the
domestic constraints in the United States as a feature of international climate
talks’.78
C Between Real Risks and Bargaining Tool
But how plausible was the argument of the Obama administration? Was the
US negotiating position determined by domestic constraints?
74 Ed King, ‘Paris Agreement “Does Not Need Senate Approval” Say Officials’, Climate Home
News, December 15, 2015, www.climatechangenews.com/2015/12/15/paris-agreement-does-not
-need-senate-approval-say-officials/, accessed September 30, 2020.
75 Associated Press, ‘Climate Deal Must Avoid US Congress Approval, French Minister Says’,
The Guardian, June 1, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/un-climate-talks-deal-
us-congress, accessed September 30, 2020.
76 Valerie Richardson, ‘Republicans Move to Undermine Obama on Paris Climate Deal’, The
Washington Times, December 7, 2015, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/7/repub
licans-move-to-undermine-obama-on-paris-clima/, accessed September 30, 2020.
77 Raman and Chiew, ‘Paris Agreement Adopted after Last Minute “Technical Corrections”’.
78 Raymond Clémençon, ‘The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal Failure or
Historic Breakthrough?’ (2016) 25 The Journal of Environment & Development 3 at 6.
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It is no question that the involvement of the Senate in the treaty-making
process would have placed a hurdle on the ratification of the Paris Agreement
which could hardly be overcome. Since the ratification of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Senate had taken a skeptical
position towards committing to more assertive climate mitigation obligations
on the international level. While the Clinton administration negotiated the
Kyoto Protocol, the Senate adopted the (nonbinding) Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
With ninety-five to zero votes, the senators emphasized that ‘the United States
should not be a signatory to any protocol which would (A) mandate new
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex
I Parties, unless the protocol also mandates new specific scheduled commit-
ment for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period,
or (B) result in serious harm to the economy of the United States’.79 By
unanimously ruling out senatorial support for an agreement which differenti-
ated in its legal bindingness for targets on greenhouse gas emission reductions
between developed and developing countries, the senators put considerable
pressure on the negotiating position of the administration. When after an
intervention of Vice-President Al Gore the Clinton administration accepted
a differentiation scheme between developed and developing countries,80 it
was obvious that the chances for passing the domestic treaty-making process
were slim. It was thus no surprise that the Clinton administration did not
submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate after signing the protocol in
November 1998.81 The Senate was regarded as the dead end of the Kyoto
Protocol.
In relation to the Paris Agreement, the chances for the acceptance of
a binding mitigation scheme did not look much brighter. Especially after
the Republican successes at the midterm elections of 2014, Republican major-
ities in the Senate and the House of Representatives signalled that they would
hardly support any policy initiatives of the Democratic President before the
upcoming presidential elections. While the Obama administration was nego-
tiating the Paris Agreement, the House and Senate adopted two resolutions
which disputed the competences of the Environmental Protection Agency to
79 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 105th Congress, 1st Session, S. RES. 98, https://web.archive.org/web/201
00626110143/http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html, accessed September 30, 2020.
80 Shardul Agrawala and Steinar Andresen, ‘Indispensability and Indefensibility? The United
States in the Climate Treaty Negotiations’ (1999) 5 Global Governance 457 at 465.
81 CRS Report for Congress, ‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions About the
Kyoto Protocol’, October 1, 2002, www.everycrsreport.com/files/20021001_98-349_75c808da
e15c29b2b5a9f594598269e489f935ba.pdf, accessed September 30, 2020.
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regulate climate change emissions under the Clean Air Act and blocked the
legal basis for such regulations.82 Republican Senator James M. Inhofe
declared that the ‘message could not be more clear that Republicans and
Democrats in both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House do not support the
president’s climate agenda, and the international community should take
note’.83 Only a presidential veto in December 2015 against this resolution
kept the door open for implementation of international commitments on
climate change mitigation at the domestic level.84
Because of these voices and the history since the conclusion of the
UNFCCC, the Obama administration knew that getting a climate treaty
through the Senate was highly unrealistic. A key goal of the US delegation
during the Paris climate change treaty negotiations was to ensure that the
President would be able to bind the United States without seeking approval
from the Senate or from Congress. Concluding the treaty as a sole executive
agreement seemed to be the only promising way forward.
Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that binding commitments
on climate change mitigation might have made involvement of the Senate
necessary. Already during the domestic discussions on Senate approval of
the UNFCCC in 1992, the domestic constitutional procedure for adopting
future protocols had been discussed. In an answer to a question by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Bush I administration stated that
the article II procedure was needed, if a protocol adopting a targets and
timetables scheme was negotiated and signed by the United States.85
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also expressed its view that the
introduction of legally binding emission targets would require the Senate’s
advice and consent.86 Accordingly, during the debate on the Kyoto
Protocol with its binding scheme on targets and timetable, policy makers
generally expected that senatorial advice and consent was a precondition
for US ratification.
Therefore, US negotiators carefully tried to avoid resemblance with the
Kyoto Protocol during the negotiations for a new agreement under the
UNFCCC. In the context of the negotiations on the Copenhagen Accord,
82 S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 24, 114th Cong. (2015).
83 Richardson, ‘Republicans Move to Undermine Obama on Paris Climate Deal.’
84 Barack Obama, ‘Memorandum of Disapproval on S.J. Res. 23,’ The White House,
December 19, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/19/memo
randum-disapproval-sj-res-23, accessed September 30, 2020.
85 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 102 Cong 2d Sess. 1992, 106.
86 S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-55, at 14 (1992) reported by Mr. Pell.
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the US delegation suggested to use the term ‘implementing agreement’ for the
new arrangement87 and was successful in convincing its negotiating partners
to drop the term ‘protocol’.88 Moreover, the Obama administration pushed
against incorporating new financial commitments or legally binding emission
targets in order to avoid involvement of the US Congress.89
Also, the domestic opposition was convinced that climate change mitiga-
tion obligations implied senatorial involvement, regardless of a legal or only
political bindingness. In the run-up to the Paris negotiations, the Senate
adopted a resolution expressing the sense of Congress that ‘any agreement
adopted at COP 21 containing targets and timetables, whether deemed
“legally binding” or not, must be submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent pursuant to Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.’90 In reaction to
the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Jim Inhofe emphasized that ‘Senate
leadership has already been outspoken in its positions that the United States is
not legally bound to any agreement setting emissions targets or any financial
commitment to it without approval by Congress’.91
But was foreign relations law so clear on the matter in particular when it
comes to the wording of article 4 (4) Paris Agreement?Would a text stating that
‘[d]eveloped country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking
economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets’ require the involvement of
Congress?
Some observers like Dan Bodansky tend to adopt the argument of the
Obama administration and put forward that ‘arguably’ the phrasing ‘shall’
would have made ‘Senate or Congressional approval . . . for US participation’
necessary.92 However, as the ‘arguably’ signals, Bodansky is cautious not to
present this legal position as the only possible view on the matter. Moreover,
others have beenmore skeptical of the Obama administration’s argument. For
instance, before the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, David Wirth sug-
gested that existing domestic federal laws and regulations allow international
87 US Submission on Copenhagen Agreed Outcome (2009), https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_proto
col/application/pdf/usa040509.pdf, accessed September 30, 2020.
88 On this David A. Wirth, ‘Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United
States Law and the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 152 at 155.
89 Bodansky, ‘Hope’, 297.
90 S. Con. Res. 25, Congressional Record Vol. 161, No 171, November 19, 2015, www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/CREC-2015-11-19/html/CREC-2015-11-19-pt1-PgS8166-2.htm, accessed September
30, 2020.
91 Martin Pengelly, ‘Obama Praises Paris Climate Deal As “Tribute to American Leadership”’,
The Guardian, December 12, 2015, www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/12/obama-speech
-paris-climate-change-talks-deal-american-leadership, accessed September 30, 2020.
92 Bodansky, ‘Reflections on the Paris Conference.’
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legally binding commitments on emissions reductions. With reference to
executive authority under the Clean Air Act and the precedent of the US
signature of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, he put forward that
‘neither Senate advice and consent nor new congressional legislation are
necessarily conditions precedent to the United States becoming party to
internationally binding mitigation commitments’.93 After the conclusion of
the Paris Agreement, Wirth claimed that there is ‘some – and perhaps
considerable – room to argue’ that enough domestic legal authority existed for
subscribing to the ‘shall’ in article 4 (4) of the Paris Agreement.94 In particular,
Wirth points to the ambiguous phrasing of the whole article 4 (4) of the Paris
Agreement when it comes to legal bindingness (inter alia the wording
‘undertaking’ meaning to begin something or promise something).95
Even if one does not subscribe to this position, the scholarly controversy
demonstrates that US foreign relations law is not definite on that matter.
Consequently, the question arises who decides on the limits of the foreign
affairs power. In contrast to other jurisdictions, the courts in the United
States are known for not weighing in on matters of foreign affairs. Despite
some debate about the ‘normalization of foreign affairs’ in the United
States,96 the political question doctrine still is the law on the books, in
particular in crucial matters of the separation of powers. As mentioned
above, the Supreme Court did not hold hearing on a case concerning the
distinction between article II treaties and congressional-executive
agreements.97 Moreover, the Supreme Court did also not decide on the
merits of a case concerning the competences for the withdrawal from article
II treaties.98 Therefore, it is by no means certain that a US court would take
up a legal challenge of the Paris Agreement containing the ‘shall’ on climate
mitigation. It is telling that, despite some claims that the current Paris
93 David A. Wirth, ‘The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding
International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?’ (2015) 39 Harvard Environmental
Law Review 515 at 517.
94 David A. Wirth, ‘Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States
Law and the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 152 at 167.
95 Wirth, ‘Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code’, 167; for a definition of
‘to undertake’ see https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/undertake, accessed
September 30, 2020.
96 Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth, ‘The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’ (2015)
128Harvard Law Review 1897; for a critique see Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Foreign Relations Law and
the Purported Shift Away From “Exceptionalism”’ (2015) 128Harvard Law Review Forum 294.
97 Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F 3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
US 1039 (2001).
98 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 US 996 (1979).
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Agreement with the ‘should’ in article 4 (4) Paris Agreement violates US
Constitution, Article II Section 2, Clause 2,99 the matter is (as far as I can see)
not litigated before courts.
Moreover, the Obama administration’s rejection of the ‘shall’ was not only
due to its foreign relations law. The US delegation also intended to prevent
a scheme which differentiated between developed and developing countries.
Already during the discussions about the Kyoto Protocol, many actors in the
United States had dismissed asymmetrical obligations on climate mitigation
between developed and developing countries pointing to potential detrimen-
tal effects for the US economy.100 For developing countries, differentiation
between binding mitigation commitments for developed countries and non-
binding rules for developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol had been a key
objective expressing the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibil-
ities’ in the climate change regime.101 However, the US delegation was no
longer willing to accept this. In the Paris negotiations, the rejection of
a differentiated regime similar to the Kyoto Protocol was a key negotiating
position of the US delegation. In October 2014, Todd Stern stressed that an
inclusive agreement with broad participation was the main goal of the United
States.102 In the context of the debate about article 4 (4) Paris Agreement, the
Obama administration was concerned that the ‘shall’ created a distinction
between binding obligations for developed countries and nonbinding obliga-
tions for developing countries.103 Accordingly, after the adoption of the agree-
ment, the Obama administration celebrated that the agreement did not
differentiate in such a way.104 Besides foreign relations law, the US negotiating
team also had its own interest in nondifferentiation between all participants in
the regime in mind.
IV CONCLUSION
This contribution demonstrates that under specific circumstances, domestic
foreign relations law might have a substantial impact on international negoti-
ations by narrowing the space for achievable outcomes.
99 Michael D. Ramsey, ‘Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding
Agreements’ (2016) 11 FIU Law Review 371 at 384–87.
100 See above III.B.
101 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative
Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 493 at 506.
102 Stern, ‘Seizing the Opportunity for Progress on Climate’.
103 Raman and Chiew, ‘Paris Agreement Adopted after Last Minute “Technical Corrections”.’
104 Background Briefing on the Paris Climate Agreement.
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In the international discussions on the Paris Agreement, the US treaty-
making procedure and potential veto players on the domestic level were the
elephant in the room. Because the negotiating partners of the US feared that
they would not get the United States on board if the Senate or Congress were
involved in the domestic decision-making process, they accepted the Obama
administration’s insistence on nonbinding commitments for climate change
mitigation. This does not mean that the Obama administration tricked its
negotiating partners when referring to domestic constraints as an argument for
replacing the ‘shall’ in article 4 (4) of the Paris Agreement with the ‘should’.
Given the history of nonratification of international climate treaties in the
United States and the debate about binding commitments in the context of
the UNFCCC, the necessity of congressional involvement for an agreement
containing binding targets and timetables is plausible. Also, the risk of non-
ratification by the Senate and Congress was credible because of the Republican
majorities in the parliamentary bodies.
However, it is important to point to the ambiguity of US foreign relations
law on the matter and the reluctance of the US Supreme Court to judicialize
foreign affairs. It seems not very likely that US courts would have decided on
the treaty-making process in relation to the Paris Agreement even if the final
version contained the ‘shall’ in article 4 (4). The Obama administration
arguably opted for a risk-averse strategy when insisting on incorporating the
‘should’ in article 4 (4) of the Paris Agreement.
A potential reason for this strategy was that the Obama administration
was interested in nonbinding commitments on climate change mitigation
itself. Because the administration regarded equal treatment of developed
and developing countries as a key negotiating goal, the US negotiators
were not willing to accept a phrasing which distinguishes between
a ‘shall’ for developed countries and a ‘should’ for developing countries.
In this sense, foreign relations law provided a welcome argument as
a bargaining tool to convince the negotiating partners to adopt the US
position.
As this example shows, the potential use of foreign relations law as a
bargaining tool is limited to very specific circumstances. It seems that a state
can rely on its foreign relations law as a bargaining tool if two conditions are
fulfilled. First, the participation of the state in a multilateral treaty is in the
interest of all other potential treaty parties because the treaty enshrines a goal
which can only be achieved in a cooperative spirit. Second, the state needs to
credibly claim that a veto power in its domestic setting will prevent the
ratification of the treaty if the treaty does not contain provisions with the
preferred outcome for the state.
Foreign Relations Law As a Bargaining Tool? 43
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
The first criterion is more likely to apply to powerful states than to weaker
states. Other parties probably are more interested in having China, India and
the US on board as partners in a multilateral treaty regime than other small
states. This is particularly true when the treaty addresses an issue to which
bigger states contribute more than others. For instance, the US seems to be in
a beneficial negotiating position in the climate change context because the
participation of the world’s second strongest emitter seems to be highly
important for the success of the treaty’s objectives.
The second criterion limits the use of foreign relations law as a bargaining
tool to actors with a certain reputation. Given that the US Senate is widely
perceived as the ‘graveyard’ or ‘cold storage’ for international treaties, the US
seems to be the most likely actor to apply this negotiating strategy. In contrast,
most states lack a veto player as strong as the Senate with a long history of
nonratification of international treaties which makes the claim of potential
nonratification credible. For instance, in India the executive alone decides
which treaties it will conclude without involving parliament. In parliamentary
systems like South Africa or Germany, the legislature most of the time supports
the foreign policy approach of the government and approves negotiated
treaties without much debate. Thus, the National Assembly and Bundestag
are highly unlikely to act as a veto power.
However, also other states might point to constitutional constraints when
they push for enshrining a certain rule in a treaty. It is telling that in the context
of debates about how to respond to the Eurozone crisis in 2012, the head of
the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, threatened to leave
the room if she would hear ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’ one more time.105
Apparently, Lagarde dismissed the argument by sceptics of the European
rescue policies that a potential judgment by the German Constitutional
Court might constrain the space for decision-making. Even though this
example does not refer to the negotiation strategy of a state in international
treaty negotiations, it demonstrates that constitutional limits might well
become an argument in supra- and international debates, also outside of the
US context.
Be it as it may, the Trump administration’s actions in relation to the Paris
Agreement are a far cry from using foreign relations law in international
negotiations. The Trump administration signalled its intention to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement in June 2017 and set in motion the year-long exiting
105 Kay-Alexander Scholz, ‘Karlsruhe’s Constitutional Monastery’, DeutscheWelle, September 11,
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process in November 2019.106 Instead of influencing international negotiations
with reference to domestic constraints, the Trump administration counts on
its oil- and coal-friendly ‘America First’ policy.
However, it is interesting to see that the debate about the contours of
foreign relations law also had repercussions for the withdrawal decision.
When President Donald Trump renounced the Paris Agreement, he referred
to ‘serious legal and constitutional issues’ since ‘[f]oreign leaders in Europe,
Asia, and across the world should not have more to say with respect to the
U.S. economy than our own citizens and their elected representatives’ allud-
ing to the noninvolvement of Congress.107 Even though every international
treaty regime might, in the view of nationalists, introduce potential elements
of influence of ‘foreign’ actors and raise ‘constitutional issues’, this might be
particularly worrying if Congress has not been involved in the treaty-making in
the first place. Moreover, the Obama administration’s decision not to involve
Congress also influenced the withdrawal decision more indirectly. Trump’s
decision to leave without involving Congress was hardly questioned on foreign
relations law grounds. Since the Paris Agreement had been concluded as an
executive agreement, most scholars agree that the executive alone could
withdraw from the agreement.108 While US foreign relations law shaped the
outcome of the Paris climate negotiations by limiting the space of potential
outcomes, it did not constrain the executive decision-making process on the
domestic level in the context of the withdrawal.
106 Emily Holden, ‘Trump Begins Year-Long Process to Formally Exit Paris Climate
Agreement’, The Guardian, November 5, 2019, www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/04
/donald-trump-climate-crisis-exit-paris-agreement, accessed September 30, 2020.
107 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, The White House, June 1,
2017, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-
accord/, accessed September 30, 2020. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements
/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/
108 However, see Harald H. Koh, ‘Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century
International Lawmaking’ (2017) 126 Yale Law Journal Forum 338 at 358.
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3
International Foreign Relations Law
Executive Authority in Entering and Exiting Treaties
Edward T. Swaine
The nascent field of comparative foreign relations law is generating consider-
able, and understandable, excitement, including for the world of treaties.1
Comparativism offers different systems the opportunity to learn from one
another, and treaties offer a particularly interesting classroom. States parties
are to an extent allies in a common cause, and profit mutually from a better
understanding of domestic treaty-making and its constraints. Yet they are
simultaneously rivals that seek to minimize the strategic opportunities
afforded others – including under the agreements binding them. It is unsur-
prising, given these conflicting impulses, that state systems show variety in how
they tackle even these common problems.
What may be more surprising is international law’s apparent agnosticism.
Treaties depend on foreign relations law: the latter, after all, is tasked not
only with establishing domestic authority to allow states to consent to treaty
obligations, but also with establishing the means by which they fulfill the
resulting obligations, including through the incorporation of treaties into
domestic law. Even so, international law treats structural provisions of
domestic constitutions as matters of indifference. Domestic laws, the
Permanent Court of International Justice once pronounced, ‘are merely
facts’ in relation to international obligations,2 and this view remains broadly
1 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
2 See Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, PCIJ Series A,
No. 7, 1926, p. 19 (‘From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its
organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of
States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures. . . . [T]here is
nothing to prevent theCourt’s giving judgment on the question whether or not, in applying that
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valid today.3 For reasons suggested in this chapter, domestic foreign relations
law is distinguishable, at least where it facilitates international law rather
than posing an obstacle to it. Nonetheless, international law seems disposed
against deferring to domestic legal systems, and those systems likewise seem
biased against inviting external evaluation.
The supposed agnosticism of international law toward foreign relations law
seems vaguely implausible – after all, treaties and customary international law
foster and monitor the human rights-conferring aspects of domestic legal
orders, so it is odd that they would cede everything structural, including the
means by which states assume many such obligations – and does not, in any
event, mean that it leaves the latter undisturbed. As others have explored,
international law creates an arena in which domestic actors assume additional
authority. For example, US foreign relations law has permitted the executive
branch to assume a capacity for creating and terminating international obli-
gations that has enhanced its institutional advantages over Congress.4 Here
I draw attention to a related, but materially distinct, phenomenon: how
international law – specifically, treaty-law principles reflected in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)5 – itself reinforces such tendencies
in domestic institutions.6 Based on plausible, historically grounded assump-
tions about how states conduct foreign relations, international law has hom-
ogenized foreign relations law relating to the creation and elimination of
international treaty obligations – encouraging even those states that possess
other constitutional agents to regard executive power as sufficient. I examine
ratification (Section I), in which this tendency is fully expressed, and then
3 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 51; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s
International Law, 9th ed., 2 vols. (Essex: Longman, 1992), vol. 1, p. 83; e.g., Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium), Separate Opinion of Judge Bula-Bula, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 100, 130–31, para.
93. See also International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, article 3 (‘The characterization of an act of a State as inter-
nationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by
the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.’).
4 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘Presidential Control Over International Law’ (2018)
131Harvard Law Review 1201; Jean Galbraith, ‘International Law and the Domestic Separation
of Powers’ (2013) 99 Virginia Law Review 987.
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155
UNTS 331; (1969) 8 ILM 679; UKTS (1980) 58.
6 Much the samemay be said to hold for customary international law and its formation – though
the capacity of a state to eliminate customary obligations is more constrained and hence less
subject to executive-branch appropriation.
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withdrawal (Section II), in which it is only just emerging.7 Such analyses seek
to augment a purely comparative approach to foreign relations with a fuller
recognition of the influence of international law.8
I RATIFICATION
Treaty law long accorded conclusive significance to treaty ratification by
executives as an incident of the sovereign power of monarchs – passed
along, naturally, to those with full powers to act on the sovereign’s behalf.9
This was challenged by two developments. First, beginning by the mid-
nineteenth century, a practice emerged in which states adopted constitutional
provisions that required legislative approval of treaties. That tendency con-
tinues largely unabated today; the subjects encompassed by such provisions
have often been expanded, along with the widening scope of treaty-making
generally, and there has even been an uptick in supermajority requirements.10
Second, agreements became more varied and often more informal, resulting
in many that arguably did not require approval by traditional, treaty-oriented
mechanisms.11 The first development meant that ratification was transformed
from a formal and infrequent act by which sovereigns confirmed, as amatter of
obligation, that their representatives had been authorized to reach agreement,
into a legislative referendum on the underlying merits of the agreement. But
the second development meant that ratification might sometimes be dis-
pensed with altogether, and agreements concluded based on signature alone.12
7 For brevity, I use terms like ‘treaty’, ‘ratification’ and ‘withdrawal’ broadly (and loosely) here, so
as to include distinct acts that are similar with respect to thematters under discussion – such as,
respectively, ‘agreement’, ‘accession’ and ‘termination’.
8 While this chapter was in draft, an important article with a comparable approach – albeit less
acutely focused on the reinforcement of executive authority, and with different prescriptive
impulses – was published. See HannahWoolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving: Domestic Law’s
Role in the International Validity of Treaty Withdrawal’ (2019) 30 European Journal of
International Law 73.
9 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and
Treaty Withdrawal: A Global Survey’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 138 (citing
Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitutions: An International and
Comparative Study (Basel and Stuttgart: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1971), p. 9).
10 See Verdier and Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers’, pp. 139–41. As the authors observe, the
proportion of states with such requirements dipped with the wave of new postcolonial states
following World War II, but many eventually followed suit.
11 Verdier and Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers’, pp. 142–47.
12 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, (1966) 2 Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 187, 197, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (discussing
draft Article 11).
48 Edward T. Swaine
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
The significance for the law of treaties was hotly contested, including as
to whether the violation of a state’s constitutional requirement of legislative
approval affected whether a nonconforming treaty nonetheless bound the state
under international law.Most agreed that domestic law regulated competence
to consent to treaties and (often distinctly) governed competence to notify that
consent to other states. But the consequences when consent had been notified
by a state official competent to that role – notwithstanding the absence of valid
consent under domestic law – were unsettled, and occasioned a diverse range
of views that flourished from the interwar period through the drafting of the
VCLT.13
At one end of the spectrum, some suggested that international law treated
notification by a competent notifying official as conclusive, either as a matter
of dogma or based on a state’s responsibility to make good the acts of its
officials. At the other extreme, some regarded constitutional law as being
conclusive as to both the domestic and international effectiveness of consent.
In the middle were those who regarded constitutional deficiencies as poten-
tially bearing on international efficacy, but varying as to when.14 The Harvard
Research study, after extensive canvassing of publicists, state practice and
jurisprudence, decided – almost arbitrarily – to recommend codifying that
‘[a] State is not bound by a treaty made on its behalf by an organ or authority
not competent under its law to conclude the treaty’, but that a nonbound state
might then be responsible for the reasonable reliance of others on its prior
representations.15 Under this approach, international law deferred to foreign
relations law, but ameliorated any adverse effect on other states through
a liability rule.
The matter was revisited by the International Law Commission (ILC) in
drafting the VCLT. Initially, the ILC’s view was similar to that of Harvard
Research: for a treaty to be binding on a state, it had to be adopted ‘in
accordance with its constitutional law and practice through an organ com-
petent for that purpose’.16 Then it reversed course. The ILC’s next proposal
stressed state autonomy and self-help: states could always, if they chose,
negotiate ratification terms that accommodated domestic processes, seek
13 For an early entry, see, e.g., Charles Fairman, ‘Competence to Bind the State to an
International Engagement’ (1936) 30 American Journal of International Law 439; for a later
survey, see Woolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving’, 84–93.
14 For excellent surveys, see Fairman, ‘Competence to Bind the State’, and Harvard Research on
International Law, ‘Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties: Text with Comment’ (1935) 29
American Journal of International Law Supplement 666, 992–1002.
15 Harvard Research, ‘Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’, 992 (Article 21).
16 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at p. 240 and n. 205 (quoting (1951) 2 Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 73).
International Foreign Relations Law 49
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
collateral arrangements, caveat their signatures, qualify full powers or
improve disclosures to other states during negotiations.17 If, despite these
options, states behaved internationally in ways that were incompatible with
their domestic constitutions, the proposal would be less forgiving. The draft
precluded a state from invalidating its consent by invoking the violation of ‘a
provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties’
unless that violation was ‘manifest’.18 This was later enhanced, in Article
46 of the VCLT, to define what ‘manifest’ meant – signifying a violation that
would be ‘objectively evident’ to any state acting normally and in good faith –
and to require that the violation also concern ‘a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance’.19
The ILC took commentary and practice to lean, slightly, in favor of its
resolution, and noted support from governments. But its conclusion also had
a normative underpinning. In its view, recent treaty-making procedures had
‘done all that can be reasonably demanded . . . in the way of taking account of
each other’s constitutional requirements’. Moreover, in most cases, states
invoking the failure to abide by constitutional requirements had other motives
for attempting to escape their obligations, and indulging them would threaten
the security of treaty obligations.20
The VCLT thus wound up contributing to an important divide. Treaty law
ceded to each state ‘the determination of the organs and procedures by which
its will to conclude treaties is formed’, concerning itself ‘exclusively with the
external manifestations of this will on the international plane’ – meaning that
the international-law determination of whether a state’s agent was competent
to commit the state largely superseded, for international purposes, any other
constitutional delicts. In principle, as the ILC explained, each government
‘had the necessary means of controlling the acts of its representative and of
giving effect to any constitutional requirements’, and perhaps making any
failings ‘the clear responsibility of the Government of the State concerned’
was more feasible. Any other approach, it suggested, ‘would certainly be
regarded as an inadmissible interference’ in another state’s internal affairs,
particularly those that followed more dualistic approaches to the relationship
between international and domestic law.21
17 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at p. 198 (discussing draft article 11).
18 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at p. 240.
19 VCLT, art. 46. The rule was reinforced by Article 27, which provided that ‘A party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’, save as
indicated by Article 46.
20 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at pp. 241–42.
21 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at pp. 241–42.
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This was not the only possible international rule, even by the ILC’s lights.
And every approach the ILC considered, not just the one it ultimately
adopted, allowed states to work around the default by developing treaty
practices that respected both constitutional requirements and the conclusion
of treaties.22 Unsurprisingly, though, the default it adopted was urged by
governments: in practical terms, the executive representatives of governments,
who were also the rule’s beneficiaries. These representatives would retain
primary authority over any workarounds that treaty negotiations might yield.
More basically, the VCLT rule established an international-law constraint on
foreign relations law. A state’s representatives, rather than the state as a whole,
would be entrusted (absent extraordinary circumstances) with exclusive
responsibility for determining whether a state had complied with its constitu-
tional rules, irrespective of whether those rules vested them with such respon-
sibility or purposefully divided domestic treaty-making authority. Even in the
event of manifest violations, it would ordinarily fall to those same representa-
tives to invoke any transgression – one made through themselves or other
executive-branch agents – unless the domestic legislature or some third party
developed standing to do so.
There was never any illusion that this would permit the vindication of
constitutional norms, even those expressed by laws regarding competence to
enter into treaties. There had already been well-known instances in which
Luxembourg and Argentina had acceded to the League of Nations despite
violations of provisions in their constitutions requiring parliamentary approval –
though there was room for disagreement as to whether these violations had been
ignored as merely domestic matters or whether tacit parliamentary approvals
might be surmised from their funding of League participation.23 The ILC itself
emphasized the exceptional nature of manifest violations, and even that other
states had never acquiesced in attempts to invoke such violations.24
Subsequent assessments, and subsequent practice, only vindicate its assess-
ment. The governments of major powers have rebuffed criticisms that they
ignored the obligation to secure legislative assent, without any apparent effect
22 This impression was reinforced by the ILC’s discussion as to whether the VCLT should
presume that treaties were to be ratified unless stated otherwise (the rule it initially proposed)
or require ratification when a treaty so provides (the rule eventually adopted). As the ILC itself
explained, its choice of default was considered substantively insignificant, and it chose the
path it did to accommodate government input and avoid the problem of drafting exceptions.
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at pp. 197–98.
23 For discussion, see Michael Bothe, ‘Article 46’, in Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), vol. II, at p. 1096.
24 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at pp. 241–42.
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on their international obligations.25 Most prominently, the International
Court of Justice rejected Nigeria’s contention that a bilateral declaration
with Cameroon was nonbinding because the Nigerian constitution at the
time required approval of its Supreme Military Council; while the provision
was of ‘fundamental importance’ under Article 46, it was not sufficiently
‘manifest’, including in part because heads of state could be presumed
competent.26 A later judgment was to much the same effect, and made clear
that – even though the Somali Parliament had rejected an agreement, making
relatively prominent its potential authority under domestic law – that mattered
little when the PrimeMinister of Somalia failed to question its validity in later
interactions on the international plane.27
It is possible that the rise in legislative authority at the national level might
shape international expectations and make deviations sufficiently apparent to
register as manifest, though the trend has yet to have any such effect; perhaps
the nascent project on comparative foreign relations law will even assist by
illuminating pertinent commonalities and differences.28 It is unlikely, in any
case, that the basic rule will be reconsidered. If anything, parallel develop-
ments suggest similar biases toward the creation of international obligations
and against means by which they might be subverted. The unilateral acts
doctrine, per the ILC’s Guiding Principles of 2006, likewise indicates that
while ‘[a] unilateral declaration binds the State internationally only if it is
made by an authority vested with the power to do so’, necessarily ‘[b]y virtue of
their functions, heads of State, heads of Government and ministers for foreign
affairs are competent to formulate such declarations’.29
25 Bothe, ‘Article 46’, at pp. 1092, 1094–96 (citing German and US examples).
26 Land andMaritime Boundary between Cameroon andNigeria (Cameroon v.Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, 430–31, paras. 264–66; see, espe-
cially, p. 430, para. 265 (explaining that ‘a limitation of aHead of State’s capacity in this respect is
not manifest in the sense of Article 46, paragraph 2, unless at least properly publicized’, and that
‘[t]his is particularly so because Heads of State belong to the group of persons who, in
accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2, of the [VCLT] “[i]n virtue of their functions and without
having to produce full powers” are considered as representing their State’).
27 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 3, 24, para. 49.
28 Karen Knop, ‘Foreign Relations Law: Comparison as Invention’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019), pp. 54–55 (noting ‘the effect that a new baseline of knowledge about domestic law
could conceivably have on the law of treaties’, and that ‘[b]y collecting constitutional law and
practice on treaties across a range of states, comparative foreign law would change, and
potentially equalize, what is known about states’ internal law’).
29 International Law Commission, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of
States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, With Commentaries (2006)’, (2006) 2 Yearbook
of the International Law Commission 369, 372 (principle 4).
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The emerging unilateral acts doctrine seems to be of a piece with the
full powers doctrine for treaties and, more broadly, the executive capacity
assumed for traditional sources of international law, insofar as it also encour-
ages the stability of international commitments.30 Still, this assignment of
responsibility – like treaties, to a limited class of officials, without regard to
what a state’s foreign relations law provides – lacks the same compelling need
to find an agreeable means of concluding a principal source of international
law, and lacks any explicit exception for manifest violations. Interestingly,
the Guiding Principles also inhibit the ‘arbitrary’ revocation of such com-
mitments, with potential parallels for treaties.31 Some governments were
discontent with this exercise, but it seems to have been due primarily to
the difficulty of establishing general principles – and, perhaps, the risk that
they would be regarded as binding their states unintentionally – and not the
risk of making international law by means that were inconsistent with
domestic law.32 The basic calculation is unsurprising. A sufficiently deliber-
ate capacity would appeal to the political actors that may make use of it,
executive officials, who might have less regard to the loss in authority
suffered by others. If consulted, national legislatures might be more inclined
to regard the emerging doctrine as creating a new rival to treaty-making by
participative means.
II WITHDRAWAL
International law’s attitude toward the domestic law regarding withdrawal
from treaties is less concrete – but as a matter of inference, at least as
indifferent. The VCLT allows a state to withdraw by consent or in conform-
ity with a treaty’s terms, or if the parties so intended or treaty’s nature so
implies.33 Additional provisions address notice and subsequent withdrawal
for cause.34
30 VCLT, art. 7.
31 International Law Commission, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of
States’, at 380–81 (principle 10).
32 See generally Unilateral Acts of States – Replies from Governments to the questionnaire:
report of the Secretary-General, 2000, UN Doc. A/CN.4/511. Italy, at least, did indicate that
legislatures might play a role, see p. 272 of the report.
33 VCLT, arts. 54, 56. In the former, any notice period is presumably dictated by the treaty; in the
latter, the state gives at least twelve months’ notice.
34 Where cause is invoked, a party is to notify others of its proposed withdrawal and seek their
approval; if others object, disagreements are subject to a dispute resolution procedure. VCLT,
arts. 65–66.
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The ILC, in drafting the VCLT, noted that withdrawal serves as a safeguard
when a state’s consent to a treaty violates its constitutional principles.35
Accordingly, ‘a defect in [the state’s] consent to be bound’ – presumably,
such as would satisfy Article 46 – is one of the grounds that may be invoked
and notified to other states parties.36 But nothing addresses whether there
might be any ‘manifest’ or other constitutional violation related to the act of
withdrawal itself – that is, addressing whether a state’s invocation of some basis
for withdrawal (or comparable act) might itself be impeached on the basis of
a constitutional violation.37 The VCLT incorporates notice periods, at least as
defaults, presumably for the benefit of other states parties,38 and allows the
notifying state to withdraw such notice or instrument before it takes effect –
including, one expects, on the basis of a constitutional violation.39 But the
practical significance is elusive. The timing in which a state can change its
mind is a serious constraint.40 In any event, the decision appears confided to
35 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, at p. 242 (‘Confronted with a challenge under national
law of the constitutional validity of a treaty, a Government will normally seek to regularize its
position under the treaty by taking appropriate action in the domestic or international
sphere’).
36 VCLT, art. 65(1).
37 See Woolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving’, 93 (conceding that ‘it appears that a strictly
internationalist approach is applicable in the context of treaty withdrawal’);
Hannah Woolaver, ‘Domestic and International Limitations on Treaty Withdrawal: Lessons
from South Africa’s Attempted Departure from the International Criminal Court’ (2017) 111
AJIL Unbound 450, 454 (‘Thus, a failure by the South African executive to abide by the
constitutional requirement to obtain parliamentary approval could, had it been evident to
other states, have resulted in the international invalidity of its consent when joining the Rome
Statute, but the very same violation would not have any international legal effect on its
withdrawal from the Rome Statute’).
38 As noted earlier, these include a period of at least twelve months’ notice when a right to
withdraw is implied by a treaty, see VCLT, art. 56(2), and at least three months’ notice in
relation to withdrawal for one of the causes indicated by Part V. See VCLT, art. 65(2). The
juxtaposition of these periods is not self-evident, but that is not of direct relevance here.
Theodore Christakis, ‘Article 56’, in Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna
Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), vol. II, pp. 1254–55 and note 14.
39 VCLT, art. 68.
40 In principle, as to the initial notice indicated by Article 65, the period for revocation may
exceed even the three months that article requires, but that is because the notice by itself
accomplishes nothing – such that it may be waived by failing to execute withdrawal, as
contemplated by Article 67, afterward. As regards execution, while the relevant instrument
may also be withdrawn per Article 68, it also takes effect upon receipt, see VCLT, art. 78, so
the window for revocation is likely to be vanishingly short. Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Article
68’, in Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:
A Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), vol. II, pp. 1566–68.
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the discretion of executive-branch officials, exactly as one might expect.41 The
result, as Hannah Woolaver has observed, is that ‘in contrast to international
law powers to join treaties, the authority of the executive to withdraw the state
from treaties in Article 67 of the VCLT is, prima facie, absolute in inter-
national law, unlimited by any checks that may exist in domestic law’.42
This withdrawal regime now faces challenges reminiscent of those once
confronted by ratification. States are slowly retreating from the practice
by which the executive is entitled to withdraw unilaterally from treaties,
instead adopting new provisions that require parliamentary approval.43
During the same period, multilateral and even bilateral treaty-making has
seen a pronounced slowdown,44 augmented (at least in the short term) by
withdrawals and similar attempts at disengagement.45 The result is that formal
constitutional revision has been accompanied by high-profile instances in
which executive-led attempts at withdrawal, like the United Kingdom’s initial
attempts to withdraw from the European Union and South Africa’s (initial?)
attempt to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, were slowed by
judicial decisions that recognized for the first time parliamentary rights to
participate in exit from certain types of treaties.46
41 The VCLT provides that the instruments actually executing withdrawal must be signed by the
head of state, head of government, or minister of foreign affairs, or by a representative whomay
be asked to produce full powers. VCLT, arts. 67(2). The provision addressing the initial notice
of cause, requires only that it be in writing, see VCLT, art. 65(1), but such matters are also
traditionally assigned to the executive.
42 Woolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving’, 95.
43 Verdier and Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers’, p. 149 (describing a ‘trend observers have largely
missed: several countries already mandate parliamentary involvement in treaty withdrawal,
and their numbers have been growing substantially in the last four decades’). Among the
examples of states with explicit restrictions are Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Chile, though in many more cases the restriction may be inferred from provisions governing
both entry and exit into treaties or from constitutional decisions, see pp. 149–50. The authors
do not, however, attempt to assess whether such a right of participation is respected in practice.
44 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel and Jan Wouters, ‘When Structures Become
Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking’ (2014) 25 European Journal
of International Law 733.
45 See, e.g., Andreas L. Paulus and Jan-Henrik Hinselman, ‘International Integration and Its
Counter-Limits: A GermanConstitutional Perspective’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), TheOxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019),
pp. 419–24.
46 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61;
Democratic Alliance v.Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017 (3)
SA 212 (GP). Brexit was ultimately effectuated, of course, with consent from the UK – and
European – parliaments. European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, https://services
.parliament.uk/bills/2019–20/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html, accessed July 16, 2020;
European Parliament legislative resolution of January 29, 2020 on the draft Council decision on
the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of theUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and
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Despite the evolution of foreign relations law, there is no evident movement
to develop international law. As with ratification, international law effectively
regards executive determinations, in notifying a state’s will, as exhausting
treaty law’s deference to domestic law, leaving any potential legislative role
to be enforced solely through a state’s own legal processes. This has clear
appeal, both internationally and domestically, in instances where national
requirements are as yet uncertain. But where national requirements are well
defined, it remains troublingly clear that foreign relations law is not self-
enforcing. For a number of actual or potential withdrawals – including
those by the United States, a frequent flyer of sorts – justiciability principles
are likely to limit the capacity of courts.47 Even where courts are willing and
ostensibly able, any domestic principle will be difficult to apply prior to
a unilateral executive notice taking effect as a matter of international law.
The readiest solution would be to infer an analogous exemption for mani-
fest violations in the withdrawal context to match that for ratification.48
However, that is difficult as a matter of treaty interpretation. Article 46 is
plainly limited to ‘provisions of internal law regarding competence to con-
clude treaties’; that heads of government and comparable officials are else-
where given authority to perform ‘any other act with respect to a treaty’ offers
no textual basis for concluding that one of those acts, withdrawal, must also be
constrained in the event of manifest violations.49 Indications in the travaux
préparatoires are mixed or negative.50 That state practice did not support any
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community
(XT 21105/3/2018 – C9-0148/2019 – 2018/0427(NLE)), www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/docu
ment/TA-9–2020-0018_EN.html<int_u, accessed July 16, 2020. As for South Africa, withdrawal
has been revived in the legislature, thoughwithout resolution to this point. International Crimes
Bill, B 37–2017, www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2017-b37-ICBill.pdf, accessed July 16, 2020.
For discussion, see Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Treaty Exit and IntrabranchConflict at the Interface of
International and Domestic Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 360–63;
Hannah Woolaver, ‘State Engagement with Treaties: Interactions between International and
Domestic Law’, in Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law,
at pp. 439–43; Woolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving’, 76–80.
47 See Curtis A. Bradley and Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Treaty Exit in the United States: Insights from
the United Kingdom or South Africa?’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 428, 432 (emphasizing other
dissimilarities).
48 See Woolaver, ‘Domestic and International Limitations on Treaty Withdrawal’; Woolaver,
‘State Engagement with Treaties’, p. 444; Woolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving’, 95–103.
49 But see Woolaver, ‘Domestic and International Limitations on Treaty Withdrawal’, 97
(discussing Articles 2, 7 and 67 of the VCLT).
50 Professor Woolaver points to ILC commentary indicating that the evidence of authority
should be the same as between consent to be bound and withdrawal, but that does not directly
implicate the Article 46 obligation. Woolaver, ‘Domestic and International Limitations on
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such principle as a matter of customary international law – as Woolaver,
a strong but judicious advocate for this interpretation, acknowledges51 –
further undermines any basis for attributing such intention to the states
agreeing to the VCLT, and the lack of supportive state practice since suggests
that it would be unreasonable to find any grounding in subsequent treaty
practice.
To be sure, teleological or policy arguments for comparable treatment are
appealing, including that the security of treaty obligations – one of the
objectives of Article 46, including in limiting its exception to manifest
violations only – is arguably hindered by the lack of any exception for
constitutional violations regarding withdrawal, since that permits too-easy
disengagement.52 Necessarily, too, the backstops are different: while with-
drawal serves as a safeguard for uncorrected constitutional violations con-
cerning ratification, re-ratification is needed to cure withdrawal in violation
of domestic law, and that tends to be more cumbersome as a matter of
domestic and international procedure. Finally, it may be possible to muster
additional arguments for cross-applying Article 46 and its manifest violation
standard. For example, one might argue that states appearing to have with-
drawn might revoke a prior notification on the ground that the relevant
instrument did not ‘take effect’ under Article 68 if it manifestly violated
a constitutional requirement of legislative participation.53 No matter the
precise basis, however, any such exemption would be doctrinally tenuous
and narrow in its potential application.54 It remains extremely unlikely that
this would change so long as the manifest violation standard serves as
a catchall for redressing other, potentially unknown, constitutional viola-
tions as well.
Treaty Withdrawal’, 96. As she also indicates, the question of whether Article 46 standards
should also be applied to withdrawal and similar matters was expressly posed, and while those
raising the issue urged that the extension be reflected in text or commentary, that was expressly
deferred – with the special rapporteur, Humphrey Waldock, saying it ‘would require some
thought’ – and nothing further was done. See p. 94 (quoting ILC, ‘Summary Records of the
Fifteenth Session’, (1963) 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 164).
51 Woolaver, ‘Domestic and International Limitations on Treaty Withdrawal’, 97.
52 Woolaver, ‘Domestic and International Limitations on Treaty Withdrawal’, 97–102; Helfer,
‘Treaty Exit and Interbranch Conflict’, p. 371.
53 What is required for a notification or subsequent instrument to ‘tak[e] effect’ under Article 68,
however, is conventionally understood as meaning simply that it is received by the relevant
depositary or states. VCLT, art. 78; see Tzanakopoulos, ‘Article 68’, p. 1567.
54 Thus Professor Helfer, who argues that the policy rationales for Article 46 warrant its applica-
tion to states leaving treaties, suggests that – for that very reason – constitutional violations are
essentially irrelevant under the international law of exit. Helfer, ‘Treaty Exit and Interbranch
Conflict’, pp. 371–72.
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What elsemight be engineered? If treaty law is to be progressively developed –
or, with great difficulty, interpreted on the basis of Article 46 or otherwise – states
and treaty depositories might adopt the assumption that a withdrawal must
satisfy the same separation-of-powers procedures by which the state approved
consent, as an international-law embodiment of the acte contraire doctrine. That
is quite vulnerable as a general principle, given the actual discrepancy in many
states between domestic laws regarding legislative approvals of ratification and
withdrawal.55 But the severity of any such rule may also be tempered. A state
might overcome any such assumption by explaining its contrary (or still indeter-
minate) domestic principle. And the consequence – if a discrepancy was
observed and remained unexplained, but withdrawal could still be approved
in reasonable time – might not be to render the initial attempt invalid, thereby
sustaining the full-fledged obligation, but instead to establish in the interim an
obligation simply to abide by the treaty’s object and purpose.56 Still less dramat-
ically, governments declaring withdrawal might be required by depositories or
other states simply to disclose their authority and its compatibility with constitu-
tional requirements – whichmight at least have the effect of making sufficiently
‘manifest’ any violations of a requirement to secure legislative approval.
Other solutions involve bearing possible constitutional restraints in mind
while negotiating withdrawal clauses in particular treaties. The easiest lift is to
restrict any immediate effect of a notice or instrument of withdrawal – for
example, by restricting when withdrawal may first be effectuated, as is typical
for International Labor Organization agreements, and evidenced in the Berne
Convention and the Paris Agreement57 – so as to permit legislative or judicial
intervention in the case of a potentially unlawful, unilateral executive meas-
ure. More particularly, a treaty’s withdrawal clause might require the disclos-
ure of authority mentioned above, following the precedent of clauses that
obligate withdrawing states to accompany their notices with explanations.58
55 As a commentator observed in another context, moreover, ‘the notion of acte contraire is alien
to international law’. Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO:
How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 535, 537 (discussing
relationship between treaties and customary international law).
56 Cf. VCLT, art. 18.
57 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berne, September 9,
1886, as amended on September 28, 1979, in force November 19, 1984, https://wipolex.wipo.int
/en/text/283698, accessed July 16, 2020, art. 35; Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the 21st Session,
UN Doc. FCCC/CP/201510/Add.1, art. 28 (December 12, 2015).
58 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation (US-UK), Washington and London,
June 21 and 26, 2007, in force April 13, 2012, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 110-7 (2007), art. 20 (requiring
‘a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its
national interests’ and warranting withdrawal); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
58 Edward T. Swaine
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III CONCLUSION
Foreign relations lawyers looking beyond their jurisdictions will naturally
focus on any directly comparable national systems, but they should also
consider the impact of international law on their discipline. First, inter-
national law not only provides opportunities for domestic actors that may be
in tension with domestic principles, but also establishes rules that constrain
foreign relations law. Second, while those rules of international law intend to
respect ratification developments, they also guarantee that (in most circum-
stances) only constitutional rules assigning authority to the executive to com-
municate state decisions regarding ratification or withdrawal will be respected.
As a result, these international rules have not adequately taken into account
developments in legislative authority. Third, none of this is inevitable. In
developing a comparative approach to foreign relations law, experts should
not overlook the degree to which the effectiveness of domestic norms require
attention to internationally established conditions.
Weapons, London,Washington andMoscow, July 1, 1968, in forceMarch 5, 1970, 729UNTS 161,
art. X(1) (requiring ‘a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests’).
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4
Comparative Foreign Relations Law between Center
and Periphery
Liberal and Postcolonial Perspectives
Michael Riegner
I TAKING GLOBAL COMPARISON SERIOUSLY
Nine months before his death in a US-backed military coup, Chilean President
Salvador Allende delivered an acclaimed speech to theUNGeneral Assembly that
must have been electrifying. As he concluded, the packed Assembly hall erupted
into enthusiastic applause and shouts of ‘Viva Allende!’.1 Allende’s 1972 speech
marked an important rallying cry in the Third World’s mobilization against
a global economic order dominated by industrialized countries and Western
multinational corporations.2 Defending the nationalization of US-owned copper
and telecommunications firms, Allende declared that ‘[o]ur economy could no
longer tolerate the state of subordination implied in the concentration of more
than 80 per cent of its exports in the hands of a small group of large, foreign
companies.’3 He mounted a spirited attack against multinational corporations’
economic ‘aggression’ and ‘imperialist intervention’ into Chile’s political affairs.
Conscious that he was expressing a grievance shared by many developing coun-
tries, Allende concluded: ‘We are witnessing a pitched battle between the great
transnational corporations and sovereign States . . . In a word, the entire political
structure of theworld is being undermined.’4Allende’s apprehensionwas no leftist
1 Robert Alden, ‘Mr. Allende follows outline of speech’, New York Times, December 5, 1972,
www.nytimes.com/1972/12/05/archives/allende-at-un-charges-assault-by-us-interests-chilean-pr
esident.html (all websites last accessed September 30, 2020).
2 On the historical context, see Jochen von Bernstorff and Philipp Dann, The Battle for
International Law: North-South Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019).
3 Salvador Allende, ‘Address delivered at 2096th Plenary Meeting, 4December 1972, New York’,
Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly (1972), para. 9.
4 Allende, Official Records UN General Assembly, para. 59.
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paranoia: in 1973, he was ousted and died in a coup that was supported by theCIA
and US-corporate interests and ushered in Augusto Pinochet’s military
dictatorship.5 Beyond this extreme case, empirical research attests not only to the
economic leverageofmultinationals overmanydeveloping countries but also to the
eminently political role transnational corporations have played inmany Southern
nations.6
Allende’s speech is typically seen as a milestone towards a New International
Economic Order in international law.7 Beyond that, however, the Allende story
also offers a different perspective on foreign relations law: one that is shaped by
the postcolonial contexts and historical experiences of countries at the periphery
of the global political economy. This perspective thus differs from conceptions of
foreign relations law that developed in liberal democracies at the center of
geopolitical gravity. If foreign relations law is to take global comparison seriously,
it needs to take into account this peripheral perspective. Doing so not only
pluralizes comparative foreign relations law and thus makes it more representa-
tive. It might also help us understand contemporary transformations of foreign
relations law in Western liberal democracies, as these legal orders become less
centric and more peripheral in a new multipolar geopolitical context.
Extant literature in foreign relations law is shaped by liberal perspectives from
the center. As a field of study, foreign relations law is commonly thought to have
originated in the peculiar context of the United States, shaped as much by its
federal and presidential system as by its geopolitical centrality and dominance.8
5 On US involvement in the coup see Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American
Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Anthony Sampson, The
Sovereign State of ITT (New York: Stein Day, 1973); United States Senate, ‘First Session,
Volume 7: Covert Action’, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Ninety Fourth Congress, 1975, available at
www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions, p. 15 f., 158 f.
6 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graaf, ‘The Corporation in Political Science’, in
Grietje Baars and Andre Spicer (eds.), The Corporation: A Critical, Multi-Disciplinary
Handbook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 134–59; Lorraine Eden and
EvanH. Potter,Multinationals in the Global Political Economy (London: PalgraveMacmillan
UK, 1993); Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The
Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971).
7 Cf. Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, ‘Rival Worlds and the Place of the Corporation in
International Law’, in Jochen von Bernstorff and Philipp Dann (eds.), The Battle for
International Law: South-North Perspectives on in the Decolonization Eera (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 141–74.
8 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Study’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 316 at
319. But see on the nineteenth-century idea of ‘Äußeres Staatesrecht’ in Germany Helmut
Philipp Aust, ‘The Democratic Challenge to Foreign Relations Law in Transatlantic
Perspective’, in David Dyzenhaus, Jacco Bomhoff and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-
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Most recent treatments of foreign relations law focus on one single legal order or
compare a small number of ‘Western’ liberal democracies, typically the US, the
UK, Germany or the European Union.9 This state of affairs carries the risk, as
Helmut Aust has put it, ‘to fall into the trap of a self-referential, liberal, and
Western mindset which takes discussions in a few jurisdictions of the “Global
North” as being representative of the broader global picture’.10
This chapter does not address this problem by adding new legal material from
the Global South to the existing comparative framework. Rather, the aim is to
uncover and pluralize the theoretical assumptions and epistemic foundations of
the existing comparative framework. This endeavor can draw on a longstanding
critique of the epistemic limitations of traditional comparative law and on the
emerging literature on a constitutionalism of the Global South.11 Two desiderata
emerge from this literature, one methodological and one epistemic: methodo-
logically, a global comparison requires not only a more representative case selec-
tion but also increased attention to the heterogenous historical, political-economic
and legal-cultural contexts that shape the meaning and function of foreign rela-
tions law in bothNorth and South.12 Foreign relations law is not simply a national
Facing Constitution: Legal Externalities and the Reshaping of the Constitutional Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 345-75.
9 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014);
Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EUConstitution: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and
Materials (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2017); Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (2017), http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/home/MPEC
COL; Thomas Kleinlein, ‘TTIP and the Challenges of Investor-State-Arbitration: An Exercise in
Comparative Foreign Relations Law’, in Anna-Bettina Kaiser, Niels Petersen and Johannes Saurer
(eds.), The U.S. Supreme Court and Contemporary Constitutional Law: The Obama Era and Its
Legacy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), pp. 211–28; Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2019) (which does contain
chapters on India, South Africa, China and Commonwealth African Countries). Conversely,
standard comparative law treaties tend not to consider ‘foreign relations’ as a self-standing field for
comparison, see e.g. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Susanna Dorsen et al.,
Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials (St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2016).
10 Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, para. 6.
11 Philipp Dann, Michael Riegner and Maxim Bönnemann (eds.), The Global South and
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Zoran Oklopcic,
‘The South of Western Constitutionalism: A Map Ahead of a Journey’ (2016) 37 Third World
Quarterly 2080; Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Constitutionalism of the Global South
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Günter Frankenberg, ‘Critical
Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26Harvard International Law Journal 411.
12 On contextual comparison see generally Günter Frankenberg, ‘Comparing Constitutions:
Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology – Toward a Layered Narrative’ (2006) 4 ICON 439. On the
combination of contextual and functionalist methods see already M. Riegner, ‘Access to
Information As a Human Right and Constitutional Guarantee. A Comparative Perspective’
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reflection of universal international principles but remains deeply embedded in
different varieties of constitutionalism, including non-liberal variants.13
Epistemically, the challenge is thus to go beyond mere addition and to question,
provincialize and pluralize the theoretical concepts and epistemic categories that
prestructure the comparative inquiry.14 Comparatists need to make explicit the
underlying assumptions that define and structure foreign relations law as a field of
study and to empirically test, rather than implicitly presuppose, their universal
validity beyondWestern liberal democracy.
This chapter pursues this approach in two steps. Section II contrasts two ideal-
typical perspectives on foreign relations law, a liberal one from the center and
a postcolonial one from the periphery. These perspectives differ in their approach
to epistemic structure, normative functions and legal subjects of foreign relations
law. These differences come into sharp relief in the legal treatment of trans-
national corporations, whose sociolegal reality questions categorical distinctions
between international and national, political and economic, state and individual.
For the purposes of this chapter, I take Salvador Allende’s speech to be illustrative
of this particular peripheral perspective, which was however widely shared at the
time by many Third World nations and whose legacy lives on in contemporary
varieties of constitutionalism in the Global South. Section III goes further and
argues that the peripheral perspective is not exclusive to an essentialized ‘South’
but has increasing resonance and heuristic value in the ‘North’, as it highlights
contemporary transformations in liberal-democratic foreign relations law. Again,
these transformations can be studied through the changing attitudes towards
transnational corporations, which represent one possible avenue for future
(2017) 50 VRÜ / Law and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America 332 at 353 ff. On case
selection see Ran Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional
Law’ (2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 125; Cheryl Saunders, ‘Towards a Global
Constitutional Gene Pool’ (2009) 4 National Taiwan University Law Review, 1.
13 See generally Mark Tushnet, ‘Editorial: Varieties of Constitutionalism’ (2016) 14 ICON 1;
Oscar V. Vieira, Uprenda Baxi and Frans Viljoen (eds.), Transformative Constitutionalism:
Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa (Pretoria: Pretoria University
Law Press, 2013); Michael W. Dowdle and Michael A.Wilkinson (eds.), Constitutionalism
beyond Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Helena A. Garcı́a and
Günter Frankenberg (eds.), Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Comparative Analysis and
Critique (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019).
14 Oklopcic, ‘The South of Western Constitutionalism’; Florian Hoffmann, ‘Knowledge Production
in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in Philipp Dann, Michael Riegner and Maxim Bönnemann
(eds.), The Global South and Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2020) pp. 41–66; Ina Kerner, ‘BeyondEurocentrism: Trajectories Towards a Renewed Political and
Social Theory’ (2018) 44 Philosophy & Social Criticism 550. On provincializing, see generally
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought andHistorical Difference (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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comparative research. Section IV concludes with some thoughts on the possibil-
ities and limits of drawing lessons from historical and global comparisons.
II TWO PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: FROM
CENTRE TO PERIPHERY
This following section develops and contrasts two perspectives on foreign
relations law, the liberal one from the center (subsection A), and the
postcolonial one from the periphery (subsection B). These should be
prefaced with three caveats: firstly, they are ideal-typical perspectives
that do not neatly map onto the actual law of any particular state, nor
are they representative of the entire ‘Global North’ or ‘South’. Rather, the
aim is to contrast different contexts, ideological formations and epistemic
structures and to offer alternative ways of thinking about foreign relations
law. Secondly, ideological and epistemic difference does not hamper
‘comparability’ but has heuristic value precisely in uncovering implicit
assumptions and teaching us as much about the self than the other.
Thirdly, contrasting the two perspectives does not, at this stage, imply
a normative judgment on which is the ‘better’ view. Normatively speak-
ing, the peripheral view does not require abandoning questions about,
and a commitment to, democracy, separation of powers and individual
rights typically asked in liberal foreign relations law; but it commands
a pluralized and contextualized understanding of these concepts.
A Liberal Foreign Relations Law from the Center
If recent handbook and encyclopedia articles are representative of the existing
literature, then foreign relations law is defined, in its core, as the domestic
legal norms that govern the participation of state organs in diplomatic rela-
tions and international lawmaking; beyond that, it arguably includes the
domestic effects of these international activities, especially international law,
and individual rights protection in internationalized situations.15 The main
research questions and normative concerns pertain to the operation of separ-
ation of powers, democracy and individual rights at the interface between the
international and domestic sphere.
15 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press, 2019), p.
3; Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, para. 8; McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, 7 ff.
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These definitions and concerns are informed by a liberal perspective from
the center of geopolitical gravity.16 This perspective is shaped by specific
contexts: the legal-cultural context is liberal-democratic constitutionalism.
The dominant ideological influence is liberalism as it evolved in Europe
and North America since the seventeenth century, embodied by intellectual
forerunners like Locke, Blackstone, Mann and others.17 Historically, it is
shaped by an experience of statehood in which the nation state preexists
international law and is located at the center of an imperially structured global
order. Economically, these states have been capital exporting market econ-
omies, either of the liberal or coordinated variety of capitalism.18
The liberal, centric perspective is defined by particular ideas about the
structure, function and subjects of foreign relations law: (1) its epistemic
structure is based on a binary distinction between international and national
that is rigidly applied to the political sphere, but not necessarily to the
economic sphere; (2) its normative function is to protect internal and external,
political sovereignty by allocating powers to different branches and levels of
government; (3) its agency structure is based on two paradigmatic legal sub-
jects: the state and the individual, who has a dual existence as a national
citoyen and transnational bourgeois. In short, the liberal foreign relations law is
focused primarily on relations among states and on political constitutionalism.
This perspective implies particular conceptions of sovereignty, democracy,
separation of powers and rights that are embedded in the broader Western
constitutional tradition. The epistemic structure of liberal foreign relations
law rests on an understanding of sovereignty that establishes a binary distinc-
tion between international and national, external and internal, outside and
inside. In this distinction, the national preexists, and autonomously deter-
mines its relationship to, the international. Foreign relations law is conceived
as the domestic interface where this determination is made. Globalization is
perceived as an external force that the state opens itself up to in choosing
between ‘open’ or ‘closed’ statehood. Importantly, the distinction between
international and national is applied rigidly to the political sphere but not to
16 I use ‘liberal’ to designate a particular constitutional tradition and political philosophy. This
usage does not correspond to the meaning of ‘liberal’ as a position in partisan politics, where it
can designate ‘progressive’ or ‘left’ in theUS, or rather the opposite in Europe. Obviously, even
within the meaning used here, there are different shades and traditions. On varieties of
liberalism, see generally Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 37 ff.; Duncan Bell, ‘What Is Liberalism?’ (2014) 42 Political
Theory 682.
17 McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, 31 ff.; Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, para. 1.
18 Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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the economic sphere. The separation of economy and politics by domestic
constitutionalism is a well-known feature of nineteenth-century classical
liberalism. Legally, this separation was effected by the constitutional protec-
tion of economic rights against political power – whether exercised by
authoritarian executives or democratically elected legislatures. Importantly
for foreign relations, as the economic sphere is separated from the state, it
remains possible to imagine a ‘world market’ or a ‘global economy’, to which
the liberal state opens itself by allowing for free trade and foreign
investment.19 Internally as externally, its economic role thus tends to be
that of a (de)regulator.
This epistemic structure prefigures the normative functions ascribed to
foreign relations law. These functions derive from a specific understanding of
sovereignty in the different spheres. Sovereignty governs the political sphere,
where it follows a dual logic: internationally, sovereignty translates into the
requirement of state consent, typically expressed by executive actors. Internally,
the logic is popular sovereignty, which requires political rights, democracy and
separation of powers. Foreign relations law, then, is essentially about which of
the two logics governs the interface of national and international. Importantly,
this dual logic does not apply in the same way to the economic sphere, which
transcends the national-international binary and remains governed at least as
much by the logic of individual liberty and economic rights. Indeed, as historian
Quinn Slobodian has recently shown, a key feature of normative order in the
twentieth century was the extension of neo- and ordoliberal principles to the
international realm: the legal separation between imperium and dominium,
sovereignty and property kept economic integration possible in a world of
ending empires and multiplying democratic nation states.20
The epistemic structure and normative functions also determine ideas
about agency and legal subjectivity. The paradigmatic actors and legal sub-
jects of liberal foreign relations law are the state and the individual. In this
binary structure, the state has authority, the individual has liberty. Individual
liberty is protected by rights, which differ on the national versus international,
political versus economic axes: political rights are, in principle, bounded by
the state: the citoyen is a national. In contrast, economic rights extend beyond
the state: the bourgeois transcends the national. This idea is most developed in
the European Union: supranational free movement rights have direct effect
19 M. Fichera, ‘Liberalism’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law
(2017), https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/home/MPECCOL.
20 Quinn Slobodian,Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2018).
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and supremacy in domestic constitutional orders. In practice, the bourgeois is
often not a human being but a legal person, typically a corporation. In liberal
foreign relations law, corporations have legal subjectivity but do not constitute
a separate category of actors. If they appear at all, it is under the rubric of
‘informality’, ‘citizens or residents of other nations’ or ‘individuals’.21 In the
binary liberal framework, corporations simply pose a problem of attribution,
and they are typically attributed to the sphere of the private individual:
corporations are expressions of economic liberty and creatures of private
law, a legal fiction designed to facilitate the accumulation of capital and its
transnational mobility.
The result of this overall framework is neatly summed up by political
theorist Christian Volk:
What states and global governance institutions do is political, and political is
equated with significant, important, primary; economic, in contrast, is
equated with secondary, private, profane. Hidden behind this, of course, is
also a normative program, namely that of the (democratic) self-determination
of society through the state. But there is a high price to be paid for this
program: The political power of private-economic actors remains invisible.22
B A Postcolonial Perspective from the Periphery
If foreign relations law emerged as an autonomous field of study in liberal
democracies like the US, the UK and Germany, this does not mean that other
states have no law governing foreign relations.23 This observation implies, on
the one hand, that a global comparison of foreign relations law is in principle
possible. On the other hand, it carries the risk of transplanting legal concepts
and epistemic categories that developed in a liberal, centric frame of reference
into different contexts. As comparative law teaches us, both the meaning and
the social function of legal concepts can vary with context. In the context of
liberal democracies, foreign relations law may have the function of allocating
jurisdiction and external powers to protect political self-determination and
individual liberty.24 But we cannot simply assume that this is true in different
21 Aust, ‘Foreign Affairs’, para. 35; Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, p. 3; McLachlan,
Foreign Relations Law, p. 27.
22 Christian Volk, ‘The Problem of Sovereignty in Globalized Times’ (2019) Law, Culture and
the Humanities, Online First 1 at 17.
23 Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, p. 8 f.
24 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law’, in
Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 21–44.
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contexts shaped by different varieties of constitutionalism, geopolitical posi-
tions and epistemic frameworks.25 Rather than assuming similarity, this chap-
ter takes the different historical and political-economic context as starting
point for an alternative perspective that looks at foreign relations law from
the postcolonial periphery. ‘Periphery’ here designates a decentered position
in the economic geography of contemporary capitalism, while ‘postcolonial’
refers to the condition shaped by the many legacies of colonial domination.26
Salvador Allende’s 1972 speech can be read as manifesto of the peripheral
perspective, in as much as it crystallizes formative experiences, epistemic
categories and legal concepts prevalent across the Third World at the time.
It captures a historical moment in which rapid decolonization gave rise to
alternative political and legal imaginations in the periphery, embodied espe-
cially by the UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources and the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order adopted in 1974.27While these initiatives are often dismissed
as inconsequential in international law, they were also an important expres-
sion of, and influence on, constitutional law within Third World countries.
Within these legal orders, they found fertile ground in traditions of social and
economic constitutionalism, inaugurated by the Mexican constitution of 1917
and the Weimar constitution of 1919, which both influenced constitutional
traditions in the developing world.28
25 See generally Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice against
Epistemicide (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2014).
26 For a contemporary legal approach to economic geography, see Michael Dowdle, ‘On the
Regulatory Geography of Modern Capitalism: Putting “Rule of Law” in its Place’, Oxford
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies Discussion Series (2018), www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/
dowdle_putting_rule_of_law_in_its_place.pdf. Classically, Immanuel Wallerstein, The
Modern World System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 302: ‘The periphery of a world-
economy is that geographical sector of it wherein production is primarily of lower ranking
goods’. On the concept of ‘postcolonial’ in comparative law, see only Philipp Dann and
Felix Hanschmann, ‘Post-colonial Theories and Law’ (2012) 45 VRÜ / Law and Politics in
Asia, Africa and Latin America 12; Judith Schacherreiter, ‘Postcolonial Theory and
Comparative Law: On the Methodological and Epistemological Benefits to Comparative
Law through Postcolonial Theory’ (2016) 49 VRÜ / Law and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin
America 291, both with further references.
27 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (Paris: UNESCO,
1979); Antony Anghie, ‘Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order’ (2015) 6
Humanity 145; Ingo Venzke, ‘Possibilities of the Past Histories of the NIEO and the Travails of
Critique’ (2018) 20 Journal of the History of International Law 263.
28 Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810–2010: The Engine Room of the
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 105 ff.; David Jungbluth, Die
Entwicklung des deutschen Wirtschaftsverfassungsrechts: Von Weimar bis zum
Investitionshilfeurteil (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag, 2018), pp. 15 ff.
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In terms of ideological influences, the peripheral perspective popularized by
Allende owedmuch to dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch and postcolonial
thinkers like Franz Fanon, who sympathized with Marxist ideas all while reject-
ing many aspects of actually existing socialism.29 As for liberalism, there was and
is little enthusiasm for those liberal varieties that subjected the periphery to free-
trade imperialism and, later on, to crippling neoliberal structural adjustment.30 In
terms of historical context, foreign relations did not begin as interstate relations
but as dealings between chartered trading companies like the East India
Company and local rulers.31The experience of statehood was also quite different:
for many postcolonial states, the international preceded the national; peripheral
statehood was produced and defined by international law during decolonization.
The state was the only form of political organization that was legally available for
collective self-determination.32 For many new states, decolonization meant polit-
ical independence but continued economic dependence: they depended on
imports of capital and technology and on volatile exports of primary commod-
ities, which were often foreign-owned or locked into unequal concessions agree-
ments. In response, they experimented with industrial policies of import
substitution and mixed or planned economies.33
This context gave rise to legal thinking about foreign relations that differs from
the liberal-centric perspective in terms of structure, function and agency: (1) the
epistemic structure is based on transnational and hybrid categories that transcend
the binary opposition between national and international, political and eco-
nomic; (2) the normative functions include enhancing economic self-
determination, socioeconomic development and equality; (3) the agency struc-
ture is plural, including legal subjects ranging from state and individual to
corporations, indigenous peoples and rights of nature. In short, peripheral foreign
relations law is broader than the liberal one: it includes economic relations with
powerful non-state actors and aspects of economic constitutionalism.
29 Matias E. Margulis, The Global Political Economy of Raúl Prebisch (Milton: Taylor and
Francis, 2017); Frantz Fanon, TheWretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1961]),
pp. 97 ff.
30 Andrew S. Sartori, Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2014).
31 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the EarlyModern Foundations
of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
32 But see on intellectual alternatives AdomGetachew,Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and
Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
33 Luis Eslava, ‘The Developmental State: Independence, Dependency, and History of the
South’, in Philipp Dann and Jochen von Bernstorff (eds.), The Battle for International Law:
South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019),
pp. 71–100; Magnus Feldmann, ‘Global Varieties of Capitalism’ (2019) 71 World Politics 162;
Margulis, The Global Political Economy of Raúl Prebisch.
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This way of thinking about foreign relations law implies different concep-
tions of sovereignty, collective self-determination and rights. In terms of
epistemic structure, the dichotomy of international and national has less
historical and sociological plausibility. International law not only produced
the peripheral state, but also pervaded it from the outset: international institu-
tions midwifed, nurtured, socialized many of the new states; postcolonial law
was ‘modernized’ in the image of Western law in ‘law and development’
efforts; land, natural resources and corporations were often foreign-owned;
globalization was not external but internal to the state.34 In this situation, the
category of transnationalism might be a more accurate representation of
peripheral relations with the rest of the world. Similarly, the separation of
the political and economic spheres had less plausibility in the periphery. In
the history of colonialism, sovereignty and property had been closely entan-
gled: colonization frequently began with land acquisition, and corporate
property rights often became functionally equivalent to sovereignty.35 After
the end of formal colonization, colonial hierarchies lived on in privatized
property relationships. The transnational corporations symbolized this
entanglement of economic and political power so vociferously denounced
by Allende in this 1972 speech. This historical experience gave credit to the
idea that economic relations were political, and vice versa.
These epistemic differences translated into different functions of foreign
relations law. After decolonization had achieved political independence,
sovereignty became closely associated with economic self-determination and
development. The external and internal spheres were not differentiated by
a dual logic of political sovereignty but bound together by one unitary ration-
ality: development. Externally, peripheral sovereignty was not defined by
consent to preexisting international law but conditioned on the state of
development – from the mandate system to weighted voting in international
financial institutions. Internally, peripheral states came into being as develop-
mental states, whose teleology was to ‘modernize’ and ‘catch up’ with
European statehood.36 Nationalizations of ‘system-relevant’ enterprises, as
34 Guy F. Sinclair, To Reform theWorld: International Organizations and theMaking of Modern
States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Eslava, ‘The Developmental State’.
35 Matthias Goldmann, ‘Colonial Law as a Symbolic Order: Property and Sovereignty in
German Southwest Africa’, SSRN (2019), October 28, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=3274198; Brenna Bhandar, Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and
Racial Regimes of Ownership (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Mieke van der Linden,
‘The Neglected Colonial Root of the Fundamental Right to Property: African Natives’
Property Rights in the Age of New Imperialism and in Times Thereafter’ (2015) 75
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 791.
36 Eslava, ‘The Developmental State’.
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those defended by Allende in his speech, were a means to achieve economic
independence, development and substantive equality. A separation of the
economic and political was neither epistemically plausible nor normatively
desirable. If there was a concern with separation, then it was separation of
powers in the private sphere, whereas the state needed a strong executive to
confront multinational corporations. Thus, the function of the law was to
realize economic sovereignty, ideals of economic democracy and ameasure of
economic equality.
Thirdly, peripheral agency structure is not binary but plural. The state and
the individual are important but not exclusive actors. There is a category of
legal subjects that occupies an intermediary space between the individual and
the state. Legal subjectivity and constitutional rights are granted to corpor-
ations, other collective actors like trade unions and indigenous peoples, and
most recently even to nature itself.37 Corporations are not only economic but
political entities, and they have their own transnational reality independent
from the private law of any particular state. As Allende put it in another speech
in 1972: corporations ‘have become a supranational force that is threatening to
get completely out of control . . . They have their objectives, their own policies
with regard to trade, shipping, international affairs and economic integration,
their own view of things, their own activity, their own world.’38
This ‘supranational’ status was ensured by a variety of legal techniques: the
internationalization of concession agreements and contracts between states
and investors, which insulated them from the domestic law of the host state;
the submission of investor-state disputes to international arbitration, which
removed them from the jurisdiction of domestic courts of the host state, as
became evident with the rise of such disputes in the 1990s; and finally the
extraterritorial enforcement of arbitral awards in all major jurisdictions, which
placed host countries at the mercy of foreign courts, often those in the
investor’s home state.39 Against this quasi-supranational status, Allende
asserted home state jurisdiction and the supremacy of home state law:
37 Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla and Luis J. Kotzé, ‘Living in Harmony with Nature?: A Critical
Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental Law
397; Elena Blanco and Anna Grear, ‘Personhood, Jurisdiction and Injustice: Law,
Colonialities and the Global Order’ (2019) 10 Journal of Human Rights and the
Environment 86.
38 Salvador Allende, ‘Address delivered at the Inaugural Ceremony, 13 April 1972,
Santiago, Chile’, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(1973), 349, paras. 58, 60.
39 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘The Battle Continued: Rebuilding Empire through
Internationalization of State Contracts’, in Philipp Dann and Jochen von Bernstorff (eds.),
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The Chilean Constitution provides that nationalization disputes should be
resolved by a tribunal which, like all tribunals in my country, has complete
independence and sovereignty in the adoption of decisions . . . we shall
continue with undiminished determination to maintain that only the
Chilean courts are competent to pass judgment in any dispute concerning
the nationalization of our basic resources. For Chile, this is not merely an
important problem of juridical interpretation; it is a question of sovereignty.
Indeed, it is far more than this – it is a question of survival.40
It is this question of survival that defined the foreign relations law in much of
the worlds’ periphery.
Allende’s reference to the Chilean constitution provides one concrete
example of how the peripheral perspective translates into positive constitu-
tional law: in July 1971, a constitutional amendment had enabled the nation-
alization of the copper industry by declaring that the state ‘has absolute,
exclusive, inalienable and imprescriptible domain over all mines’ –
a provision still in force at the time of writing (article 19 XXIV of the
constitution of 1980).41 While this chapter is not the place for a systematic
comparison of positive legal provisions across time and space, some
further examples might still serve to illustrate the theoretical points
made above.
In this regard, provisions on public ownership of natural resources like the
ones in Chile are not an isolated example but a recurring theme of a foreign
relations law that rejects the liberal dichotomy of economy and politics,
property and sovereignty. Many postcolonial constitutions introduced similar
provisions that allowed for the nationalization of assets of transnational cor-
porations and that constituted the domestic equivalent of international law
claims to permanent sovereignty over natural resources.42 Several examples
thus stem from the heyday of the New International Economic Order: the
The Battle for International Law: South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 175–97.
40 Salvador Allende, ‘Address delivered at 2096th PlenaryMeeting, 4December 1972, New York’,
para. 47, 52.
41 Ley 17450 of 16.7.1971, available at www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29026&idParte=&id
Version=1971–07-16; on the context see Wolf Radmann, ‘Staatliche Beteiligungs- und
Verstaatlichungsvereinbarungen mit den ausländischen Kupferbergbaugesellschaften in
Chile und Sambia’ (1971) 4 VRÜ / Law and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America 301
at 317.
42 On permanent sovereignty over natural resources in international law see Nico Schrijver,
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development,
Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), pp. 95 ff.
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independence constitution of Angola of 1975, for instance, declared all natural
resources, including oil and minerals, property of the state (article 11, today
article 16 of the constitution of 2010). Iran, known to international lawyers for
protracted arbitration over the nationalization of its oil industry, provides in its
constitution of 1979 that ‘mineral deposits’ shall be at the disposal of the
Islamic government (article 45), excludes foreigners from mineral extraction
concessions (article 81) and prohibits agreements resulting in foreign control
over natural resources (article 153). The current Constitution of Kenya (2010)
not only declares all minerals and mineral oils to be ‘public land’ (article 61
I lit. f), but also requires parliamentary approval for the grant of natural
resource concessions (article 71).43
Other examples come from an older constitutional tradition in Latin
America, which is often associated with the Calvo doctrine in international
law. Domestically, theMexican constitution of 1917 vested ownership of natural
resources like petroleum in the nation (article 27), and the Brazilian constitu-
tion of 1967 stipulated a public monopoly for petroleum exploration and
exploitation (article 162, today articles 176 and 177).44 Latin America also offers
other examples beyond public ownership. Constitutional land rights of indigen-
ous peoples, for instance, illustrate the plural agency structure of a postcolonial
foreign relations law. In particular, the requirement of free, prior and informed
consultation is recognized in constitutional law, either by the constitutional text
like in Bolivia (article 30.II.15, 352, 403) or by constitutional case law like in
Colombia.45 In practice, this requirement can lead to quasi-diplomatic negoti-
ations between indigenous representatives and private transnational corpor-
ations in which the state plays merely a moderating role, if at all.46
43 On these provisions see Petra Gümplová, ‘Popular Sovereignty over Natural Resources:
A Critical Reappraisal of Leif Wenar’s Blood Oil from the Perspective of International Law
and Justice’ (2018) 7 Global Constitutionalism 173; Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, p. 263.
44 On the significance of these provisions, see John Gledhill, ‘“The People’s Oil”: Nationalism,
Globalization, and the Possibility of another Country in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela’
(2008) 52 Focaal 57. On the related approach to property, see Manuel Garcia-Mora, ‘The
Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions and International Law’ (1950) 33
Marquette L. Rev. 205.
45 From the Colombian case law, see inter alia Constitutional Court, cases SU-039/97; C-169/
2001. More generally, Rachel Sieder, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Law in Latin America’
in Cesár Rodrı́guez Garavito (ed.), Law and Society in Latin America: A NewMap (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2015), pp. 143–57.
46 Jessika Eichler, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in the Bolivian Lowlands’ (2016) 5
International Human Rights L. Rev. 119; César Rodrı́guez Garavito and Carlos Baquero
Dı́az, ‘The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation in Colombia: Advances and
Setbacks’ (2018), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/EMRIP/FPIC/GaravitoAndDi
az.pdf.
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While these examples all illustrate elements of the peripheral perspective in
positive law, they still evince a considerable diversity in terms of actual
practice and wider constitutional context, which ranges from mixed-
economy constitutional democracies like Brazil to authoritarian systems like
Iran. This diversity suggests that constitutionalism in the Global South is too
heterogeneous to attribute one uniform peripheral perspective to its foreign
relations law. If one is intent on finding a measure of convergence, an intra-
regional perspective might be more promising. One example for such
a regional approach to foreign relations law is regional integration in Latin
America, which is still influenced by peripheral experiences. The model of
regional integration espoused by Latin American states has recently been
labelled as a multi-level exercise in ‘transformative constitutionalism’47 –
a variety of constitutionalism that is often conceived as a ‘Southern’ alternative
to ‘Northern’ liberal constitutionalism.48
This model of open statehood differs from its European counterpart in its
differential constitutional openness for human rights and economic
integration.49Human rights norms and case law from the Inter-American system
enjoy a privileged constitutional status in contemporary foreign relations law in
Latin America. This status is based on explicit opening clauses such as article 93
of the Constitution of Colombia and on incorporation doctrines like the ‘block of
constitutionality’ and ‘conventionality control’.50 These doctrines accord inter-
national civil, political and social rights a status that is comparable to EU-type
direct effect and, in some jurisdictions, supremacy. In contrast, regional eco-
nomic integration and international economic law do not enjoy a similarly
47 Armin von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The
Emergence of a New Ius Commune (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). For a discussion,
see Michael Riegner, ‘Transformativer Konstitutionalismus und offene Staatlichkeit im
regionalen Verfassungsvergleich mit Lateinamerika’ (2019) 67 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen
Rechts der Gegenwart 265.
48 The concept has multiple origins but is typically associated with Karl Klare, ‘Legal Culture
and Transformative Constitutionalism’, (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146.
See also Vieira, Baxi and Viljoen, Transformative Constitutionalism. For a discussion of the
claim of Southern particularism, see Michaela Hailbronner, ‘Transformative
Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South’ (2017) 65 American Journal of
Comparative Law 527.
49 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Observations on
Transformative Constitutionalism’, in Armin von Bogdandy et. al. (eds.), Transformative
Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 27–48.
50 Mariela M. Antoniazzi and Pablo S. Alessandri, ‘Inter-Americanization: Its Legal Bases and
Political Impact’, in Armin von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), Transformative Constitutionalism in
Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), pp. 255–76 with further references.
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privileged constitutional status.51 And while the Inter-American human rights
acquis protects collective rights of social groups like indigenous peoples,52 it does
not recognize rights of legal persons like corporations – unlike the European
Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU.53Overall, this model
of regional integration thus focuses on openness towards supranational guaran-
tees for democratic and social constitutionalism, whereas economic constitution-
alism remains located at the national level – quite the reverse of the European
model.
III CONTEMPORARY TRENDS: IS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
BECOMING MORE PERIPHERAL?
The following section begins by sketching the changing context which gives
the peripheral perspective increasing resonance across the North-South-divide
(subsection A). Against this background, it seeks to illustrate the heuristic
value of peripheral research perspectives, which shed light on three contem-
porary trends in foreign relations law (subsection B): the rebalancing of the
relationship between property and sovereignty in investment law; the hybrid-
ization of foreign relations through state-owned enterprises; and attempts at
limiting private corporate power, or quasi-sovereignty, in debates about busi-
ness and human rights.
A Changing Context: Peripheral Echoes in the Center
In June 2018, the US White House published a report denouncing China’s
‘economic aggression’, warning that ‘Beijing’s ultimate goal is for domestic
companies to replace foreign companies as designers and manufacturers of
key technology and products first at home, then abroad . . . [C]orporate
51 Liliana Lizarazo Rodrı́guez and Philippe de Lombaerde, ‘Regional Economic Integration and
the Reality of Strong National Constitutional Powers in South America: A Comparative
Analysis’ (2017) 11 International Constitutional Law Journal 365. On the relationship of
Latin American transformative constitutionalism to international economic law, see Armin
von Bogdandy et al., El constitucionalismo transformador en América Latina y el derecho
económico internacional: De la tensión al diálogo (México: UNAM/MPIL, 2018).
52 Ximena Soley, ‘The Transformative Dimension of Inter-American Jurisprudence’, in Armin
von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence
of a New Ius Commune (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 337–55.
53 Cf. Anna Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal
Humanity (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Die
juristische Person des Privatrechts in der Rechtsprechung des EGMR’ (2017) 65 Jahrbuch des
öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 85.
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governance has become a tool to advance China’s strategic goals, rather than
simply, as is the custom of international rules, to advance the profit-
maximizing goals of the enterprise’.54 Soon, this political stance had legal
consequences: the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei was banned
by Congress from sensitive public procurement, and the US administration is
pushing for Huawei’s exclusion from 5G networks in the US and Western
allies.55 As other governments were pondering such a move, the UK House of
Commons published a report addressing the role of social media companies in
‘Disinformation and “fake news”’: It found that ‘malicious forces use Facebook
to . . . influence elections and democratic processes –much of which Facebook,
and other social media companies, are either unable or unwilling to prevent.
We need to apply widely-accepted democratic principles to ensure their appli-
cation in the digital age. . . . The big tech companies must not be allowed to
expand exponentially, without constraint or proper regulatory oversight.’56
These statements echo some themes familiar from Allende’s speech: the
hybrid nature of corporations between the political and the economic; their
impact on democracy; and their role in foreign relations. These echoes do not
necessarily imply that Euro-America is evolving towards the South, as prom-
inent anthropologists claim.57 They do show, however, that peripheral ideas
on foreign relations law are not exclusive to an essentialized ‘South’ but have
increasing resonance in the changing context of foreign relations law in
the ‘North’. This context is marked by intensifying contestations of liberal
democracy, of economic liberalism and of liberal internationalism.58 The
geopolitical context is increasingly shaped by emerging powers like China
54 White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression
Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World (2018),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-
Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf, 1, 11.
55 National Defense Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–91, 131 Stat. 1283 (2017), s. 1656;
Paul Mozur and Austin Ramzy, ‘Huawei Sues US Government over what it Calls an Unfair -
Ban’, New York Times, March 6, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/business/huawei-united
-states-trade-lawsuit.html.
56 ‘Disinformation and “fake news”: Final Report’ (2019 HC 1791), p. 5.
57 Jean Comaroff and John. L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is
Evolving toward Africa (Boulder: Paradigm, 2012).
58 Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark V. Tushnet (eds.),Constitutional Democracy in
Crisis? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Manuel Castells, Rupture: The Crisis of
Liberal Democracy (Newark: Polity Press, 2018); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The
Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014); Dani Rodrik, ‘Populism and
the Economics of Globalization’ (2018) 1 Journal of International Business Policy 12.
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and by the incremental evolution of Western liberal democracies from capital
exporters to capital importers, from norm shapers to norm takers.59
In this new multipolar context, international law is increasingly ‘hitting
home’, and foreign relations law is evolving in response.60 A peripheral per-
spective brings these transformations of foreign relations law into focus. Its
main heuristic value in contemporary times is the recognition that in an
economically interdependent and multipolar world, foreign relations law is
not limited to political relations but requires attention to the materiality of
global relations, to interferences between different varieties of economic
constitutionalism, and to the interdependence of economic and political
constitutionalism. Again, this general point can be illustrated by legal attitudes
towards transnational corporations.61
B Peripheral Perspectives on Contemporary Trends in Foreign Relations Law
1 Rebalancing Sovereignty and Property in Foreign Investment Law
A first trend is the rebalancing of the relationship between sovereignty
and property in the area of investment law. Standard narratives portray
international investment law as an evolution from diplomatic protection
of private property by sovereign states to a depoliticization and privatiza-
tion of property disputes between investors and states.62 Consequently,
investment law has not been in the focus of liberal foreign relations law.
However, host countries in the Global South have been experiencing for
some time that international investment protection and arbitration can
interfere with domestic constitutional principles of democracy, rule of
59 William Burke-White, ‘Power Shifts in International Law: Structural Realignment and
Substantive Pluralism’ (2015) 56Harvard Journal of International Law 1; Oliver Stuenkel, Post-
Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016).
60 Aust, ‘The Democratic Challenge to Foreign Relations Law in Transatlantic Perspective’,
at 351.
61 On renewed criticisms of corporate power, see generally Florian Wettstein, Multinational
Corporations and Global Justice: The Human Rights Obligations of a Quasi-Governmental
Institution (Stanford: Stanford Business Books, 2009); Baars and Spicer, The Corporation:
ACritical,Multi-Disciplinary Handbook; AdamWinkler,We theCorporations: How American
Businesses Won their Civil Rights (New York: Liveright, 2018).
62 A. Kulick, ‘Narrating Narratives of International Investment Law: History and Epistemic Forces’,
in Stephan W. Schill, Christian. J. Tams and Rainer Hofmann (eds.), International Investment
Law and History (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), pp. 41–69. For the reverse trend,
see now Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, The Return of the Home State to Investor-State Disputes: Bringing
Back Diplomatic Protection? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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law and human rights.63 This peripheral experience has eventually hit
home with recent controversies about TTIP, CETA and TPP in Europe
and North America.64 This is leading to re-evaluation, reform and some-
times repudiation of bilateral investment treaties and arbitration agree-
ments across the North-South divide.65 These reform efforts seek to
recalibrate the relationship between property and sovereignty, a process
which can arguably draw important lessons from peripheral legal experi-
ences, concepts and arguments. As a recent observer put it: developed
countries have learned to start worrying and love the Calvo doctrine.66
If one takes peripheral perspectives on the structure, function and subjects
of foreign relations law seriously, then at least three issues lend themselves to
further investigation. The first concerns the legal relations between foreign
investors and the host states, be they contractual or hierarchical. If these legal
relations are part of foreign relations, then the question of who decides about
the admission of foreign investment, in what procedure and under what
conditions is a critical question for foreign relations law. For jurisdictions
like Germany, such criticality, or Wesentlichkeit, may have doctrinal conse-
quences under prevailing doctrines of separation of powers and democracy:
public relations with foreign investors may need to be increasingly subjected
to parliamentary legislation instead of executive regulation.67
The second issue is jurisdiction. If investor-state relations are part of foreign
relations, then the question of how foreign relations law allocates investment
63 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law, 95 ff; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Resistance
and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015); Yannick Radi (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and
Investment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018).
64 Kleinlein, ‘TTIP and the Challenges of Investor-State-Arbitration’; Peter-Tobias Stoll, Till
P. Holterhus and Henner Gött, Investitionsschutz und Verfassung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2017); Rhea T. Hoffmann, Divergenz und Transformation: Verfassungstheoretische
Untersuchung des Eigentumsschutzes in der demokratischen Eigentumsverfassung und im
Investitionsschutzregime (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019); Ntina Tzouvala, ‘The Academic
Debate about Mega-Regionals and International Lawyers: Legalism as Critique?’ (2018) 6
London Review of International Law 189.
65 Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski (eds.), Shifting Paradigms in International
Investment Law: More balanced, less isolated, increasingly diversified (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016); Prabhash Ranjan, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Refusal,
Acceptance, Backlash (New Delhi: Oxford University Press India, 2019).
66 See generally Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, ‘The No of Tokyo Revisited: Or How Developed
Countries Learned to Start Worrying and Love the Calvo Doctrine’ (2015) 30 ICSID Review
172. On potential lessons from the South, see FabioMorosini andMichelle R. Sanchez Badin
(eds.), Reconceptualizing International Investment Law from the Global South (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
67 See generally on the constitutional implications of investment protection treaties, Stoll,
Holterhus and Gött, Investitionsschutz und Verfassung.
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disputes among host state courts, arbitral tribunals and third-country judiciar-
ies is a key question.68 From a peripheral perspective, the enforcement of
arbitral awards against host states in third-country jurisdictions is a key inter-
face between state and non-state legal systems. Behind seemingly technical
questions regarding standards of review for annulment or non-execution of
awards on the basis of public policy lurk fundamental questions of trans-
national legal pluralism and protection of foreign property, sovereignty, dem-
ocracy and rule of law.69
A third issue is the domestic effect of international investment law and
arbitral awards in host countries. If a domestic constitutional order
contains opening clauses for international law, do these apply to inter-
national investment treaties? And what is the domestic effect of arbitral
awards? This latter question was less relevant as long as tribunals awarded
monetary compensation that would be paid voluntarily or be enforced
against state assets abroad. But recent awards also adopt in-kind remedies.
In a 2018 award in the Chevron v. Ecuador saga, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ordered Ecuador ‘to remove the status of enforceability’ from
domestic court judgments and ‘to preclude any of the [plaintiffs] from
enforcing’ them.70 These judgments had required Chevron to pay dam-
ages to local residents and had been confirmed by the Ecuadorian
constitutional court. Implementing such an award certainly poses delicate
questions for domestic constitutional law and for the separation of powers
in any constitutional order, and for foreign relations law research in
general.
68 For a discussion of the relationship between domestic courts and arbitral tribunals from the
perspective of transformative constitutionalism in Latin America, see René Urueña, ‘Después
de la fragmentación: ICCAL, derechos humanos y arbitraje de inversiones’, in Armin von
Bogdandy et al.El constitucionalismo transformador en América Latina y el derecho económico
internacional: De la tensión al diálogo (México: UNAM/MPIL, 2018), pp. 59–85.
69 See generally Leon Trakman, ‘Domestic Courts Declining to Recognize and Enforce Foreign
Arbitral Awards: A Comparative Reflection’ (2018) 6 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law
174. On the annulment of arbitral awards by third countries, see Felix Boor, ‘Die Aufhebung
der Yukos-Schiedssprüche des Permanent Court of Arbitration vor demBezirksgericht inDen
Haag – nur der Anfang einer langen Vollstreckungsodyssee?’ (2018) 54 Archiv des
Völkerrechts 297.
70 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009–23,
Second Partial Award on Track II, 30 August 2018. On this lengthy litigation, see generally
Hannah Franzki and JohannHorst, ‘On the Critical Potential of Law – and its Limits: Double
Fragmentation of Law in Chevron vs. Ecuador’, in Kerstin Blome et al. (eds.), Contested
Regime Collisions: Norm Fragmentation in World Society (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2016), pp. 347–70.
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2 Sovereignty in the Guise of Property: Hybrid Foreign Relations and
State-Owned Enterprises
If international investment law is being rebalanced towards sovereignty,
then sovereignty is at the same time being transformed by a symbiosis
with property: state-owned enterprises, hybrid public-private entities or
partly privatized corporations are increasingly internationalizing their
activities.71 In this regard, the maybe most significant transformation of foreign
relations is the globalization of Chinese state-owned enterprises and the rise of
foreign investment by sovereign wealth funds.72 In a parallel development,
sovereignty appears in the guises of property in large-scale land acquisition by
public investors in Africa and elsewhere, which potentially disassembles terri-
torial sovereignty of host states.73 In all these instances, foreign relations acquire
a hybrid nature – private in form but public in substance.
To analytically capture this hybridization, foreign relations law research
needs a more complex account of the corporation than liberal legalism
ordinarily gives. If ‘corporate governance has become a tool to advance
China’s strategic goals’,74 as the Trump administration laments, then foreign
relations lawyers need to understand non-liberal conceptions of the corpor-
ation in China and other capital exporting countries.75Huawei, for instance, is
71 Michael J. Strauss, Hostile Business and the Sovereign State: Privatized Governance, State
Security and International Law (Milton: Routledge, 2019). To peripheral countries, this is not
news, if one remembers that most colonial trading companies were public-private ventures,
and were treated as such by the courts, McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, 49, citing the case
Nabob of Arcot v. East India Company [1793] EngR 1368, (1792–1793) 2 Ves Jun 56, (1793) 30
ER 521 (Company held not to be a private person, and its agreement with a foreign ruler ‘the
same, as if it was a treaty between two sovereigns’).
72 Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China’ (2013) 65 Stanford Law Review 697; Gregory
Shaffer and Henry Gao, ‘A New Chinese Economic Law Order?’, Univ. of California Legal
Studies Research Paper Series (No. 2019–21), April 11, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3370452; Ronald Gilson and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds
and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism’ (2008) 60
Stanford Law Review 1345.
73 Lorenzo Cotula et al., Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and
International Land Deals in Africa (London: IIED,FAO and IFAD, 2009); Saskia Sassen,
‘LandGrabs Today: Feeding theDisassembling of National Territory’ (2013) 10Globalizations
25; Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘Who Is Entitled to Cultivate the Land? Sovereignty, Land
Resources and Foreign Investments in Agriculture in International Law’, in Francesca
Romanin Jacu, Angelica Bonfanti and Francesco Seatzu (eds.), Natural Resources Grabbing
: An International Law Perspective (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), pp. 55–74.
74 White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression
Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, 1, 11.
75 For a comparison of liberal and non-liberal conceptions of the corporation see
Teemu Ruskola, ‘What Is a Corporation?: Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of
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formally not a public enterprise but employee-owned; but Chinese law may
have other ways of establishing state control.76 Comparing these different
theoretical and legal conceptions of the corporation will be a first important
avenue of research for comparative foreign relations lawyers.
A second set of questions pertains to the constitutional rights of foreign state-
owned corporations. For instance, the German Federal Constitutional Court
held in its 2016 decision on the phase-out of nuclear energy that Vattenfall,
a Swedish state-owned enterprise, enjoyed constitutional protection of prop-
erty in Germany.77 Although the court was careful to limit its reasoning to
‘exceptional cases’ of enterprises owned by EU member states, there still
remain many open questions for foreign relations lawyers in this regard –
not least because Vattenfall has initiated parallel arbitration procedures and
because the European Court of Human Rights recognizes property rights of
state-owned enterprises regardless of EU membership.78
While granting constitutional rights to foreign state-owned enterprises
limits the space for regulation in this regard, another legal institution raises
even farther-reaching issues: namely, sovereign immunity and its application
to state-owned enterprises in foreign courts. While the German Constitutional
Court adopts a restrictive stance on acta iure gestionis,79 Chinese state-owned
enterprises seem to have successfully invoked sovereign immunity in US
federal courts, prompting proposals for reform.80 If granted, immunity not
only poses problems from a rule of law perspective but also limits the reach of
democratic economic regulation.81
Enterprise Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood)’ (2014) 37 Seattle Univ. Law
Review, 639.
76 Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘Huawei Pulls back Curtain on Ownership Details’, Financial Times,
February 27, 2014, www.ft.com/content/469bde20-9eaf-11e3-8663-00144feab7de. See also
White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic
Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the
World, 18 f.
77 Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 143, 246.
78 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey (Appl. No.40998/98), Judgment of
13 December 2007. For a general discussion of the issues, see Jochen Rauber, Zur
Grundrechtsberechtigung fremdstaatlich beherrschter juristischer Personen: Art. 19 III GG
unter dem Einfluss von EMRK, EU-GRCh und allgemeinem Völkerrecht (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2019).
79 BVerfGE 16, 27 – Iranische Botschaft; BVerfGE 117, 141 – Immunität Argentiniens. For
a discussion, see Rauber, Zur Grundrechtsberechtigung, pp. 33 f.
80 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017 Report to Congress,
November 2017, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2017_Annual_Report_to_C
ongress.pdf, p. 4, 29.
81 See generally McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, Ch. 12.
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3 Limiting or Legitimizing Private Quasi-Sovereignty: Business
and Human Rights and Is Alternatives
If Northern efforts to internationalize corporate rights in investment law have
succeeded, Southern attempts at internationalizing corporate obligations have
failed so far: early initiatives at UN level, launched by Allende’s Chile and its
allies, led to the establishment of a UN Commission on Transnational
Corporations in 1975 and to a soft-law code of conduct, but not to a binding
legal instrument.82 Regulation remained mostly at national level and thus
vulnerable to bilateral pressures, collective action problems and regulatory
arbitrage in a globalized political economy. This situation has not changed
thus far with the renewed push for internationalization under the rubric of
‘business and human rights’, although developing countries are spearheading
negotiations for a binding treaty on business and human rights, supported by
China and opposed by most Western liberal democracies.83
The legal focus thus remains on domestic law, and thus on the foreign
relations law of investor home states and host states. The current debate
centers on the role of home states in the extraterritorial protection of human
rights against corporate misconduct in host states.84 Since the US Supreme
Court has all but closed the door to the extraterritorial application of the Alien
Tort Claims Act, the focus has shifted to domestic courts in Europe and to
legislative projects, enacted for instance in California and in France and
tabled in Germany in February 2019.85
82 Tagi Sagafi-nejad and John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From
Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008);
Jennifer Bair, ‘Corporations at the United Nations: Echoes of the New International
Economic Order?’ (2015) 6 Humanity 159; Pahuja and Saunders, ‘Rival Worlds and the
place of the Corporation in International Law’.
83 Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds.), Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights:
Context and Contours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
84 Jennifer Zerk, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights
Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas’, Harvard Corporate Social Responsibility Working Paper
No. 59 (June 2010), www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/
workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf; Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘Extraterritoriale menschenrechtliche
Staatenpflichten und Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011) 49 Archiv des Völkerrechts 34;
Thilo Marauhn, ‘Sicherung grund- und menschenrechtlicher Standards gegenüber neuen
Gefährdungen durch private und ausländische Akteure’ (2015) 74 Veröffentlichungen der
Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer 373.
85 Dalia Palombo, ‘The Duty of Care of the Parent Company: A Comparison between French
Law, UK Precedents and the Swiss Proposals’ (2019) 4 Business and Human Rights Journal
265; Saskia Wilks and Johannes Blankenbach, ‘Will Germany Become a Leader in the Drive
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A peripheral perspective, however, raises further questions. Firstly, from this
perspective, the focus on extraterritorial home state obligations and regula-
tions is ambivalent: it not only subjects host states to standards defined and
applied elsewhere but also implies that host state legal systems are incapable,
or unwilling, to dispense justice. While this may be true in some cases, it
cannot be assumed for all jurisdictions, especially the many constitutional
democracies with independent courts in the Global South. Indeed,
a peripheral perspective might reverse the focus and ask to what extent host
state regulation and adjudication can and should be extended extraterritorially
to govern global value chains and transnational corporate conglomerates.
Taking host state law seriously brings distinct regulatory approaches to the
table – such as horizontal effect of fundamental rights. The idea of horizontal
effect is a hallmark of transformative constitutionalism in the Global South
and is used by activists and social movements against corporate abuses of
powers.86 In substance, this approach redeploys the vocabulary and legal
techniques developed to restrain public authority to tame private power.
The consequences of this move for separation of powers, democracy and
foreign relations remain to be fully understood. One consequence of applying
fundamental rights to transnational corporations is that courts effectively
become extraterritorial regulators and tend to be empowered vis-à-vis the
other branches. This is potentially a problem from a liberal foreign relations
law perspective; it may be less problematic for a transformative constitutional-
ism that prizes activist courts and an understanding of separation of powers not
limited to checks and balances but also encompassing pushes and pulls.
Beyond this, there are issues of separation between public and private
power. Some see horizontal effect as a basis for corporate commitments to
human rights, a desirable ‘self-constitutionalization’ of transnational enter-
prises and a basis for a societal constitutionalism beyond the state.87 Others
fear that a rights-based societal constitutionalism will not restrain but rather
legitimize private power.88 Likening a corporation to a state for purposes of
86 David Bilchitz, ‘Constitutionalism, the Global South, and Economic Justice’, in Daniel
Bonilla Maldonado (ed.), Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of
India, South Africa, and Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 41–94;
Hailbronner, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South’.
87 Gunther Teubner, ‘Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs?: On the Linkage of ‘Private’ and ‘Public’
Corporate Codes of Conduct’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17;
Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
88 Christian Scheper, ‘“From Naming and Shaming to Knowing and Showing”: Human Rights
and the Power of Corporate Practice’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Human Rights 737.
For a different notion of societal constitutionalism, see Gavin Anderson, ‘Societal
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human rights obligations might confirm, rather than restrain, their quasi-
sovereign status. Domestic courts are faced with these controversies when
pondering the legal value of corporate human rights standards in litigation.
In light of these doubts, a third and final question pertains to alternatives to
the business and human rights frame from a peripheral foreign relations law
perspective. Again, Allende’s speech offers such an alternative perspective: his
concerns and proposals were not formulated in the liberal language of rights
but in the register of democracy. While ideas about economic democracy and
workers co-determination have lost traction in a globalized economy domin-
ated by (neo)liberal thinking, it may be worth reflecting on how the vocabulary
of collective self-determination may be used creatively within the contempor-
ary globalized economy. For instance, resurgent interest in inequality has led
to greater space for alternative visions of corporate governance that go beyond
‘shareholder democracy’ and ‘corporate citizenship’ on the one hand, and
nationalization and state ownership on the other. Such proposals are based on
the premise that the corporation, conceived as a political entity, allows similar
collective participation rights than the political sphere and that these rights do
not depend on ownership. Rather, they allow for inclusion of workers and
other stakeholders affected by corporate activities.89 In these schemes, periph-
eral countries would benefit from the inclusion in corporate decision-making
by virtue of their labor and affected stakeholders. This might alter the current
North/South dynamics of capital exploitation by promoting economic dem-
ocracy in developing countries through formally private initiatives that poten-
tially bypass current barriers to more democratic economic reforms in highly
unequal societies with unresponsive political regimes.
IV CONCLUSION
Peripheral legal ideas are not exclusive to an essentialized ‘Global South’ but
are present in legal history, heterodox thinking and contemporary legal trans-
formations across the North-South divide. In foreign relations law, peripheral
Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (2013) 20 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 881. On self-regulation generally, see also A. Claire Cutler,
Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
89 Isabelle Ferreras, Firms as Political Entities: Saving Democracy through Economic
Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); David Ciepley, ‘Beyond
Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation’ (2013) 107 American
Political Science Review 139. On a Chinese experiment in this regard, see Karita Kan,
‘A Weapon of the Weak? Shareholding, Property Rights and Villager Empowerment in
China’ (2019) 237 The China Quarterly 131.
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ideas are often located at the margins of, or outside, a field of study defined by
a liberal perspective from the center. A peripheral perspective brings these
questions into sharper focus, and it offers different answers contingent on
differing geopolitical positions and epistemic foundations. This raises the
question of whether there are any lessons to be learned from experiences of
the periphery for our normative evaluation of present-day challenges across
the North-South divide.
That question must be denied if one assumes a view of history and time that
follows a liberal narrative of progress and a singular conception of modernity:
The West is ahead, everyone else is catching up. If one accepts, instead, the
idea of multiple modernities and nonlinear historical evolution, one may see
the history of Southern countries as an inspiration – and as a warning.90 One
ironic aspect of the recent backlash against internationalism are the curious
echoes of anticolonial nationalism in the language of populist nationalism –
for instance, in Brexit proponents’ appeals to national liberation and to
individual sacrifice as necessary for achieving this goal.91 These echoes are
reason enough to recall postcolonial critiques of ‘national liberation’, which
left unresolved the question of who would govern the nation once liberated,
and who would do the sacrificing. Franz Fanon warned of the pitfalls
of ‘national consciousness’, seeing within the liberation movements a group
of bourgeois leaders who ‘mobilize the people with slogans of independence,
and for the rest leave it to future events’ and are committed only to a ‘mission
[that] has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of
being the transmission line between the nation and capitalism’.92
90 Hoffmann, ‘Knowledge Production in Comparative Constitutional Law’; Peter Wagner,
Modernity: Understanding the Present (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).
91 Kojo Koram, ‘Britain’s Blindness: How did “national liberation” become a rallying cry in what was
once the world’s largest empire?’, Dissent Magazine, February 6, 2019, www.dissentmagazine.org
/online_articles/britains-brexit-blindness.
92 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 100.
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[A]s a Justice of the High Court of England . . . it is my duty to apply English municipal
law, including English foreign relations law . . . Questions of foreign affairs arising in
English courts have . . . English law answers.1
Could an Indian judge, as the purveyor of the common law coming from
England to India, too, identify a duty to apply Indian ‘foreign relations law’
(FRL), if any? Could the judge also assert that the questions of ‘foreign affairs’
arising before Indian courts ought to have Indian law answers? After acknow-
ledging the presence of an established FRL in England, the British High
Court in the Muffakham Jah case notably found for Pakistan ‘a foreign
relations law’ but a ‘constitutional law’ for India.2Wewill do well to remember
that while Britain does not have a written constitution, United States has one
of the world’s shortest written constitutions.3 Contrarily, the Constitution of
India is the postcolonial world’s most detailed text. Needless to say, the
Constitution is a significant lens with which to identify the possibility, or
not, of an FRL within the law of the land.
In what follows, Section II investigates the origins of FRL that appears to
reinforce, in the words of the Commonwealthian D.P. O’Connell, the ‘essen-
tial unity of all European legal structures’ that is ‘founded on the moral
1 High Commissioner for Pakistan in the United Kingdom v. Prince Muffakham Jah, [2019]
EWHC 2551 (Ch) para. 85.
2 ‘[V]iewed from the perspective of the law of Pakistan – including her foreign relations law’ and
‘I also have absolutely no doubt that, viewed from the perspective of the law of India – including
in particular her constitutional law’. High Commissioner for Pakistan in the United Kingdom
v. Prince Muffakham Jah, [2019] EWHC 2551 (Ch) paras. 83–84.
3 Fali S. Nariman, God Save the Hon’ble Supreme Court (New Delhi: Hay House, 2018) p. 135.
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concord of Western peoples’.4 It concludes that the FRL scholars practice
a convenient overlooking of the colonial history of the common law. Section
III studies the significance Indian Constitution attaches to the international
law of states and that of state and peoples and aliens. Since the Indian
Constitution does not break free by design from common law, the Indian
judges use the Constitution as well as common law to harmonise international
law with Indian law. Section IV investigates how the Indian Supreme Court
excludes foreign relations from judicial scrutiny. An outcome of this investi-
gation is the fidelity of the Supreme Court to British case laws over the
American precedents in its first two decades.5 Section V discusses the
Supreme Court’s reading of India’s postcolonial territory under the uti possi-
detis lens of international law. The study of uti possidetis for India is significant
in that the Supreme Court has created a balance between a fractured recep-
tion of territory from the British and the postcolonial government’s reception
of territory within the Constitution. Indeed, the President of India has from
time to time sought the Court’s opinion on the executive’s power of exchange
of territory and cession, like with regard to Pakistan, or the Court has examined
the welcoming of new territories, like Sikkim, into the Union of India. Such
questions from the executive have allowed the Indian Supreme Court to
affirm its Constitutional superiority with deference to the competence of the
executive in territorial matters while reading international law in harmony
with, what I call, a ‘postcolonial common law’. Section VI concludes.
II FRL AS THE ‘CONCORD OF WESTERN PEOPLES’:
THE COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIALISM
A The FRL of the Commonwealth
An FRL, in Campbell McLachlan’s definition, ought to be ‘a distinct field in
Anglo-Commonwealth legal systems’.6 How inclusive is this common law,
however, of non settler jurisdictions such as India and Kenya, for example? ‘In
approaching the question of the existence or otherwise of [a] doctrine in
4 Daniel P. O’Connell, ‘Unjust Enrichment’ (1956) 5 American Journal of Comparative Law 2
at 4.
5 Exactly two decades after the Indian independence, in 1967 Justice Subba Rao, against the will
of the Indian Government, read the American doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’ into Indian
Law. Fali S. Nariman, India’s Legal System: Could it Be Saved? (Gurgaon: Penguin Random
House India, 2017 [2006]) pp. 74–5, 158–9.
6 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law’ (2012) 82 British
Yearbook of International Law 349.
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English law’, O’Connell wrote in 1956, ‘one must not only appreciate the
character of the English legal system, but go further and recognize the essen-
tial unity of all European legal structures, a unity founded on the moral
concord of Western peoples’.7
O’Connell was referring to the resistance among the English lawyers in
importing a European legal idea calling into service the ‘unity founded on the
moral concord of Western peoples’. In the twenty-first century, McLachlan’s
Foreign Relations Law explicitly refers to only four Anglo-Commonwealth
states; the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand,8 effecting
a further provincialisation of the ‘concord of Western peoples’ – the white ex-
colonies of imperial Britain. Commonwealth lawyers have, as it were, gone
out into the woods to pick mushrooms of various laws, if you will, for an FRL
soup. The American and the British lawyers have to go mushroom-picking
perhaps because they do not have the benefit of a Constitution like India’s, the
world’s largest and enduring. Besides, India, a common law jurisdiction, is
expectedly out of the consideration from both the ‘concord of the Western
peoples’ as well as the list of jurisdictions to make an FRL from.9 Should the
FRL scholars look into the deliberations of the Indian Constitution, the
conclusion would be that the advocacy for FRL is somewhat provincial.
For McLachlan, an FRL pertains to a
whole class of legal issues and disputes, dealing with: the relationship
between public international law and the municipal legal system in the
control of foreign relations; the exercise of the foreign relations power by
the three organs of government – its legal implications and its limits; the
implications of the foreign relations power for the rights of the individual; and
the treatment of the foreign state within the municipal legal system.10
This class is understandably large. McLachlan claims that FRL ‘serves to fill
a key gap by extending to the field of public powers the technique of private
7 Daniel P. O’Connell, ‘Unjust Enrichment’ at 4.
8 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014) refers to only four Anglo-Commonwealth states; the United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada and New Zealand.
9 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’ (2001) 91 American Economic
Review 1369 at 1370.
10 McLachlan, ‘The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law’, 349; Campbell McLachlan,
‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The
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international law – jurisdiction and applicable law’ thereby depositing FRL in
the domain of the ‘constitutional state’.11
It is well known that India inherited a common law system from British
colonialism. And in 1950 India received her Constitution that was inspired by
various civil and common law systems. Does India also have an FRL in the
cast and mould made by theOxford Handbook on FRL?12 TheHandbook casts
a very wide net in so far as crafting an FRL is concerned. And the cast of that
FRL net, for the Handbook editor Curtis Bradley, covers not just classic
international law. For Bradley, the FRLs ‘encompass the domestic law of
each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the
world’. We are confronted with the famous Dworkinian question then;
could the ‘principles’ of foreign affairs be passed off as the ‘law’ of foreign
affairs in India? I think not.
We need to first find an FRL in India. Only afterwards could we answer
whether there exists or not the possibility of either bridges or boundaries
between an Indian FRL and international law. If we take the FRL’s scope
and definition from the Handbook and combine it with this volume editors’
expectations, we might squarely conclude that FRL for India remains primar-
ily a constitutional reading of the international law of states and individuals.13
B Overlooking Legal History
The idiosyncratic judges, scholars, and diplomats in the geographical South
should not be easily convinced by the FRL scholarship that is innocent of legal
history.14 The FRL’s first impression on any Asian post-colony is that of a new
blueprint of imperialism through law in the twenty-first century because, as
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson note:
There were different types of colonization policies which created different
sets of institutions. At one extreme, European powers set up ‘extractive states’,
[where the colonists] did not introduce much protection for private property,
11 McLachlan, ‘The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law’, 349–50.
12 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’ in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019)
p. 3.
13 Venkatachala G. Hegde, ‘Indian Courts and International Law’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of
International Law 53 at 58.
14 A ‘discursive formation of common law resulting in the transformation of the law of nations in
the Indian colony rejects the idea of the periphery as only the receiver of the law. The Indian
colony supplied common law to England instead.’ Prabhakar Singh, ‘Indian Princely States
and the 19th-century Transformation of the Law of Nations’ (2020) 11 Journal of International
Dispute Settlement 365 at 387.
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nor did they provide checks and balances against government expropriation.
In fact, the main purpose of the extractive state was to transfer as much of the
resources of the colony to the colonizer. At the other extreme, many
Europeans migrated and settled in a number of colonies, creating . . . ‘Neo-
Europes’. The settlers tried to replicate European institutions, with strong
emphasis on private property and checks against government power.15
It is rather remarkable that, as a legal innovation, FRL is made up of and
seeks to export to the rest of the world the common law of ‘Neo-Europes’
whose ‘[p]rimary examples’ for Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson ‘include
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States’.16How exactly does
McLachlan’s choice of jurisdictions map on to lands where ‘Europeans
migrated and settled in a number of colonies’ beyond Europe? Given this
obvious colonial history impacting the choice of the four jurisdictions to
make and export FRL from, the postcolonial Indian should be circumspect.
Whether such an FRL’s legal hermeneutics, in the presence of other ways of
doing law – the regular constitutional law for example – will convince the
geographical South remains to be seen.17
Effectively, from our vantage point, the FRL scholars seem to conveniently
overlook legal history.18 There are two aspects of that overlooked legal history
relevant to the postcolonial common lawworld. Jurist FaliNariman reminds us of
the first one: a remarkable aspect of ‘legal history is that no country which had not
at some time or the other been a part of the British Empire has ever voluntarily
adopted the common law!’19 Nariman finds it a ‘stark fact’ that ‘whenever there
was a choice between common law and the Roman law’, the basis of the
continental law, ‘the decision has always been in favour of Roman law’.20
Second, the employment of private law in the service of public law is not so
new. The attempts to create FRL as a new field to study law in that sense
15 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’, 1370.
16 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’,
1370.
17 To the extent FRL borrows from private law made in the defence of private property and
private investors, Ayyangar J. in theMithibarwala case discredited that ‘theory’ because ‘there
could be no analogy between individuals and States’ within ‘the basic foundations of the rules
of [p]ublic [i]nternational [l]aw’. State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala,
1964 Indlaw SC 357, para. 51.
18 ‘A recent book [on FRL] with over 46 chapters does not contain a single chapter or sustained
analysis of issues of identity and/race even though the U.S. Foreign Relations paradigm is the
defining framework for the book’. James T. Gathii, ‘Writing Race and Identity in a Global
Context: What CRT and TWAIL Can Learn From Each Other’ (2020) 67UCLA Law Review
footnote 191.
19 Nariman, India’s Legal System, p. 23.
20 Nariman, India’s Legal System, p. 24.
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mimics the McNair-Lauterpacht school of public law making by private law
principles. This stoked Jessup’s theoretical innovation soon after the Asian
decolonisation aimed at puncturing Asian states’ new-found sovereignty by
invoking as the applicable law the pro-investor law of the United States.21
Walking through the Indian constitutional cases that have settled questions
of jurisdiction and applicable law, the fulcrum of FRL’s proposal, seems
a good starting point for reflection.
III THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT BETWEEN PRINCIPLES,
POLICY AND THE LAW
Part 5, chapter 4 of the Indian Constitution talks about ‘the Union judiciary’.
The Supreme Court of India currently comprises of a Chief Justice and thirty
other judges appointed by the President of India.22 Under article 143(1) the
President has the powers to seek the opinion of the Court about ‘a question of
law or fact’ which is of ‘public importance’. The Court ‘as it thinks fit, report[s]
to the President its opinion’. Article 144 mandates that ‘All authorities, civil
and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court’.
Very importantly, under article 145(5) of the Constitution:
No judgment and no such opinion shall be delivered by the Supreme Court
save with the concurrence of a majority of the Judges present at the hearing of
the case, but nothing in this clause shall be deemed to prevent a Judge who
does not concur from delivering a dissenting judgment or opinion.
The Indian Constitution in providing for the possibility of ‘delivering a dissenting
judgment or opinion’ seeks to balance the majority rule principle of judicial
decision-making with the constitutional mandate for judicial idiosyncrasy of
separate and dissenting opinions. It bears reminding that this constitutional
mandate for dissent has allowed the Indian judges to save India’s democratic
and secular fabric from the blades of the past and the present authoritarian
governments.
A Article 51 of the Constitution and International Law
Article 51 of the Indian Constitution speaks most directly about international
law. It reads as follows:
21 Prabhakar Singh, ‘The Private Life of Transnational Law’, in Peer Zumbansen (ed.), The
Many Lives of Transnational Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 419.
22 The Supreme Court of India, https://main.sci.gov.in/constitution [30 September 2020].
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The State shall endeavour to –
(a) promote international peace and security;
(b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings
of organized peoples with one another; and
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.
Since article 51(c) distinguishes ‘international law’ and ‘treaty obligations’, the
Indian Constitution in such ways recognises both treaty and non-treaty sources of
international law. The Indian Supreme Court in the seven bench Maneka
Gandhi ruling noted: In the context of expressions like ‘security’, ‘public order’,
‘public interest’ and ‘friendly foreign relations’, governments come and go, ‘but
the fundamental rights of the people cannot be subject to the wishful value sets of
political regimes of the passing day’.23 Maneka Gandhi thus pointed at the
permanency of fundamental rights over the political nature of the executive.
Maneka Gandhi set a fertile bed for and planted the seeds of Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan to flower later in that the former’s emphasis on the ‘fundamental rights’
nudged theCourt in the latter case to import under article 51 froman international
convention on the fundamental rights for women. Justice Verma noted in
Vishaka:
In the absence of domestic law to formulate effective measures to check [an]
evil naturally the contents of International Conventions and norms are
significant for the purpose of interpretation of [fundamental rights guaran-
tees] of the Constitutions . . . Any International Convention not inconsistent
with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into
these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the
object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51(c).24
Article 51 remains non-justiciable for falling under ‘policy’ and ‘principle’ and
not ‘law’ nevertheless. In other words, while one cannot directly invoke a treaty
in the Supreme Court that India has not passed into a domestic law, Justice
Verma, a champion of human rights, offered a useful elucidation. The
Parliament has full powers to enact laws for implementing international
conventions by virtue of article 253 read with Entry 14 of the Union List in
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. And article 73(1)(a) provides that
the ‘executive power of the Union shall extend’ to the ‘matters with respect to
which Parliament has power to make laws’. Next, article 73(1)(b) extends the
23 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 Indlaw SC 212, para. 211.
24 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan And Others, 1997 Indlaw SC 2304, para. 14.
92 Prabhakar Singh
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
executive power ‘to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are
exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement’.
We find that the Indian Constitution distinguishes the executive’s compe-
tence from the ‘Parliament’s power’ and authority to pass a law by virtue of ‘any
treaty’. The executive power of the Indian Union, Justice Verma said, is
therefore available ‘till the parliament enacts to expressly provide measures
needed to curb a gap in the law’.25
The executive is under the Constitution vested with residual powers up
until the Parliament passes an international treaty into domestic law. The
Supreme Court’s firm statement of the relationship between international
treaties and rights and obligations in municipal law, an assertion of dualism,
can be found first in the Maganbhai judgment:
TheConstitution of Indiamakes no provisionmaking legislation a condition of
the entry into an international treaty in times either of war or peace. The
executive is qua the State competent to represent the State in all matters
international and may by agreement, convention or treaties incur obligations
which in international law are binding upon the State. There is a distinction
between the formation and the performance of the obligations constituted by
a treaty. Under the Constitution the obligations arising under the agreement or
treaties are not by their own force binding upon Indian nationals or others.26
Essentially, Maganbhai distinguishes the signing of a treaty by the State from
the ‘performance’ of obligations arising from such a treaty under the Indian law.
While the executive is fully competent to sign a treaty, for the treaty to pass into
domestic law the Parliament alone can do the lawmaking. Acknowledging this
difference, Justice Verma astutely read article 51 as allowing international
conventions and treaties becoming only a ‘policy’ guide for interpreting
Indian law so long as such international laws do not conflict with Indian laws.
In other words, international law for Vishaka only offers tools for interpretation
and not for creating new obligations to arise without a supporting domestic law.
We can therefore hardly say that the ‘directive principles’ have become
justiciable. They continue to remain ‘principles’ and ‘policy’ that the Court
might remind the executive of, as it sometimes does, to nudge them to pass
a suitable law. Article 37 of the Indian Constitution makes it very clear: ‘The
provisions contained in this Part [on directive principles] shall not be enforce-
able by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the
25 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan And Others, 1997 Indlaw SC 2304, para. 14.
26 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, 1969 SCR (3) 254, para. 79.
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State to apply these principles in making laws’.27 On balance, article 37
appears to instruct the Indian state and not the higher judiciary.28
We can see that for the Court instructing the executive in territorial matters is
a more contested endeavour than importing justice-enhancing norms from
human rights treaties. This is so because the Vishaka reads human rights treaties
as codified customary laws but the Court generally finds no such thing as
customary laws on territory. To then adjudge the Court’s views on human rights
treaties as a possible rejection of dualism in India is the kind of eagerness that is
misleading. Little surprise that we find the anglophileHidayatullah holding a line
harder than the conservative Gajendragadkar in matters of territorial acquisition
after decolonisation.29Nevertheless, all laws in India get oxygen from our written
Constitution.
B Common Law and the Colonial Continuity
VP Menon – Constitutional advisor to India’s last British Governor General –
noted: theBritish ‘came to trade, but stayed to rule.They left of their ownwill; there
was nowar, there was no treaty – an act with no parallel in history’.30 India became
a fully independent dominion by an Act of the British Parliament, the Indian
IndependenceAct, 1947. The IndianConstitution article 147 therefore defined the
‘interpretation’ of the Constitution of India to specifically include the reading of
the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Legally, as Nariman says, India did not reject
common law under its Constitution.31 Yet, as Madhav Khosla says, India did not
become a case of a ‘thoughtless duplication’ of British laws.32
27 Article 37 of the Indian Constitution of 1950.
28 See generally, Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Directive principles and the expressive accommodation of
ideological dissenters’ (2018) 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law 389–420.
29 Gajendragadkar for Dhavan ‘was the Rooseveltian New Deal judge’ and ‘only in the 1970s was it
discovered that this kind of judge was too closely linked with the government to credit identifica-
tion with a Holmes or a Cardozo’. Rajeev Dhavan, ‘Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of American
Scholarship on Indian Law’ (1985) 33 American Journal of Comparative Law 505 at 515. Yet, as
Gadbois points out, the ‘Anglophile’ Chief Justice of India during 1968–70, Hidayatullah and his
colleague under his stewardship ‘reflected views that were more conservative than during any
earlier period’.GeorgeH.Gadbois Jr, Judges of the SupremeCourt of India: 1950–1989 (NewDelhi:
Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 136. TheNehruGovernment curiously enough sent the Bombay
HighChief JusticeMCChagla, at the time judge adhoc in theRight of Passage case, to theUnited
States as India’s ambassador. Chagla was later ‘appointed as minister in successive governments at
the centre’. Nariman, India’s Legal System, p. 77. Should we see Nehru pollinating politics with
law or vice versa?
30 Vappala P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2020 [1957])
p. 436.
31 Nariman, India’s Legal System, p. 23.
32 Madhav Khosla, India’s FoundingMoment: The Constitution of a Most Surprising Democracy
(London: Harvard University Press, 2020) at 20.
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The Indian Constitution has made the Indian Supreme Court the final
authority on the reading of the Indian laws.33 The Court has the authority to
interpret the reception of international law by the municipal courts. At the
core of the Indian Supreme Court’s foot in the door on international law
matters is India’s common law tradition as well as the continuity of the
colonial laws, precedents as well the various codes passed for the Indian
colony after 1857, guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Article 372(1) of the
Constitution guarantees that ‘all the law in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue
in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority’.34 Article 372, if you will, gives
Indian judges the licence to practice comparative legal hermeneutics. With
the continuity of the colonial laws guaranteed by the Indian Constitution,
the Indian courts have a large say in determining and affirming the execu-
tive’s international legal commitments made before 1947 that is embedded
in common law.35
In 1964, Justice Mudholkar framed the pressing issue of common law,
municipal courts, and international law in clear terms. However, ‘would the
position be different’, Justice Mudholkar asked, ‘where a particular rule of
international law has been incorporated into the common law by decisions of
courts?’ He noted:
Where Parliament does not modify or abrogate a rule of international law
which has become part of the common law, is it open to a municipal court to
abrogate it or to enforce it in a modified form on the ground that the opinion
of civilized States has undergone a change and instead of the old rule a more
just and fair rule has been accepted?36
As a matter of ‘legal method’, a large chunk of the arguments before the Indian
Supreme Court for judicial review of the executive actions in international
matters are trojan horses for importing British and American precedents. The
Indian Supreme Court has under common law kept its umbilical cord with
the mother British law intact even as it consistently rejected, up until the
33 Prabhakar Singh, ‘Spinning Yarns from Moonbeams: A Jurisprudence of Statutory
Interpretation in Common Law’ (2021) 42 Statute Law Review, https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hm
y035, accessed 30 September 2020.
34 Article 372 (1) of the Indian Constitution of 1950.
35 ‘[A] rule of international law on which the several Privy Council decisions as to the effect of
conquest or cession on the private rights of the inhabitants of the conquered or ceded territory
is founded has become a part of the common law of this country’. State of Gujarat v. Vora
Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, 1964 Indlaw SC 357 (Mudholkar J.), para. 180.
36 State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, 1964 Indlaw SC 357 para. 180.
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1970s, the revolutionary nature of the American precedents.37 In a protracted
hermeneutical battle of the law, while the executive since 1947 has been
inspired by the American independence, the Supreme Court has defended
the British common law as the true law for India.38 At the core of finding
a possible FRL in India rests the local postcolonial common law, the extent of
judicial review of the executive function, and the constitutional bind on the
executive’s competence in withdrawal from international legal obligations
existing before 1947.39
C The Supreme Court and Extradition of Aliens: Policy or Law?
One of the ways to detect an FRL,McLachlan says, is to evaluate the ‘question
of the role of law in political matters, whether presented as a plea of non-
justiciability, act of state or political question’.40 Yet the foreign affairs excep-
tionalism cannot be wished away even in states where, to recall O’Connell,
‘the essential unity of all European legal structures, a unity founded on the
moral concord of Western peoples’ is recognised. Let us see how the Indian
Supreme Court has treated foreign states before it.
The Hans Muller case arose when the then West German Government
requested the extradition of one Mr Muller for offences which he had
allegedly committed in West Germany.41 Justice Vivian Bose was admittedly
forced to ‘turn to a wider question’ bringing the Indian Supreme Court ‘to the
fringe of International law’.42 The West German Consul at Calcutta had
written to the West Bengal Government on 9 October 1954 requesting that
the provincial Government issue a ‘provisional warrant’ of arrest against Mr
Muller, keeping him in custody until the West German Government could
37 ‘English courts have thus given effect to rules of international law by resorting to a process of
incorporation’. State of Gujarat v.Vora Fiddali BadruddinMithibarwala, 1964 Indlaw SC 357,
para. 181.
38 InRosiline George v.Union of India 1993 Indlaw SC 1535, the Indian SupremeCourt declared
‘rights and obligations under all international agreements’ to which ‘India was a party imme-
diately before 1947, automatically devolved upon India after it achieved independence’.
39 There are no substantive limitations upon the executive from withdrawal from international
commitments. Unless there is a Parliamentary process to reject an existing international
obligation pre-cast in common law, the Executive cannot arbitrarily withdraw. This has
been articulated in by Justice Mudholkar and Justice Lokur respectively. State of Gujarat
v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, 1964 Indlaw SC 357, para. 180; Verhoeven, Marie-
Emmanuelle v. Union of India, 2016 Indlaw SC 321, para. 79.
40 McLachlan, ‘The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law’, 375.
41 Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 1955 Indlaw SC 8.
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initiate his extradition proceedings. On receipt of this letter, the West Bengal
Government sent a note saying it would have ‘no objection’ in keeping Muller
in ‘detention’.
Justice Vivian Bose disagreed with the executive, here the provincial gov-
ernment of West Bengal. He did not find ‘obvious’ within Indian law the
Government Secretary’s proposal to keep Muller under detention and
rejected the executive’s position as unfounded, conceding ‘[t]his may not be
the law in all countries’.43 Justice Bose thought that common law courts
differed from civil law states in their deference to the executive action. In
India, an executive action is governed by common law in the absence of
express international law, here, between India and West Germany.
Effectively, Justice Bose made a distinction between the common law and
the civil law approach on the role of foreign states in domestic courts. Justice
Bose rejected the Indian executive’s action on the detention of aliens ‘without
the recommendation of a court’.44 The Supreme Court nevertheless held in
India the law is that the executive Government has ‘an unfettered right’ to
expel foreigners.
In the Verhoeven, Marie-Emmanuelle case, the Indian Supreme Court had
an opportunity to go back to the roots of India’s legal basis for foreign
relations.45 The Annexure to the Report of the Expert Committee No. IX on
Foreign Relations contains a list of 627 treaties, conventions, agreements etc.
entered into by the Government of India or by the British Government in
which India or Pakistan or both were or are interested. This Annexure does not
mention the Extradition Treaty between India and Chile. The precise legal
issue in Verhoeven was whether the Expert Committee recognized the exist-
ence in 2016 of the extradition treaties between the United Kingdom and
Chile, and therefore between India, the successor state to the British Indian
government, and Chile.
Justice Lokur thought that all international agreements to which India (or
British India) was a party would devolve upon the Dominion of India and the
Dominion of Pakistan and, if necessary, the obligations and privileges should
be apportioned between them. For the Supreme Court there existed ‘no
limitation’ in the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order
of 14 August 1947 in that it was ‘only with regard to the 627 treaties’ mentioned
43 Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 1955 Indlaw SC 8,
para. 35.
44 Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 1955 Indlaw SC 8,
para. 35.
45 Verhoeven, Marie-Emmanuelle v. Union of India, 2016 Indlaw SC 321, para. 79.
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by the Expert Committee on Foreign Relations; rather the reference was to ‘all
international agreements’.46
IV EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FROM JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY
Foreign relations remain excluded from the purview of the Court thereby
depositing it into the domain of ‘policy’ and, consequently, excommunicating
it from the province of the law. The actual power of the executive and its
primary competence in the field of international affairs suggest that sover-
eignty remains an important principle. Other common law jurisdictions
would not be very different. Prime Minister Nehru, Thiruvengadam says,
‘was an ardent champion of judicial review and independence’ but at the
same time he firmly ‘believed that it was Parliament and the government of
the day which would have the final say on policy decisions’.47 And under ‘our
jurisprudence’, Nariman reminds, ‘a law can be enacted by the Parliament or
state legislature but generally it comes into effect only when brought into force
by a notification of the Government’.48Needless to add, foreign relations stand
excluded from judicial scrutiny in India even as the executive could stall law-
implementation on the technical ground of non-notification.
The only way ‘foreign relations’ as a policy could be brought within the pale
of the law is by adjudging the extent of a possible judicial review of the
executive actions. I discuss below, in subsection IV.A, the Court’s reading of
46 Verhoeven, Marie-Emmanuelle v. Union of India, 2016 Indlaw SC 321, para. 89. Remarkably,
the petitioner in Verhoeven relied upon the Government of India’s preliminary objections to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10th
August 1999. Ibid., para. 97 (citing Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India),
Jurisdiction of theCourt, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 12). In a response to the executive’s contention
that ‘the existence of a treaty is a political question and that this Court cannot go into the issue
whether there is a subsisting and binding treaty’, the court in Verhoeven found it ‘difficult to
fully accept the proposition in the broad manner’. Ibid., para. 111. The Delhi High Court in
Ellis case tried to clarify the ratio of Verhoeven. ‘The petitioner had’, Delhi High Court said,
‘approached the SupremeCourt, inter alia, with the plea that there was no binding extradition
treaty in terms of Section 2(d) of the [Indian Extradition] Act between India and Chile.
Another plea raised before the Supreme Court was that the requisition made by the Republic
of Chile, invoking the principle of reciprocity and the general principles of international law,
for extraditing the petitioner from India was not maintainable. The Supreme Court did not
accept either of the aforesaid submissions of the petitioner’. Lennox James Ellis v. Union of
India, 2019 Indlaw DEL 14, para. 20.
47 Arun K. Thiruvengadam, The Constitution of India: A Contextual Analysis (New Delhi:
Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 118.
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the UN Charter. Finally, this section studies the ‘political thicket’ question
examined by the Indian Supreme Court in the Sikkim case.
A The Indian Supreme Court and the UN Charter
So far, we have walked through Indian case laws keeping in mind
McLachlan’s exposition of an FRL. One of McLachlan’s stresses is upon the
reception and treatment of international law in domestic courts. In this
section, I will examine the Indian Supreme Court’s treatment of an important
regime of international law – the UN Charter.
India sent forces into Goa after the ICJ in the Right of Passage case ruled
against Portugal having any military right of passage through Indian
territory.49 The British government at the time did not recognize India’s de
facto control of Goa in law (de jure). TheMonteiro litigation before the Indian
Supreme Court originated from the Goa situation where Father Monteiro
having overstayed his residence permit did not apply for the Indian passport.50
His other options were to either exit the territory of India, or take the offer of
the Indian passport without which he would become an illegal ‘alien’ in Goa.
India called her annexation lawful and valid. ‘Annexation may sometimes be
peaceful’, Justice Hidayatullah reasoned,51 ‘as for example, Texas and
Hawaiian Island were peacefully annexed by the United States or after war,
as the annexation of South Africa and Orange Free State by Britain’.52
When a title to the new territory actually begins is not an easy question to
answer. Since the ‘military engagement’ in Goa was only ‘a few hours’ dur-
ation’ and ‘there was no resistance at all’, Justice Hidayatullah ruled: ‘true
annexation followed here so close upon military occupation as to leave no real
hiatus’.53 According to Justice Hidayatullah,
[t]he occupation on December 20, 1961 was neither belligerent occupation
nor anticipated occupation, but true annexation by conquest and subjuga-
tion. It must be remembered thatMr. Gardiner, counsel for FatherMonteiro,
concedes that the annexation was lawful. Therefore, since occupation in the
49 Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment 12 April 1960, ICJ
Report 6.
50 Rev. Mons. Monteiro v. State of Goa, 1969 Indlaw SC 583.
51 Monteiro is a five-judge bench ruling written by Hidayatullah, a student of McNair at
Cambridge. Mohammed Hidayatullah wrote The South-West Africa Case (Bombay: Asia
Publishing House, 1967) on the encouragement of his teacher: ‘Lord McNair was responsible
for my book’. M. Hidayatullah, My Own Boswell (New Delhi: LexisNexis, 2020 [1981]) at 87.
52 Rev. Mons. Monteiro v. State of Goa, 1969 Indlaw SC 583, para. 34.
53 Rev. Mons. Monteiro v. State of Goa, 1969 Indlaw SC 583, paras. 31, 36.
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sense used in Art. 47 [of Convention IV54] had ceased, the protection must
cease also. We are, therefore, of opinion that in the present case there was no
breach of the Geneva Conventions.55
The Indian justification of Goa’s annexation lay in Goa being a Portuguese
‘blue-water’ province.56 Due to India’s brush with Portuguese colonialism in
the Right of Passage case,57 the decade that followed presented a change in the
way Indian judges looked at international law. India had sent the Bombay
High Court Chief Justice MC Chagla to sit as judge ad hoc on the Right of
Passage bench.58 A cosmopolitan Nehru at the time suddenly woke up to the
reality of India’s incomplete decolonization. The fact that Goa, Dadra, and
Nagar Aveli continued to be governed by Portugal meant India stood between
Lisbon and Portugal’s ultramar province, Goa.
While India also stood between Pakistan’s two overland provinces East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West-Pakistan (now Pakistan), New Delhi
did not view these two situations, overseas and overland provinces, similarly.
Portugal, in Nehru’s words, presented the vestiges of colonialism, particularly
after France had returned Pondicherry to India by a treaty and Britain by
passing a domestic law. Judge Hidayatullah’s reading of the UN Charter
naturally acquires significance then. Judge Hidayatullah asserted:
Some would make title depend upon recognition. Mr. Stimson’s doctrine of
non-recognition in cases where a State of things has been brought about contrary
to the Pact of Paris was intended to deny root of title conquest but when Italy
conquered Abyssinia, the conquest was recognized because it was thought that
the state of affairs had come to stay. Thus, although the United Nations Charter
includes the obligation that force would not be used against the territorial
integrity of other States (Art. 2 Para 4), events after the Second World War
have shown that transfer of title to territory by conquest is still recognized.59
54 4 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.
55 Rev. Mons. Monteiro v. State of Goa, 1969 Indlaw SC 583, para. 37.
56 The Portuguese Permanent Representative to the UN said to the Australian diplomat Sir Owen
Dixon, UN Representative for India and Pakistan, that on the Goa question ‘a majority of the
Council would be in sympathy with the Portuguese, whereas in the General Assembly things
might go against the Portuguese’. Letter of AR Moore, May 15, 1958, in Foreign Office Files for
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1947–64, Doc DL 1024/2, FO371/135944 (1958) para. 1.
57 Prabhakar Singh, ‘India Before and After the Right of Passage case’ (2015) 5 Asian Journal of
International Law 176.
58 Mahomedali C. Chagla, Roses in December: An Autobiography (Mumbai: Bhartiya Vidya
Bhawan, 2018 [1973]), p. 211.
59 Rev. Mons. Monteiro v. State of Goa, 1969 Indlaw SC 583, para. 35. The American professor
Quincy Wright, the then editor of the American Journal of International Law, while visiting
New Delhi on Ford Foundation grant found Goa to be a case of Asia’s reading of the UN
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We can see that the Indian Supreme Court finds the Indian Constitution, and
not the UN Charter, is the applicable law in India. The reference to inter-
national law and treaty in article 51 of the Constitution only gives a ‘policy’
nudge to the Indian executive offering no ‘law’ to be applied. In
December 1960, India’s agent before the ICJ in the Right of Passage case,
MC Setalvad ‘expressed the opinion that there was no legal impediment in
incorporating the liberated Portuguese territories into India’.60
B The Sikkim Case: The ‘Political Thicket’ Question
On 8 May 1973, the King of Sikkim, the Government of India, and leaders
of the political parties representing the people of Sikkim entered
a tripartite agreement.61 Sikkim finally became a province of India in
1975. Justice LM Sharma thought the issue of Sikkim joining India was
subject to the ‘political questions doctrine’. In other words, ‘the questions
raised in the petitions pertaining’ to the ‘terms and conditions of accession
of new territory are governed by rules of public international law’ and they
are as such ‘non-justiciable’ on the ‘political questions doctrine’.62 The
territory of Sikkim was admitted into the Indian Union by an act of
voluntary cession by the general consent of its inhabitants expressed on
a Referendum.63 The Court invoked the American case Baker v. Carr.64
According to the Indian Supreme Court, the effect of Baker v. Carr ‘is that
in the United States of America certain controversies previously immune
from adjudication were held justiciable and decided on the merits. The
rejection of the “political thickets” arguments in these cases marks
a narrowing of the operation of the doctrine in other areas as well’.65
‘The submission is further that’, the Court noted, ‘since the terms and
conditions on which Sikkim was admitted in Union of India, are political
in nature, the said terms and conditions cannot be made the subject
matter of challenge before this Court because the law is well settled that
Charter. QuincyWright, ‘TheGoaQuestion’ (1962) 56 American Journal of International Law
617–32.
60 Motilal C. Setalvad,MyLife: Law and other Things (Mumbai: T. Setalvad&A. Setalvad, 1990
[1970]) p. 325.
61 RC Poundyal v. Union of India, 1993 Indlaw SC 1362, para. 120.
62 RC Poundyal v. Union of India, 1993 Indlaw SC 1362, para. 87.
63 RC Poundyal v. Union of India, 1993 Indlaw SC 1362, para. 88. The court here referred to
A. K. Pavithran, Substance of Public International Law Western and Eastern (Madras:
A. P. Rajendran, 1965) for which Justice Radhabinod Pal wrote the foreword.
64 Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962).
65 RC Poundyal v. Union of India, 1993 Indlaw SC 1362, para. 17.
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courts do not adjudicate upon questions which are political in nature’.66
In the Sikkim case, the Supreme Court moved away from Mithibarwala in
that the Court was now open to borrow from common law jurisdictions
other than England.
Sikkim joined the Union of India by an international agreement.
Irrespective of this agreement, as the later Judge of the ICJ Rosalyn Higgins
noted, the UN Human Rights Committee ‘questioned’ if the treatment of
Sikkim, ‘which had been overrun by force and incorporated within India, was
compatible with self-determination’.67 Although the Indian Supreme Court
decided the Sikkim case four years after Higgins wrote about Sikkim’s merger
into India, Western scholars often fail to draw a distinction between India’s
takeover of Goa, a colonial province of Portugal, and Sikkim, an independent
Asian kingdom that joined India by an international agreement and
a subsequent constitutional process.
Generally speaking, if the Western opinion could so easily question a full
political process expressed in the referendum in favour of joining India, and
the later incorporation effected under the Constitution of India as ‘overrun by
force’ and not ‘compatible with self-determination’, it is not difficult to argue
that India does not see its Constitution and common law having ‘a unity
founded on the moral concord of Western peoples’. No wonder justice
Mudholkar thought ‘the law of a State can only be modified or repealed by
a competent legislature of the State and not by international opinion however
weighty that Opinion may be’.68
Generations of Indian jurists have worked overtime to cultivate and harvest
British laws in postcolonial India.69 And yet a constitutional reading of
international law has remained in the Commonwealth a one-way traffic of
precedents and scholarship exposing its imperial bias, the periphery never
educating the centre. One does not need to remind that foreign relations are
based on reciprocity. There remains an absence of references and reciproca-
tion to Indian case laws on foreign relations in the standard FRL textbooks.
66 The political question doctrine has been evolved in the United States to deny judicial review
in certain fields. The doctrine received a setback in the case of Baker v. Carr. Baker v. Carr,
369 US 186 (1962), para. 132.
67 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Human Rights: Some Questions of Integrity’ (1989) 15Commonwealth Law
Bulletin 598 at 608.
68 State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, 1964 Indlaw SC 357, para. 180.
69 Justice Vivian Bose noted Oppenheim saying the British Government had ‘no power to expel
even the most dangerous alien without the recommendation of a court’. Hans Muller of
Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 1955 Indlaw SC 8, para. 35.
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V THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND UTI POSSIDETIS
The Indian Constitution doubtless gives the law that the Indian Supreme
Court applies. The taking and giving of territory by India too is governed by the
Constitution. Territory as defined in the Montevideo Convention is central to
the existence of a modern state.70 Add to that the doctrine of uti possidetis that
instructs former colonies to keep territories and honour boundaries they have
received from their colonial masters. But the uti possidetis principle needed
a reading by the postcolonial Supreme Court since the colonial masters had
defeated in India – by slicing British India into two states – this principle. The
new post-colonies bordering India, here Pakistan, went into a further break-up
of its territories, creating new sovereign boundaries. This geopolitical situation
led India to a constitutive (through the Indian Constitution) and a declaratory
(by the executive) re-perfecting of its uti possidetis in the way discussed below.
A Constitutional Perfecting of Uti Possidetis
In 1959, the President of India wrote to the Indian Supreme Court for an
advisory opinion about the questions of law that might arise relating to the
Berubari Union as well as the Agreement relating to the exchange of Enclaves
with Pakistan.71 In the Berubari opinion, Justice Gajendragadkar wrote that,
on a ‘true construction’ of article 1(3)(c) of the Indian Constitution, it was
erroneous to assume that it confers specific powers to acquire foreign
territories.72 This opinion noted that cession of national territory in law
amounts to the transfer of sovereignty over the said territory by the owner-
State in favour of another State.73 Justice Gajendragadkar spoke of, if you will,
an implied uti possidetis. For him,
It may be that this provision has found a place in the Constitution not in
pursuance of any expansionist political philosophy but mainly for providing
for the integration and absorption of Indian territories which, at the date of
the Constitution, continued to be under the dominion of foreign States; but
that is not the whole scope of Art. 1(3)(c). It refers broadly to all foreign
territories which may be acquired by India and provides that as soon as they
70 Art. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165
LNTS 19.
71 Re: The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, 1959 Indlaw SC 294.
72 Re: The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, 1959 Indlaw SC 294, para. 53.
73 ‘But though from the human point of view great hardship is inevitably involved in cession of
territory by one country to the other’, Gajendragradkar said, ‘there can be no doubt that
a sovereign state can exercise its right to cede a part of its territory to a foreign state’. Re: The
Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, 1959 Indlaw SC 294, para. 55.
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are acquired they would form part of the territory of India. Thus, on a true
construction of Article 1(3)(c) it is erroneous to assume that it confers specific
powers to acquire foreign territories.74
The Government of India in Berubari surprisingly did not make a distinction
between boundary adjustment and cession. Nevertheless, exactly a decade
later, in Maganbhai,75 Justice Hidayatullah accepted and confirmed the
distinction the West Bengal provincial government had made in Berubari
between boundary adjustment and cession:
The argument that if power to settle boundaries be conceded to the
Executive, it might cede some vital part of India is to take an extreme view
of things. The samemay even be said of Parliament itself but it is hardly to be
imagined that such gross abuse of power is ever likely. Ordinarily an adjust-
ment of a boundary which International Law regards as valid between two
Nations, should be recognised by the Courts and the implementation thereof
can always be with the Executive unless a clear case of cession is involved
when Parliamentary intercession can be expected and should be had. This
has been the custom of Nations whose Constitutions are not sufficiently
elaborate on this subject.76
‘The power to legislate in respect of treaties lies with the Parliament’,
Justice Hidayatullah continued, ‘[b]ut making of law under that authority
is necessary when the treaty or agreement operates to restrict the rights of
citizens or others or modules the laws of the State’. Very importantly, ‘[i]f
the rights of the citizens or others which are justiciable are not affected, no
legislative measure is needed to give effect to the agreement or treaty’.77
Since international law falls within the non-justiciable article 51, rights of
the citizens and that of the aliens, legal or illegal, stem from India’s
written Constitution.78
74 Re: The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, 1959 Indlaw SC 294, para. 53.
75 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, 1969 Indlaw SC 269.
76 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, 1969 Indlaw SC 269, para. 42.
77 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, 1969 Indlaw SC 269, para. 79.
78 Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, 2005, Indlaw SC 404 updates on the ‘law regarding
deportation of aliens’. In Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, 1991, 3 SCC 664 the Supreme
Court clearly held that constitutional rights available to foreigners are restricted to Article 21 of
the Constitution. Cf. Prabhakar Singh, ‘More Norms, Less Justice: The Refugees, the
Republic and Everyone in Between’ (2018) 39 Liverpool Law Review 123.
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B Declaratory Perfecting of Uti Possidetis
While India signed an agreement to welcome Sikkim into the Union of India,
almost at the same time, in 1974, the Government of India declared to accept
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ ‘in conformity with paragraph 2 of
article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to
terminate such acceptance, as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, and on the basis and condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of
the ICJ over all disputes other than’ those mentioned in the Swaran Singh
Declaration.79 Paragraph 10 of the declaration noted India’s exclusion from
the ICJ’s jurisdiction:
disputes with India concerning or relating to:
(a) the status of its territory or the modification or delimitation of its
frontiers or any other matter concerning boundaries;
(b) the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the margins, the exclusive
fishery zone, the exclusive economic zone, and other zones of national
maritime jurisdiction including for the regulation and control of marine
pollution and the conduct of scientific research by foreign vessels;
(c) the condition and status of its islands, bays and gulfs and that of the bays
and gulfs that for historical reasons belong to it;
(d) the airspace superjacent to its land and maritime territory; and
(e) the determination and delimitation of its maritime boundaries.
Paragraph 11 of the declaration made it retrospective. India tactically declared
its exclusion of the ICJ jurisdiction, in 1974, right before the Third UNCLOS
conference began. Why? Might paragraph 10(c) of India’s declaration answer
this? The declaration excluded from the ICJ disputes about ‘the condition and
status of its islands, bays and gulfs and that of the bays and gulfs that for
historical reasons belong to it’.
India thus secured its uti possidetis in the sea before the UN Convention
would fix the substantive content of the law of the sea ( the UNCLOS) putting
India’s possessions in the sea beyond the UNCLOS.80 India has submitted
a new Declaration on 27 September 2019 replacing the 18 September 1974
Declaration. In 2019, a new Jaishankar Declaration excluded from the ICJ’s
79 Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, ‘Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as com-
pulsory’, 17 September 2019, The ICJ, The Hague, available at: www.icj-cij.org/en/declar
ations/in. The ‘Jaishankar Declaration’ further ‘expand[s] the scope of India’s reservations’.
Srinivas Burra, ‘India’s Modified Declaration on the Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice’ EJIL Talk (2 April 2020).
80 Prabhakar Singh, ‘The Kashmir Question’, Deccan Herald, 13 September 2019, p. 10.
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jurisdiction ‘disputes where the jurisdiction of the Court is or may be founded
on the basis of a treaty concluded under the auspices of the League of
Nations’.81 By excluding from the ambit of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction
in 2019 ‘disputes with the government of any State which is or has been
a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations’ India has attempted to put its
residual uti possidetis beyond the ICJ’s adjudication.82
VI CONCLUSION
The ‘decisions of the Privy Council’, as Fali Nariman reminds us, ‘are called
“opinions” because they are in the form of advice to the English Monarch’
while the decisions of the House of Lords were known as ‘speeches’.83 Nehru
had accepted Sir BN Rau’s formulae to stay within the Commonwealth as
a ‘Republic’ without recognising the British Monarch’s moral, legal or polit-
ical authority.84 Should the British ‘opinions’ to the Monarch and ‘speeches’
in the House of Lords pre-cast in common law become ‘applicable law’ in
India after 1950? Purshottam Tricumdass, counsel in Mithibarwala, had
suggested that the Indian Supreme Court ‘discard the theory of public inter-
national law that underlies the decisions of the Privy Council’ in favour of ‘the
more rational, just and human doctrine’ of the ‘American decisions’. His
‘thesis’, in the words of Justice Ayyangar, ‘was that the doctrines evolved by
the Privy Council were conditioned by Britain being an Imperialist and
expansionist power at the date when they originated and were applied’ and
that ‘these might have been suited to the regime of a colonial power’ alone.85
In exporting FRL, scholars from common law states seemingly exhibit
a lack of sensitivity for the history of common law in British colonies. But for
colonialism, common law surely could not have visited India or the other
British colonies. The countries that did not suffer British colonialism chose
the continental law without exception!86 In fact for Nariman ‘common law’ is
not so much a ‘law’ as it is a ‘uniquemethod of administering justice’ or, might
I add, injustice. After centuries of the reception of the British common law,
FRL as a new call to collapse public international law with domestic law
81 Jaishankar, ‘Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory’,
17 September 2019, The ICJ, The Hague, para. 6.
82 Jaishankar, ‘Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory’,
17 September 2019, The ICJ, The Hague, para. 2.
83 Nariman, Before Memory Fades, p. 112.
84 Sir BNRau later become a judge of the ICJ. Setalvad, ‘My Life: Law andOther Things’, p. 140.
85 State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, 1964 Indlaw SC 357, para. 44.
86 Nariman, India’s Legal System, p. 24.
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appears an innocuous innovation only because, as noted before, the FRL
scholars overlook the colonial history of common law that jurist Nariman as
well as economic historians Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson point at.
In order to ossify the native sovereignty, the nineteenth century British
colonial scholars had argued for an imperial law that was neither international
law nor domestic law. Sitting in a post-colony like India, transnational law and
FRL appear twins divided by time. In the twenty-first century, FRL scholars
argue for a composite ‘doctrine derived from public international law, private
international law and municipal English law’.87 An uncritical growth of FRL
happens solely because such an ‘Anglo-commonwealth’ FRL does not yet
recognise law, common law or civil law, of the geographical South as worthy of
export. India has gone on a borrowing binge for far too long and an FRL is least
desirable in a legal environment of the one-sided traffic of precedents. The
common law’s unwillingness for learning is not limited to her intellectual
apathy for Britain’s ex-colonies but extends even to continental law for which
O’Connell had exhorted ‘the essential unity of all European legal structures,
a unity founded on the moral concord of Western peoples’.
But India has inherited a British ‘legal structure’ without ‘a unity founded
on the moral concord of Western peoples’. FRL for India remains a moral
platitude of the sort O’Connell talked about in relation to Europe and
England. Besides being anthropologically challenged, FRL reverses norma-
tive decolonisation while claiming to offer a bigger basket of problem-solving.
Many foreign relations issues emerge because of India’s marriage to com-
mon law. The twenty-first century FRL then appears to uncritically mimic the
two older common law projects; ‘imperial law’ of the nineteenth century
Britain and ‘transnational law’ of the twentieth century post-war United
States. We may wish to go by our written Constitution without needing, or
having found, a ‘foreign affairs’ law. Shakespeare famously wrote ‘what’s in
a name’. McLachlan and Bradley think otherwise; everything is in the name.
The name is ‘foreign relations’ law. Not for India, however. Since 1950, it is
constitutional law in New Delhi.
87 McLachlan, ‘The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law’, 374.
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6
Foreign Legal Policy As the Background to Foreign
Relations Law?
Revisiting Guy de Lacharrière’s La politique juridique extérieure
Frédéric Mégret
The study of foreign relations law has been largely devoted to domestic laws as
they affect foreign policy.1 An element seems to be missing, however, some-
where between domestic and international law that is reducible to neither the
constraints of domestic or international law on foreign policy. Although that
element may simply be the national interest, the latter seems too crude
a variable to explain alone how countries navigate not just their foreign policy
generally, but its many legal dimensions specifically.
A more discreet strand of thought has looked at how national policies in
relation to international law are formulated. This could be seen as including
the quite specific but rich genre of writing on foreign policy legal advice and
advisors (which has both a foreign policy law allocation dimension, and
a foreign legal policy element)2 although what this chapter is interested in is
arguably broader and not necessarily as personalised. The key intuition here is
1 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, in Curtis A. Bradley
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019). On this more conventional conception of foreign relations law and
how it has been understood in the context of this chapter’s case study, France, see the chapter by
Niki Aloupi, ‘The Conseil Constitutionnel’s Jurisprudence on “Limitations of Sovereignty”’.
Whereas the latter ‘foreign relations law’ stricto sensu varies quite significantly from country to
country based on constitutional specificities, the attempt to theorise a ‘politique juridique
étrangère’ arguably includes an effort to reach for something which may have local specificities
but is also more functionally and universally oriented.
2 StephenM. Schwebel, ‘Remarks on the Role of the Legal Advisor of the US State Department’
(1991) 2 EJIL 131–5; Jesselyn Radack, ‘Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government
Advisor in the War on Terrorism’ (2006) 77 University of Colorado Law Review 1–48;
Lewis Johnman, ‘Playing the Role of a Cassandra: Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Senior Legal
Advisor to the Foreign Office’ (1999) 13 Contemporary British History 46–63; Robbie Sabel,
‘The Role of the Legal Advisor in Diplomacy’ (1997) 8 Diplomacy and Statecraft 1–9;
Andriy Melnyk, ‘Master or Servant? International Law in the Foreign Policy Context’, in
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that a state’s foreign policy is reducible neither to compliance with inter-
national law (as international law insists), nor to the constraints imposed by
domestic law on foreign policy (as foreign relations law sometimes implicitly
claims). The elaboration of the law of a state’s foreign relations – rather than
foreign relations law, strictly speaking – is certainly influenced by inter-
national law but is not reducible to compliance with it (even a policy of
compliance with international law can be understood as a domestic policy
rather than just obedience to international legal diktats). In between domestic
and international law, then, lies a vibrant practice of defining what a state’s
policy towards international law should be that can be understood to be
a central part of the definition of the law of foreign relations, albeit not strictly
what is conventionally understood as ‘foreign relations law’.
France may be an intriguing country to look for clues as to how to concep-
tualise such policies. Foreign relations law as a discipline is often seen there as
a US oddity. Moreover, it is one that is seen as standing in real tension to
a commitment to public international law and even as having echoes of earlier
denials of its very existence – international law as really only the accumulation
of the externally oriented facets of domestic law. This is particularly clear in
the French perspective where the emphasis on the primacy of international
law is historically combined with a very strong insistence on monism. Georges
Scelle even went as far as claiming that the state had no particular pride of
place, as international law was, fundamentally, not that different from domes-
tic law.3 Nonetheless, France, perhaps unsurprisingly for a country with
a strong republican and Jacobin tradition, has also produced its own approach
to the law of foreign relations, if not quite ‘foreign relations law’. Rescuing that
tradition that has been somewhat neglected in contemporary foreign relations
law scholarship can help understand the US approach as less idiosyncratic
than it is sometimes presented as being, but also help appreciate how different
Hélène R. Fabri, Emmanuelle Jouannet, Vincent Tomkiewicz (eds.), Select Proceedings of the
European Society of International Law, 5 vols. (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008), vol. I,
pp. 237–78; Kenneth M. Manusama, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Providing Legal
Advice on Military Action Against Iraq’ (2011) 42 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
95–121; Stephen Bouwhuis, ‘The Role of an International Legal Adviser to Government’ (2012)
61 ICLQ 939–60; JohanG. Lammers, ‘The Role of the Legal Adviser of theMinistry of Foreign
Affairs: The Dutch Approach and Experience’ (2009) 18 Tulane Journal of International and
Comparative Law 177–205; Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz, ‘Lawyering Compliance with
International Law: Legal Advisors and the Legalization of International Politics’, PhD thesis,
The Ohio State University (2013).
3 Georges Scelle, Droit international public: manuel élémentaire avec les textes essentiels (Paris:
Domat-Montchrestien, 1944); Patrick Daillier, ‘L’héritage de Georges Scelle, une utopie, une
théorie ou une doctrine juridique? Les trois à la fois, peut-être’ (2018) 34 Anuario Español de
Derecho Internacional 5–8.
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approaches inevitably betray different conceptualisations of the relationship of
the state to international law.
Published in 1983, Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière’s La politique juridique
extérieure4 was a highly unusual book by the standards of both French inter-
national law academia and the French diplomatic service. De Lacharrière was
by then a former legal advisor to the Quai d’Orsay, the seat of the foreign
ministry. The book was relatively short (around 200 pages), lightly footnoted in
a way that at times suggested off-the-cuff remarks rather than a standard
academic treatment, but erudite and theoretically provocative. It came with
the credibility and aura of de Lacharrière’s experience. It seemed to pull the
curtain on the making of international law in the twilight of a higher civil
servant’s career. It can be seen as part of a small but highly distinctive and
illustrious tradition of monographs written by international lawyers with
intense exposure to the state practice of international law.5 Indeed it was
praised at the time for seeming to combine in one the qualities of ‘Le Sage,
le Prince et le Savant’.6 In its emphasis on state practices it has been analogised
with some of the earlier work of the Russian Grigory Tunkin,7 but it also bears
mentioning that La politique juridique extérieure bears some affinity with
Wilhelm Grewe’s Spiel der Kräfte in der Weltpolitik8 published at about the
same time.
At the same time, the book remains somewhat obscure and a little heretical.
It has never been republished since 1983 and is increasingly hard to locate
outside specialised libraries. It is little known outside France, where its place is
sometimes hard to gauge, and even harder to situate in a global context.9 It has
of late become the object of renewed interest, at least in francophone
4 Guy de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure (Paris: Economica, 1983).
5 Martti Koskenniemi was director of the Division of International Law in the Finnish foreign
ministry. Philip Allott was a legal adviser in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
from 1960 to 1973. Wilhelm Grewe was involved throughout a distinguished career in the
German foreign service in a variety of positions which involved international law. It is
somewhat more common for US international law scholars to have worked for the State
Department in some legal capacity (José Alvarez, Dan Bodansky, AnneMarie Slaughter, Lori
Damrosch, etc.). See André Oraison, ‘La place des jurisconsultes internationaux au sein de “la
doctrine des publicistes les plus qualifiés des différentes nations”’ (1998) 11Hague Yearbook of
International Law/Annuaire de la Haye de droit international 43–65.
6 Alain Pellet, ‘Le Sage, le Prince et le Savant (A propos de “La politique juridique extérieure”
de Guy de Lacharrière)’ (1985) 112 Journal du droit international 407–14.
7 Michel Virally, ‘Réflexions sur la politique juridique des Etats’ in Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière
et la politique juridique extérieure de la France (Paris: Masson, 1989), p. 394.
8 Wilhelm G. Grewe, Spiel der Kräfte in der Weltpolitik. Theorie und Praxis der internationalen
Beziehungen (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Taschenbuchverlag, 1981).
9 Kolb suggests a lineage between Guy de Lacharrière and ‘critical legal studies’ notably in the
form of the work of David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi but this lineage is tenuous.
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academic circles.10 Although Guy de Lacharrière was described recently as
‘l’un des plus grands jurisconsultes français du XXe siècle’,11 this was, perhaps
tellingly, in the Annuaire français de relations internationales rather than the
Annuaire français de droit international, and by two young French public
international lawyers but associated with the Centre Thucydide, which is
devoted to the study of international relations. For all these reasons, de
Lacharrière’s book deserves a broader recognition for its contribution to our
knowledge of international law ‘from the inside’, even as one must speculate
about his relative lack of influence.
De Lacharrière had had a prestigious career by the time the book was
published. He had graduated first of the concours of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. He spoke Russian fluently and one of his first postings
was in the French embassy in Moscow (1946–8). A significant part of his
career was devoted to France’s relationship to international organisations,
including the UN and UNESCO. However, he is most keenly remem-
bered as the legal adviser to the foreign ministry from 1969 to 1979. His
most significant exposure to the trade of international law arose when he
represented France at the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea that
gave rise to UNCLOS, from 1979 to 1982. He had earlier on also been
involved in the creation of the UNCTAD and the GATT. Subsequently,
he would become a judge at the International Court of Justice and even
the court’s vice-president.12
De Lacharrière was, revealingly, never a legal academic; rather, he was
a career civil servant and diplomat who sought to theorise a certain praxis of
international law. Contra an international lawyers’ international law (‘les
commentateurs’), he opposed, fundamentally, a domestic civil servant’s inter-
national law (‘les décideurs’).13 This chapter will re-examine this contribution
in a contemporary light, weighing it against the monist and universalist
assumptions of French foreign legal policy. Within the broader field of foreign
relations law, the work of Guy de Lacharrière is hard to categorise. Rather than
Koskenniemi cites the book only once in From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of
International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 632.
10 Julien Cazala, ‘Retour sur un classique : Guy de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extér-
ieure’ (2013) 117 Revue générale de droit international public 411–16; Pellet, ‘Le Sage, le Prince
et le Savant’; Virally, ‘Réflexions sur la politique juridique des Etats’; Robert Kolb, Réflexions
sur les politiques juridiques extérieures (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 2015).
11 Julian Fernandez and Nicolas Haupais, ‘Introduction’ (2012) XIII Annuaire français de rela-
tions internationales 553.
12 Julien Cazala, ‘Guy Ladreit de Lacharrière (1919–1987)’, Société française pour le droit inter-
national, www.sfdi.org/internationalistes/lacharriere-guy-ladreit-de/, accessed 30 September 2020.
13 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 215.
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seeing foreign relations as constrained by the domestic law framework or, for
that matter, international law itself, de Lacharrière saw it as being above all
determined by what he described as a state’s ‘foreign legal policy’.
I THE PRIMACY OF FOREIGN LEGAL POLICY
La politique juridique extérieure insisted on the centrality of the relationship
between the state and its ‘exterior’, and argued for a voluntaristic and strategic
legal foreign policy. In particular, it suggested, that if international law was
international law it was because states had a ‘legal foreign policy’ – international
law’s law-ness was not immanent or metaphysical but embedded in states’
defence of the national interest, opportunistic as it might be. In de
Lacharrière’s view, foreign legal policy towards international law was not itself
entirely or even particularly determined by domestic law, asmuch as by concern
with the national interest.14
His contribution to foreign relations law was therefore much less notable
than his work on states’ politics of international law. If anything, he tended to
see foreign policy lawyers as involved in strategising about international law
itself, anticipating its changes, trying to soften contradictions between posi-
tions adopted by their state over time, and understanding how evolutions in
international law might affect them. In other words, the crucible of foreign
relations law lied in the encounter between the national interest and the
particular proclivities of the international legal order, a space that was domin-
ated neither entirely by international law (as some academic international
lawyers might imprudently presuppose) nor the national interest (as realists
were too quick to conclude).
According to one of La politique juridique extérieure’s most recognisable
and paradoxical formulas: ‘before international law, there are national policies
towards international law’,15 this is reminiscent of the chicken-and-egg debate
on the primacy of sovereignty or international law or of practice over opinio
juris. But how can there be a politics of international law before international
law itself? What Guy de Lacharrière rejected above all was a vision of the
priority and primacy of international law, one in which law ‘serait reconnu
comme étant d’une nature sacrée qui le voue au respect des gouvernements et
le met au-dessus des manipulations politiques. Considéré sous l’angle d’une
telle dévotion, il ne pourrait faire l’objet de politiques gouvernementales’.16
14 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, ch. I.
15 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 5.
16 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 9.
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This is what might be understood as the ‘immanent’ conception of inter-
national law, and it is of course quite widespread.17 It would tend to view the
idea of a ‘foreign legal policy’ as ‘sacrilegious’.18 At the opposite extreme is
a particular extreme form of the realist critique, one that would be so dismis-
sive of international law as to find futile any notion that states have a policy
towards it. As de Lacharrière puts it, ‘le droit ne mériterait pas l’honneur qu’on
lui ferait en ayant une politique à son égard’.19
Guy de Lacharrière doubted that either school reflected the practice of
statecraft (as opposed, perhaps, to the scholarship of international lawyers) or
was seriously entertained by those actually entrusted with safeguarding states’
foreign policy legal interests. Rather than each position being represented in
its pure form, however, either might taint the foreign legal policy of given
states at any given moment based on its interest. This is a striking notion: the
idea that views about international law are themselves influenced by a sort of
jeu de masques that leads states to adopt the views that they need under the
guise of interpreting international law. Even the insistence on respect for
international law, in that context, could be understood as a foreign policy
option, associated with an a priori in favour of the status quo. By the same
token, too blatant an instrumentalisation of the law would be self-defeating:
even realists know that if they play the international law game, they need to
play it at least half-heartedly, or expose the mediocrity of their arguments.20
At any rate, foreign legal policy did not exist in a void and was not autono-
mous; it existed at the discretion and in relation to a broader national interest.
The power of states was an evident element in the determination of their
foreign legal policy. All other things being equal, weak states were likely to
consider that an international rule of law was more advantageous; by contrast,
powerful states would have a great ability to resist or withstand a finding that
they had violated international law.21 Another factor was, quite simply, the
psychology and even training of those deciding in any given country and
whether they were convinced of the usefulness of international law or not
(although de Lacharrière noted that Nixon was a lawyer and Eisenhower
a military man).22 This is not necessarily a rejection of ‘foreign relations
law’, but in its conspicuous ignorance of domestic law, it is an implicit
17 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 9.
18 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 9.
19 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 9.
20 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, ch. V.
21 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 138–9.
22 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 212.
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claim that runs throughout the book about a certain exceptionality of foreign
policy when it comes to domestic law.
For Guy de Lacharrière, domestic factors were quite key in explaining
national variations between states.23 The continuity of governments or some-
thing as trivial as the availability of archives were key in evaluating the risk of
incoherence in foreign legal policy-making and dealing with it.24 Perhaps
more importantly, the place of law within national legal institutions stood
out as relevant. For some states, the rule of law was highly important, and this
was bound to have an impact: a state that despises law domestically is unlikely
to embrace it internationally, for example.25
The constitutional framework did matter of course but only indirectly and
because of its potential to shape foreign legal policy. Although foreign policy
in France was a prerogative of the president, treaties stood to be adopted by the
Assemblée nationale and to become law as soon as ratified. For monist states,
the exact content of a treaty mattered all the more given the lack of an
opportunity to subsequently adapt it into domestic law. At the same time,
the absence of common law style judicial review meant that it was unlikely
that France’s treaty obligations would, having satisfied an a priori contrôle de
constitutionnalité, be contested by domestic courts. This is, in turn, in contrast
to common law states that are often wary of implementing their treaty obliga-
tions in domestic law lest the treaties be challenged before ordinary courts.
However, de Lacharrière was well aware that in both monist and dualist
countries the force of international law was not such that its violations were
typically treated on a par with domestic law violations. If anything, violations
of international law took importance because they were seen as also violations
of domestic law.26
In short, the domestic element in foreign legal policy was not absent (for
example, the book mentions the fact that new revolutionary governments
sought to distance themselves from previous governments),27 but it was not
particularly causal from a social scientific point of view. This may be because
de Lacharrière understood, rightly as it turns out in most states, that aside from
procedures of ratification, much of the legal national interest stood to be
defended and even defined by the executive. Treaties were negotiated by
23 The interest in such variations is, in fact, what has prompted the field of foreign relations law –
understood initially as mostly a US paradigm – to increasingly effect a shift to comparative
foreign relations law. Bradley, Comparative Foreign Relations Law.
24 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 188.
25 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 208–12.
26 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 208–9.
27 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 210.
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diplomats; the decision to use force was made in the highest reaches of the
state; the day-to-day conduct of relations with other states and international
organisations was entirely in the hands of foreign ministries. If anything, it was
the international environment that shaped the conduct of foreign legal policy,
an environment that was significantly more political than legal. This was of
course nowhere truer than in Fifth Republic France and de Lacharrière may
have been guilty of universalising on the basis of what was in the end a fairly
atypical constitutional environment. That evaluation would also stand to be
relativised since the publication of La politique juridique extérieure, in an era
marked by increasing efforts to coordinate foreign policy at the European
level, parliamentary scrutiny and civil society monitoring.
Yet foreign legal policy was also not simply the translation of the national
interest into an international law policy; rather, it was more broadly
a governmental policy on international law. An example of such a policy,
paradoxically, was that of states that had decided to oppose international law
generally, whether newly independent or ideologically radical (the USSR,
Iran, etc.).28 In such a case, foreign legal policy could touch upon even the
most fundamental aspects of international law, including state succession or
the formation of customary international law. In addition, states might have
a sectoral foreign legal policy concerned with particular aspects of inter-
national law only. It seems Guy de Lacharrière had in mind mostly primary
rules of international law, notably the law of economic relations (including
nationalisations), the law of the sea or international humanitarian law.
Although states wanting to transform international law might stand out, de
Lacharrière insisted that states bent on maintaining the status quo had as
much of a foreign legal policy as the revolutionaries – simply that it was less
visible.29
For Guy de Lacharrière what was striking was that no one had thought of
this before and indeed that La politique juridique extérieure was not the object
of any particular study or, for that matter, a term of art. There were isolated
exceptions of course, among which John Foster Dulles30 and Stanley
Hoffmann’s notion of legal strategy.31 But the topic was not taught in univer-
sities. De Lacharrière did not designate who was responsible for this lack of
interest, but at times it seems quite clear that the culprit was international law
itself (‘une discipline abstraite’), understood as a system of constraints rather
28 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 6.
29 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 6.
30 John F. Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950).
31 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 9; also, Stanley Hoffmann, ‘International
Systems and International Law’ (1961) 14 World Politics 205–37.
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than the product of uncoordinated policies that take it seriously but are not
reducible to it (‘la discipline concrète’).32To de Lacharrière, this would be the
equivalent of teaching international relations only without teaching foreign
policy, where the study of foreign policy has, in fact, preceded the study of
international relations as its own discipline. It is almost as if the study of
international law had it the wrong way round: studying the system, before it
has even begun to understand its agents’ rationalities.
In trying to conceptualise the place of La politique juridique extérieure in
relation to the paradigm of ‘foreign relations law’, then, the point might be that
international law was much more significant to the conduct of foreign policy
than domestic law, only not in the way that most international lawyers
understood. International law was not important because it bound states, but
because it provided executive branches with sophisticated opportunities to
maximise the national interest, opportunities that they would be wise to
understand and not ignore. Rather than an alternative to foreign relations
law, La politique juridique extérieure is better understood as a complement to it
or, even better, an inherent part of it and provides opportunities for dynamic
reconceptualisation. Foreign legal policy includes both an attention to foreign
relations law stricto sensu (domestic law) and to international law and, indeed,
requires that one keeps an eye on how the gambits onemakes on one level may
ricochet on the other. Where foreign relations law as it is conventionally
understood is at risk of reducing international lawmaking to a domestic entre
soi, foreign legal policy could be understood as operating more on the inter-
face of the domestic and the international.
II THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF FOREIGN LEGAL POLICY
For Guy de Lacharrière the strength of having a foreign legal policy was that
‘elle tend à substituer un ensemble d’actions préméditées à des comporte-
ments qui, autrement, procéderaient de la spontanéité, du réflexe, de
l’instinct’.33 Governments should not adopt positions merely on a reactive
and knee-jerk basis; rather, they needed to organise themselves so as to
maximise their interest over time by carefully strategising about their legal
policy. However, the catch was that for de Lacharrière the national interest
included a moral as well as material dimension, both on image grounds but
also because, for example, even a bias in favour of the ‘règne du droit dans
l’ensemble de la société internationale’ could turn out to be beneficial for
32 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 7–8.
33 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 9.
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a particular state from the point of view of its own, narrow national interest.34
Of course, this portrayed such commitments in quite a different light than
how they portrayed themselves: not some sort of Kantian a priori commitment
to the law as an incarnation of reason, but a somewhat interested commitment
to the law as a form of protection. Still, the grounding of support for an
international rule of law in the national interest made it seem much less
utopian.
In that light, states typically sought to both inscribe themselves within
international law and push it in a direction that was favourable to them.
Guy de Lacharrière could not fail to have been impressed as legal adviser to
the French foreign ministry by the vast movement of challenge of inter-
national law that had arisen in the two previous decades as a result of the
rise of the Third World. He was less inclined than some to describe what they
did as ‘political’ and what Western states did as ‘legal’. Instead, he expressed
a certain understanding for their aspiration to transform international law
from an oligarchic and confiscatory system into amore equal and participatory
one.35 Even the Soviet notion of international law as an instrument of class
coercion found favour in principle with de Lacharrière (whose own political
sensitivities one imagines to have otherwise been quite remote from material
determinism), since it had the merit of expressing a clear sense of ‘interest’ in
international law.36
For Guy de Lacharrière, the ‘national interest’ in international law arose not
purely domestically, but in relation to the interests of others. The national
interest was a ‘preference’ for the state’s own well-being over the well-being of
others. Yet, to be taken seriously, it also had to be enunciated in ways that
resonated with the system. In the process, they would seek to pass off their
national interest as entirely compatible with the common good.37 This was
perhaps a very French way of identifying the national and universal interests as
coinciding. But even the most radical turn in international law (such as the
one argued for by the Third World in the 1960s) was likely to be justified as
consonant with the interest of the international community. The ability to
speak the language of the common interest, then, was crucial to states’ success
in promoting their vision of international law.
At times, though, the incompatibility of one’s national interest with the
national interest of others would be hard to ignore, in which case one’s interest
34 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 13–14.
35 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 14.
36 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 14–15.
37 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 15–16.
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might simply be claimed to be superior. Particularly revolutionary projects in
international law had been less prone to underline the consensus, and more
ready to highlight the element of struggle involved in international law.38
Imperialism and aggression are, however, always on the other side. And in the
end, de Lacharrière entertained little doubt that his fellow practitioners of
international law on behalf of states implicitly acknowledged that each of
them was championing a national cause, and that there would not be much
use in pretending that this was otherwise. Every state tended to see the
proclamations of innocence of others as merely self-serving, perhaps only
because they subtly knew their own proclamations to be so.
How should one go about – if at all – reconciling opposite national
interests? Guy de Lacharrière was sceptical that a formula existed that could
easily be relied on. To be sure, chairs in international conferences would not
tire of insisting on the importance of ‘equitable and reasonable
compromise’.39 But who was to say what such a compromise entailed? How
far should individual negotiators go in taking into account the interests of
others? What if the opening position of one party had been plainly unreason-
able? And how might each convince herself that the interest represented on
the other side was as respectable as her own? And if the notion of compromise
is so ambiguous, then howmuch of an obligation to compromise can there be?
As de Lacharrière put it, ‘les affirmations d’ouverture au compromis colorent
donc de courtoisie l’antagonisme des préférences nationales mais en confir-
ment surtout l’existence sans en réglementer précisément l’issue’.
Instead, the effect of foreign legal policy was to distribute the advantages
and disadvantages of international law. States typically wanted to have their
cake and eat it and to hold others to standards that they sought to escape for
themselves. A government will be intransigent vis-à-vis the need for
a manifestation of its own voluntarism, but adopt a more relaxed attitude
when it comes to the consent of other states. It will protest other states’ use of
their veto at the Council, but will be very understanding of its own. States will
formulate apparently general rules in terms that happen to narrowly suit their
own characteristics. The game is a game of passing off one’s interest as the
general interest, but it is a ‘game’ nonetheless, with its rules and constraints
and, indeed, its risks and dangers. For example, every rule or interpretation
thereof that one puts out there is likely to be used by one’s ‘enemies’. Here law
can be seen to have a somewhat autonomous effect: rules imply corresponding
obligations; obligations are understood to be symmetrical, etc. States must
38 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 19–20.
39 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 21.
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constantly bear in mind the risk that pushing a certain abstract position in
international law will come back to haunt them.
Rather than the problem of incoherence in international law itself (a non-
problem as far as de Lacharrière was concerned), what intrigued was the
problem of incoherence within the foreign legal policy of states. Because of
the evolving national interest foundation of all foreign legal policy, states
might over time be called upon to argue the opposite of what they had
previously argued. Indeed, they might occasionally simultaneously adopt
opposite positions in different sectors of international legal regulation where
their interests differed, or even on the same issue. (De Lacharrière cites the
example of the lawyer of a Third World country who simultaneously favoured
the equidistance and the equitable principles approaches to maritime delimi-
tation ‘depending on which part of their coast’.40) Would this doom their
policy and expose them to the critique of contradicting themselves?
Although politically possible, legal incoherence could sometimes be paid
with a high price. Newly decolonised states who strongly defended the prin-
ciple of self-determination, for example, were sometimes caught at their own
game when they had to insist that it was not available to Katanga or Biafra.41
Nonetheless, Guy de Lacharrière was sceptical that incoherence would be
exposed as such, at least if it was managed well. There are, after all, many ways
in which states can rationalise evolutions in their policies and distinguish the
facts. They can make sure that they are evasive about why they have adopted
certain options and avoid too onerous a judicial scrutiny and the threat of
estoppel.42 As to other states, although they may temporarily exploit the sin of
incoherence, they are likely to be understanding of a practice that they
themselves partake in.
III CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
But what of international law in this context? Was it anything more than the
aggregate of foreign legal policies and did that not point to its fundamental
instability or even futility? One of the most striking conclusions of Guy de
Lacharrière was that states – as opposed to academic international lawyers –
had relatively little interest in international law in general. They might cer-
tainly have strident opinions on certain points of international law or claim
a broad commitment to it (as in the recent Franco-German ‘Alliance for
40 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 183.
41 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 97.
42 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 191.
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Multilateralism’), but no state would commit itself to some general concept of
what international law stood for (or only in the broadest, most rhetorical
terms).43 The challenge for someone working at the intersection of foreign
legal policy and international law – as had by then become de Lacharrière’s
case given his ICJ functions – was to imagine what all this meant for the idea of
international law, despite states’ best efforts not to do so. The simplest conclu-
sion that de Lacharrière came up with was that the existence of foreign legal
policies testified to international law’s existence:
Pour que le droit international n’existe pas, alors que les politiques nationales
le prennent si constamment pour objet, il faudrait supposer de la part de
l’ensemble des gouvernements un singulier pouvoir d’illusion quant aux
réalités de la vie internationale et une extraordinaire capacité de s’acharner
sur une pure chimère.44
This sort of trope has long been quite familiar in discussions of international
law and may not be much of a defence of the existence of international law.
International law is detected indirectly through one of its effects, but this does
not tell us much about whether it has any causal force or what it means to see it
only through the eyes of its actors rather than, say, the perspective of the
system. Moreover, international law’s content and structure are very uncertain
even as Guy de Lacharrière never makes the move, conceptually, to an
understanding of international law as a practice. He even ponders the possi-
bility that there are ‘many international laws’ each existing, perhaps, only as
a figment of the imagination of a particular participant.
More interestingly, de Lacharrière saw foreign legal policy as not only
a passive response to an already existing international law, but as actively
involved in shaping it. De Lacharrière could not imagine states that would
merely ‘apply’ international law in good faith, without seeking to influence it.
Such a position would be non sensical precisely because the content of the law
stood to be determined by its subjects’ deliberations and determinations about
it. In international law, ‘la distinction entre l’élucidation du droit positif et
l’influence sur celui-ci est particulièrement émoussée’.45 This is particularly
true of treaty-making of course – where no actor pretends that they are just
implementing international law since per hypothesis there is no law to imple-
ment yet – but it is also clear in relation to customary international law where
states could be mindful that what they did might participate in the production
43 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 195.
44 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 196.
45 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 198.
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of custom. They would, as a result, become deliberate customary agents,
encouraging or impeding its formation. After all, the very notion of opinio
juris makes it clear that what states think about a norm is crucial to it becoming
a norm, perhaps one of themost striking recognitions, from the point of view of
international law, of a form of at least de facto foreign legal policy.
In the end, Guy de Lacharrière found that foreign legal policies were
efficient, precisely because international law was their product:
[le droit international] n’est donc pas à découvrir comme une science dont
on chercherait à élucider les lois, mais à faire ou refaire. Il n’a rien de fatal et
n’est donné ni par Dieu ni par la nature. Parfaitement contingent, il ne
correspond à aucune nécessité transcendante mais à des convenances appré-
ciées par des gouvernements que l’on peut désigner. C’est une politique qui
a réussi, une stratégie qui a triomphé.46
In fact, states had a chance to influence not only this or that rule of inter-
national law, but also its very function, subject of course to the limits of
political reality.
International law might be felt as an imposed law, a constraint, by some
states but that was only because it was the willed law of another set of states.
This is also the source of one of its weaknesses. If international law was only the
manifestation of the preferences of some states generalised to the world, then
violating international law should cease to appear so scandalous. Violating
international law might just be an instance of ‘l’opposition d’une politique à
une autre’.47 In fact, de Lacharrière noted that most states were not particularly
shocked by violations of international law most of the time, and only pressed
a point if it happened to conflict with their national interest: ‘une certaine non-
application des traités bénéficie en fait d’une indulgence très générale comme
si chacun comprenait fort bien, même s’il ne juge pas opportune de le dire
officiellement, qu’il est imprudent de trop blâmer chez l’autre la recherche
d’une liberté que l’on entend bien revendiquer pour soi’.48
This notion of treaties as basically a useful technique to predetermine the
future was fully compatible with frequent violations. This might seem like
a fairly cavalier attitude to international law coming from a jurisconsult, but in
Guy de Lacharrière’s mind it did not make the mechanism of binding treaties
useless; it just made it useful in a way different than that commonly under-
stood. States embraced treaties precisely because they saw them as flexible and
because they could interpret their obligations in ways that would not
46 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 199.
47 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 200.
48 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 201.
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compromise their interest. At the same time, the treaty form remained useful
as long as there was a certain ‘taux de concordance’ between treaty provisions
and actual behaviour.49
In practice, did international law determine state behaviour? Guy de
Lacharrière’s concern was not with such systemic questions as such; rather,
he was more interested in the foreign legal policy question of how inter-
national law might enter into decision-making. At times, it would be
a decisive factor (for example when two equally beneficial political outcomes
were available), but it could also be one element among others. Even compli-
ance with the law was in the end a strategic element to be taken into account
by states strategically. More often than not, international law intervened as
a justification of decisions that would most likely have been taken on other
grounds, although it might temporarily succeed in making that justification
appear as causal.50 In short, the international lawyer was often called up after
the decision; more rarely before the facts.51 But even the justification of
decisions might ‘retroact’ on the determination of that decision, by at least
affecting its modalities of execution.
The strength of de Lacharrière’s analysis of international law is threefold.
First, he emphasises the role of the national interest in spurring international
law. The national interest is not, as in the typical realist account, a limitation
on the ability of states to comply with international law; rather, it is, more
productively, an orientation that dictates the kind of international law that
states want and can over time seek to obtain. In short, the national interest is
productive of international law because it makes international law the sort of
law that states can, precisely, live with. Second, the book emphasises the
relatively decentralised nature of international law-making and its bottom-
up character. Contra a view of states as mere conveyor belts for the injunctions
of international law, it sees them as implicated in its production, all be it with
their own interest in sight. In that respect, de Lacharrière was less interested in
‘respect’ for or enforcement of international law than in the creation of
international law. Third, the book suggests the creativity and a priori undeter-
mined character of international law. States do not know in advance what
international law’s exact injunction is, at least until they have thrown their
forces in the battle and sought to develop it in a direction that suits them.
Contra the focus on adjudication, his emphasis on the living actors of
49 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 201.
50 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 204–5.
51 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 205.
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international law – his role as legal adviser far more than his role as ICJ judge –
is what makes for compelling reading.
In short, in being a theory of the international legal policy of states, La
politique juridique extérieure could not avoid also being a theory of inter-
national law. Guy de Lacharrière foreshadows, in some ways, Martti
Koskenniemi’s work on The Politics of International Law.52 Koskenniemi, in
focusing on the more systemic level of international law does not start expli-
citly from what states’ foreign legal policy should be. But as himself a former
legal advisor to a foreign ministry, he is keen to construct a theory of inter-
national law that understands it as the product – inchoate, contradictory and
even circular – of various discursive practices by which international lawyers
in a position to do so produce its meaning. Where de Lacharrière’s standpoint
is one of moderate realism, Koskenniemi’s is based on a more systematic
critique of international law itself: international law can only be this discursive
practice not specifically because states treat it that way (although that is also no
doubt true), but because states could only treat it that way. In that respect, La
politique juridique extérieure is aligned and converges with that later and in
many ways far more sophisticated body of work in at least one fundamental
respect: that of the theoretical (and not just practical) primacy of the experi-
ence of the practitioner over a more academic and contemplative approach to
international law. Where de Lacharrière innovates ‘in advance’ of From
Apology to Utopia53 as it were is in his willingness to share some of the tricks
of the trade by which practicing international lawyers, confronted with contra-
dictions of their discipline, act as its sophisticated managers, for the greater
good of their state and, quite possibly, of the project of international law itself.
There is no place in La politique juridique extérieure, however, for envisaging
how this exercise might be more fundamentally liberating and open up
emancipatory possibilities; only the certainty of how one might go about
best serving one’s masters.
One common theme that runs through the book is, in that respect, the
relative inadequacy of scholarly treatments of international law. Although
Guy de Lacharrière was characteristically and typically diplomatic, he knew
that his readership would be largely academic and that his views could be seen
as a provocation to the French professorate. He noted, for example, that
governments and their agents would be surprised to learn that academic
international lawyers (such as Georges Scelle) thought of international law
52 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing,
2011).
53 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia.
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as attributing the state certain competencies, where their daily experience was
surely that these competencies were very much the state’s in the first place and
in no need of recognition from outside. He also noted in relation to treaties, for
example, that ‘les recherches sur le caractère de dogme fondamental du
principe pacta sunt servanda semblent un peu à côté de la question’.54
However, de Lacharrière also saw the kind of distortions introduced by
academic international lawyers as relatively minor as long as they were of
marginal importance (and in his view no international legal theory ever
created a significant obstacle to good foreign legal policy).55
Indeed,Guy de Lacharrière did not let these imperfections of international law
stand in the way of an overall positive evaluation of its incidence. He was aware
that his book might be dispiriting for scholarly observers who had ‘the internal
model’ of law in mind and who thought that international law should promptly
be reformed to be something else than it currently was – presumably something
more hierarchical and institutionalised.56The truth of thematter, however, is that
international law is exactly where states want it to be, and no less useful for it:
le produit livré par les producteurs satisfait les consommateurs, qui sont
identiques aux premiers. Les Etats, responsables du droit international, le
sont aussi de ses ‘faiblesses’, de ses ‘carences’, car ils ne les sentent pas comme
telles et les tiennent au contraire pour des caractéristiques précieuses; globa-
lement, il existe une très vaste et très puissante connivence sur l’actuelle
société ‘anarchique’ et sur la place qu’elle réserve au droit.57
International law, moreover, cannot improve itself by itself and, as
a technique, is neutral as to its destination. If states wanted more jurisdictional
control and compulsory jurisdiction, they would create it. Nothing happened
by chance and no ‘defect’ that was intentionally there was about to be remed-
ied. It would have been hypocritical for anyone with governmental experience
to claim otherwise.
It remains that the foreign legal policy of some states is not the foreign legal
policy of others, and that, for example, a rougher, more primitive international
legal order may be to the benefit of a minority. Of course, nothing prevented
weaker states, according to Guy de Lacharrière, from at least constituting
a more integrated international legal system between themselves, and to
thus announce a more cosmopolitan international law.58 Moreover, it was
54 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 201.
55 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 203.
56 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 215.
57 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 217.
58 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 218.
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not impossible that the concurrence of foreign legal policies would end up
upgrading international law indirectly as captured in this ambiguous formula:
‘les politiques juridiques extérieures manipulent le droit international, mais
dumême coup elles s’occupent de lui’.59 Still, de Lacharrière may have ended
up broadly satisfied with this vision of international law only because he
understood it as having served his own political commanditaires well. But
there was something almost a bit smug about the way in which he saw states as
masters of their foreign legal policy, as if all states could equally afford to
choose which foreign legal policy path they could adopt (consider, for
example, the situation of France’s former African colonies).
As Robert Kolb has pointed out, moreover, ‘Il n’est sans doute pas innocent
que G. de Lacharrière était le ressortissant d’un Etat se voyant traditionnelle-
ment comme Grande Puissance’.60 His broad-brush, somewhat carefree
vision of an instrumental international law worked better for France in the
1970s and 1980s than for others (although arguably he would have been the
first to concede this). To this day, the vast majority of states are relatively weak
powers who may find more succour in a strong international law than a sense
that key powers have mastered the art of crafting the international law that
works for them and that they are free to do the same. France itself has evolved
somewhat in this direction as its influence declined. Still, it is not actually
clear that this need always be the case: witness, for example, the discontent of
a number of African states vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court, an
institution that is at least relatively strong towards them, but on the receiving
end of which they are not particularly happy to be and against whom they have
waged a quite significant battle. Moreover, a commitment to a ‘strong inter-
national law’ (whatever that may mean), de Lacharrière would no doubt
argue, is itself merely a form of foreign legal policy.
IV CONCLUSION
Guy de Lacharrière’s La politique juridique extérieure was an odd book by
French standards and has remained so ever since. It has a cult following of
sorts, but is not part of the canon in the teaching of French universities. It is
largely unknown beyond the borders of France and does not fit within any
simple category. However, it remains a singular and refreshing contribution to
the study of foreign policy, one that can be recast in light of an increasingly
global interest in foreign relations law. As I have argued in this paper, de
59 de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, p. 218.
60 Kolb, Réflexions sur les politiques juridiques extérieures, p. 9.
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Lacharrière was not interested in the conventional sense of that paradigm in
that he largely ignored the constraints of domestic law on foreign policy.
Partly, one is tempted to say, this is because he could. Under the Fifth
Republic, the conduct of foreign policy is a singularly presidential prerogative,
and the holders of the post (de Lacharrière served under de Gaulle, Pompidou
and Giscard-d’Estaing) intended it to remain that way. A legal adviser in the
foreign ministry would entertain few doubts about his position within a larger
hierarchy of decision-making that foregrounded a certain fait du prince.
In a more than 200 page book, Guy de Lacharrière only devotes about 5 to
the issue of domestic constraints.61 To the extent that La politique juridique
extérieure can be construed as a book on foreign relations law, then, it is one
that is largely dismissive of the role of domestic law, emphasising instead
domestic politics of the highest order and an almost neo-realist insistence on
the place of each state within the international system with deep conservative
overtones. This does not mean of course that La politique juridique extérieure
was, instead, a matter of helping and even coaxing the state to respect its
international law commitments. De Lacharrière was too wedded to a model of
medium-power politics to think that his role as legal adviser was to ‘represent’
international law to his government. He would have scoffed at the suggestion
that he was primarily an agent of international law within a national setting.
Interestingly, however, even in his role as a legal apologist for the national
interest of France, he thought quite highly of international law as something
that he understood to transcend that national interest. International law might
well be the sum of successful foreign legal policies, but it was at least that.
Moreover, one did not, at least not always, win in foreign legal policy through
sheer brute force. One needed to persuade, rally, entrench certain forms of
legal reasoning, in the hope that they would catch on and would, in turn,
become international law. This is an exercise that conventional international
lawyers would probably recognise as coming quite close to their lived experi-
ence of the making of international law.
Foreign legal relations, then, were certainly not determined by domestic
law and was certainly more than the implementation of international law. It
involved an intermediary element of legal statecraft, one in which states
deliberately thought about their use of international law over time, calculated
what they could get away with, were often brazen about adopting contradict-
ory positions, but much less inclined to see this as contradictory or at least
problematic than a pious doctrine speaking from outside the cenacle of power.
This might not seem much of a defence of international law and indeed it is
61 Notably, de Lacharrière, La politique juridique extérieure, pp. 206–10.
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one that is very much at odds with how many international lawyers – most of
them academics – see its promise. Yet this is no doubt on some level intended
and de Lacharrière was certainly out, on some level, for a degree of
provocation.
How has the book aged, and what can it tell us today? Guy de Lacharrière’s
treatment is very much based on his own experience as legal adviser. Although
this surely gave him a first-row seat to observe the making of international law,
it is also, in its own way, a limited vision for at least three reasons. First, just as
de Lacharrière faults scholars of international law for focusing too much on
judges, he is guilty of the symmetrical mistake, that of not focusing on judges
at all. The same is true of de Lacharrière’s discreet dismissal of scholars of
international law; as Alain Pellet once noted, it is precisely his presentation of
foreign relations as largely determined by idiosyncratic national interest cal-
culations that militates for a strong role for la doctrine.62 In fact, de
Lacharrière’s strong emphasis on political voluntarism could only go so far
from a theoretical point of view: it helped explain the formation of inter-
national law, quite possibly its implementation, but Michel Virally specific-
ally put the former legal adviser to task for failing to explain the very authority
and legitimising function of international law, which could not themselves be
derived from state will.63
Second, it is true that legal advisors tend to operate in a relative shadow and
that his book was thus an irreplaceable testimony on a considerably important
but unfairly neglected facet of international lawmaking. But international law
is not exclusively a creation of states, and to the extent that it is it is hardly
entirely determined by legal advisors. Indeed, in upgrading international law-
making to a matter of policy, Guy de Lacharrière is always at risk of subtly
overestimating the importance of lawyers’ calculations, at the expense of
general policy development. Indeed, from the point of view of the mainstream
of foreign relations law, de Lacharrière’s treatment is almost hubristic in its
focus on the executive and the foreign ministry. It entirely neglects the role of
the legislative and judicial branches in ways that are problematic now in
France as in most countries. It also is oblivious to the role that civil society
actors have increasingly played. La politique juridique extérieure would gain
from being reread in light of these developments and understood as hence-
forth more embedded in domestic practices – precisely the gap that foreign
relations law has identified. At any rate, there are greater dangers for the
62 Pellet, ‘Le Sage, le Prince et le Savant’, 407 at 410.
63 Virally, ‘Réflexions sur la politique juridique des Etats’.
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purposes of human rights or the rule of law, than states not maximising their
national interest because of incoherences in their legal discourses.
Third, Guy de Lacharrière also wrote at a time of great change (decolon-
isation, the law of the sea) but in a context where the Cold War had frozen
many options for international law. La politique juridique extérieure entirely
ignores some areas such as international environmental law, international
human rights law and international trade law, not to mention the law of
European integration which has arguably such an impact on foreign rela-
tions law.64 It is as if the conversations that animate these branches of
international law did not exist for the once legal adviser to the French foreign
ministry. This is in itself a striking contrast to some of his successors who have
made a name for themselves as pleader before the European Court of
Human Rights (Ronny Abraham) or judge at the International Criminal
Court (Perrin de Brichambaud). Although a recent treatment by Robert
Kolb takes de Lacharrière’s book as his starting point, Kolb is more sanguine
about the autonomous existence of international law and its ability, without
denying the incidence of foreign legal policy, to retroact on its creators and
actors. Kolb goes as far as to suggest that, next to an interest-driven foreign
legal policy, is a more objective variant that is geared towards the creation of
stable relations and devoted to some of the ideals of an international
community.65
It is true that the two can at times seem hard to distinguish, as when
France famously opposed the war in Iraq, in ways that could be
understood to exalt international law and its prudential restraints or,
more simply, to coincide with the country’s geopolitical interest of the
moment. Champions of international law often happen to be cham-
pions of their own interest. Certainly, legal advisers in both the UK and
the US have been in the spotlight for their willingness to provide
excessively supple advice in relation to torture66 or the use of force,67
in ways that show the limits of a purely instrumental approach to
international law especially when, as is increasingly the case, civil
society is watching. Indeed, one of the facets of foreign legal policy-
making that has changed is the willingness of various groups and
individuals to challenge it ‘from below’. The days in which foreign
policy was a purely regal function insulated from common politics
64 See the chapter by Aloupi, ‘Limitations of Sovereignty’, Section IV.
65 Kolb, Réflexions sur les politiques juridiques extérieures, p. 10.
66 Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
67 Frédéric Mégret, ‘“War”? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence’ (2002) 13 EJIL 361–99.
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and activism seem to be long gone. French foreign policy appears more
constrained by its legal environment today and less administratively
elitist than it may have appeared to de Lacharrière forty years ago. If
not quite the constraint of foreign relations law or the command of
international law, then, that is a further significant domestic constraint
on foreign policy-making.
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7
Judicial Review, Foreign Relations and Global
Administrative Law
The Administrative Function of Courts in Foreign Relations
Angelo Jr. Golia
I INTRODUCTION: ADMINISTRATIVIZATION OF JURISDICTION
AND JURIDIFICATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
On 19 March 2019 the High Administrative Court (OVG) of North Rhine-
Westphalia (Münster) issued a decision on the legality of the use of the
Ramstein military air base1 which had been made available by Germany to
the US for drone strikes in Yemen2. Reversing the holding of the lower court,
the OVG found that the measures taken by the German government did not
suffice to fulfil its positive obligations arising from the right to life. Touching
on crucial diplomatic relations, this decision is remarkable for at least two
reasons. First, before starting the lawsuit before German courts, the plaintiffs
had already sued the US government before American federal courts, but on
appeal the DC District court decided that the alleged extrajudicial killings by
drone strikes were a non-justiciable political question. Second, the OVG did
not only find a violation of applicable constitutional and international law, but
ordered also the German government to put into place measures to ensure the
1 Bin Ali Jaber v.Germany, Judgment, 19March 2019, 4 A 1361/15. See Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘US-
Drohneneinsätze und die grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht für das Recht auf Leben: “German
exceptionalism”?’ (2020) 75 Juristenzeitung 303; Leander Beinlich, ‘Germany and its
Involvement in the US Drone Programme before German Administrative Courts’, EJIL:
Talk!, April 8, 2019, www.ejiltalk.org/germany-and-its-involvement-in-the-us-drone-
programme-before-german-administrative-courts/, accessed September 30, 2020. The decision
was quashed by theGerman Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG,Bin Ali Jaber v.Germany,
Judgment, 25 November 2020, 6 C 7.19) in November 2020, as the present piece was already at
the proof-editing stage. However, as pointed out by Helmut Aust and Thomas Kleinlein in the
introduction to this volume, it remains the case that for both courts the question of whether
international law permits armed drone missions in Yemen was not a political question, but
rather a legal question, to be assessed by the judiciary.
2 The base was used for the relay of flight control data necessary to the drone strikes.
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legality of the use of the Ramstein base. Therefore, the OVG did not only
review – unlike its US counterpart – the foreign policy of its own government,
but also required it to manage/administer it in a different manner. This also
means that, following the judgment, the German government was called to
interact with the US in a way different from that originally planned, with
a potential adverse impact on their otherwise (mostly) friendly relationship.
This case is exemplary of a general trend in contemporary western tradition
systems towards the weakening of two fundamental dichotomies in their
political-legal structures: that between domestic and foreign affairs; and that
between judicial and executive/administrative power. Indeed, at least since
the principle of separation of powers emerged as a distinctive feature of
modern constitutionalism, western legal tradition has been built on the
assumption that the public authorities performing executive/administrative
functions and those performing judicial functions should be kept structurally
distinct.3 At the same time, liberal constitutions of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries were based on a clear divide between internal and external
sovereignty,4 dealing with foreign relations (FRs) only in a limited and osten-
sibly value-neutral way. That is why they generally did not impose substantive
obligations to the political branches of government in the management of
FRs. Interestingly, in Locke’s construction of the separation of powers – which
did not clearly distinguish between executive and judicial power – the feder-
ative power,5 what today is usually indicated as foreign relations power (FRP),
was qualitatively different from the legislative and the executive: insofar as it
could not be subject to prior legal norms, a judicial review over the exercise of
federative power was conceptually inconceivable.6 More generally, the ori-
ginal theories of the rule of law and liberal constitutional models did not focus
3 This stark separation did not belong to either Locke’s nor Montesquieu’s theories: see Jenny
S. Martinez, ‘Horizontal Structuring’, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajó (eds.), Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.
548–49; Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.
16 ff.
4 The general assumption that Hobbes was actually the originator of the dichotomy between
internal and external sovereignty is contested by Theodore Christov, ‘Hobbes’s Janus-Faced
Sovereign’, in David Dyzenhaus, Jacco Bomhoff and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-Facing
Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 94–120.
5 ‘The power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons
and communities without the commonwealth.’
6 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (NewHaven and London: Yale University Press,
2003), § 147, p. 165. On the qualitative difference of the federative power see generally
Thomas Poole, ‘The Idea of the Federative’, in David Dyzenhaus, Jacco Bomhoff and
Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-Facing Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2019), pp. 54–93.
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on the relationship between a single State and other States, but almost
exclusively on the internal sovereignty.7 As a consequence, they generally
framed FRs as a sort of free zone where the rule of law did not apply,
characterized by judicial deference and self-restraint, and therefore by
a certain ‘exceptionalism’.8
Both normative and factual developments of the twentieth century affected the
divide between domestic and foreign affairs. From a normative perspective, post-
war constitutions have established more institutional constraints on FRP.9 At the
same time, contemporary constitutionalism and international human rights and
humanitarian law gave more relevance of the legal position of the individual,
strengthening material constraints legal systems – especially in western tradition
jurisdictions –10 and turning some cosmopolitan values into binding legal prin-
ciples, that is, result-oriented norms to be potentially applied as standards of
review also in the field of FRs.11 This might explain both the rise of foreign
relations law (FRL) as a distinct field of legal studies and its persistently disputed
7 See Thomas Poole, ‘The Constitution and Foreign Affairs’ (2016) 69 Current Legal Problems
143 at 148 ff. (referring to a ‘unilateral’ constitutional model); Umberto Allegretti, ‘Stato di
diritto e divisione dei poteri nell’era dei conflitti asimmetrici’ (2005) 11 Dir pubb 93 at 99–101.
8 The ‘foreign affairs exceptionalism’ implied in Locke’s notion of federative power had a deep
intellectual influence on American constitutionalism, especially through the work of
William Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p.
160 at 243. Classic formulations of such exceptionalism may be found in the US Supreme
Court decisions Missouri v. Holland, 252 US 416 (1929); and United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp, 299 US 304 (1936). See generally David Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes on the
International Rule of Law’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International Affairs 53; Thomas M. Franck,
Political Questions/Judicial Answers. Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs?
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 10–30 (for the influence of British doctrine
of royal prerogative on the practice of judicial abdication in the US); J. Richard Broughton,
‘Judicializing Federative Power’ (2006) 11 Texas Review of Law & Politics 283; Stephen Breyer,
The Court and the World. American Law and the New Global Realities (New York: Vintage,
2015), pp. 15 ff.
9 See Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution. An International and
Comparative Study (Basel-Stuttgart: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1971); Jenny S. Martinez,
‘The Constitutional Allocation of Executive and Legislative Power Over Foreign Affairs:
A Survey’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 97–114.
10 On the internationalization/humanization of public law see Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Modern
Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
211; Chang Wen-Chen and Yeh Jiunn-Rong, ‘Internationalization of Constitutional Law’, in
Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajó (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 1165–84; Karen Knop, ‘The Spectre of
Comity’, in David Dyzenhaus, Jacco Bomhoff and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-
Facing Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 177–210.
11 See generally Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers, pp. 61 ff.; Deborah N. Pearlstein,
‘After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law’ (2011) 159
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 783; Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth, ‘The
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disciplinary location.12 Indeed, constitutional and international law together
changed the normative relationship between law and FRs,13 traditionally based
on a strict interpretation of the separation of powers and on axiological
neutrality.14 From a more factual perspective, globalization processes established
deep and unprecedented interdependencies among individuals, polities and
systems at global level,15 piercing national-political boundaries and therefore
weakening the factual bases underpinning the domestic/foreign dichotomy.
Turning to the divide between judicial and executive/administrative power,
today even Kelsen would be surprised to see how the prediction hemade in the
early twentieth century while discussing the theoretical foundations of consti-
tutional adjudication – the end of the ‘opposition’ between judicial and
executive power –16 has come close to reality. Following the rise of principled
(i.e. result-oriented)17 norms and relative indeterminacy in contemporary
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’ (2015) 128 Harvard Law Review 1897; Poole, ‘The
Constitution and Foreign Affairs’.
12 For the debate concerning the interaction between public international law and FRL see the
chapter by Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Final Reflections’, in this volume; Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is
Foreign Relations Law?’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.),Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign
Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 8–13; and Helmut Philipp Aust and
Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, this volume, arguing that the ‘hybridity’ between domestic
(public) law and public international law is an effect rather than a characteristic of FRL.
13 See Poole, ‘The Constitution and Foreign Affairs’, 148 ff. (referring to a ‘reflexive’ or ‘mutually
constitutive’ constitutional model). More generally see Jean-Bernard Auby, Globalisation,
Law and the State (Oxford: Hart, 2017), pp. 80 ff.
14 This may also be read as the latest stage of a more general process, started with modernity, of
formalization of politics by law. See Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions:
Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Torbjörn Vallinder, ‘The Judicialization of Politics. A
World-Wide Phenomenon: Introduction’ (1994) 15 IPSR 91; Ran Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization
of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts’ (2008) 11 Annual Review of Political
Science 93.
15 See famously Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990),
pp. 64 ff.
16 See Hans Kelsen, ‘La garantie juridictionnelle de la constitution’ (1928) 45Revue du droit public
et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger 197 at 212–14. At the time Kelsen wrote, public
law theory was still influenced by assumptions typical of the nineteenth century administrative
state, framing executives as possessing autonomous legitimation: in that context, the distinction
between jurisdictional and executive/administrative functions was traditionally linked to the fact
that only the exercise of the former was based on legal rules. Rejecting this criterion, Kelsen
argued that the relationship of administrative/executive bodies towards law did not qualitatively
differ from that of judicial bodies, especially when it comes to the norms of ‘higher level’. Rather,
the only real distinction lied in the different modes of organization of tribunals and executive
bodies, difference that he predicted would come to an end.
17 See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),
pp. 47–49, and his conception of principles as result-oriented norms, i.e. norms containing
‘optimisation commands’.
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legal systems,18 and the spread of judicial review mechanisms, judicial prac-
tice has progressively internalized consequentialist and teleological
approaches.19 Next to normative inputs, courts are more and more condi-
tioned by the (expected) output of their decisions, and accommodate them to
future-oriented purposes set by law in specific regulatory fields, as general or
indeterminate as they may appear. Often based on balancing/proportionality
techniques, domestic and international courts turn (their perception of) social
expectations and policy goals, positivized in legislative, constitutional or
international norms, into decisions aimed at solving and/or managing con-
crete issues on an ongoing basis, thus performing de facto executive/adminis-
trative functions. Therefore, rather than simple external reviewers, they
increasingly act as internal participants in administrative functions. In the
context of global governance, such ‘administrativization’ of the judicial func-
tion places courts in the broader set of global regulators,20 thus contributing to
the development and implementation of rules of coexistence, collision and
cooperation among involved systems.21
This chapter investigates the connection between the expanding ‘adminis-
trative’ functions of courts and the ongoing normalization (i.e. juridification/
judicialization) of FRs.22To that purpose, it resorts to the analytical tools of the
‘global administrative law’ (GAL) approach, and argues that there is a factual
trend towards what may be seen as a ‘global administrative law of foreign
relations’, that is, a transnational legal language erratically but increasingly
18 Gunther Teubner, ‘“AndGodLaughed . . .” Indeterminacy, Self-Reference and Paradox in Law’
(2011) 12 German Law Journal 376; Inger Johanne Sand, ‘Changing Forms of Governance and
the Role of Law’, ARENA WP No. 00/14, www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/
arena-working-papers/1994–2000/2000/wp00_14.htm, accessed September 30, 2020.
19 See Neil MacCormick, ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’ (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 16;
Gunther Teubner, ‘Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses’, in
Richard Rawlings (ed.), Law, Society and Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
p. 149 at 167; Klaus Mathis, ‘Consequentialism in Law’, in Klaus Mathis (ed.), Efficiency,
Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations (Berlin: Springer, 2012), pp. 3–29.
20 See Sabino Cassese, The Global Polity. Global Dimensions of Democracy and the Rule of Law
(Sevilla: Global Law Press, 2012); Elisa D’Alterio, ‘Judicial Regulation in the Global Space’, in
Sabino Cassese, Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law (Cheltenahm: Elgar,
2016), pp. 314 ff. On the link between proportionality-based reasoning and ‘administratization’
of constitutional law and constitutional adjudication see Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat,
‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) 59 American Journal of Comparative
Law 463, pp. 487 ff.
21 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NewWorld Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
pp. 51–61.
22 See Sitaraman and Wuerth, ‘The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’; Carlos
M. Vasquez, ‘The Abiding Exceptionalism of Foreign Relations Doctrine’ (2015) 128
Harvard Law Review Forum 305.
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developed by courts in different jurisdictions, aimed at concretely managing
issues falling within the scope of FRs. More specifically, the GAL approach is
used, firstly, to conceptualize the function performed by courts applying FRL
in the context of the increased interdependence driven by the processes of
globalization and global governance. This means that, as courts increasingly
participate in the ‘administration’ of FRs, an administrative conception can
be added to and, to a certain extent, overlaps with other conceptions23 of
FRL. From this perspective, the trend towards the judicial ‘administration’
of FRs could be seen as the ultimate form of the – admittedly precarious and
reversible – normalization of FRL. Secondly, the GAL approach is here used
to categorize judicial rulings, according to the type of norms they implement
or develop in the context of FRL. Here, it is possible to conceptually
distinguish between norms and/or standards implemented or developed in
relation to the FRs conduct of the political branches of the jurisdiction to
which a given court belongs (‘review norms’); and norms and/or standards
implemented or developed to manage interactions with other jurisdictions
or legal systems affecting FRs (‘interaction norms’).
Section II briefly recalls the main features of FRL (subsection II.A) and
GAL (subsection II.B), mapping the analytical bases of the chapter, their
conceptual assumptions, and the main challenges they face. Based on an
a-systematic survey, Section III outlines a tentative taxonomy of the forms
that the judicial practice takes in developing an embryonic ‘global adminis-
trative law of foreign relations.’ In particular, subsection III.A focuses on the
‘review norms’, while subsection III.B on the ‘interaction norms’. Section IV
concludes, summarizing the core claims and highlighting, from a more nor-
mative perspective, the potential risks of the administrativization of FRs,
which may also cast doubts on the general value of GAL as a normative
endeavor.
II BRINGING TOGETHER FRL AND GAL
A The Struggles of FRL with its Scope, Sources and Functions
FRL intersects two axes of constitutional legal theory: the relationship
between domestic law and international/transnational legal systems;24 and
23 See Campbell McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Functions of Foreign Relations Law’, in
Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 21 ff.
24 See Anne Peters, ‘Foreign Relations Law and Global Constitutionalism’ (2017) 111 AJIL
Unbound 331.
Judicial Review, Foreign Relations and Global Administrative Law 135
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
that between judicial and political branches in legal systems characterized by
the constitutionalization of value choices.25 However, although it is by now
relatively well-established as a field of studies (at least in common law juris-
dictions), FRL still struggles with some foundational issues,26 concerning its
scope, sources and functions.
Concerning its scope, at least two conceptions of FRLmay be individuated.
The first one, based on a strict dichotomy domestic/foreign, limits FRL to
three macro-areas: treaty-making, -development and -termination; inter-
national and supranational integration; and use of military force.27
A broader conception, based on a functional understanding of FRL, focuses
on all the legal norms affecting the relations of a nation with the rest of the
world. Under this broader conception, FRL would for example include the
conflict of laws of each nation,28 and in some cases even fields normally
regarded as purely internal. A US Supreme Court decision concerning the
interpretation of federal copyright law29 may matter to manufacturers and
consumers both in the US and throughout the world, with economic impacts
worth billions, and potentially generating significant diplomatic frictions.30
Likewise, a judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG),
holding that a specific statutory design for the surveillance powers of intelli-
gence agencies violate the Basic Law, and forbidding the transfer of data thus
obtained to other intelligence services,31 may undermine the diplomatic
position of the German government. Similarly, constitutional provisions and
the related judicial rulings concerning public ownership of natural resources
and property rights of corporations constitute examples of norms functionally
falling withing FRL – especially from a ‘peripheral perspective’.32 In all these
cases constitutional courts inevitably decide also on FRs issues, as in the age of
globalization FRs are virtually everywhere. Therefore, the struggles of FRL
25 See in recent scholarship Möllers, The Three Branches.
26 See McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Functions of Foreign Relations Law’, p. 20.
27 See e.g. Thomas Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.),Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
p. 178 at 183.
28 See William S. Dodge, ‘International Comity in Comparative Perspective’, in Curtis
A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), pp. 701 ff.; and Restatement of the Law Fourth, The Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (Philadelphia: ALI, 2018), pp. 148 ff and 303 ff.
29 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 US 519 (2013).
30 See Breyer, The Court and the World, pp. 124–31.
31 See BVerfG, 19 May 2020, 1 BvR 2835/17 – BND.
32 See Michael Riegner, ‘Comparative Foreign Relations Law between Center and Periphery’,
in this volume.
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scholarship with the definition of its own analytical scope derive also from the
difficulty to be coextensive with its factual scope.33
Regarding its sources, FRL has been traditionally conceived as a branch of
domestic systems,34 namely of their constitutional and administrative law.35
However, following the normative developments occurred during the twenti-
eth century, FRL has progressively come to include international law,36 to the
extent this latter applies to a specific domestic jurisdiction, or imposes on
States a certain conduct in the management of their FRs, or directly regulates
the conduct of individuals. Importantly, the influence of international law
sources contributes to making FRL at least in part ‘transnational’, insofar as
courts in different jurisdictions, which apply the same rules of international
law or decide on similar issues concerning FRs, increasingly develop compar-
able and/or equivalent – albeit not identical – standards of adjudication,37 also
through reciprocal influence and cross-fertilization.38
This last aspect is linked to the functions attributed to FRL. Campbell
McLachlan has listed five conceptions of the functions performed by FRL,
namely the exclusionary, the internationalist, the constitutional, the diplo-
matic and the allocative.39 While not necessarily mutually exclusive, these
conceptions have different ideological roots, and potentially result in conflict-
ing implementations by institutional actors, especially courts. Put differently:
in applying FRL or in adjudicating issues related to FRs, judicial bodies may
develop different understandings of their own role and the results to pursue,
also depending on the underlying function attributed to FRL. However, none
of these conceptions as such captures the idea that FRL has come to provide
33 See Anne Peters, ‘Military Operations Abroad under the German Basic Law’, in Curtis
A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), p. 809.
34 See Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, p. 178.
35 See Jean Galbraith, ‘From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing
Landscape of Foreign Relations Law’ (2017) 64 University of Chicago Law Review 167,
at 1684–97.
36 On the ‘double-facing’ nature of FRL see McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Functions of
Foreign Relations Law’, p. 2; and David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Janus-Faced Constitution’, in
David Dyzenhaus, Jacco Bomhoff and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-Facing
Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 17–53.
37 See Bradley, ‘Final Reflections’, in this volume and, in deeper detail, Anthea Roberts et al.
(eds.), Comparative International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
38 See generally Gregory Shaffer and Carlos Coye, ‘From International Law to Jessup’s
Transnational Law, From Transnational Law to Transnational Legal Orders’, UC Irvine
School of Law Research Paper No. 2017-02.
39 See again McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Functions of Foreign Relations Law’.
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concrete legal standards – potentially justiciable by courts – to ‘manage’ FRs
on an ongoing basis.
In the light of such struggles, it seems that no single approach accounts in
a comprehensive manner for some key elements of FRL, namely the mis-
match between its analytical and factual scope; its ‘transnationality’; its poten-
tially ‘administrative’ function; and, finally, the active – be it unifying or
fragmenting – role played by judicial bodies in that context.
B GAL As an Analytical Approach to FRL
Giving an accurate idea of GAL in few words is not easy. It has emerged
together with other approaches in the galaxy of global law and postnational
constitutionalism,40 and it does not indicate a full-fledged legal system in
a traditional sense.41 Rather, it can be broken down into two main parts.
Firstly, GAL stands as an analytical/descriptive tool, referring to a factual42
trend whereby a set of procedural and substantive norms – inter alia review,
transparency, reason-giving, participation, audiatur altera pars, legal
accountability and liability of administrative authority – has been increas-
ingly developed and implemented, either formally or informally, by ‘global
administrative bodies’ (GABs) all around the world and at different govern-
ance levels, including the domestic one. GAL focuses on the ‘mechanisms,
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or
otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies’.43 It
highlights that, when confronted with functionally differentiated issues of
global concern (corruption, competition, banking supervision, terrorism,
food safety, etc.), GABs of different jurisdictions and governance levels
increasingly interact, often working as (either formal or informal) trans-
national networks. From this standpoint, GAL claims that ‘much of the
global governance can be understood in administrative terms, as global
administration that operates in a “global administrative space” . . . in which
the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has largely broken
40 Although it is not possible to discuss its conceptual genealogy here, see Benedict Kingsbury,
Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005)
68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15; Sabino Cassese, ‘Administrative Law Without the
State? The Challenge of Global Regulation’ (2005) 37NYU Journal of International Law and
Politics 663; Cassese, Research Handbook.
41 See however Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’
(2009) 20 EJIL 23.
42 See Lorenzo Casini, ‘Global Administrative Law Scholarship’, in Sabino Cassese, Research
Handbook on Global Administrative Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2016), p. 554.
43 Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 17.
138 Angelo Jr. Golia
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
down’.44 Therefore, the label ‘GAL’ refers to an emerging form of trans-
national law, whose norms are implemented and developed by sub- and
non-state administrative institutions, often with little or no involvement of
political branches of governments.
Secondly, GAL embodies the normative stance of a scholarly movement
towards such practices. In other words, the GAL approach does not only
outline the factual implementation of a certain set of norms by administrative
bodies, but also supports their spread and strengthening. It also argues that
these norms and networked modes of action help to order the structures of
global governance and achieve results in fields of common concern, by also
strengthening their legitimacy and cooperation, and decreasing conflicts and
inconsistencies among involved actors/systems. From this perspective, GABs
would be also incentivized to act as transnational networks. Overall, the GAL
approach claims to retains a soft normative value, aiming to bridge a relatively
little gap between an ‘Is’ and an ‘Ought’ at global level, by expanding guaran-
tees in administrative action, in fields where they have not been established
yet. By these means, the GAL approach is – or claims to be – less ambitious
than other ‘constitutionalist’ approaches to global law,45 as it does not engage
directly with the issue of unitary axiological framework(s) and global
democracy.
The GAL approach deals with courts in two different yet linked ways.46
First, they are regarded as reviewing bodies, checking the respect by GABs of
the norms aimed at keeping them accountable and increasing their legitim-
acy. Therefore, courts implement and develop review norms on administrative
action. Secondly, they are regarded as GABs themselves, especially when
exercising substituting functions or working as transnational networks. In
this latter case, the standards developed or implemented by courts often take
the form of ‘interaction norms’ (margin-of-appreciation; Solange-like doc-
trines; subsidiarity; deference/comity doctrines), and are generated by courts
to manage actual or virtual clashes among the systems where they operate
respectively.47 One of the merits of GAL as an analytical tool has been to
44 Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 EJIL 1.
45 See Nico Krisch, ‘Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition’, in
Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 245–66.
46 Formore detailed accounts see D’Alterio, ‘Judicial Regulation in the Global Space’, pp. 314 ff;
and Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, Between Fragmentation and Democracy. The
Role of National and International Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
47 See Sabino Cassese, I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale
(Rome: Donzelli, 2009).
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highlight that, whether they act as reviewers of the action of GABs or as GABs
themselves, courts take part of the regulation/administration of global
governance.48 Another analytical contribution of GAL is to read the inter-
actions and reciprocal influences among courts as networks. Indeed, judicial
networks, just like other information, harmonization and enforcement
networks,49 may promote convergence, compliance and cooperation among
involved systems, and they are called upon to manage clashes emerging from
globalization processes.50
In the light of these considerations, the GAL approach may provide
a useful – although not exclusive – analytical/descriptive framework, at the
same time accounting for the elusive scope of FRL, its ‘transnationality’, its
‘administrative’ function, and the role played by courts in managing coordin-
ation and/or fragmentation among systems. In other words, the GAL approach
constitutes a viable tool to frame and understand two major tensions under-
lying FRL: that between its still somehow persistent ‘exceptionalism’ and
ongoing/erratic process of normalization, where the aspiration to manage
even FRs according to material legal standards meets the obstacles of the
Realpolitik; and that between its domestic and international dimensions,
where the aspiration to provide global legal standards meets the obstacles of
different sources of legitimation andmodes of lawmaking. The GAL approach
crosscuts these tensions and may potentially offer a useful conceptual frame-
work. Building on this core insight, the next section brings the argument
further and, based on the GAL framework, outlines a tentative taxonomy of
the decisions of courts ‘administering’ FRs.
III A (TENTATIVE) TAXONOMY OF A ‘GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF FRS’
Drawing a clear-cut taxonomy of the decisions taken by domestic courts in FRs
matters is problematic, considering the institutional and procedural variances
among different systems of judicial review. However, based on the GAL
48 See Cassese, I tribunali di Babele; Elisa D’Alterio, ‘From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity:
A Judicial Solution to Global Disorder?’ (2011) 9 ICON 394; D’Alterio, ‘Judicial Regulation in
the Global Space’, explicitly referring to courts as ‘GAL regulators’.
49 For these categorizations see again Slaughter, A New World Order, pp. 51–61.
50 The persisting significant differences between administrative and judicial networks cannot be
explored here, but see further Alexander Somek, ‘Administration without Sovereignty’, in
Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), pp. 267–87; Christoph Möllers, ‘Constitutional Foundations of
Global Administration’, in Sabino Cassese (ed.), Research Handbook on Global
Administrative Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2016), pp. 114 ff.
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framework,51 onemay distinguish between (1) norms involving the application
of certain standards of review on FRs acts, or of acts otherwise affecting FRs
(‘review norms’); (2) norms affecting the coordination/cooperation with other
systems in FRs matters (‘interaction norms’). Both categories may in turn be
subcategorized, based on the procedural or substantive grounds. Such tax-
onomy is summarized above in Table 7.1.
To be sure, these categories should be seen only as a general descriptive
account of the way courts generally frame the arguments underpinning their
decisions in FRs matters, and may in fact overlap. For example, reasonable-
ness/proportionality arguments are categorized sub the ‘review norms’ cat-
egory, as they are mostly used as a benchmark to review domestic acts, but may
often explicitly enter into considerations related to comity. Similarly, deci-
sions based on justiciability doctrines (e.g. the British ‘foreign act of State’)
may also give rise to interaction norms. More generally, such taxonomy does
not aspire to establish strong normative divides, especially considering that the
same decision may often generate uno actu both review and interaction
norms.
A Review Norms
The first category, comprising the review norms implemented and/or developed
on the issue as to whether to decide, includes rules on the access/standing of
table 7.1 Taxonomy of the Judicial Administration of Foreign Relations
review of FRs acts/con-
ducts (‘review norms’)
interaction with other






• Deference to executive’s
interpretation/findings
• Justiciability doctrines











• (. . .)
• Evaluation of other systems’
respect of human rights
• (. . .)
51 See above Section II.B.
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private parties, the deference towards executive (either on the interpretation of
relevant law or on factual findings), the justiciability of the question, etc. In this
field, for the last decades domestic judicial practice has been heading – slowly,
contradictorily, but constantly – towards the expansion of the courts’ compe-
tence to adjudicate FRs issues, both in common law and in civil law jurisdic-
tions. More importantly, courts seem increasingly to be reducing the use and
scope of ‘exceptional’ doctrines of nonjusticiability (such as the US political
question doctrine) and/or of deference to executives’ interpretations/findings,
often under the influence of international human rights law.52 Indeed, even
when they accord such deference, they increasingly give their own legal justifi-
cations as to the reasons for doing so (e.g. executive expertise).
In civil law jurisdictions, Germany is probably the most prominent example
of rejection of doctrines of judicial abdication in FRs matters, even for cases
involving the deployment of military force.53 Helped by their specific cultural
and institutional environment, since at least the 1954 Status of the Saar case,54
through the 1983 Pershing II case,55 up to the decision of the OVGMünster on
the use of the Ramstein base, German courts have consistently rejected
doctrines of intrinsic nonjusticiability,56 and rather tend slightly to lower the
intensity of scrutiny of the merits case.57
52 See e.g. ECtHR Chevrol v. France (App. No. 49636/99), Judgment (Second Section),
February 13, 2003, https://hudoc.ECHR.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&i
d=001-60941&filename=001-60941.pdf&TID=thkbhnilzk, accessed September 30, 2020.
53 On the contrary, French and Italian (mainly administrative) courts keep on applying doctrines of
judicial abstention (acte de gouvernement, atto politico) in cases involving the use of military force.
See Conseil d’Etat, No. 255905, 10 April 2003; No. 292539, 17 April 2006; No. 321470,
15 October 2008; and Cons St, 11 May 1966, No. 344; Cons St, 3 August 2000, No. 530; Cass,
5 June 2002, No. 8157 –Markovic;Cons St, No. 3992, 29 July 2008; Trib Rome, Società Fincantieri,
10October 1991. See Moncef Kdhir, ‘La théorie de l’acte de gouvernement dans la jurisprudence
du Conseil d’Etat relative aux relations internationales de la France à l’épreuve du droit inter-
national’ (2003) 4 JDI 1059; Natalino Ronzitti, ‘Azioni belliche e risarcimento del danno’ (2002) 85
Rivista di dritto internazionale 682; and Daniele Amoroso, ‘A Fresh Look at the Issue of Non-
Justiciability of Defence and Foreign Affairs’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 933.
54 BVerfGE 4, 157 – Saarstatut.
55 BVerfGE 66, 39 – Nachrüstung, where the German Federal Constitutional Court was called
to decide whether the government’s authorization to the installation of nuclear missiles on
German territory was compatible with international law. See also a similar decision in the UK,
Hutchinson v. Newbury Magistrates Court [2000] EWHC QB 61; and, in Italy, Trib Ragusa,
Barker e altri, 14 April 1984, (1985) 108 Foro italiano 21 (alluding, however, to the impossibility
to adjudicate the question on the merits).
56 Whereby a judge recognizes that an applicable legal standard to decide the issue would be
virtually available but abstains from adjudicating it anyway.
57 See Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers, pp. 107–25; Peters, ‘Military Operations
Abroad under the German Basic Law’.
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Contrary to some scholarly suggestions,58 even common law jurisdictions,
where the influence of ‘foreign affairs exceptionalism’ is traditionally stronger,
seem to participate in this trend. Importantly, in its most recent case law the
US Supreme Court has increasingly rejected the use of the so-called Chevron
approach in FRs matters. Such approach, intrinsically linked to the autono-
mous political legitimation of the executive branch in US government, com-
pels federal courts to defer to a federal agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
statute that Congress delegated to the agency to administer, and results in an
almost exclusive abdication to government’s agencies in interpreting the
statutes.59 Similarly, US federal courts are gradually reducing the application
of the political question doctrine, even in key FRs cases such as Zivotofsky,60
the Guantanamo cases61 and, more recently, Al Shimari,62 concerning alleged
acts of torture committed by a private military contractor’s employees towards
Abu Ghraib prisoners, which vacated the lower court’s dismissal based on the
political question doctrine.
Other examples of this trend may be found in the case law of the
Israeli Supreme Court starting from the beginning of the 1980s,63 in the
practice of the Canadian Supreme Court,64 as well as in India,65 UK,66
58 Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law’ (2006) 116 Yale
Law Journal 1170.
59 See Nada Mourtada-Sabbah and Bruce E. Cain (eds.), The Political Question Doctrine and
the Supreme Court of the United States (Lanham: Lexington, 2007); Sitaraman and Wuerth,
‘The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’; Breyer, The Court and the World, pp. 65–87.
60 Zivotofsky v.Clinton, 566US 189 (2012), holding that a dispute over the regulation of passports
was not a political question and thus resolvable by the courts.
61 Rasul, 542 US 466 (2004); Hamdi, 542 US 507 (2004); Hamdan, 548 US 557 (2006);
Boumediene, 553 US 723 (2008).
62 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech, Inc (Al Shimari IV), 840 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2016).
63 See e.g. Segal v.Minister of Interior, HCJ 217/80; Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority, HCJ 1/81;
Baransa v.Commander of Central Command, HCJ, 554/81;Ressler v.Minister of Defense, HCJ
910/86,Hilman v.Minister of Internal Security, HCJ, 3123/99; Adala v.Commander of Central
Command, HCJ 3799/02, affirming the justiciability of questions related to military oper-
ations, in some instances even issuing preliminary orders to stop them. See
Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
pp. 61 ff.
64 See Operation Dismantle [1985] 1 SCR 441, rejecting on the merits the challenge against the
executive for allowing the US government to test cruise missiles over Canadian territory, but
dismissing the ‘political question’ doctrine; and, similarly, Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr
[2010] 1 SCR 44, concerning the modalities Canada should respond to the violation of
a Canadian citizen’s rights held in at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
65 See the evolution from State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [1977] (3) SCC 5, to Bommai
v. Union of India [1994] 2 SCR 644.
66 Historically, UK courts have practiced a high degree of self-restraint towards the royal
prerogative, especially in foreign affairs: see Frederick Alexander Mann, Foreign Affairs in
English Courts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); Nigel D. White,Democracy Goes to War (Oxford:
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South Africa67 and even Russia.68 More generally, when courts declare
inadmissible a question related to FRs, they increasingly resort to the
‘ordinary’ tools provided by judicial procedure, such as standing require-
ments, although even the evolutive interpretation of these latter seems
increasingly to permit a greater access of private individuals to litigate
FRs issues.69 In particular, the comparison between Germany and the US
shows that, while the respective practice still differs as for the underlying
legal culture and the concrete results, there is a sort of progressive
alignment as for the restriction of ‘exceptional’ doctrines of judicial
abdication.
These insights support the claim that the area of judicial reach over FRs is
expanding. Such ‘normalization’ is a necessary precondition for claiming that
the management of FRs can be conceived in terms of (co-)administration by
courts. Indeed, insofar as judicial bodies increasingly address the merits of
FRs cases, or declare them inadmissible based on ordinary procedural
standards, they apply the same norms as for any other executive action. At
the same time, the possibilities for courts to adjudicate and even ‘administer’
FRs issues grow.
Concerning the legal standards used on the merits, that is, the norms
concerning how to decide on FRs issues, it is also possible to identify an
expanding trend. Indeed, national courts – in the different ways permitted
by their respective domestic law – increasingly use the same substantive
criteria of evaluation as for ordinary domestic issues. This trend, which varies
in context and intensity, does not concern only the application of constitu-
tional/legislative norms specifically related to FRs (e.g., the content of an
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 283–94. However, see CCSU v. Minister for the Civil
Service [1984] UKHL 9, holding that prerogative powers are as susceptible to judicial review as
statutory powers; and, more recently, Belhaj & Rahmatullah (No 1) v. Straw & Ors [2017]
UKSC 3, ruling that sued officials had not shown any entitlement to rely on the doctrine of the
Crown act of state so as to defeat the claims brought against them. See Eirik Bjorge and
Cameron Miles, ‘Crown and Foreign Acts of State before English Courts: Rahmatullah,
Belhaj, and the Separation of Powers’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 715–32.
67 See Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA
235 (CC), already holding that courts are entitled to review decisions of the executive in the
exercise of its mandate in FRs. See the chapter by Dire Tladi, ‘A Constitution Made for
Mandela, a Constitutional Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma’, this volume.
68 See theChechnya judgment of 31 July 1995, where the Constitutional court heard petitions by
opposition members of the Duma, challenging the constitutionality of three presidential
decrees ordering the invasion of Chechnya. The Russian case is recalled next to common
law jurisdictions only because, just as these latter, it traditionally accords to the executive an
extremely broad area of nonjusticiability in FRs matters.
69 See e.g. Bond v. United States, 564 US 211 (2011) (Bond I).
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agreement or the process of treaty-making) which in some cases may lead to
the invalidation of the law implementing a treaty, but also the use of constitu-
tional general principles. These latter include both the respect of constitu-
tional rights, often interpreted in the light of international law, and general
clauses and standards such as reasonableness and proportionality. Major
examples pointing to this direction may be drawn from German,70 Italian71
and US case law, as well as from the European Court of Justice (ECJ).72
Importantly, US federal courts applied proportionality/balancing tech-
niques in issuing (or in staying) preliminary injunctions barring the enforce-
ment of President Trump’s ‘travel bans’.73 This application is particularly
significant, especially when compared to the traditional ‘plenary power
doctrine’.74 Similar developments may be observed in the case law on the
treatment of enemy combatants in the ‘war on terror’.75
In this context, and even though it did not resort to balancing techniques,
the decision of the OVGMünster is particularly interesting. Indeed, based on
a typical result-oriented norm – the obligation to protect the life and physical
70 See again Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers, pp. 107–25; Peters, ‘Military
Operations Abroad under the German Basic Law’.
71 See decisions nos. 54/1979, 132/1985, 128/1987, 223/1996, 238/2014 of the Constitutional court.
Further, with the decision No. 135/1963, the court declared unconstitutional a decree preclud-
ing any action against decisions of the Minister of Justice in respect of seizure of goods
belonging to foreign States.
72 See Case 93/78, Lothar Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkühlkost eG [1978] ECR
2203; Case 191/82, EEC Seed Crushers’ and Oil Processors’ Federation (FEDIOL)
v. Commission of the European Communities [1983] ECR 2913; Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner
Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany [1995] ECR I-0318958; Case
C-120/94,Commission of the EuropeanCommunities v.Hellenic Republic [1994] ECR I-03037;
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v.Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities
[2008] I-6351; Case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v. Front populaire pour la
libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario) [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:973.
See Panos Koutrakos, ‘Judicial Review in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’
(2018) 67 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1.
73 See e.g. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 US (2017), and the en banc decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitVilar, 729 F.3d 62 (30 August 2013). See Desiree C. Schmitt,
‘The Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability in the Travel Ban Cases: Kerry v. Din Revisited’
(2018) 33 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 55. See also Trump v. Hawaii, 585 US (2018)
which, although upholding a later version of the travel ban, emphasizing deference to the
executive, still applied a rational basis review.
74 Justifying the ‘constitutional exceptionalism’ of US immigration law with reference to the
connection between the admission and removal of foreigners and ‘basic aspects of national
sovereignty, more particularly . . . foreign relations and the national security in immigration
policies’: see Matthew J. Lindsay, ‘Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of
Foreignness’ (2012–13) 45 Connecticut Law Review 743.
75 See again the ‘Guantanamo cases’ (n. 61).
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integrity deriving from article 2(2) of the German Basic Law – it held that, as
the legality of the US strikes was doubtful under international humanitarian
law, the right to life of the claimants might have been violated. This triggered
two obligations of the German authorities: (1) to make sure, on the basis of the
legal assessment of the court, whether the practice of US strikes in Yemen
region is in conformity with international law as it stands – to the extent that
the German territory is involved; and (2) to take measures deemed appropriate
in order to work towards compliance with international law.
Another interesting instance is theUrgenda saga, where Dutch courts ruled
that the government owes a duty of care to its citizens to provide protection
against the risks posed by climate change.76 Based on general principles of
domestic civil law, reinterpreted in the light of the UN and EU climate
agreements, along with international law principles and climate science,
Dutch courts ordered the government to revise its policies and ensure that
by the end of 2020 carbon dioxide emissions are reduced by 25 percent
compared to 1990 levels, that is, more than that initially planned by the
government in the context of the Paris agreement. Also in this case, based
on result-oriented domestic and international norms (principle of duty of care
plus reduction of greenhouse emissions), judicial bodies reviewed the legality
of measures adopted by political branches, and indicated the way to manage
(‘administer’) a given issue, namely climate change. This also implies that the
court co-determined, at least indirectly, the concrete implementation of the
Netherlands’ international obligations. Although not immediately connected
with IRs stricto sensu, theUrgenda saga is highly significant to our purposes: by
judicially restricting the executive’s discretion on the concrete implementa-
tion of international obligations, Dutch courts potentially set an important
precedent also in fields different from climate justice, as they codetermined
the possible options on the design of foreign policy.
A third exemplary case is the 2019 SADC Tribunal judgment of the South
African Constitutional Court,77 concerning the decision of the Southern
76 Urgenda Foundation, case C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, 24 June 2015; Urgenda, Case
200.178.245/01, 9 October 2018; Urgenda, Case 19/00135, 20 December 2019. See
Suryapratim Roy, ‘Urgenda II and Its Discontents’ (2019) 13 Carbon & Climate Law Review
130; and Otto Spijkers, ‘Pursuing Climate Justice through Public Interest Litigation: the
Urgenda Case’, in Völkerrechtsblog, April 29, 2020, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/pursuing-
climate-justice-through-public-interest-litigation-the-urgenda-case/, accessed September 20,
2020.
77 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
(CCT67/18) [2018] ZACC 51; 2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), https://collections.concourt.org.za/h
andle/20.500.12144/34610. See Riaan Eksteen, The Role of the Highest Courts of the United
States of America and South Africa, and the European Court of Justice in Foreign Affairs (The
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African Development Community (SADC) heads of State and Government
to remove the right of individual access to the SADCTribunal. Approached by
the Law Society of South Africa, the Court found that the executive’s partici-
pation in the ‘decision-making process and his own decision to suspend the
operations’ of the Tribunal to be unconstitutional, unlawful and irrational.78
The judgment also found that the signing of the 2014 Protocol was unconsti-
tutional, unlawful and irrational and, as a result, ordered the President to
withdraw his signature, greatly restricting the executive’s discretion.
Importantly, the Court based its reasoning on the fact that the 2014 Protocol
denied citizens of South Africa and other SADC countries the access to justice
at a regional level, despite the fact that such individual access is not per se
imposed by any international law obligation, not even at regional level.79
A final remarkable example is the judgment C-252/19 of the Colombian
constitutional court.80 Evaluating the compatibility with the domestic consti-
tution of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) signed with France, the court
declared it ‘conditionally constitutional’, that is, only under specific condi-
tions. Turning away from previous approaches,81 the Colombian court
imposed to the executive branch the negotiation and adoption of a joint
interpretive note, concerning the meaning to attribute to several clauses of
the BIT. Also in this case, a domestic court did not merely review the legality of
executive’s conduct in FRs – namely, the exercise of treaty-making power –
but also imposed to take specific measures and, therefore, actively participated
in the concrete management/administration of Colombia’s FRs.
In other cases, judicial review of FRs conducts has come to impose partici-
patory/procedural rights of parliaments or other actors, even when relevant
domestic law does not explicitly provide for or is unclear on that point.82 In this
Hague: Asser Press, 2019), pp. 305–11; and Tladi, ‘A Constitution Made for Mandela,
a Constitutional Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma’, this volume.
78 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,
para. 97.
79 See again Tladi, ‘A Constitution Made for Mandela, a Constitutional Jurisprudence
Developed for Zuma’, this volume.
80 C-252/19, expediente LAT-445, www.corteconstitucional.gov.corelatoria/2019/c-252-19.htm,
accessed September 30, 2020. See Gustavo Prieto, ‘The Colombian Constitutional Court
Judgment C-252/19: A NewFrontier for Reform in International Investment Law’, EJIL: Talk!,
July 29, 2019, www.ejiltalk.org/the-colombian-constitutional-court-judgment-c-252-19-a-new-
frontier-for-reform-in-international-investment-law/, accessed September 30, 2020.
81 See e.g. C-358/96 and C-379/96.
82 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and
Treaty Withdrawal: A Global Survey’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 136–55,
showing that there is a clear trend reflecting increased involvement of both parliamentary
Judicial Review, Foreign Relations and Global Administrative Law 147
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
regard, however, there are still significant differences between the US and
other – notably European – jurisdictions. Undeniably, a field where the US
political question doctrine remains almost untouchable concerns the choice
on the way to internally implement or to withdraw from international
agreements.83
On the other side of the ocean, the UK Supreme Court recently held that the
government was required to obtain authorization from parliament before it could
initiate withdrawal from the EU.84 Although British scholarship has not reached
a consensus as to whether the decision is in continuity with UK constitutional
tradition,85 it was mainly based on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.
However, it also relied on the principle that democratic consent mediated by
(constitutional) law is necessary to take the most fundamental FRs decisions
affecting the rights of British citizens, and, more generally, involving ‘fundamen-
tal change in the constitutional arrangements’. The UK Supreme Court seemed
thus to overcome the 1971 ruling concerning the British accession to the
European Community, stating that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the courts
to perform a judicial review on Parliament’s rightful exercise of its powers.86Even
more importantly, following such judgment the British parliament passed legis-
lation empowering the Prime Minister to give to the EU Council the notice for
starting negotiations for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU87 and requiring
Parliamentary approval of the outcome of the government’s negotiations with
the EU under article 50(2) of the TEU.88 It is therefore fair to say that, although it
cannot be regarded as a direct judicialization of FRs, the high instability due to
the parliamentary involvement in the Brexit negotiations is also and at least
indirectly a result of that decision, that is, that of the imposition by a court of
a procedural requirement on the management of a FRs issue.
and judicial branches in treaty-making in constitutional systems; and Jean Galbraith, ‘From
Scope to Process’, this volume.
83 SeeGoldwater v.Carter, 444US 996 (1979);Made in the USA Foundation, 56 F.Supp.2d 1226
(ND Ala 1999) which had reached the merits of the case, thus excluding that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question.
84 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61.
See generally Mark Elliot, Jack Williams and Alison L. Young (eds.), The UK Constitution
after Miller (Oxford: Hart, 2018).
85 See David Feldman, ‘Pulling a Trigger or Starting a Journey? Brexit in the Supreme Court’
(2017) 76 The Cambridge Law Journal 217; Gavin Philippson, ‘Brexit, Prerogative and the
Courts: Why Did political Constitutionalists Support the Government Side in Miller?’ (2017)
36 University of Queensland Law Journal 311; Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Foreign Relations
Power in the Supreme Court’ (2018) 134 Law Quarterly Review 380.
86 Blackburn v. Attorney General [1971] 2 All ER 1380.
87 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017.
88 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
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Similar decisions were taken by the Irish SupremeCourt, ruling that any new
provision amending the EC/EU treaties which alters ‘the essential scope or
objectives’ of the EC/EU requires the intervention of the people to be constitu-
tionally valid;89 and the BVerfGwhich, in its Lisbon treaty ruling, alluded to the
possibility that the German people as constituent power adheres to a future
European federal state through referendum, despite the fact that such institute
is not foreseen by the German Basic Law.90 In this regard, it worth recalling that
some continental scholars have even taken a step further, looking for legal bases
to entitle foreign subjects to challenge a State’s foreign policy.91
Outside the European context, themajor example can probably be found in
South Africa. InDemocratic Alliance v.Minister of International Relations and
Cooperation,92 the HighCourt of Gauteng was faced with a question similar to
that decided by the UK Supreme Court in Miller, that is, the executive’s
withdrawal from the Rome Statute, an international treaty ratified and domes-
ticated by the parliament, without prior parliamentary approval. Although the
question is not directly addressed by the South African Constitution, in 2017
the Court, stressing the importance of public participation when withdrawing
from treaties,93 held that Section 231(2) of the Constitution, requiring parlia-
mentary approval for treaties subject to ratification, also requires by implica-
tion parliamentary consent to withdraw from such treaties. Therefore, the
notice of withdrawal was unconstitutional and invalid.
More generally, some scholars suggest that FRs issues are best addressed by
judicial bodies through traditional balancing/proportionality standards of
review.94 Obviously, in deciding which values/rights to balance, and the ‘weight’
to give to each of them, courts inevitably exercise some discretion, which cannot
89 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713, Finlay CJ, 767.
90 BVerfGE 123, 267 – Lissabon, paras. 217, 228. See however art. 146, hinting to the replacement
of the Basic Law by a ‘constitution freely adopted by the German people’.
91 See e.g. Umberto Allegretti, ‘Costituzione e politica estera: punti preliminary’ (1990) 4 Pace,
diritti dell’uomo, diritti dei popoli 31.
92 Democratic Alliance v.Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017 (3)
SA 212 (GP) (‘Withdrawal judgment’), www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.pdf. See
Hannah Woolaver, ‘State Engagement with Treaties: Interactions between International and
Domestic Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.),Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 431 at 440–42 (comparing the UK Supreme
Court Miller judgment); and Tladi, ‘A Constitution Made for Mandela, a Constitutional
Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma’, this volume.
93 Democratic Alliance v.Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others, paras.
61–63.
94 See e.g. Daniele Amoroso, ‘Judicial Abdication in Foreign Affairs and the Effectiveness of
International Law’ (2015) 14 Chinese Journal of International Law 99 (and the literature
recalled).
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but impact on a State’s FRs. Also from this perspective, they might increasingly
participate in the management/administration of FRs.
B Interaction Norms
This subsection looks at the trends concerning the interaction norms, imple-
mented and/or developed to manage interactions with other jurisdictions or
legal systems affecting FRs. Similarly to the review norms, courts may base
their rulings on either procedural or substantive grounds, but such subcategor-
ization can be even more blurred.
Such norms include the application of ‘(foreign) act of State’ and sovereign
immunity doctrines – limiting the circumstances under which courts examine
the validity of foreign governments acts and the responsibility of sovereign
actors – as well as other doctrines of judicial abstention (international comity,
forum non conveniens, margin-of-appreciation, subsidiarity, Solange, controli-
miti, etc.) preventing judges from evaluating the merits of a claim or grant
recognition/enforcement of outer legal sources.
In particular, in common law jurisdictions – especially in the US – courts
seem to explicitly take into consideration, next to strictly legal elements, lato
sensu political elements.95 While such attitude contributes to make their
decisions more understandable, it also affects their capacity to set clear and
foreseeable standards, and has been generally criticized for its
unpredictability.96 In European jurisdictions, where the choice-of-law rules
are generally seen as less flexible and more predictable,97 such elements are
hidden in the folds, so to say, of legally ‘pure’ argumentations.
This attitude is quite apparent in the evolution of the US ‘act of State’ doctrine,
whose scope98has beennarrowed since 1990by the SupremeCourt,99 limiting the
case-by-case balancing in deciding whether to apply it or not.100 More generally,
95 See Timothy A. O. Endicott, ‘International Meanings: Comity in Fundamental Rights
Adjudication’ (2001) 92 International Journal of Refugee Studies 280; and, more generally,
part VI of Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 625–732.
96 See Dodge, ‘International Comity in Comparative Perspective’.
97 See Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations (Rome II), OJ 2007No. L199, 31 July 2007, pp. 40 ff.; Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of
12December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters, OJ 2012 No. L351.
98 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964).
99 Kirckpatrick & Co v. Environmental Tectonics Corp, 493 US 400 (1990).
100 However, subsequent federal jurisprudence was not particularly consistent: see Curtis
A. Bradley, Ashley S. Deeks and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law. Cases &
Materials (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2020), pp. 84–102.
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US courts increasingly adopt reasonableness standards in deciding whether to
extend the reach of domestic law or not.101 Importantly, this ‘prescriptive comity’,
consisting in the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach
of their laws, does not totally coincide with the ‘judicial comity’, whereby judges
decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged else-
where, as it happens in the forumnon conveniens doctrine.102 Similarly, in the field
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is possible to observe an – apparently paradoxical –
double movement toward global coordination: while US courts seem to progres-
sively reduce the extraterritorial reach of their jurisdiction when the legal text do
not explicitly provide otherwise,103 the European multilevel system seems to
progressively expand its reach.104
Here, two points are worth underlining. First, in many instances courts,
especially in the US, take into consideration the foreign policy dimension in
order to decide a case or to interpret relevant laws, often against the positions
of executive branches. This is quite apparent in the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
case law,105where the Court explicitly or implicitly decided the cases based on
its own assessment of how to avoid diplomatic frictions. Second, reasonable-
ness and proportionality may be applied not only to evaluate a FRs act as such,
but also to extend or narrow the reach of a court’s own legal system.
Consequently, substantive evaluations affect procedural decisions, which
only apparently do not concern the merits of a case. Indeed, in the context
of decisions related to interaction norms, there is often a silent shift towards
substantive standards of review, hidden in the fabric of procedural rulings.106
This is quite apparent when courts, in deciding whether to extend their
jurisdiction extraterritorially or not, refer to the respect of human rights and/or
justice in the system which would be competent. For example, before the ECJ
judgment Owusu ruled that Regulation (EC) 44/2001 prevented its applica-
tion, this was the case for the British forum non conveniens doctrine. In
101 For the related case law see generally Breyer, The Court and the World, pp. 89–164.
102 See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 US 155 (2004).
103 See Aramco, 499US 244 (1991);Morrison, 561US 247 (2010); Kiobel, 569US 108 (2013); Vilar,
729 F.3d 62 (August 30, 2013).
104 See e.g. EctHR,Al-Skeini &Others v.UK (Appl. No. 55721/07), Judgment (GrandChamber),
July 7, 2011, www.rulac.org/assets/downloads/CASE_OF_AL-SKEINI_AND_OTHERS_v._
THE_UNITED_KINGDOM.pdf; Jaloud v. The Netherlands (Appl. No. 47708/08),
Judgment (Grand Chamber), November 20, 2014, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-1483
67; and the ECJ judgmentOwusu, Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v.N.B. Jackson, trading as
‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ (et al.) [2005] ECR I-01383, and their effects on the legal
systems of Member States (especially the UK).
105 Sosa, 542 US 692 (2004); Kiobel, 569 US 108 (2013); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 US (2018).
106 See Galbraith, ‘From Scope to Process’, in this volume.
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determining ‘themore appropriate forum’, British courts took into account the
interests of the parties and the nature of the subject matter, and made
a determination as to whether another forum was more appropriate than
England. Further, they inquired as to whether ‘substantive justice’ would be
achieved in that other forum. This second part distinguished the English test
from the US test, where ‘justice’ is not such an explicit element.107 Similar
considerations influenced the Pinochet case, where the House of Lords held
that (1) allegations of torture and hostage taking ‘pierced the veil’ of the
personal jurisdictional immunity granted of Heads of State, codified in articles
28, 29 and 31 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations (and in part II
of the 1978 State Immunity Act); (2) the Crown act of state doctrine was
inapplicable, as Parliament, by enacting section 134(1) of the 1988 Criminal
Justice Act defining torture and section 1(1) of the 1982 Taking of Hostages Act,
had shown that the conduct with which Pinochet was charged was
a justiciable matter before the English courts.108 More recently, similar argu-
ments were the basis for the Belhaj decision,109 holding that the UK govern-
ment could not rely on sovereign immunity and foreign act of state to escape
claims in the two cases alleging UK involvement in breaches of human rights
by foreign governments in Libya.110
In an opposite and equal direction, domestic courts increasingly use balan-
cing techniques, reasonableness and human rights in granting recognition or
enforcement to foreign sources into domestic systems, or in granting self-
executing status to international law norms. This field is notoriously explored
in the European continental scholarship, as a consequence of the EU integra-
tion process. EU member States, Germany and Italy in particular, have
developed similar – though not coincident – doctrines of constitutional toler-
ance/resistance (Solange, controlimiti), which accord or deny the ‘entrance’ of
external legal sources under certain circumstances, and have contributed to
107 See in particular Lubbe [2000] 4 All ER 268 (UKHL).
108 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1998] 2WLR
827 (HL 1999).
109 Belhaj & Rahmatullah (No 1) v. Straw & Ors [2017] UKSC 3. See again Bjorge and Miles,
‘Crown and Foreign Acts of State before English Courts’.
110 Outside Europe, one may refer here again to the judgment of the South African
Constitutional Court SADC Tribunal (n. 77), para. 11. Insofar as its reasoning is based on
the denial to citizens of South Africa and other SADC countries of the right to access to
a regional tribunal, the judgment seemed to imply that the executive, when acting in FRs,
should do so in a manner that protects fundamental rights extraterritorially: see Tladi, ‘A
Constitution Made for Mandela, a Constitutional Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma’, this
volume.
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the reflexive evolution of the EU system towards greater political integration
and respect of fundamental rights.
These models of constitutional tolerance/resistance/jurisgeneration are
increasingly invoked and applied outside the intra-EU context, as a general
template to manage inter-systemic collisions.111 The most famous example
probably remains the Kadi saga, comprising several decisions whereby the
ECJ annulled EU Regulations implementing UN Security Council resolu-
tions imposing restrictive measures directed against persons and entities asso-
ciated with Al-Qaeda, for the violation of the affected persons’ procedural
rights, such as the right to be heard and the requirement for an adversarial
process. As a result, a source of binding international law was denied entrance
and implementation into the EU legal system.112
A significant example of this model and its potential risks is judgment no.
238/2014 of the Italian constitutional court. Although it is not possible to
provide the full procedural background, this ruling held that the norm of
customary international law (CIL) concerning the jurisdictional immunity of
States for acta iure imperii, as ascertained by the ICJ in 2012 –113 was incom-
patible with the ‘supreme principles’ of the constitution, when applied to
exclude Italian civil jurisdiction for war crimes committed by the Third
Reich.114 In particular, the Italian court recognized the ICJ’s monopoly over
the interpretation of CIL, proclaiming its incompetence to reassess the exist-
ence of the rule on the State immunity, and how it relates to the right to
jurisdictional remedy. Secondly, claiming to adopt a balancing approach,115 it
weighted the values that – in its opinion – were at stake: the total
111 See Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘The Solange-Method as a Tool for Regulating Competing
Jurisdictions among International Courts and Tribunals’ (2008) 30 Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review 275 (seeing the Solangemethod as a genus of the
species ‘judicial comity’).
112 See in particular Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, European Commission
and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. See Matej Avbelj,
Filippo Fontanelli and Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial. A Multifaceted Analysis
of the Kadi Trial (London: Routledge, 2014). A similar case, with the same result, was decided
in the UK in HM Treasury v. Ahmed & others [2010] UKSC 2.
113 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 3 February 2012.
114 For a similar case in Greece see Areios Pagos, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Fed Republic of
Germany, 11/2000 (awarding damages against Germany for war crimes during World War II).
115 See ItCC judgment No. 238/2014, paras. 3.1–3.5, para. 3.1: ‘It is indeed possible to review the
[constitutional] compatibility even when both norms – as in the case at issue – have
constitutional status, since balancing is one of the ordinary tasks that this Court is asked to
undertake in all cases within its competence.’ One may question whether the subsequent
reasoning constitutes an actual exercise of judicial balancing but what matters to our purposes
is the fact that balancing discourse, based on principled legal norms, facilitates judicial
intervention in the management of FRs.
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ineffectiveness of the right to an effective jurisdictional remedy, under articles
24 of the Italian Constitution and 6 ECHR; and the State immunity recog-
nized by international law, in this case shielding the commission of war
crimes. Thirdly, it denied the ‘entrance’ of the CIL norm into the domestic
system, thus preventing ordinary courts from implementing it.
Importantly, and first, the court at least formally accorded deference to the
ICJ. As some scholars argued,116 the court could have autonomously reassessed
the scope of the CIL norm on State immunity, but rather claimed not to be
allowed to do so. However, in this case ‘judicial comity’ did not lead to ‘legal
comity’,117 as it provoked a diplomatic deadlock. Secondly, the court took
a position clearly in conflict with the Italian parliament and government.118
Indeed, in its balancing it did not take into account, or did not give much
weight, to other possibly involved values, for example the ‘peace among
nations’ and the interest to friendly relationships among sovereign entities
(article 11). Regardless of its legal form, this relatively discretional choice had
a political impact. Thirdly, the court explicitly had a ‘iurisgenerative’ intent,
that is, the purpose of inducing changes in international law, namely the scope
of the State immunity norm,119 and also aimed to compel the Italian govern-
ment to promote further negotiations with Germany. Fourthly, in order to
support its argument and the final outcome, the court explicitly relied on the
ECJ’sKadi case law, thus trying to present its decision so as to be coherent with
a broader ‘transnational’ judicial consensus.120 Finally, the subsequent prac-
tice of lower courts has proved crucial in somehow managing and de-
escalating the resulting diplomatic deadlock, either when they formulated
settlement proposals with the German government;121 or when they found that
116 Giovanni Boggero, ‘The Legal Implications of Sentenza No. 238/2014 by Italy’s
Constitutional Court for Italian Municipal Judges: Is Overcoming the “Triepelian
Approach” Possible?’ (2016) 76 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 203.
117 See D’Alterio, ‘From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity’.
118 Aiming at avoiding diplomatic friction with Germany, in 2013 the Italian parliament added
a provision to the law ratifying the 2004 New York Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States, excluding the Italian jurisdiction for war crimes committed by the Third Reich,
even for pending proceedings. The Court also declared such provision unconstitutional and,
in this sense, judgment No. 238/2014 could also be analyzed from the perspective of the
‘review norms’.
119 For a critical assessment see Raffaela Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and
“Constructive Contestation”: A Miscarried Attempt?’ (2016) 14 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 621.
120 See para. 3.4.
121 See Trib Florence, Simoncioni, Order March 23, 2015; and Trib Florence, Simoncioni, No.
2469, July 6, 2015. On this point see Daniele Amoroso, ‘Italy’, in Fulvio Maria Palombino
(ed.), Duelling for Supremacy. International Law vs. National Fundamental Principles
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 186–92.
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the rule on State immunity still barred the exercise of executive jurisdiction,
thus avoiding the seizure of German assets in Italy.122
From a more general perspective, this example is significant, as it
concerns the development by a domestic court of norms regulating the
relationships between an external legal system (in this case, CIL) with the
domestic one. Further, it demonstrates that, while it is generally true that
the ‘“judge judging the judge” activity heavily depends on the political
influence and diplomatic relations between systems’,123 in many instances
judicial rulings may run contrary to otherwise friendly relations and the
reciprocal trust.
The scenario arisen from the judgment no. 238/2014 is not an isolated case
but, as courts increasingly ‘administer’ FRs, reflects a potentially recurring
scenario. Here again, and although it did not involve any interaction
between judicial bodies, the decision of the OVG Münster on the
Ramstein base provides a significant example. Indeed, insofar as it raised
doubts on the legality of the strikes conducted through the Ramstein base by
the US government, and imposed the German government to take appropri-
ate measures in that regard, such decision generated also interaction norms,
affecting the coordination/cooperation with other systems in FRs matters.
This, however, restricted greatly the diplomatic room of maneuver of
Germany, and seem to have produced a diplomatic deadlock with the US,
a key strategic ally.124
In yet other cases, political influence and economic interests, as well as
power grab considerations,125 rather than ‘humanity’, might play a more direct
role into the development of interaction norms. This may be the case, for
example, of the use of self-executing doctrines by the US Supreme Court
towards the rulings of the ICJ,126 and by the ECJ in the field of GATT, WTO
122 Ordinary courts applied art. 39(1) of the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes, not involved in the decision of the ItCC. See however the judgment
of the Italian Supreme Court Cass, No. 21995, June 25, 2019, allowing executive actions
against a German state-owned company, brought by Greek plaintiffs for credits concerning
Third Reich’s war crimes, to proceed before Italian courts.
123 D’Alterio, ‘Judicial Regulation in the Global Space’, p. 317.
124 See again Aust, ‘US-Drohneneinsätze’, pp. 307 ff.
125 See Federico G. Thea, ‘The Role of Judges in Political Struggles’ (2012) 2 Queen Mary Law
Journal 57; and, more generally, Richard A. Posner,How Judges Think (Cambridge-London:
Harvard University Press, 2008).
126 Medellı́n v. Texas, 552US 491 (2008), a case inmany ways similar to judgment No. 238/2014 of
the ItCC, as it held that the Avena judgment of the ICJ was not enforceable as domestic law,
thus letting the execution of a death penalty against a Mexican national. Also in this case, the
Supreme Court took a stance opposite to that of President Bush administration, and created
significant diplomatic frictions with Mexico.
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and international economic agreements.127 Similarly, US courts restricted the
extraterritorial reach mainly in the field of human rights protection,128 but
narrowed it only slightly as regards its instruments of (direct or indirect)
government of global economy, often with the result to shield US companies
from lawsuits brought by foreign nationals.129 In these instances, domestic
courts, in denying the direct effect of international binding norms, seemmore
concerned with preserving their domestic authority as holders of the ‘final say’,
or with guaranteeing domestic political and/or economic interests.
IV CONCLUSION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONCEPTION OF
FRL, ITS ‘TRANSNATIONALITY’ AND POTENTIAL RISKS
The necessarily a-systematic survey conducted above, based on the GAL
analytical framework, seems to provide some answers to the persisting strug-
gles of FRL scholarship. First, the GAL approach confirms the necessity to
look at FRL in functional terms. At a time when the divide between foreign
and domestic affairs has become almost impalpable, the (study of the) law of
FRs cannot be limited to the traditional areas of treaty-making; international
and supranational integration; and use of military force. To have a realistic
understanding of the law/FRs relationship, the scope of FRL (and its scholar-
ship) must include the legal fields functionally affecting FRs. Although
admittedly in the age of globalization FRs are virtually everywhere, the GAL
approach provides reasons to expand the scope of FRL, so as to include at least
127 See ECJ, Joined Cases C-21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others v.
Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 01219; Case C-280/93, Germany
v. Council [1994] ECR I-04973; Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, [1999] ECR I-08395;
Case C-377/02, Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) [2005]
ECR I-01465; Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Dior and Assco Gerüste [2000]
ECR I-11307. See also the judgment in Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik v. Achmea BV,
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, holding that the arbitration clause contained in art. 8 of the 1991
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT had an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law, and was
therefore incompatible with it.
128 See again the ATS case law (n. 105).
129 See e.g. the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act: While its repressive provisions have a broad territorial
reach (they can be applied each time there is a ‘foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States’), Liu v. Siemens AG (no 13-cv-4385, 2014WL 3953672 (2d Cir. August 14 2014))
held that the anti-retaliation provisions protecting whistle-blowers do not apply extraterrito-
rially, even for companies listed on the US stock exchange. See also RJR Nabisco, 579 US
(2016) holding that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act has certain
extraterritorial applications, but plaintiffs must prove injuries within the US for the act to
apply; and Jam, 586 US (2019), where the US Supreme Court, denied absolute immunity
under the International Organizations Immunity Act to the International Finance
Corporation, part of the World Bank group.
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all the legal fields that somehow separate the internal from the external and
mediate the inward reception of international law into the domestic legal
system.130 In this regard, looking at FRL through the lenses of GAL offers
another conception of (the function of) FRL in the context of legal-political
globalization: the administrative one. Such conception captures the idea that
the sources of FRL – be they domestic or international – provide relevant
institutional actors with concrete goals and results to accomplish in the
context of FRs, as well as substantive and procedural standards to ‘manage’
FRs, whose respect can be in turn reviewed by judicial bodies.
The functional understanding of FRL makes apparent another key element
brought out by the GAL approach: the role of ‘global regulators’ of courts, in
a domain where their influence is still underestimated.131The expansion of the
judicial reach in FRs is not just quantitative, as more and more FRs questions
are adjudicated by courts on the merits; but also qualitative, as judicial rulings
affect the concrete management/‘administration’ of FRs. Courts – either
voluntarily or involuntarily, either directly or indirectly – increasingly partici-
pate in the exercise of FRP, as they contribute to set or change the legal patters
that the political branches must follow, also prospectively. This holds true
even when courts adhere to the position of political branches: as courts step
into the FRs arena, for analytical purposes it does not change much whether
their assessments coincide to that of the executives and parliaments or not. For
this reason, in highlighting the role played of courts, the GAL approach could
also strengthen their self-awareness and responsiveness, just as for other GABs.
The analytical tools provided by GAL proved also useful to assess the
emerging ‘transnationality’ in FRL, in two respects at least. Firstly, in adjudi-
cating FRs questions judicial bodies often apply a sort of ‘patchwork’ of
domestic and international legal sources.132 Secondly, courts seem increas-
ingly to develop comparable and/or equivalent argumentative models and
standards of review, sometimes even explicitly recognizing reciprocal
influence.133 However, the degree of formalization of such ‘common lan-
guage’ is probably fated to remain underdeveloped, when compared to other
functionally differentiated fields which constitute the usual focus of GAL
studies. Indeed, next to other factors which make judicial networks less
formalized than others, in FRs matters judiciaries are ‘torn between, on the
130 See Aust and Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, this volume.
131 See however in the most recent literature Eksteen, The Role of the Highest Courts, assessing
the role of courts applying foreign policy analysis.
132 See e.g., theUrgenda Foundation, District Court of the Hague, 24 June 2015, paras. 4.35–4.86
and the Ramstein decision OVG NRW 4 A 1361/15, spec. pp. 52 ff.
133 See, e.g., the ItCC judgment No. 238/2014, para. 3.4, recalling the ECJ’s Kadi decisions.
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one hand, [their] loyalty to the international and national rule of law and, on
the other, [their] allegiance to national or organisational interests’.134
This point leads to a final consideration. The survey showed that the
expansion of the judicial reach on FRs questions often ends up in further
obstacles to the coordination of conflicting systems and to the ordering of
global governance. Even the use of human rights or other substantive stand-
ards can lead to greater disorder, especially because courts’ decisions highly
differ as regards their hierarchization. The administrativization of FRs –
a complex phenomenon driven, among other factors, by the greater relevance
to the legal position of the individual, the spread of (constitutional) result-
oriented norms, and a procedural turn in FRL – does not always imply greater
coordination among systems, but can rather bring more disorder, conflict and
unpredictability. The Miller judgment of the UK Supreme Court, the ItCC
judgment no. 238/2014 and the ruling of the OVG Münster on the Ramstein
base – the very case with which we opened this chapter – are glaring examples
of the risks linked to this trend. More generally, this consideration puts
somehow into question the normative aspirations of GAL, insofar as it advo-
cates for the expansion of ‘administrative’ norms and judicial control on the
exercise of power in transnational arenas, with the goal to decrease conflicts
and inconsistencies among involved actors/systems, and increase their legit-
imacy. Although a critical assessment of such normative aspirations lies
outside the scope this chapter, the administrativization of FRs, and the role
played by courts in that context, constitute a hard test for the capacity of the
GAL project – not only to describe, but also – to order the structures of global
governance, and opens new venues for further research in the vast field of the
relationship between law, FRs and global governance.
134 Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, p. 186. See also Benvenisti and Downs, Between
Fragmentation and Democracy, pp. 145–48.
158 Angelo Jr. Golia
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 




Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
8
The Conseil Constitutionnel’s Jurisprudence
on ‘Limitations of Sovereignty’
Niki Aloupi
I ‘DROIT DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES’
AND ‘FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW’
In French doctrine, the term ‘droit des relations internationales’ (literally
translated as ‘Foreign Relations Law’) is not ‘used to encompass the domestic
law of each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the
world’.1 As a distinctive field, French ‘Relations Internationales’2 studies in
a nonexclusively-legal way the interactions and communications between
nations and other actors and social groups across the borders, that is, all the
relations (stricto sensu international or lato sensu international including
transnational ones) presenting a foreign element. Thus, political, economic
and sociological considerations are taken into account in order to apprehend
the international legal order. Foreign relations law (droit des relations inter-
nationals) can consequently seem ambiguous in French and therefore is often
used as a synonym of public international law (droit international public). As
amatter of fact, a great number of French students that are enrolled in a course
‘Droit des relations internationales’ in first year of law school actually study
public international law. Few French law schools teach foreign relations as
a distinctive discipline and even fewer have a research center specially dedi-
cated to it.3 As far as French foreign relations handbooks are concerned, they
propose mostly three different approaches, that can also be combined between
1 Curtis Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, in Curtis Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019),
pp. 3–20.
2 For an analysis about ‘Relations Internationales’ as a separate, distinctive and autonomous field
in French doctrine, see Julian Fernandez, Relations internationales, 2nd ed. (Paris: Dalloz,
2019), pp. 1–27.
3 Fernandez, Relations internationales, pp. 24–27.
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them: a theoretical/doctrinal/political science approach; an historical
approach; or an institutional/normative/juridical approach.4
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the semantics, that is, even without naming
this particular field ‘Foreign Relations Law’ and without considering it as
autonomous, the French doctrine does study ‘how French law (i.e. constitu-
tional law, statutory law, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions)
interacts with the rest of the world’, as well as ‘the role of domestic courts in
applying international law and in adjudicating cases that implicate govern-
mental interests’.5 In this sense, the French approach, as far as interaction
between domestic law and international law is concerned, is one of a monist
state that places its constitution on the summit of the hierarchy of norms and
attributes to international law a supra-legislative but infra-constitutional
authority (article 55 of the French Constitution 1958).
However, in a perspective where ‘Foreign Relations Law’ is meant to be
studied as a distinctive and a fortiori autonomous field, this assertion is far too
simplistic to truly apprehend the articulation of the French legal order with
the international one. This interaction is rather complex and cannot be fully
understood unless all aspects of French domestic law and more importantly
French case law (in the sense of jurisprudence, since there is no stare decisis/
binding precedent rule in French law) relative to international law have been
studied. Indeed, not only the French courts jurisprudence affine, enrich or
even alter the written French norms concerning domestic law/international
law interaction, but also the approaches adopted by the three French Supreme
Courts (Cour de Cassation, Conseil d’Etat and Conseil Constitutionnel,
which is not hierarchically superior to the other two) are not always identical
or even harmonized and may thus govern the relation domestic law/inter-
national law in different ways.
This chapter will focus on the Conseil Constitutionnel and its role in
controlling the executive as far as the adoption of international treaties is
concerned. The Conseil Constitutionnel’s jurisprudence on ‘limitations of
sovereignty’6 is a very interesting one and, notwithstanding its numerous
4 Fernandez, Relations internationales, p. 15.
5 Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, p. 9.
6 By ‘limitations of sovereignty’ doctrine this contribution refers to the doctrine of the
Constitutional Council relative to the international treaties that ‘jeopardize the essential
conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’ and thus cannot be ratified without prior
amendment of the Constitution. The term ‘limitation of sovereignty’ doctrine is chosen here
for convenience reasons and because the whole doctrine takes as a starting point paragraph 15
of the Constitution Preamble 1946which refers to accepted limitations to France’s sovereignty.
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ambiguities and grey areas, clearly reflects the strong role that the French
Constitutional Council wishes to play in foreign relations law.
In its first section, this paper focuses on the role of the French
Constitutional Council with regard to the review of international treaties
before their ratification. Its second section offers insights on the ‘limitations
of sovereignty’ doctrine and its criticism, whereas the third section proposes
several illustrations of the Conseil Constitutionnel’s jurisprudence concern-
ing the compatibility between international treaties and the French
Constitution. In its final section, this article suggests a critical assessment of
this jurisprudence and argues that with the ‘limitations of sovereignty’ doctrine
the Constitutional Council has achieved great power and discretion and has
thus indirectly acquired an important role influencing the way the executive
conducts its foreign relations.
II THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL
IN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES BEFORE THEIR RATIFICATION
The French Constitutional Council was created by the Fifth Republic’s
Constitution adopted on October 4, 1958. Initially conceived by General de
Gaulle as a rather weak mechanism, feared by him because of the American
precedent of what was considered as the risk of a ‘judges’ government’, it
developed an extensive and rich jurisprudence, which, combined with several
constitutional modifications over the years, increased its powers and import-
ance in the French legal order. The general growing of the Constitutional
Council’s role and the expansion of the possibilities of its referral also influ-
enced its jurisprudence concerning interactions between domestic law and
international treaty law.
The French Constitutional Council rules on whether proposed inter-
national treaties are in conformity with the French Constitution. This review
is possible after the international treaty has been approved by the Parliament7
and before it is ratified by the President of the French Republic. It takes place
on a referral from the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the
President of one or the other Houses (National Assembly or Senate), or from
sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators. If the Council
7 According to article 53 of the Constitution, peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or
agreements relating to international organization, those committing the finances of the
State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, those relating to the
status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory, may be
ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament.
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asserts that the international undertaking reviewed contains a clause contrary
to the Constitution, the authorization to ratify the treaty or otherwise approve
the undertaking involved may be given only after amending the Constitution
(article 54 of the French Constitution). According to article 61 of the
Constitution, referral of certain acts and bills to the Council before their
coming into force for it to rule on their conformity with the Constitution is
compulsory. This is the case, amongst others, for the government bills that
provide for authorization to ratify an international treaty which, although not
contrary to the Constitution, would affect the functioning of the institutions.
Thus, the Constitutional Council exercises an a priori review on inter-
national treaties, which is compulsory in some cases and just a possibility for
the President of Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of one or the
other of the Houses or for sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty
Senators in all the others. This is called ‘contrôle de constitutionnalité’. The
Council does not however exercise a ‘contrôle de conventionnalité’ meaning
that it does not review the conformity of French law and administrative
regulations with international law (treaties, other undertakings, unilateral
acts and customary law). Indeed, in its 1975 IVG decision,8 the
Constitutional Council asserted that such a review belongs to the administra-
tive and judicial courts (notably Conseil d’Etat and Cour de Cassation), since
international law was not a part of the French Constitution and ‘bloc de
constitutionnalité’ (this ‘constitutionality block’ is composed of the
Constitution 1958, its preamble, the French Declaration of Human and
Civic Rights, the Preamble of the Constitution 1946 of the Fourth Republic
and the Charter for the Environment 2004).
8 Decision no. 74–54 DC – Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, pts. 3–7:
3. While these provisions confer upon treaties, in accordance with their terms, an
authority superior to that of statutes, they neither require nor imply that this
principle must be honored within the framework of constitutional review as
provided by article 61.
4. Decisions made under article 61 of the Constitution are unconditional and final,
as is clear from article 62, which prohibits the promulgation or implementation of any
provision declared unconstitutional; on the other hand, the prevalence of treaties over
statutes, stated as a general rule by article 55, is both relative and contingent, being
restricted to the ambit of the treaty and subject to reciprocity, which itself depends on the
behavior of the signatory state or states and on the time at which it is to be assessed;
5. A statute that is inconsistent with a treaty is not ipso facto unconstitutional;
6. Review of the rule stated in article 55 cannot be effected as part of a review
pursuant to article 61, because the two reviews are different in kind;
7. It is therefore not for the Constitutional Council, when a referral is made to it
under article 61 of the Constitution, to consider the consistency of a statute with the
provisions of a treaty or an international agreement.
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The Constitutional Council thus limits itself to the constitutional review of
international treaties. In the 1975 Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act deci-
sion, the Council asserted that ‘[a]rticle 61 of the Constitution does not confer on
the Constitutional Council a general or particular discretion identical with that of
Parliament, but simply empowers it to rule on the constitutionality of statutes
referred to it’. However, when one studies theCouncil’s case law as regards treaties
and international agreements, one realizes that its ‘discretion’ is farmore important
than what the letter of the Constitution and the 1975 assertion suggest.
The ‘limitations of sovereignty’ doctrine has indeed allowed the Council to
develop its own foreign relations law approach regarding international undertak-
ings by France and to enjoy an important margin of appreciation while doing so.
The result is that the Constitutional Council can prevent the organs in charge of
France’s foreign relations from undertaking some international engagements
considered by it as incompatible with ‘national sovereignty’. If the executive,
with the agreement of the Parliament whenever necessary, insists on adopting an
international treaty deemed by the Council as incompatible with national sover-
eignty, a modification of the Constitution will be necessary before ratification of
the treaty. And indeed, aswill be shown inSection IV, several examples existwhere
such amendments have taken place after an incompatibility decision rendered by
the Constitutional Council. However, this possibility does not imply that the
normativity and hierarchical position of the French Constitution is lesser than in
other countries, since, in theory at least, theConstitution remains on the summit of
the norms’ hierarchy and its interaction with international law derives from the
Constitution itself andnot from international lawnorms. It does however highlight
the power of the Constitutional Council, that can thus have an influence on the
conduct of foreign relations by the executive. Also, themere fact that amending the
Constitution is envisaged in order to ratify a treaty or otherwise approve the
undertaking involved, points out how important international cooperation is for
theFrench legal order.This is also reminded inparagraph 14of thepreambleof the
Constitution 1946 (which, as stated above, is actually a part of the ‘bloc de
constitutionnalité’ used by the Council to review the constitutional conformity
of law and treaties), stipulating: ‘The French Republic, faithful to its traditions,
shall respect the rules of public international law. It shall undertake no war aimed
at conquest, nor shall it ever employ force against the freedom of any people.’
III BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE ‘LIMITATIONS
OF SOVEREIGNTY’ DOCTRINE AND ITS CRITICISM
The very notion of sovereignty in its external, international meaning (i.e.
the fact that France as a sovereign state is not submitted to any authority
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superior to it and that it is only bound by undertakings that it accepted
explicitly, implicitly or tacitly) is absent from the Constitution 1958,
which, in article 3, only refers to internal sovereignty in these terms:
‘National sovereignty shall vest in the people, who shall exercise it
through their representatives and by means of referendum’.9 However,
paragraph 15 of the preamble of the Constitution 1946 refers to external
sovereignty in the following terms: ‘Subject to reciprocity, France shall
consent to the limitations upon its sovereignty necessary to the organiza-
tion and preservation of peace’, thus reminding, even if it is in
a somewhat inept way, the famous Lotus and Wimbledon PCIJ dicta on
the right to enter into international engagements being an attribute of
state sovereignty.10 Thus, this paragraph proclaims France’s sovereign
right to undertake international engagements.
As part of its a priori review of international treaties based on article 54
of the Constitution, the Constitutional Council developed a doctrine on
the respect of the ‘essential conditions for exercise of national sovereignty’
which indirectly refers to external sovereignty11 although explicitly
9 See also article 3 of the French Declaration of Human and Civic Rights (also part of the
constitutionality block): ‘The principle of any sovereignty lies primarily in the Nation. No
corporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not expressly emanate
from it.’
10 Case of the S.S. ‘Wimbledon’, Judgment, Series A No. 1, p. 25: ‘The Court declines to see in the
conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing
a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an
obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State,
in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.’ And Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’,
Judgment, Series ANo. 10, p. 18: ‘The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these coexisting
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’
11 N.B. the ideas put forward in Section III of this contribution are largely inspired by an article of an
important representative of the French voluntarist doctrine of international law: Jean Combacau,
‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans la jurisprudence duConseil constitutionnel français’
(2001) 9 Cahiers du conseil constitutionnel (dossier: souveraineté de l’Etat et hiérarchie des
Normes) (www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/nouveaux-cahiers-du-conseil-constitutionnel/la-souverai
nete-internationale-de-l-etat-dans-la-jurisprudence-du-conseil-constitutionnel-francais, accessed
September 30, 2020); see also, in a similar vein, Andrea Hamann, ‘Sur un “sentiment” de
souveraineté’ (2018) 21 Jus Politicum, 187–213 (http://juspoliticum.com/article/Sur-un-sentiment-d
e-souverainete-1259.html, accessed September 30, 2020); see also, Alain Pellet, ‘Le Conseil
constitutionnel, la souveraineté et les traités – À propos de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel
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invoking ‘national’ sovereignty in order to limit the executive’s power to
conclude international treaties when intolerable ‘limitations of sover-
eignty’ were found. The phrase – even though directly inspired by the
Lotus dictum – is without any doubt improper. In international law,
a state that transfers or limits some of its powers undertaking an inter-
national engagement does not ‘limit’ its sovereignty (which is not apt to
be limited) but rather exercises it by concluding a treaty.12 Thus, the
actual question to which the Constitutional Council answers with the
‘limitations of sovereignty doctrine’ is the following one: are the limita-
tions of powers and of liberty of action (and not of sovereignty) or even
the transfers of competencies undertaken by the state in its international
engagement compatible with its Constitution?
The inopportune confusion caused by this ‘limitation of sovereignty’
expression is due to the fact that the Council refers to ‘national sover-
eignty’ in a twofold and indistinctive manner creating an erroneous
amalgam between external and internal sovereignty, although the two
concepts ought to be completely and carefully separated.13 Thus, instead
of clarifying the signification of paragraph 15 of the Preamble 1946, the
Council, in its effort to distinguish between the ‘limitations of sover-
eignty’ that are compatible with the Constitution and those that are not,
creates a rather confusing and obscure doctrine.14 The confusion was
even more important in the early beginnings of this case law. Indeed, in
Decision no. 76–71 DC – Election of the Assembly of the Communities
decision-du-conseil-constitutionnel-du-31-decembre-1997-traite-d-amsterdam.52845.html, accessed
September 30, 2020). François Luchaire, ‘La souveraineté extérieure dans laConstitution française
et la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel’, in Dominique Maillard Desgrées du Loû (ed.),
Les évolutions de la souveraineté (Paris: Montchrestien, 2006), pp. 119–25.
12 Combacau, ‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans la jurisprudence du Conseil con-
stitutionnel français’:
Selon cette conception, formelle et non substantielle, de la souveraineté au sens du droit
international, on ne peut donc dire d’un État qu’il consent à des limitations de souver-
aineté à telle ou telle condition, mais qu’il considère comme compatibles avec sa souver-
aineté les limitations de sa liberté d’action, pour autant qu’elles respectent les conditions
en cause : soit que ces traités modifient, par renonciation totale ou partielle, l’étendue du
champ de la compétence internationale dont il jouissait, à titre exclusif ou concurrem-
ment avec d’autres États, ou portent atteinte à son monopole dans les domaines où elle
était exclusive; soit qu’ils réduisent les pouvoirs qui lui étaient internationalement recon-
nus dans le cadre de cette compétence.
13 Combacau, ‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans la jurisprudence du Conseil
constitutionnel français’.
14 Combacau, ‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans la jurisprudence du Conseil
constitutionnel français’.
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by direct universal suffrage,15 the Council distinguished between author-
ized ‘limitations of sovereignty’ and unauthorized ‘transfers of sover-
eignty’. This unclear distinction has, fortunately, been abandoned in
the case law thereafter.
IV PANORAMA OF THE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL’S
JURISPRUDENCE AS TO WHICH INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENTS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE FRENCH
CONSTITUTION16
In a 1985 decision17 about the ratification of the Sixth Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights, the Council seemed to identify
three elements as ‘essential conditions for the exercise of national sover-
eignty’, the contrariety to which would render an international treaty incom-
patible with the French Constitution. Firstly, to ensure the respect of the
institutions; secondly, to ensure the continuity of the life of the nation; and,
thirdly, to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens. At the time, French
doctrine considered these elements to be the actual content of ‘national
sovereignty’,18 the limitations to which would not be tolerated. Thus, it may
have seemed clear that if an international treaty limited one or more of these
three ‘essential conditions’, it could not be undertaken without prior
constitutional amendment. However, the Council showed no constancy in
15 Decision no. 76–71 DC, December 30, 1976 – Décision du Conseil des communautés eur-
opéennes relative à l’élection de l’Assemblée des Communautés au suffrage universel direct, pt. 1.
16 The decisions presented in this section can be found in English in the French Constitutional
Council’s site:www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/selection-of-dc-decisions, accessedSeptember 30,
2020.
17 Decision no. 85–188 DC, May 22, 1985 – Protocole n˚ 6 additionnel à la Convention
Européenne de sauvegarde des Droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales concernant
l’abolition de la peine de mort, signé par la France le 28 avril 1983, pt. 2 : ‘cet engagement n’est
pas incompatible avec le devoir pour l’État d’assurer le respect des institutions de la
République, la continuité de la vie de la nation et la garantie des droits et libertés des citoyens’.
18 Louis Favoreu, ‘La décision du 22mai 1985 du Conseil constitutionnel relative au Protocole no 6
additionnel à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’ (1985) 31 Annuaire français de
droit international 868 at 873 (www.persee.fr/doc/afdi_0066–3085_1985_num_31_1_2696, accessed
September 30, 2020); see also Lucie Laithier, ‘Observations sous Cons. const., 9 avril 1992, no
92–308 DC, Traité sur l’Union européenne (“Maastricht I”)’, in Alain Pellet and Alina Miron
(eds.),Les grandes décisions de la jurisprudence française de droit international public (Paris: Dalloz,
2015), pp. 216 at 220–21, paras. 7 et 9; Pellet, ‘LeConseil constitutionnel, la souveraineté et les traités:
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repeating these elements – and a fortiori clarifying their content – in the
numerous decisions that followed.
Subsequently, the most important Constitutional Council’s decisions
resorting to the doctrine of ‘limitations of sovereignty’ in order to prevent
the ratification of an international treaty without previous amendment of
the Constitution were, and this does not come as a surprise, relative to
the European Union treaties.19 The most topical decisions in this regard
will be briefly presented hereafter.
In Decision 92–308 DC – Treaty on European Union (Maastricht I), the
Council asserted:
It follows from these various institutional provisions [i.e. article 3 of the
French Declaration, paragraphs 14 and 15 of the 1946 Preamble and
article 53 of the 1958 Constitution] that respect for national sovereignty
does not preclude France, acting in accordance with the Preamble to
the 1946 Constitution, from concluding international agreements relat-
ing to participation in the establishment or development of a permanent
international organization enjoying legal personality and decision-
making powers on the basis of transfers of powers decided on by the
Member States, subject to reciprocity. However, should an international
agreement entered into to this end involve a clause conflicting with the
Constitution or jeopardizing the essential conditions for the exercise of
national sovereignty, authorization to ratify would require prior amend-
ment of the Constitution.20
Thus, the ‘pure’ unconstitutionality of a clause is presented as a distinct
hypothesis from the jeopardy of the essential conditions for the exercise of
national sovereignty. The Council concludes that the authorization to ratify
the Treaty on European Union requires a constitutional amendment because
it creates situations (concerning the establishment of Union citizenship with
right to vote in municipal elections; the single monetary and exchange-rate
policy and measures relating to the entry and movement of persons) in which
the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty were
19 Besides the decisions analyzed thereafter see also Decision no. 70–39 DC, 19 June 1970 –
Traité portant modification de certaines dispositions budgétaires [. . .] et décision du Conseil des
Communautés européennes [. . .] relative au remplacement des contributions des États membres
par des ressources propres aux Communautés; Decision no. 76–71 DC, 30 December 1976 –
Décision du Conseil des communautés européennes relative à l’élection de l’Assemblée des
Communautés au suffrage universel direct; Decision no. 91–294 DC, 25 July 1991 – Loi
autorisant l’approbation de la convention d’application de l’accord de Schengen.
20 Decision no. 92–308DC – Treaty on European Union (Maastricht I), pts. 12 and 13 (emphasis
added).
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jeopardized. As a result, the Constitution 1958 was amended and articles 88–1
and 88–2 were added.21
21 As amatter of fact, every revision of the EuropeanUnion treaties between 1992 and 2007 lead to
a revision of the FrenchConstitution. Title XV bearing the title ‘On the European Union’ and
added to the FrenchConstitution after the 1992Decision counts nowadays the following seven
articles:
Article 88–1
The Republic shall participate in the European Union constituted by States which
have freely chosen to exercise some of their powers in common by virtue of the Treaty
on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as
they result from the treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December, 2007.
Article 88–2
Statutes shall determine the rules relating to the European arrest warrant pursuant to
acts adopted by the institutions on the European Union.
Article 88–3
Subject to reciprocity and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on European
Union signed on 7 February 1992, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal
elections shall be granted only to citizens of the Union residing in France. Such citizens
shall neither hold the office ofMayor orDeputyMayor nor participate in the designation of
Senate electors or in the election of Senators. An Institutional Act passed in identical terms
by the two Houses shall determine the manner of implementation of this article.
Article 88–4
The government shall lay before the National Assembly and the Senate drafts of
European legislative acts as well as other drafts of or proposals for acts of the European
Union as soon as they have been transmitted to the council of the European Union.
In themanner laid down by the rules of procedure of eachHouse, European resolutions
may be passed, even if Parliament is not in session, on the drafts or proposals referred to in
the preceding paragraph, as well as on any document issuing from a European Union
Institution.
A committee in charge of European affairs shall be set up in each parliamentary
assembly.
Article 88–5
Any government bill authorizing the ratification of a treaty pertaining to the acces-
sion of a state to the European Union shall be submitted to referendum by the president
of the republic.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, by passing a motion adopted in identical terms in
each House by a three-fifths majority, Parliament may authorize the passing of the bill
according to the procedure provided for in paragraph three of article 89.
[Article 88–5 is not applicable to accessions that result from an Intergovernmental
Conference whose meeting was decided by the European Council before July 1, 2004.]
Article 88–6
The National Assembly or the Senate may issue a reasoned opinion as to the
conformity of a draft proposal for a European Act with the principle of subsidiarity.
Said opinion shall be addressed by the President of the House involved to the Presidents
of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European
Commission. The Government shall be informed of said opinion.
Each House may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European
Union against a European Act for non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
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The exact same reasoning is followed in Decision no. 97–394 DC – Treaty
of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establish-
ing the European Communities and certain related instruments.22 This time,
the ‘limitations of national sovereignty’ that resulted in the impossibility to
ratify the treaty without prior constitutional amendment concerned the trans-
fers of powers to the community in matters of asylum, immigration and the
crossing of internal and external frontiers.
In Decision no. 2004–505DC – Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
the henceforth classic phrase is enriched: ‘When however commitments entered
into for such purposes contain a clause running counter to the Constitution, call
into question constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms or adversely affect the
fundamental conditions of the exercising of national sovereignty, authorization to
ratify such measures shall require a prior revision of the Constitution.’23 The
Council concludes that neither the assertion of ‘primacy’ of the European Union
law, nor the title of the new Treaty or the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union require a revision of the French Constitution, but that other
clauses of the Constitution for Europe ‘which transfer to the European Union
powers affecting the essential conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty in
areas or on terms other than those provided for in theTreaties referred to in article
88–2’ do. This is notably so with the subsidiarity principle, with the ordinary
legislative procedure, with the simplified revision procedures of the Treaty of
European Union, with the new powers vested in national parliaments in the
framework of the Union, and more generally with
any provisions of the Treaty which, in a matter inherent to the exercise of
national sovereignty and already coming under the competences of the
Union or the Community, modify the applicable rules of decision-making,
either by replacing the unanimous vote by a qualified majority vote in the
Such proceedings shall be referred to the Court of Justice of the EuropeanUnion by the
Government.
For the purpose of the foregoing, resolutions may be passed, even if Parliament is not
in session, in the manner set down by the Rules of Procedure of each House for the
tabling and discussion thereof.
Article 88–7
Parliament may, by the passing of a motion in identical terms by the National
Assembly and the Senate, oppose any modification of the rules governing the passing
of Acts of the European Union in cases provided for under the simplified revision
procedure for treaties or under judicial cooperation on civil matters, as set forth in the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
as they result from the treaty signed in Lisbon on December 13, 2007.
22 Decision no. 97–394DC – Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related instruments, pt. 6.
23 Decision no. 2004–505DC–Treaty establishing aConstitution for Europe, pt. 7 (emphasis added).
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Council, thus depriving France of any power to oppose such a decision, or by
conferring decision-making powers on the European Parliament, which is
not an emanation of national sovereignty, or by depriving France of any
power of acting on its own initiative.24
In Decision no. 2007–560 DC – Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, the
Council recalls the same compatibility clause as in 200425 and repeats
thereafter the exact same reasoning given the similarities between the
Lisbon Treaty and the aborted Constitution for Europe. However, in this
2007 decision the Council takes a step further in distinguishing European
Union law and international law. Not only does it refer to article 88–1 of the
Constitution as revised since the Treaty of Maastricht (indeed, since 1992,
referral to article 88–1 was added to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Preamble
1946), but also points out that ‘while confirming the place of the Constitution
at the summit of the domestic legal order, these constitutional provisions
enable France to participate in the creation and development of
a permanent European organization vested with a separate legal personality
and decision-taking powers by reason of the transfer of powers agreed to by
the Member States’.26 As a matter of fact, between 1992 and 2007, the shift
towards the recognition of the autonomy of the European Union legal order
is subtle but clear. Whereas, for instance, in the 1997 decision, the Council
still referred to an international organization (‘in accordance with the
Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, concluding international agreements
for participation in the establishment or development of a permanent inter-
national organization’), in 2004, there is a referral to ‘[enable France to
participate in the creation and development of] a permanent European
organization’, (emphasis added) and, in 2007, the balance between the
place of the Constitution at the summit of the domestic legal order and
the participation of France to the European Union is clearly stated. Thus,
the Council takes an unambiguous position as far as the interaction between
French constitutional law and European Union law is concerned. After
having clarified this relation, the Council recalls once again that if ‘under-
takings entered into for this purpose contain a clause running counter to the
Constitution’ its revision is necessary.
24 Decision no. 2004–505 DC – Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, pts. 24 and 29.
25 Decision no. 2007–560 DC – Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty establishing the European Community, pt. 9.
26 Decision no. 2007–560 DC – Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty establishing the European Community, pt. 8.
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The same remarks apply to Decision no. 2012–653 DC – Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union,27 which follows an identical reasoning. However, in this decision,
the Council considers that the provisions on the ‘fiscal compact’ and the
other provisions of the Treaty are not unconstitutional. Nevertheless, this
conclusion is subject to certain conditions enumerated by the Council in
paragraphs 21, 28 and 30 of the decision,28 the non-satisfaction of which
would render the Treaty unconstitutional, since it is only under these
conditions that the Treaty provisions ‘will not infringe the essential condi-
tions for the exercise of national sovereignty’.
Finally, Decision no. 2017–749 DC – Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement between Canada, on the one hand, and the European Union and its
Member States, on the other, concerns a particular case, namely an EU mixed
agreement: an agreement that must be signed and entered into force both by the
27 Decision no. 2012–653 DC – Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union, pts. 8–10.
28 § 21: Considering that the Constitution lays down the prerogatives of the Government and
Parliament in the elaboration and enactment of finance laws and social security
financing laws; that the principle that finance laws are to be enacted annually results
from articles 34 and 47 of the Constitution and applies with respect to the
calendar year; that the direct introduction of provisions of binding force and
permanent character mandating compliance with rules on balanced public
finances requires that these constitutional provisions be amended; that conse-
quently, if France chooses to give effect to the rules laid down in paragraph 1 of
article 3 through provisions of binding force and permanent character, authorization
to ratify the Treaty may only be granted after the Constitution has been amended
(emphasis added).
§ 28: Considering that according to the above, if in order to comply with the commitment
stated in paragraph 1 of article 3, France chooses to adopt an institutional act having the
effect required under paragraph 2, in line with the second alternative stated in the first phrase
of paragraph 2 of article 3, authorization to ratify the treaty may only be granted after the
Constitution has been amended (emphasis added).
§ 30: Considering that paragraph 2 of article 3 does not require that the
Constitution be amended in advance, the provisions of article 8 do not have the
effect of enabling the Court of Justice of the European Union to assess within this
framework whether the provisions of the Constitution are compatible with the terms
of this Treaty; that accordingly, if France decides to give effect to the rules laid down
in paragraph 1 of article 3 of the Treaty in accordance with the procedures stated in
the second alternative in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of article 3, article 8 will not
infringe the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty (emphasis
added).
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European Union and by each of its Member States. The Council, while follow-
ing its case law on limitations of sovereignty, has thus to innovate. It asserts that
it is its responsibility to distinguish between, on the one hand, the stipulations of
this agreement that relate to the exclusive competence of the European union
pursuant to the commitments previously agreed to byFrance that led to the transfer
of competence agreed to byMember States, and on the other, the stipulations of
this agreement that relate to the competence shared between the European Union
and theMember States or competence belonging only toMember States. In regard
to stipulations of the agreement relating to shared competence between the
European Union and the Member States or a competence belonging only to
Member States, it is up to the Constitutional Council, as is established in
paragraph 11, to determine if these stipulations contain a clause that is unconstitu-
tional, calls into question the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
or runs contrary to the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty.29
But, as far as the previously transferred exclusive EU competence is con-
cerned, the Council adds a condition relative this time to ‘the constitutional
identity of France’, known from its doctrine concerning the transposition of
EU Directives:
However, if the stipulations of the agreement establish exclusive competence of
the European Union, the Constitutional Council is only asked to determine if
authorization to ratify this agreement requires a constitutional review, to establish
that they do not call into question a rule or a principle inherent to the constitutional
identity of France. If this is not called into question, it is up to the judge of the
European Union to oversee the compatibility of the agreement with European
Union law.30
The Council carefully examines the provisions of the Treaty, especially those
relative to shared competences (the threshold to consider that a principle inher-
ent to the constitutional identity of France is infringed being much higher), and
concludes that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between
Canada, on the one hand, and the European Union and its Member States, on
the other, does not contain unconstitutional clauses.
Besides the European Union treaties, and notwithstanding the gradual
distinction operated by the Constitutional Council between public inter-
national law and European Union law, the doctrine of ‘limitations of sover-
eignty’ has been applied mutatis mutandis in other international treaties
29 Decision no. 2017–749 DC – Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between
Canada, pts. 12 and 13 (emphasis added).
30 Decision no. 2017–749 DC – Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between
Canada, pt. 14 (emphasis added).
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signed by France.31 Decision no. 98–408DC – Treaty laying down the Statute
of the International Criminal Court constitutes the most important example of
an incompatibility ruling having resulted in the amendment of the French
Constitution in order for an international treaty to be ratified. In this case, the
incompatibility clause is formulated a little bit differently: ‘Where an inter-
national agreement contains a clause that is contrary to the Constitution or
jeopardizes the rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution, the authoriza-
tion to ratify it requires revision of the Constitution.’32 Instead of adding
‘jeopardizes the rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution’ to ‘jeopard-
izing the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’ like in
the 2004, 2007 and 2012 decisions, the Council replaces the latter by the
former. However, the reasoning and result are the same. After having found
the incompatibility of several clauses of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court in regards with specific articles of the French Constitution
(provisions on the criminal responsibility of the holders of certain official
status are contrary to the special constitutional rules governing liability of the
President of the Republic, Members of the Parliament and of the
Government),33 the Council goes on to examine more generally the ‘respect
of the essential conditions for exercise of national sovereignty’ (under a section
of the decision that bears this title). The review concerns the principle of
complementarity between the International Criminal Court and the national
courts, the international cooperation, judicial assistance and the Prosecutor’s
powers, as well as the enforcement of sentences passed by the International
Criminal Court. The Council finds that
under the Statute, the International Criminal Court could be validly seized
on the grounds of an amnesty statute or internal rules on limitation; in such
a case, France, even if a State were neither unwilling nor unable to act, might
be required to arrest and surrender to the Court a person accused of conduct
covered by an amnesty or limitation period in French law; this would violate
the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty.34
31 See for instance Decision no. 85–188 DC – Protocole n˚ 6 additionnel à la Convention
Européenne de sauvegarde des Droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales concernant
l’abolition de la peine de mort, signé par la France le 28 avril 1983; Decision no. 78–93 DC
29 April 1978 – Loi autorisant l’augmentation de la quote-part de la France au Fonds monétaire
international; Decision no. 2005–524/525 DC, 13 December 2005 – Engagements internatio-
naux relatifs à l’abolition de la peine de mort.
32 Decision no. 98–408DC – Treaty laying down the Statute of the International Criminal Court,
pt. 12 (emphasis added).
33 Articles 26, 68 and 68–1 of the Constitution 1958.
34 Decision no. 98–408DC, 22 January 1999 – Treaty laying down the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, pt. 34.
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It also finds that ‘the power conferred on the Prosecutor to carry out these
measures without the presence of the competent French legal authorities is
liable to violate the essential conditions for the exercise of national
sovereignty’.35 Thus, authorization to ratify the treaty laying down the
Statute of the International Criminal Court required amendment of the
French Constitution.
What is interesting in this decision is the clear dichotomy between contrar-
iety to the Constitution per se (its articles or the constitutional principles) and
incompatibility with the ‘respect of the essential conditions for exercise of
national sovereignty’. Contrary to previous decisions on European Treaties,
the Constitutional Council does not explicitly conclude here that limitation
of the essential conditions for exercise of national sovereignty is as such
unconstitutional, but rather dresses two different hypotheses that both result
in the necessity of Constitution amendment.36 Thus, the respect of the essen-
tial conditions for exercise of national sovereignty becomes an autonomous
basis of review, alongside the ‘bloc de constitutionnalité’. When such
a ‘general’ infringement is asserted by the Constitutional Council, the neces-
sary amendment of the Constitution cannot aim at this or that article (since no
precise article is identified by the Council). In such a case, the only amend-
ment leading to the possibility to ratify the international treaty is to add in the
Constitution a habilitation clause (such as article 88–1 after the 1992Decision
or article 53–2 after the 1998 Decision)37 authorizing such an undertaking as
compatible with national sovereignty.38
Such a mechanism raises once again the question of the actual normativity
of the French Constitution and of its true interaction with international (or
even foreign relations) law. It is of course clear that, in theory, still nothing
changes as far as the supremacy of the FrenchConstitution in the French legal
order is concerned. The mere fact that the international treaty cannot be
ratified without previous amendment of the Constitution goes to show that the
latter prevails normatively over the former. However, when a Constitution is
over and over again amended in order for international treaties to be ratified
and a fortiori when some of the modifications at hand consist in a simple
35 Decision no. 98–408DC, 22 January 1999 – Treaty laying down the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, pt. 38.
36 See also Combacau, ‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans la jurisprudence du
Conseil constitutionnel français’.
37 ‘The Republicmay recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as provided
for by the Treaty signed on 18 July 1998’, added to the Constitution by the Constitutional Law
of June 28, 1999.
38 For a more theoretical analysis see Combacau, ‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans
la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel français’.
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addition of a habilitation clause, it cannot be denied that such a Constitution
seems less ‘rigid’ than the ones that leave no place to that kind of amendments.
The theoretical place of the French Constitution in the hierarchy of norms
may be the same as in other constitutional countries, but its actual normative
density can be questioned, since the executive, the Parliament and the
Constitutional Council can all influence the outcome of a constitutional
amendment through their conduct of foreign relations.
V CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL’S DIFFERENT DECISIONS THAT APPLIED
THE ‘LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY’ DOCTRINE
What is striking in this panorama of the Constitutional Council’s case
law – other than the relative ‘hypocrisy’ of the assertion concerning the
absolute primacy of a Constitution that is revised as and when the
ratification of a new international treaty needs it – is the rather arbitrary
way in which the Council decides which limitations of sovereignty are
tolerable and which are not, at least as far as the substantial content of
‘national sovereignty’ is concerned. Indeed, the review of those few deci-
sions does not allow to predict for the future which international treaties
will be considered by the Council as respecting the essential conditions
for the exercise of national sovereignty. It does not allow either to dress
an inventory of different substantial criteria (other than purely material/
formal ones) taken into account by the Council in order to decide or to
provide some guidelines as to how it will exercise its control power.39
Notwithstanding the constancy of the reasoning itself, the actual argu-
ments and results are essentially built on a case by case basis.
Concerning the actual determination of what ‘national sovereignty’ entails
and which are the ‘essential conditions’ for its exercise, the only decision that
tried to identify some elements was the 1985 one, as seen above. However, not
only the three elements put forward in that case by the Constitutional Council
did not survive in the subsequent decisions, but also and foremost the deliber-
ation minutes of the 1985 decision indicate that there was no real intention to
define ‘national sovereignty’ by those three elements invoked.40 The conse-
quence is a rather confusing case law as to why one international treaty is
39 See also Combacau, ‘La souveraineté internationale de l’Etat dans la jurisprudence du
Conseil constitutionnel français’.
40 Hamann, ‘Sur un “sentiment” de souveraineté’, 207, II. B.
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considered to infringe the essential (?) conditions for the exercise of national
sovereignty (?), whereas another international treaty is not. The consultation of
several deliberation minutes (henceforth available for the earlier decisions)
reinforce this impression of obscurity and arbitrariness.41 As a matter of fact,
the doctrine of ‘essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’ is
only a partial and incomplete one at best.
The only common factor that can be identified throughout the different
decisions (besides the ‘reciprocity’ criterium invoked again and again by the
Council, but also found in paragraph 15 of the Preamble 1946) is material
concerning the conditions of the international engagement.42 In short, if
France maintains a certain liberty of action (for instance, to denounce the
treaty even if the treaty does not actually contain a denunciation clause43 or to
invoke an exception derogatory clause in case of urgency or necessity) and if
the Constitutional Council is able to review any future undertaking going
further than the previous ones, then it seems that the essential conditions for
the exercise of national sovereignty are respected.
However, if the Council seems to have a clear course of action as to the
material conditions of powers’ exercise that the treaty must satisfy, there is little
indication (besides the mere listing of the spheres enumerated in the different
decisions up to today) as to the domains in which the treaties can intervene in
order for the undertaking to respect the essential conditions for the exercise of
national sovereignty. Certainly, the Council asserts that ‘the international
agreements entered into by the authorities of the French Republic may not
41 See analysis and long critical assessment in Hamann, ‘Sur un “sentiment” de souveraineté’,
207, II. B. According to the author:
The confusion by the Council between two concepts that are alien to each other, as well
as its ignorance of the singularity of State sovereignty in its international law meaning,
inevitably lead to issues of State sovereignty to be measured against a famous tool of its
own fabric, the ‘essential conditions for exercising national sovereignty’. As an operative
tool for review, this concept is consequently inadequate – and can only be inadequate,
as the minutes of the Council’s deliberations reveal today, given that the fate of these
‘essential conditions for exercising national sovereignty’ was but an accident, the
product of a mistake which became ‘jurisprudence constante’.
42 Hamann, ‘Sur un “sentiment” de souveraineté’, 207, II.B for the distinction between material/
formal elements and substantial elements.
43 See the apparent contradiction between Decision no. 85–188 DC, 22 May 1985 – Protocole n˚ 6
additionnel à la Convention Européenne de sauvegarde des Droits de l’homme et des libertés
fondamentales concernant l’abolition de la peine de mort, signé par la France le 28 avril 1983, pt.
1; Decision no. 91–294DC, 25 July 1991 – Loi autorisant l’approbation de la convention d’applica-
tion de l’accord de Schengen, pt. 58; Decision no. 2005–524/525 DC, 13 December 2005 –
Engagements internationaux relatifs à l’abolition de la peine de mort, pt. 5; Decision no.
2017–749 DC – Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, pt. 69.
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adversely affect the exercise by the state of the powers that are at the core of its
national sovereignty’.44 It also refers to ‘arrangements which deprive the
Member States of their own powers in a matter which is vital to the exercise
of national sovereignty’.45 Still, no clear list of which those matters are is given
nor the criteria to identify those matters are laid down. In other words, the
‘national sovereignty’ in its substantial meaning is not really defined by the
Constitutional Council (as it is not defined by paragraph 15 of the Preamble
1946 either), although this same Council establishes itself in its case law as the
‘national sovereignty’s’ guarantor.
Thus, the executive branch has no real guidance as to which international
treaties are likely to be deemed respectful of the essential conditions for the
exercise of national sovereignty by the Council and which are not. If it is free to
conduct foreign relations as it wishes, and if the French legal order encourages
international cooperation, the executive is never immune from a Conseil
Constitutionnel’s incompatibility decision resulting in a long process of
a prior Constitution amendment in order for the treaty in question to be
ratified. Of course, when the a priori constitutional review is not compulsory,
referral to the Council will depend on the will of the executive (President of
Republic and Prime Minister) or of the legislative (President of one or the
other of the Houses or sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty
Senators). Thus, the possible interference of the Constitutional Council in
the conduct of foreign relations is not without limits and its role remains
closely linked to the one of the executive and the legislative branches. Still, it is
clear that the Council conserves great power and discretion as to its review and
its possibility to weigh upon the ratification process of the most important
international treaties. In other words, its position in the management of
France’s foreign relations is rather significant.
44 Decision no. 92–308 DC, 9 April 1992 – Treaty on European Union (Maastricht I), pt. 49.
45 Decision no. 92–308 DC, 9 April 1992 – Treaty on European Union (Maastricht I), pt. 43.
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9
Democratic Participation in International Lawmaking
in Switzerland after the ‘Age of Treaties’
Anna Petrig*
I INTRODUCTION
If someone were asked to name but one typical feature of the Swiss constitu-
tional system, chances are high that the answer would be ‘direct democracy’.
Indeed, Switzerland is arguably the state granting the most far-reaching
democratic participation rights in the process of lawmaking; and this holds
true for both domestic and international law. Since the late 1990s, the concept
of ‘parallelism’ – the idea that the same degree of domestic democratic
legitimacy should apply to the making of international law as it does to the
enactment of domestic law – has been progressively implemented. As a result,
from a comparative perspective, the Swiss legal framework on democratic
participation in international lawmaking is unique in terms of the actors
involved, the phases during which participation is possible, and the intensity
and effects it features. Despite the breadth of this legal framework, it is
simultaneously very narrowly designed: in its largest parts, it is geared towards
just one source of international law – treaties. The ‘age of treaties’, however,
seems to be over and informal lawmaking increasingly supersedes formal
lawmaking.
In the introduction to this book, the editors note that the ‘horizons of
international law have greatly expanded’ and that this expansion ‘affected
the two most foundational organizing concepts of this body of law: sources
and subjects’.1 During the post-1945 period, states were the main players in
international lawmaking, often acting under the auspices of an international
organisation (IO), and treaties were the main vehicle to bring international
legalisation forward. After the turn of the millennium, however, the
* I would like to sincerely thank Dr Maria Orchard, J.D./LL.M., for the editorial work on the
chapter.
1 See the introductory chapter by Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, p. 10.
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international institutional landscape changed dramatically and a series of new
actors appeared, which notably participate in the production of norms. While
these new participants in international lawmaking are as diverse as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational corporations, industry
associations and regulatory agencies, they share a commonality: not one of
them possesses international legal personality (yet) and, consequently, they all
lack treaty-making capacity. Their normative output is thus condemned to fall
short of formal international law – they cannot regulate but through infor-
mal law.
The Swiss legal framework on democratic participation in international
lawmaking, being a child of its time, is largely predicated on a very traditional
understanding of international law. Yet, the mentioned structural changes in
international law did not go unnoticed in politics and among the broader
public. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that the Swiss
mechanisms for generating democratic legitimacy need to be adjusted in light
of these new (complex) realities if they are to maintain their function. Still,
building new bridges in the context of informal law has proven to be far more
complex than it is for treaties: what we praise as the beauties of informal
lawmaking – namely that the process and actors are not being forced into
a rigid corset – turn out to be the beasts when it comes to grasping the
phenomenon in constitutional and statutory terms. International informal
lawmaking sets boundaries on democratisation ‘from below’ that do not exist
for treaty-making; such limits arise, for example, from the fact that the state
may not even sit at the negotiating table. Overall, informal lawmaking greatly
complicates the relationship between sovereignty (including domestic demo-
cratic self-determination) and international cooperation – and, to some extent,
their simultaneous realisation is no easier than squaring a circle. This insight is
difficult to accept for a state like Switzerland, where democratic participation
in lawmaking is part of its constitutional DNA. At the same time, one tends to
forget that Switzerland is one of the most globalised countries of the world and
not seldom a driving force behind informal lawmaking projects.
In order to fully grasp the significance of the turn to informal lawmaking for
the Swiss legal framework, which governs democratic participation in inter-
national lawmaking, it is necessary to take a step back and understand its roots,
development and context. Accordingly, this chapter sets the scene by demon-
strating that foreign relations law exists in Switzerland, even if this label is
rarely attached to the respective set of rules. It lays out two main categories of
norms belonging to it, which are those providing substantive guidance for the
conduct of foreign policy and those allocating powers in this realm. This will
demonstrate that foreign relations are no longer understood as an exceptional
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state activity subject to political discretion, and thus a prerogative of the
executive, but rather as coming within the ordinary constitutional framework
and being a competence jointly exercised by the government and Parliament;
a result of a steady move towards normalisation2 (Section II). It then goes on to
describe that, mainly as a reaction to internationalisation, the democratic
participation rights in international lawmaking were increasingly bolstered
in the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium and the concept of
‘parallelism’, which testifies to the high degree of normalisation in the field of
international lawmaking, was progressively implemented (Section III). It then
discusses how the shift to informal lawmaking deprives this highly developed,
but heavily treaty-oriented, democratic participation mechanism of much of
its relevance, how the legislator has reacted to the rising importance of
informal law, and what challenges potentially lay ahead in building new
bridges (Section IV). A brief conclusion notes that not every boundary can
be overcome with a bridge and that globalisation and international cooper-
ation arguably come at a cost to democracy; yet such costs can be reduced with
a domestic democratic participation framework, which is not anchored in
traditional international lawmaking but reflects the complexities of contem-
porary international norm production (Section V).
II SWISS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: TOWARDS
NORMALISATION
A Is There a ‘Swiss Foreign Relations Law’?
‘Foreign relations law’ has been defined as encompassing ‘the domestic law of
each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the world’,
most importantly with other nations and international institutions.3 As per
Karen Knop, ‘[a]ll legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have
a field of “foreign relations law”’.4 This statement succinctly describes the
current situation in Switzerland where foreign relations law has not yet
emerged as a distinct field of study or law. So far, even the term ‘foreign
2 See text belonging to n. 42 below for a definition of the term.
3 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Study’ (2017) 111 AJIL 316–20 at 318; in
similar terms: the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 9.
4 Karen Knop, ‘Foreign Relations Law: Comparison as Invention’, inCurtis A. Bradley (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2019), p. 45; see also Campbell McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign
Relations Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign
Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 21.
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relations law’ has been sparsely used in writings on legal rules governing how
Switzerland interacts with other subjects of international law.5 Similarly,
courses specifically entitled ‘foreign relations law’ are a rare occurrence in
Swiss universities as compared to American universities where such courses
tend to be more commonplace.6 Nonetheless, a densely knit web of legal
provisions governing Switzerland’s interaction with other states and inter-
national actors is in place and continues to develop.
The Federal Constitution of 19997 contains a series of provisions governing
foreign relations, the entirety of which is denoted as the ‘external constitution’
(‘Aussenverfassung’); a term firmly rooted in the constitutional discourse since the
adoption of the current constitution.8 Indeed, the predecessor Constitution of
1874 regulated foreign relations only in fragments and left various aspects to
constitutional practice.9 The Constitution of 1999 is the first federal constitution
comprising a fairly comprehensive legal framework for the conduct of foreign
relations, which justifiably deserves the designation as ‘external constitution’. In
terms of substance, the ‘external constitution’ can roughly be divided into provi-
sions allocating authority and provisions containing substantive guidance for the
conduct of foreign relations.10 These two sets of norms – to which we turn next –
are specified and refined at the level of federal acts and ordinances. Further, in
some fields, rules have also been developed through the case law of the Swiss
5 But see recently Odile Ammann,Domestic Courts and the Interpretation of International Law:
Methods and Reasoning Based on the Swiss Example (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2019), pp. 65–6. It
must be noted, however, that the term cannot be translated into German or French in
a succinct way.
6 Aspects of foreign relations law are integrated in general courses; there is no equivalent to
Staatsrecht III taught in Germany (on the latter, see Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘The Democratic
Challenge to Foreign Relations Law in Transatlantic Perspective’, in Jacco Bomhoff,
David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-Facing Constitution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 363). Exceptional in that sense is the course ‘Foreign
Relations Law in Comparative Perspective’ taught by Roland Portmann at the University of
St. Gallen, available at https://tools.unisg.ch/handlers/Public/CourseInformationSheet.ashx/
semester/FS19/eventnumber/8,492,1.00, accessed 29 June 2020.
7 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, Classified compilation 101
(hereinafter: Constitution of 1999); the entire federal law is available at www.admin.ch/gov/
en/start/federal-law/classified-compilation.html, accessed 29 June 2020 (where existing, the
English translation, which does not have legal force, is cited).
8 For an early reference, see Giovanni Biaggini, ‘Das Verhältnis der Schweiz zur internationalen
Gemeinschaft: Neuerungen im Rahmen der Verfassungsreform’ (1999) Aktuelle Juristische Praxis
722–9, passim; see also, e.g., Roland Kley and Roland Portmann, ‘Vorbemerkungen zur
Aussenverfassung’, in Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (eds.), Die Schweizerische Bundesverfassung:
St. Galler Kommentar, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Zürich: Dike, 2014), vol. I, p. 1097.
9 See Biaggini, ‘Internationale Gemeinschaft’, 723.
10 Kley and Portmann, ‘Aussenverfassung’, p. 1097.
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Federal Supreme Court.11 In sum, foreign relations law is not (yet) treated as
a discrete field of law or study in Switzerland, but certainly exists as a matter of
fact.12
B Substantive Guidance for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
The Constitution of 1999 is novel in that it spells out general foreign policy
objectives.13 Article 54(2), entitled ‘foreign relations’, represents the key refer-
ence point in terms of material guidance for the conduct of foreign policy.14
Substantive orientation can further be found in various other parts of the
Constitution.15 The operationalisation and (to some extent) concretisation of
these goals painted with broad brushstrokes takes place through an increasing
number of federal statutes pertaining to foreign relations-related activities,16
the adoption of treaties, and by means of foreign policy decisions by the
authorities.17
The constitutional statements providing substantive guidance for the con-
duct of foreign policy feature varying degrees of abstraction and normativity.18
Yet they share a commonality: they all testify to the legislator’s heightened
awareness in the 1990s of globalisation and global interdependence and the
consequent growing importance of foreign relations. This phenomenon led to
an incremental blending of the internal and external dimension of a state’s
policy19 and the increased difficulty of clearly separating internal forms of state
11 As per Kley and Portmann, ‘Aussenverfassung’, p. 1107, the significance of court decisions in
the context of foreign relations has increased in recent years.
12 This holds equally true for other jurisdictions; see, e.g., Bradley, ‘Field of Study’, 319, for the
United States.
13 Biaggini, ‘Internationale Gemeinschaft’, 723.
14 Bernhard Ehrenzeller and Roland Portmann, ‘Art. 54(2)’, in Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (eds.),
Die Schweizerische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Zürich: Dike,
2014), vol. I, p. 1125.
15 See, e.g., preamble, para. 4, and art. 2(1) and (4) setting out the goals to be pursued by the
Confederation; foreign policy goals are further mentioned in provisions on specific subject
matters, see, e.g., art. 101(1) on foreign economic policy.
16 They cover a wide range of issues, such as Swiss army participation in international peace-
keeping operations, development aid, the strengthening of human rights and the rule of law in
third states, or the transfer of war material and related technology abroad; for a list of relevant
statutes: Ehrenzeller and Portmann, ‘Art. 54(2)’, p. 1130.
17 Ehrenzeller and Portmann, ‘Art. 54(2)’, pp. 1130–4.
18 See Biaggini, ‘Internationale Gemeinschaft’, 723–4.
19 Raffaela Kunz and Anne Peters, ‘Constitutionalisation and Democratisation of Foreign
Affairs: The Case of Switzerland’, in Anneli Alba and Samo Bardutzky (eds.), National
Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law
(Berlin: Springer, 2019), pp. 1519 and 1499.
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action from external forms20 – an insight that, as we will see, provided
momentum for the normalisation of foreign affairs.
C Allocation of Powers on Foreign Policy
The second category of provisions of the ‘external constitution’ allocates power
between the various levels of government (Confederation and Cantons) and
branches of government (executive, legislative and judiciary). These provi-
sions, accounting for the lion’s share of the ‘external constitution’,21 are more
chiselled and specific as compared to those providing substantive guidance for
the conduct of foreign policy. Their content is forged by the tension between
the executive’s claim (and need) for a certain degree of flexibility and swiftness
when conducting foreign policy22 and the quest to give due weight to federal-
ism and democracy. The more internationalisation has progressed and the
more foreign policy has shaped the domestic political environment, the more
fiercely the question of vertical and horizontal allocation of powers in foreign
policy has been debated.23 Overall, the tendency is to give more weight to
democracy and federalism – after all, both are foundational principles of the
Constitution24 – in order to prevent them being undermined by the external-
isation of many policy areas.
As Switzerland is a federal state – the Confederation consists of 26Cantons,
which are ‘sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the
Federal Constitution’25 – the Constitution of 1999 explicitly addresses the
vertical separation of powers: foreign relations are, as per Article 54(1) of
the Constitution, ‘the responsibility of the Confederation’, even for matters
domestically falling within the competence of the Cantons.26 This implies
20 See the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 5.
21 Matthias Oesch, ‘Ein Europa-Artikel für die schweizerische Bundesverfassung’, in
Andreas Glaser and Lorenz Langer (eds.), Die Verfassungsdynamik der europäischen
Integration und demokratische Partizipation (Zürich: Dike, 2015), p. 165.
22 Critically on whether a general need for flexibility and swiftness exists in the conduct of foreign
relations: Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Legislative Gewalt und Aussenpolitik: Eine rechtsverglei-
chende Studie zu den parlamentarischen Entscheidungskompetenzen des deutschen
Bundestags, des amerikanischen Kongresses und der schweizerischen Bundesversammlung im
auswärtigen Bereich (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 1993), pp. 330–1.
23 Kley and Portmann, ‘Aussenverfassung’, p. 1103.
24 Conseil fédéral (CH), Message relative à une nouvelle constitution fédérale du 20 novembre
1996, Feuille fédérale 1997 I 1, pp. 14–15.
25 Constitution of 1999, art. 3.
26 Giovanni Biaggini, BV Kommentar: Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft
(Zürich: Orell Füssli, 2017), p. 583; Walter Haller, The Swiss Constitution in a Comparative
Context, 2nd ed. (Zürich: Dike, 2016), p. 71; Roland Portmann, ‘Foreign Affairs Federalism in
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a certain erosion of cantonal competences as internationalisation progresses. It
is against this background that the Constitution of 1999, by way of compensa-
tion, stipulates that the Confederation ‘shall respect the powers of the Cantons
and protect their interests’.27 Moreover, the Constitution foresees a role for
Cantons in foreign policy affairs, albeit a subordinate one. Concretely, Article
55 confers Cantons participatory rights in foreign policy decisions by stipulat-
ing that the Cantons ‘shall be consulted’ if the respective decisions ‘affect their
powers or their essential interests’;28 and that the ‘Confederation shall inform
the Cantons fully and in good time and shall consult with them’.29 Further,
Article 56, which governs relations between the Cantons and foreign states,
authorises the Cantons to conduct their own foreign policy in fields in which
they are competent according to domestic federalism and to conclude treaties
in these areas,30 which is fittingly dubbed ‘small foreign policy’ (‘kleine
Aussenpolitik’).31 This autonomous foreign policy competence and residual
treaty-making capacity of the Cantons32 is of considerable practical import-
ance since no less than fifteen Cantons border at least one foreign state.33
As regards the horizontal separation of powers, the Constitution is primarily
concerned with the allocation of foreign relations competences between the
executive and legislative branches, viz. between the government (Federal
Council) on the one hand and the Parliament (Federal Assembly) and, for
certain matters, the people, or the people and the Cantons, on the other.
While some constitutions are based on a rebuttable presumption in favour of
executive competence, the Swiss Constitution today follows a shared power
approach whereby foreign relations are a domain equally entrusted to the
executive and the legislature.34 This was not always the case. Under the
Switzerland’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign
Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 300–1.
27 Constitution of 1999, art. 54(3).
28 Constitution of 1999, art. 55(1).
29 Constitution of 1999, art. 55(2); these participatory rights are specified in the Federal Act on
the Participation of the Cantons in the Foreign Policy of the Confederation, Classified
compilation 138.1 (author’s translation of: Loi fédérale sur la participation des cantons à la
politique extérieure de la Confédération du 22 décembre 1999) (hereinafter: Cantonal
Participation Act).
30 Portmann, ‘Federalism’, p. 300.
31 Thomas Pfisterer, ‘Art. 55’ in Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (eds.), Die Schweizerische
Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Zürich: Dike, 2014), vol. I, p. 1162.
32 Portmann, ‘Federalism’, p. 299.
33 Biaggini, ‘BV Kommentar’, p. 600.
34 On the two approaches: Thomas Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’ (last updated January
2011), in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
online edition, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231
690-e937, accessed 29 June 2020, para. 20; on Switzerland, see Conseil fédéral (CH), Message
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Constitution of 1874, foreign policy was understood to be a prerogative of the
executive whereas the role of Parliament, the people and Cantons was essen-
tially limited to the approval of certain categories of treaties.35 In 1994,
a revision of the Constitution of 1874 was initiated. Since previous attempts
had failed, the mandate for this revision was very narrowly defined, essentially
consisting in an ‘update’ (‘mise à jour’, ‘Nachführung’) rather than a redesign:
its primary objective was to systematise and streamline the content of the
constitutional document and to bring it in line with the then-existing consti-
tutional practice without, however, engaging in its substantive amendment.36
Yet, capturing ‘existing constitutional practice’ and drawing a line between
documenting the status quo and introducing novel elements proved challen-
ging, and foreign relations law is exemplary in this regard. The provisions (re-)
defining the role of Parliament in shaping foreign policy were among the most
fiercely debated aspects because they were deemed by some to overstep the
‘updating mandate’.37 Indeed, the provisions ultimately adopted reflect
a paradigm shift38 as regards the allocation of authority on foreign policy by
entrenching a shared power approach. However, this change did not happen
overnight but rather started crystallising in preceding years in legislation and
practice.
In constitutional terms, the shared power approach is expressed as follows:
Article 184(1) stipulates, from the government’s perspective, that ‘[t]he Federal
Council is responsible for foreign relations, subject to the right of participation
of the Federal Assembly’; while Article 166(1) states, from the Parliament’s
perspective, that ‘[t]he Federal Assembly shall participate in shaping foreign
relative à une nouvelle constitution fédérale du 20 novembre 1996, Feuille fédérale 1997 I 1,
p. 399, and Kley and Portmann, ‘Aussenverfassung’, p. 1105, para. 25.
35 However, some authors argued that not the constitutional text but its interpretation led to such
limited role for Parliament: see, e.g., Fritz Fleiner and Zaccaria Giacometti, Schweizerisches
Bundesstaatsrecht (Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1949), pp. 525–6; and, fifty years later,
Ehrenzeller, Legislative Gewalt, pp. 293–300, especially p. 298.
36 Eva Maria Belser, ‘Einleitung’, in Bernhard Waldmann, Eva Maria Belser and Astrid Epiney
(eds.), Bundesverfassung: Basler Kommentar (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2015), p. 11.
37 Biaggini, ‘Internationale Gemeinschaft’, 722; Florent Tripet Cordier, ‘Art. 152’, in
Martin Graf, Cornelia Theler and Moritz von Wyss (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und
Parlamentspraxis der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung: Kommentar zum
Parlamentsgesetz (ParlG) vom 13. Dezember 2013 (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2014), pp.
1035–6; mentioning these provisions as an example where the updating of the constitutional
text necessarily implies the taking on board of novel elements: Conseil fédéral (CH), Message
relative à une nouvelle constitution fédérale du 20 novembre 1996, Feuille fédérale 1997
I 1, p. 47.
38 Expression used by Jörg Künzli, ‘Art. 184(1)’, in Bernhard Waldmann, Eva Maria Belser and
Astrid Epiney (eds.), Bundesverfassung: Basler Kommentar (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn,
2015), p. 2683.
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policy and supervise the maintenance of foreign relations’. In order to describe
this (new) cooperative relationship, which was specified by, inter alia, the
Parliament Act,39 Swiss constitutional doctrine metaphorically refers to the
executive and legislative as ‘fingers of the same hand’ (‘les doigts d’une même
main’,40 ‘Verhältnis zu gesamter Hand’).41 The inclusion of a model of shared
competences and intense cooperation between the executive and the legisla-
tive in the Constitution of 1999 marks a milestone in the overall trend of
erosion of the executive’s monopoly over large parts of foreign relations and is
strong proof of a move towards normalisation.
D Towards Normalisation of Foreign Relations
In the context of foreign relations law, the term ‘normalisation’ is used to
denote the phenomenon that ‘the conduct of foreign relations is increasingly
subjected to the constitutional and other legal standards that apply to other
governmental action’.42 From the brief overview on the main content of the
Swiss ‘external constitution’ follows that foreign policy is no longer regarded as
‘exceptional’43 but rather as coming within the ‘normal’ constitutional
framework.44
First of all, in Switzerland, the long-held view that the principle of legality –
that is, subjecting the exercise of political and administrative powers to the
law – does not apply to foreign policy is now outdated.45 In the early 1990s,
39 Federal Act on the Federal Assembly (Parliament Act) of 13 December 2002, Classified
compilation 171.10, especially arts. 24 and 152; on the genesis and content of these provisions:
Luzian Odermatt and Esther Tophinke, ‘Art. 24’, in Martin Graf, Cornelia Theler andMoritz
von Wyss (eds.), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis der Schweizerischen
Bundesversammlung: Kommentar zum Parlamentsgesetz (ParlG) vom 13. Dezember 2013
(Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2014), pp. 195–201, and Tripet Cordier, ‘Art. 152’, pp. 1029–44.
40 Conseil fédéral (CH), Message relative à une nouvelle constitution fédérale du 20 novembre
1996, Feuille fédérale 1997 I 1, p. 399.
41 Bundesrat (CH), Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 20. November 1996,
Bundesblatt 1997 I 1, p. 392.
42 See the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 14; see further, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman and
Ingrid Wuerth, ‘The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law’ (2015) 128 Harvard Law
Review 1897–979 at 1901.
43 The term ‘foreign affairs exceptionalism’ has been coined by Curtis A. Bradley, ‘A New
American Foreign Affairs Law’ (1997) 70 Colorado Law Review 1089–107 at 1096, and stands
for ‘the view that the . . . government’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a different, and
generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that govern its domestic
powers’.
44 See Portmann, ‘Federalism’, p. 302.
45 On the development of this view, see Matthias Lanz, Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik:
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen parlamentarischer Mitwirkung (Zürich: Dike, 2020), pp. 37-43.
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Bernhard Ehrenzeller – author of the first comprehensive treatise examining
the role of the legislative in foreign policy and advocate of a shared power
approach – deplored that foreign affairs were, in various respects, perceived as
‘exceptional state activity’ and treated accordingly.46 Indeed, at that time,
Swiss practice and prevailing doctrine viewed foreign relations as an area
that cannot be regulated by law.47 JeanMonnier put it quite bluntly by writing
that ‘foreign affairs are a subject matter inappropriate for codification’;48 while
Luzius Wildhaber warned that legislation related to foreign policy would risk
lacking substance (or even be insubstantial altogether) and could at most
pertain to the allocation of powers.49 Bernhard Ehrenzeller criticised this
‘almost mythical perception of foreign policy as an area not susceptible to
normalization’ that prevailed at the time.50
Yet, at latest with the adoption of the Constitution of 1999, ‘a shift away from
exceptionalism’ took place51 – to use a term coined by Curtis A. Bradley in this
very period of time and describing a similar phenomenon occurring in the
United States.52 As demonstrated, the Swiss Constitution provides substantive
guidance for the conduct of Switzerland’s foreign policy (although still in
a modest way as compared to the domestic policy sphere);53 and the move
towards normalisation is further evidenced by the ever-growing body of rules
and statutes concretising and operationalising these foreign policy
objectives.54 All in all, the principle of legality – a cornerstone of the rule of
46 Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Legislative Gewalt und Aussenpolitik: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie
zu den parlamentarischen Entscheidungskompetenzen des deutschen Bundestags, des amerika-
nischen Kongresses und der schweizerischen Bundesversammlung im auswärtigen Bereich
(Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 1993), p. 298 (in the original: ‘Sonderfall der Staatstätigkeit’).
47 See, e.g., Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Legalitätsprinzip und Aussenpolitik’, in Edouard Brunner et al.
(eds), Einblick in die schweizerische Aussenpolitik: Zum 65. Geburtstag für Staatssekretär
Raymond Probst (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1984), p. 447.
48 JeanMonnier, ‘Les principes et les règles constitutionnels de la politique étrangere’ (1986) 127/
II Revue de droit suisse 107–247 at 157 (in the original: ‘la politique étrangère est une matière
impropre à la codification’).
49 Wildhaber, ‘Legalitätsprinzip und Aussenpolitik’, p. 455.
50 Ehrenzeller, ‘Legislative Gewalt’, p. 299 (in the original: ‘die fast mythische Vorstellung von
der Unnormierbarkeit der Aussenpolitik’).
51 Portmann, ‘Federalism’, p. 302; on today’s view that foreign relations are an area subject to and
governed by law, see e.g., Astrid Epiney, ‘Beziehungen zum Ausland’, in Daniel Thürer, Jean-
François Aubert and Jörg Paul Müller (eds.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz – Droit constitu-
tionnel suisse (Zürich: Schulthess, 2001), p. 880; Künzli, ‘Art. 184(1)’, p. 2683.
52 Bradley, ‘New American Foreign Affairs Law’, 1104.
53 See Oesch, ‘Europa-Artikel’, p. 166.
54 See Lanz, ‘Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik’, p. 41; he argues that newer statutes (such
as the Federal Act on the Freezing and the Restitution of Illicit Assets held by Foreign
Politically Exposed Persons of 18 December 2015, Classified compilation 196.1) evidence
that foreign policy issues can be governed by law.
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law and laid down in Article 5(1) of the Constitution of 1999 – today extends, as
a general rule, to foreign policy.55
The Constitution of 1999 has also heralded a shift towards normalisation as
regards allocation of competences and brought foreign policy within the
constitutional separation of powers framework. Foreign relations are no longer
monopolised by the government but are a competence exercised jointly with
Parliament. The latter has a right to steer foreign policy, notably by approving
treaties56 – a power explicitly mentioned in the Constitution57 to which we
turn now.
III ALLOCATION OF POWERS FOR TREATY-MAKING:
TOWARDS DEMOCRATISATION
A A Reaction to the Legalisation of World Politics
One of the encounters between international law and foreign relations
law that has been identified by the editors is ‘procedure’.58 Indeed, large
parts of foreign relations law deal with procedure,59 notably by distribut-
ing powers horizontally among the three branches of government;60 and,
within federal states, vertically between the various governmental levels.61
With international law having attained enormous importance, the rules
allocating powers specifically for international lawmaking today form
a core aspect of foreign relations law. A vast majority of constitutions
adopted by nation-states include provisions allocating powers for the
conclusion of treaties.62
As regards the distribution of powers between the executive and legislative
in treaty-making, ‘a sustained trend toward greater parliamentary involvement’
55 Ehrenzeller, Legislative Gewalt, p. 371; as per Thomas Cottier, ‘“Tax Fraud or the Like”:
Überlegungen und Lehren zum Legalitätsprinzip im Staatsvertragsrecht’ (2011) 130/I Revue de
droit suisse 97–122 at 110, the principle of legality standards can be (and sometimes are) lowered
in order to take the specificities of foreign policy into account.
56 See Lanz, ‘Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik’, p. 43.
57 Constitution of 1999, arts. 166(1) juncto 184(1).
58 See the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 13.
59 See the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 14.
60 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), p. 7.
61 Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, para. 39.
62 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Comparative Foreign Relations Law: A National Constitutions Perspective’,
in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 67.
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has been identified and empirically backed.63 Many constitutions require
parliamentary authorisation before the executive consents to be bound by
a treaty and the categories of international agreements necessitating prior
approval have widened over time.64 The shift from the executive’s monopoly
in treaty-making towards increasingly robust parliamentary participation can
be observed in jurisdictions around the globe.65 This transition from
a complete separation of powers towards a shared power approach is com-
monly referred to as the ‘democratisation’ of the treaty-making process.66
The main driver behind the democratisation of the treaty-making process is
the growing importance of international law in the post–Cold War period.67
With this, an increasing number of aspects previously regulated by domestic
law became matters of international law. As a consequence, they fell to the
executive, which, at that time, held primary responsibility for foreign relations
and were thus removed from the legislature’s ambit.68 In order to reduce the
democratic deficit resulting from globalisation and enhanced international
cooperation and to re-institute the constitutional balance in the realm of
lawmaking, steps towards (more closely) associating Parliament with the
treaty-making process were considered a necessity.69
B The Concept of ‘Parallelism’ in Switzerland
As regards the development of the Swiss rules allocating powers for inter-
national lawmaking, democratisation is indisputably the leitmotif as well.
Already under the Constitution of 1874 and thus at a time when Swiss doctrine
and practice considered foreign relations to be a prerogative of the executive,
parliamentary approval was required for specific treaties.70 As early as 1921, an
63 Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and Treaty
Withdrawal: A Global Survey’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 137 and 142.
64 See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Executive and Legislative
Power over Foreign Relations’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 104.
65 Verdier and Versteeg, ‘A Global Survey’, p. 142.
66 Term used, e.g., by Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitutions: An
International and Comparative Study (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 1971), p. 9.
67 In more detail, see text relating to n. 113 ff. below.
68 See Anne Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’, in Janne Nijman and
André Nollkaemper (eds.), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 282–3, on the democratic
deficiencies resulting from globalisation.
69 See Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, para. 51.
70 See Odermatt and Tophinke, ‘Art. 24’, p. 197.
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optional referendum for treaties not containing a withdrawal clause or con-
cluded for a duration of more than fifteen years was introduced, a move
towards democratisation triggered by massive protests against a previously
concluded treaty of unlimited duration concerning the Gotthard tunnel.71
In 1977, treaties entailing accession to IOs or a ‘multilateral unification of the
law’ became eligible for the optional referendum, while accession to organisa-
tions of supranational character or collective security were subjected to the
mandatory referendum.72 This major step in the democratisation process was
deemed necessary in light of the increasing number of treaties pertaining to
matters previously governed by federal acts and thus removing them from
parliamentary enactment and the popular referendum.73
During the span of the last century, participatory rights in the treaty-making
process have steadily been expanded. Yet, it was only in the late 1990s that
a paradigm shift regarding democratic participation in international lawmak-
ing occurred: the idea of reducing incongruities, which guided earlier
reforms, gave way to the concept of congruence or – to use a word forged by
the federal authorities in this context – ‘parallelism’ between domestic and
international lawmaking.74 The concept of ‘parallelism’ essentially entails
applying the same degree of democratic legitimacy in the realm of treaty-
making as is required for the enactment of domestic statutes, whichmeans that
similar democratic participation rights should be granted regardless of
whether an important treaty or a federal act is being adopted.75 Hence, it is
not the form (treaty or federal act) but the normative content of a legal
instrument that should be decisive for the question of whether it is subject
to a referendum. This idea was (partially) implemented in 2003: in the
domestic sphere, ‘[a]ll significant provisions that establish binding legal
rules must be enacted in the form of a federal act’, which is subject to the
optional referendum.76 As a consequence, all treaties containing ‘important
legislative provisions’ or the implementation of which requires the enactment
71 Yvo Hangartner and Andreas Kley, Die demokratischen Rechte in Bund und Kantonen der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (Zürich: Schulthess, 2000), pp. 435–6.
72 See Hangartner and Kley, Demokratischen Rechte, p. 436.
73 SeeConseil fédéral (CH),Message concernant de nouvelles dispositions sur le référendum en
matière de traités internationaux du 23 octobre 1974, Feuille fédérale 1974 II 1133, pp. 1146–7.
74 Oliver Diggelmann, ‘Verletzt die “Standardabkommen-Praxis” der Bundesversammlung die
Bundesverfassung?’ (2014) 115 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht
291–323 at 294.
75 See, e.g., Conseil fédéral (CH), Message concernant la loi fédérale sur la compétence de
conclure des traités internationaux de portée mineure et sur l’application provisoire des traités
internationaux du 4 juillet 2012, Feuille fédérale 2012 6959, pp. 6973–4.
76 Constitution of 1999, art. 164(1) juncto art. 141(1)(a).
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of federal acts, were equally made eligible for the optional treaty
referendum.77
While initially developed in the context of the optional referendum, the
concept of ‘parallelism’ later became a general guiding principle for the
allocation of powers regarding international lawmaking,78 and even for rules
governing the relationship between the Swiss legal order and international law
more generally.79 The idea of ‘parallelism’ is essentially the Swiss response to
the hollowing out of (direct) democracy and cantonal autonomy brought
about by internationalisation. It constitutes the benchmark to be attained in
the effort to democratise international lawmaking ‘from below’.
C Far-Reaching Democratic Participatory Rights
Since foreign relations law is ‘undoubtedly shaped by the specific elements of
each state’s constitution’80 and direct democracy being a hallmark of the Swiss
constitutional system, it is hardly surprising that democratic participatory
rights in international treaty-making are well-developed. From
a comparative perspective, the participatory rights are arguably even unique
in terms of the actors involved, the phases during which participation is
possible, and regarding their intensity and effect.81 As we will see, not only
the bicameral Parliament, but also the people, Cantons, and even interested
groups and political parties – albeit to a very limited degree – are granted
certain participatory rights. Importantly, participation is not limited to the
approval of treaties, but extends from the initiation and negotiation phase to
the provisional application and termination of treaties.
77 Conseil fédéral (CH), Message relatif à l’initiative populaire ‘Pour le renforcement des droits
populaires dans la politique étrangère (accords internationaux: la parole au peuple!)’ du 1er
octobre 2010, Feuille fédérale 2010 6335, p. 6359.
78 See, e.g., the pending proposal to further implement the concept in the context of the
mandatory referendum: Conseil fédéral (CH),Message concernant le référendum obligatoire
pour les traités internationaux ayant un caractère constitutionnel du 15 janvier 2020, Feuille
fédérale 2020 1195.
79 E.g., regarding the publication of legal acts, see Conseil fédéral (CH), Message relatif à la
modification de la loi sur les publications du 28 août 2013, Feuille fédérale 2013 6325, p. 6343.
80 McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, p. 10; see also the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 14, on
the embedment of allocation of authority rules in the constitutional structures and domestic
legal cultures.
81 See Kunz and Peters, ‘Democratisation in Switzerland’, p. 1508 (on the ‘intensity of parlia-
mentarisation’); Anne Peters and Raffaela Kunz, ‘Voting Down International Law? Lessons
from Switzerland for Compensatory Constitutionalism’, Völkerrechtsblog, 3 December 2018,
p. 2 (on Switzerland probably having the ‘most far-reaching democratic participation rights for
its citizens’); and Portmann, ‘Federalism’, p. 311 (on the unique interplay between federalism
and direct democracy).
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The initiative to participate in, or even launch, a treaty-making process with
other like-minded states stems, as a general rule, from the Federal Council.
Yet Parliament, through means of parliamentary procedural requests,82 may
urge the government to join a given treaty-making process.83 The ultimate
decision on the commencement of treaty negotiations remains, however, with
the Federal Council.84 Even the people can trigger treaty negotiations by
requesting an amendment of the Constitution, which directs the government
to commence specific negotiations.85 The popular initiative ‘Yes to Europe!’,
for example, entailed a constitutional amendment stipulating that ‘[t]he
Federal Government shall enter into accession negotiations with the
European Union without delay’.86
If the treaty is of major importance, the so-called consultation procedure is
carried out at this early stage (as compared to lesser but still ‘significant’
treaties, for which the procedure only takes place prior to the submission of
the treaty to Parliament for approval). This procedure allows any person and
any organisation to express its views on the treaty to be negotiated (or to be
ratified if the procedure takes place at the later stage).87 Specific stakeholders –
notably the Cantons, political parties and national umbrella organisations for
the economic sector – are specifically invited to participate in the procedure,88
the purpose of which is to associate a broad circle of actors ‘in the shaping of
opinion and the decision-making process’ and ‘to provide information on
material accuracy, feasibility of implementation and public acceptance of
a federal project’.89 The latter aspect is not to be underestimated in light of the
looming referendum.90
As mentioned, foreign relations are a federal power, which even extends to
matters for which, in the internal policy sphere, the Cantons are competent.
Internationalisation thus encroaches on the competences of the Cantons,
82 On the different means, see Parliament Act, art. 118 et seq.
83 Lanz, ‘Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik’, pp. 165-6.
84 CH, Directorate for European Affairs DEA, ‘Yes to Europe!’, last updated 27November 2017,
www.eda.admin.ch/dea/en/home/europapolitik/abstimmungen/ja-zu-europa.html, accessed
1 July 2020 (initiative was rejected in a popular vote).
85 Roger Nobs, Volksinitiative und Völkerrecht: Eine Studie zur Volksinitiative im Kontext der
schweizerischen Aussenpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum
Völkerrecht (Dissertation University of St. Gallen, 2006), pp. 138–43.
86 Chancellerie fédérale (CH), ‘Initiative populaire fédérale “Oui à l’Europe!”’, www.bk.admin.ch
/ch/d/pore/vi/vis254t.html, accessed 1 July 2020.
87 Constitution of 1999, art. 147; Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure (Consultation
Procedure Act) of 18 March 2005, Classified compilation 172.061, art. 4(1).
88 Consultation Procedure Act, art. 4(2).
89 Consultation Procedure Act, art. 2(2).
90 Haller, Swiss Constitution, p. 244.
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which are, by way of compensation, granted a series of participatory rights.91
Apart from associating them to the consultation procedure pertaining to
treaties, the Cantons must, as a rule, be consulted before treaty negotiations
start.92 The Federal Council must consider their comments; if the treaty to be
negotiated affects cantonal competences, it must attach particular weight to
them and provide reasons if it deviates from their positions.93
The determination of the negotiation mandate is an executive competence,
yet the Federal Council must consult the Foreign Policy Committees94 on
‘the guidelines and directives relating to mandates for important international
negotiations before it decides on or amends the same’.95 Further, the govern-
ment ‘shall inform these committees of the status of its plans and of the
progress made in negotiations’.96 At times, parliamentarians also seek to
influence ongoing negotiations by means of parliamentary procedural
requests, by which the executive is, however, not legally bound.97 If a treaty
affects the competences (and not only the interests)98 of the Cantons, they
must be involved in the preparation of the negotiation mandate and ‘shall
participate in negotiations in an appropriate manner’.99
While the signing of treaties falls within the competence of the
Federal Council,100 the Constitution of 1999 establishes a presumption
that they must be approved by Parliament.101 Importantly, the Federal
Assembly must not only approve the conclusion and amendment of
treaties, but – since December 2019 and in an effort to further imple-
ment the concept of ‘parallelism’ – also the withdrawal from them.102 An
exception to parliamentary approval exists if the Federal Council is
authorised to conclude, amend or withdraw from a treaty at its own
behest by virtue of a federal act or an international treaty approved by
91 See text relating to n. 27 ff. above.
92 Cantonal Participation Act, art. 4(2).
93 Cantonal Participation Act, art. 4(3).
94 ‘Committees’ are ‘groups formed from a set number of members of Parliament’ whose
‘principle task is to discuss the items of business assigned to them before these are debated
in the chamber’; the National Council has twelve permanent committees and the Council of
States has eleven: Lexicon of Parliamentary Terms, ‘Committees’, www.parlament.ch/en/ü
ber-das-parlament/parlamentswörterbuch, accessed 1 July 2020.
95 Parliament Act, art. 152(3).
96 Parliament Act, art. 152(3).
97 For examples, see Lanz, ‘Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik’, p. 168.
98 Biaggini, ‘BV Kommentar’, p. 597.
99 Constitution of 1999, art. 55(3); Cantonal Participation Act, art. 5(1).
100 Constitution of 1999, art. 184(2).
101 Constitution of 1999, art. 166(2); Parliament Act, art. 24(2).
102 Parliament Act, art. 24(2).
Democratic Participation in International Lawmaking in Switzerland 195
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
Parliament.103 Essentially, the executive is allowed to do so for treaties of
‘limited scope’.104 When approving a treaty, the Federal Assembly can
also approve, amend, reject or request reservations; and the Federal
Council is, generally, obliged to comply.105 A recent addition to
Parliament’s participation tool-kit is the obligation of the Federal
Council to consult the Foreign Policy Committees on the provisional
application of a treaty later subject to parliamentary approval. If both
Committees are against provisional application, the Federal Council
must refrain therefrom.106
Finally, and this is a Swiss idiosyncrasy, various categories of treaties
are subject to a popular referendum. If a treaty entails accession to an
organisation for collective security or of a supranational nature, the
mandatory referendum applies. Mandatory means that the referendum
is carried out ex officio, that is, without the need for a referendum
request; and its adoption requires a double majority of the people and
the Cantons.107 So far, the only mandatory referendum held was in 1986,
concerning Switzerland’s accession to the United Nations.108 The
optional referendum, the adoption of which only requires a majority of
the people, is carried out solely at the request of 50,000 voters or eight
Cantons. Subject to the optional referendum are treaties that are of
unlimited duration and may not be terminated, treaties leading to the
accession to an IO, and treaties containing important legislative provi-
sions, or whose implementation requires the enactment of a federal
act.109 If no referendum is requested or the treaty passes the vote, the
Federal Council is authorised to proceed to ratification.110 Switzerland
being a monist state, treaties take effect domestically as soon as they bind
the state at the international plane.111 All treaties eligible for the manda-
tory or optional referendum, and other treaties ‘that enact law or confer
103 Constitution of 1999, art. 166(2); Parliament Act, art. 24(2); Government and Administration
Organisation Act of 21 March 1997, Classified compilation 172.010, art. 7a(1).
104 Government and Administration Organisation Act, art. 7a(2)–(4).
105 Claude Schenker, Départment fédéral des affaires étrangères (CH), ‘Guide de la pratique
en matière de traités internationaux’, édition 2015, available at www.eda.admin.ch/dam/e
da/fr/documents/publications/Voelkerrecht/Praxisleitfaden-Voelkerrechtliche-Vertraege_f
r.pdf, accessed 1 July 2020, p. 35.
106 Parliament Act, art. 152(3bis) and (3ter); the provision entered into force on 2December 2019.
107 Constitution of 1999, art. 140(1)(b).
108 Biaggini, ‘BV Kommentar’, p. 1121.
109 Constitution of 1999, art. 141(1)(d).
110 Constitution of 1999, art. 184(2).
111 Ammann, Domestic Courts and the Interpretation of International Law, p. 72.
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legislative powers’, must be published in the compilations of federal
legislation.112
D A Child of Its Time: A Strong Treaty Focus
In Switzerland, the democratisation of international lawmaking ‘from
below’ – along the lines of the concept of ‘parallelism’ – is rather advanced.
Very broadly speaking, the allocation of authority in international treaty-
making is no longer fundamentally different from domestic lawmaking.
Normalisation and democratisation of this subset of rules of Swiss foreign
relations law is accomplished to a high degree.
Yet, a limitation of the legal framework on democratic participation in
international lawmaking is palpably obvious. It is geared towards just one
source of international law: treaties. This treaty focus is plausible if we
consider the context in which these rules originated and developed. While
participatory rights have steadily expanded over the last century, they experi-
enced a more rapid growth in the 1990s and the first years of the new millen-
nium. This boost mirrors the ‘legalisation’ of world politics113 and how
international law was ‘on the rise’ both qualitatively114 and quantitatively115
speaking during this period.
This ‘move to law’ that arose in world politics116 after the end of the Cold
War has most notably been brought about by the conclusion of treaties. This
period of time ‘witnessed a striking proliferation in treaties’ codifying more
traditional topics of international law as well as newer ones previously under-
stood as being unsuitable for international regulation, such as international
criminal law.117 A sharp increase in the number of treaties concluded can also
be observed in Switzerland. In the first half of the 1980s, Switzerland entered
112 Federal Act on the Compilations of Federal Legislation and the Federal Gazette
(Publications Act) of 18 June 2004, Official compilation 170.512, art. 3(1).
113 JudithGoldstein et al., ‘Introduction: Legalization andWorld Politics’ (2000) 54 International
Organizations 285–399 at 386; Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Rise or the Fall of International
Law?’ (2000) 69 Fordham Law Review 345–72 at 351.
114 See, e.g., Heike Krieger and Georg Nolte, ‘The International Rule of Law-Rise or Decline?
Approaching Current Foundational Challenges’ in Heike Krieger, Georg Nolte and
Andreas Zimmermann (eds.), The International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 12–13.
115 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Jessica Green and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Organizational
Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance’ (2016) 70 International
Organization 247–77 at 247; and Goldstein et al., ‘Legalization and World Politics’, 386.
116 Goldstein et al., ‘Legalization and World Politics’, 385.
117 José E. Alvarez, ‘The New Treaty Makers’ (2002) 25 Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review 213–34 at 216.
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into around seventy treaties yearly; in the early 1990s, the number was already
at 135, meaning that the figure nearly doubled in less than a decade. Between
2000 and 2003, the sheer number of roughly 210 treaties were concluded
per year, which represents a growth of 55 per cent compared to the early
1990s.118 It is against the backdrop of this changing international landscape
with a ‘gigantic treaty network’119 under construction, that the Swiss concept of
‘parallelism’ came into being and a major expansion of democratic participa-
tion rights took place. Being a child of its time, it is nothing but understand-
able that the respective rules are heavily oriented towards treaties.
The years leading up to the turn of the millennium were characterised by
a belief (in hindsight, some even term it a ‘mantra’)120 among international law
scholars that the legalisation trend would persist and that international law,
and therewith the treaty ‘production rate’, would continue to grow
exponentially.121 Yet, ‘times are changing’ – as Andreas Zimmermann wrote
in allusion to the Bob Dylan song – and the then ‘prevailing euphoria’ among
international law scholars as to international law becoming increasingly and
steadily more efficient, value-oriented and richer in content has since
abated.122 The contemporary views about the state and future of international
law are more pessimistic: the discourse of international law being ‘on the rise’
turned into whether international law is ‘in decline’.123 Whether the manifest-
ation of signs of crisis indicate the beginning of a general downward trend
across all sub-branches of international law remains to be seen. What is
already empirically proven, though, is the stagnation of formal international
law.124 The number of adopted treaties has fallen dramatically: between 1950
and 2000, the number of multilateral treaties deposited with the UN Secretary
General per year was never below thirty-four; between 2005 and 2010, the
count was at nine per year, and not a single multilateral treaty was deposited in
118 Oliver Diggelmann, Der liberale Verfassungsstaat und die Internationalisierung der Politik:
Veränderungen von Staat und Politik in der Schweiz (Bern: Stämpfli, 2005), p. 2.
119 Alvarez, ‘The New Treaty Makers’, 218 (citing Roy Lee, ‘Multilateral Treaty-Making and
Negotiation Techniques: An Appraisal’, in Bin Chang and Eduard Brown (eds.),
Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberger
on his Eightieth Birthday (London: Stevens, 1988), p. 158).
120 Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel and Jan Wouters, ‘When Structures become Shackles:
Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking’ (2014) 25 The European Journal of
International Law 733–63 at 733.
121 See, e.g., Alvarez, ‘The New Treaty Makers’, 217.
122 Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Times Are Changing – and What About the International Rule of
Law Then?’, EJIL: Talk!, 5 March 2018, p. 3.
123 See, e.g., Krieger and Nolte, ‘The International Rule of Law-Rise or Decline?’, passim.
124 Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, ‘When Structures become Shackles’, 734.
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2011, 2012 or 2013.125 A certain ‘treaty fatigue’ has spread across the international
community.126
IV TURN TO INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING:
BRIDGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
A Informal International Law Superseding Formal International Law
While formal lawmaking through the adoption of treaties is in decline, the
demand for rules governing transnational or global phenomena is on the
rise.127 This growing need for norms is notably catered to by what is referred
to as ‘informal law’ – that is, instruments which fall short of the traditional
sources of international law128 but are normative in the sense that they ‘steer . . .
behaviour or determine . . . the freedom of actors’.129 Importantly, informal
lawmaking, which progressively supersedes formal lawmaking,130 not only
differs from the latter in terms of the normative output it produces, but also
regarding the process and actors involved. Informal lawmaking has been
defined as:
Cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with or without the
participation of private actors and/or international organizations, in a forum
other than a traditional international organization (process informality),
and/or as between actors other than traditional diplomatic actors (such as
regulators or agencies) (actor informality) and/or which does not result in
a formal treaty or other traditional source of international law (output
informality).131
Informal law is not a new means for regulating international cooperation,132
but its occurrence and crowding out effect on formal law (most notably
treaties) significantly increased after the turn of the millennium – such that
informal lawmaking has been termed a ‘signature development’ of
125 Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, ‘When Structures become Shackles’, 734–5.
126 Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, ‘When Structures become Shackles’, 739.
127 See Ayelet Berman, ‘Is There a Stagnation in International Law?’ (2015) 109 Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 71–74 at 73.
128 Berman, ‘Stagnation in International Law’, 71.
129 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research
Questions’, in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessels and Jan Wouters (eds.), Informal
International Lawmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 16.
130 Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, ‘When Structures become Shackles’, 734.
131 Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Lawmaking’, p. 22.
132 Berman, ‘Stagnation in International Law’, 73.
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contemporary global governance.133While various reasons account for the rise
of informal international law,134 the ‘dramatic’ changes in institutions of global
governance135 in recent years are a key factor. Traditionally, the main players
in international lawmaking were states and IOs; the latter, occasionally
referred to as ‘treaty machines’, played a central part in treaty-making.136 José
Alvarez noticed that the proliferation of treaties has been ‘aided and abetted by
the concomitant rise in intergovernmental organizations’ and that the age of
treaties is therefore ‘not incidentally also the age of IOs’.137 In the early 2000s,
however, the formation of new IOs slowed markedly.138 Simultaneously, the
number of non-state actors active at the international level – notably in the
‘production of normativity’139 – multiplied. They are a diverse group, ranging
from NGOs and transnational corporations to industry associations and regu-
latory agencies.140 As they have yet to acquire international legal personality,
they lack treaty-making capacity; as a consequence, any normative instrument
they adopt is informal in nature.141
B The Development of ‘Soft Participatory Rights’ for ‘Soft Law’
In recent years, awareness of the potential of informal law (similar to that of
formal law) to limit the domestic policy space has grown considerably among
Parliament and the broader public. For a while, the Migration Pact was the
epitome of the ‘encroachment potential’ of informal law. Meanwhile, the
discussion moved beyond this specific instrument and turned into a more
principled one: how to involve Parliament more closely in ‘soft law projects’.142
133 Jean Galbraith and David T. Zaring, ‘Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law’ (2014) 99 Cornell
Law Review 735–94 at 745.
134 See, e.g., Brown Weiss, ‘The Rise or the Fall of International Law?’, 352.
135 See Abbott, Green and Keohane, ‘Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change’, 247
and 271.
136 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), pp. 275–6.
137 Alvarez, ‘The New Treaty Makers’, 217.
138 Abbott, Green and Keohane, ‘Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change’, 247.
139 See the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 11.
140 Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of
Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of
International Law 579–610 at 592–3.
141 Berman, ‘Stagnation in International Law’, 73.
142 See The Federal Council (CH), ‘Parliament to be more closely involved in soft law projects’,
27 June 2019, www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-75590.html,
accessed 1 July 2020.
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While the debate on democratic participation in informal lawmaking
gained momentum with the Migration Pact, it is far from novel in
Switzerland. Rather, the role of Parliament in the making of ‘non-binding
instruments’ has been discussed time and again – often in connection with
‘soft law’ in the fields of banking, finance and tax. As early as 1985, a member of
Parliament requested the Federal Council to consider rejecting an OECD
recommendation on banking secrecy.143 The request was rebuffed with the
competent Federal Chancellor replying that the government did not intend to
enter into a binding obligation and, consequently, had no reason to consult
Parliament ‘in advance – and certainly not in advance! – on what it must do’;
rather, it would be for the executive to decide on Switzerland’s position as long
as it did not legally oblige the country.144 The answer is reflective of the
allocation of powers as it stood under the Constitution of 1874, where foreign
relations matters were a prerogative of the executive.
It was only under theConstitution of 1999, which conceives foreign relations as
a shared competence requiring close cooperation between the executive and
legislative branches, that things changed. In 2002, the Parliament Act was
adopted, Article 152 of which obliges the executive to inform the Foreign Policy
Committees ‘regularly, comprehensively and in good time of important foreign
policy developments’; and to consult and update them on ‘important plans’
(‘orientations principales’, ‘wesentliche Vorhaben’).145 As per the common under-
standing, the notion of ‘important plans’ includes ‘soft law’ projects of a certain
significance.146 Yet, the implementation of Article 152 of the Parliament Act has
been far from frictionless; Parliament – or at least some of its members – has felt
bypassed by the government on more than one occasion.147
As a consequence, the notion of ‘important plans’ of Article 152(3) of the
Parliament Act was clarified by including Article 5b in the Government and
Administration Organisation Ordinance in 2016, which defines two instances
in which the Foreign Policy Committees must be consulted. First, if the
implementation of recommendations of IOs or multinational fora requires
143 Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale (CH), Conseil national, 1985, vol. III, Interpellation
urgente Eisenring: Recommendation de l’OECD concernant le secret bancaire (85.435),
p. 1070.
144 Interpellation urgente Eisenring: Recommendation de l’OECD concernant le secret ban-
caire, p. 1075 (author’s own translation).
145 Parliament Act, art. 152(3); the Foreign Policy Committees and other parliamentary commit-
tees can also request to be informed and consulted: Parliament Act, art. 152(5).
146 Tripet Cordier, ‘Art. 152’, p. 1040.
147 For a detailed account, see Francesco Naef, ‘Soft Law und Gewaltenteilung: Über die Kunst
der Legiferierung durch die Katzenklappe’ (2015) 8 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 1109–21 at
1115–19.
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the enactment or substantial revision of a federal act. Second, if a failure to
implement exposes Switzerland to risk of serious economic disadvantage,
sanctions, isolation or damage to its political reputation, or if other serious
disadvantages for Switzerland are to be expected.148This long-winded wording
not only testifies to the fact that informal law may exert a certain compliance
pull on states, but also to the difficulty of defining instances that trigger
consultation rights in abstract terms.
The newly introduced provision soon came under fire, in part for enshrining
parliamentary rights in an ordinance, which can be modified or revoked by the
government alone, rather than a formal law.149 Moreover, despite the more
detailed description of the instances in which Parliament must be consulted, it
again felt bypassed – notably in the context of the Migration Pact. It is against
this background that the Foreign Policy Committee of the Council of States
tasked the government to report on the ‘growing role of soft law in international
relations’ and ‘the resulting creeping weakening of Parliament’s democratic
rights’ and to consider possible amendments of Article 152 of the Parliament
Act.150 All things considered, the propositions put forward in the report to better
associate Parliament in the making of ‘soft law’151 are neither novel nor revolu-
tionary, yet the report’s significance may lay elsewhere. While the Federal
Council has long been rather reserved about further increasing parliamentary
participation in the field of ‘soft law’, it now ‘considers it a priority to create the
necessary conditions for Parliament to better assess soft law instruments and, on
this basis, to exercise its right to participate in a more targeted manner.’152
C Demands for ‘Hard Participatory Rights’ for ‘Soft Law’
The democratisation of informal lawmaking ‘from below’ is arguably more
developed in Switzerland than in many other jurisdictions, but it is still
148 Ordonnance sur l’organisation du gouvernement et de l’administration du 25 novembre 1998,
Receuil systématique 172.010.1.
149 See, e.g., Conseil national (CH), Groupe PDC, interpellation 18.4112, ‘Participation du
Parlement aux décisions portant sur du droit souple: Absence de ligne claire du Conseil
fédéral’, 28.11.2018.
150 Conseil des Etats (CH), Commission de politique extérieure, postulat 18.4104, ‘Consultation
et participation du Parlement dans le domaine du droit souple (“soft law”)’, 12November 2018
(author’s own translations).
151 For the various options, see Conseil federal (CH), ‘Consultation et participation du
Parlement dans le domaine du droit souple (“soft law”)’, Rapport du Conseil federal en
réponse au postulat 18.4104, Commission de politique extérieure CE, 12 novembre 2018
(hereinafter: Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’), pp. 18–19.
152 Federal Council, ‘Parliament to be more closely involved in soft law projects’.
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relatively embryonic when compared with democratic participation in treaty-
making. In terms of actors, only parliamentary committees (and, among them,
mainly the Foreign Policy Committees) are granted information and consult-
ation rights – not Parliament as a whole, let alone the people, Cantons or
broader public.153 As regards the phases and intensity, solely a right to be
informed and consulted during the making of informal law is granted, but not
the veto power that Parliament, the people and Cantons possess vis-à-vis
certain categories of treaties through parliamentary approval or referenda.
Broadly speaking, nothing more than ‘soft participatory rights’ are available
for ‘soft law’, while ‘hard participatory rights’ are reserved for ‘hard law’ – that
is, treaties. For a long time, the discussion surrounding the expansion of
democratic participation rights centred on the scope of information and
consultation rights. With the Migration Pact, however, the reform discussion
took on a new dimension: a rather widely supported claim for ‘hard participa-
tory rights’ in informal lawmaking was formulated. No less than three different
parliamentary committees – the composition of which reflects the strength of
the political parties of the respective parliamentary chamber154 – instructed
the Federal Council not to sign the Migration Pact during the UN
Conference in Morocco in December 2011 and to submit it to Parliament
for approval.155 Individual requests even tabled the question whether the
people and Cantons, by means of popular referendum, should have the final
say on Switzerland’s participation.156
To shrug off the call for ‘hard participation’, which took shape in the context
of theMigration Pact, as a purely populist manoeuvre would not do the matter
justice.157 Admittedly, had the Pact pertained not to migration, but say civil
aviation, it would have sparked very little debate;158 moreover, various parlia-
mentary requests on the matter had populist undertones. For example, the
Swiss People’s Party unleashed a barrage of criticism about Switzerland’s
153 As it is the case for treaties, see above Section III.C.
154 Parliament Act, art. 43(3).
155 Conseil national (CH), Commission des institutions politiques, motion 18.4093, ‘Pacte de
l’ONU sur les migrations: Soumettre à l’Assemblée fédérale la décision d’approbation’,
19 October 2018; Conseil des Etats (CH), Commission des institutions politiques, motion
18.4103, ‘Pacte de l’ONU sur les migrations: Soumettre à l’Assemblée fédérale la décision
d’approbation’, 8 November 2018; Conseil des Etats (CH), Commission de politique extér-
ieure, motion 18.4106, ‘Pacte mondial des Nations Unies sur les migrations: Soumettre à
l’Assemblée fédérale la décision d’approbation’, 12 November 2018.
156 See, e.g., Conseil national (CH), A. Glarner, interpellation 18.3842, ‘Pacte de l’ONU sur les
migrations: Participation démocratique et validité intraétatique’, 26 September 2018.
157 Peters and Kunz, ‘Voting down international law?’, p. 4.
158 Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, p. 16.
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leading role in the making of the Pact – even asking whether the Swiss
ambassador should incur liability for having facilitated the process.159 Hence,
to some extent, the debate on democratic participation in informal lawmaking
has been hijacked by the right-wing populist party in order to make political
capital. At the same time, various requests – especially those emanating from
parliamentary committees160 – seem to have been truly spurred by the concern
that informal lawmaking suffers from democratic deficits. It is arguably this
broader, cross-party call for ‘hard’ participation that ultimately led to the
Federal Council’s decision not to sign the Pact in December 2018 and to submit
the decision to Parliament. Yet the government tried its best not to set
a precedent, stressing that according to the current rules on allocation of powers,
namely Article 184(1) of the Constitution, it is authorised to sign the Pact in its
own competence, and that the decision to submit it to Parliament was taken
solely for political (not legal) reasons. Consequently, the Federal Council for-
mally rejected the parliamentary requests asking for the Pact’s submission to
Parliament but acted in conformity with the requests as a matter of fact.161
At this juncture, it is difficult to tell whether the decision to submit the
Migration Pact to Parliament for approval (which, as of January 2021, has yet to
happen) broke through the glass ceiling in terms of limiting participation in
informal law to ‘soft participatory rights’. At the time of writing, discussions on
whether to grant ‘hard participatory rights’ are ongoing. A parliamentary
initiative submitted in the National Council, which requests adaptation of
the rules on allocation of authority in a way that foresees parliamentary
approval for ‘soft law’, is currently pending. Concretely, it suggests to submit
to Parliament those informal instruments that involve compliance-
monitoring, from which reporting obligations arise, if non-compliance may
constitute a breach of the principle of good faith, or if its implementation is
likely to require the enactment or amendment of a federal act.162 In the
Council of States, the Foreign Policy Committee suggested to establish a sub-
commission specifically tasked with evaluating the need for legislative action
in order to ensure parliamentary participation in informal lawmaking.163 As a
159 Conseil national (CH), T. Matter, question 18.5601, ‘Pacte de l’ONU sur les migrations:
Conséquences pour les responsables’, 26 November 2018.
160 See n. 155 above.
161 See the answer of the Federal Council provided in response to the three motions mentioned
in n. 155 above.
162 Conseil national (CH), Groupe de l’Union démocratique du centre, initiative parlementaire
18.466, ‘Approbation du droit non contraignant par l’Assemblée fédérale’, 29November 2018.
163 Conseil des Etats (CH), ‘Nouvelle législature: Perspectives en matière de politique extér-
ieure’, Communiqué de presse, 14 January 2020, www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/m
m-apk-s-2020-01-14.aspx, accessed 6 July 2020.
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result, both parliamentary chambers are currently considering how meaning-
ful ‘soft participation’ in informal lawmaking could be granted and whether
‘soft law’ is even amenable to ‘hard participatory rights’.
D Challenges in Building New Bridges
To sketch out detailed construction plans for building new bridges between
informal international lawmaking and domestic democratic participation
proves challenging. Applying the provisions available in the context of treaties
by analogy164 will not work in many cases, while designing specific rules for
informal lawmaking is no easy feat. This is not surprising given that the
phenomenon is negatively defined as lawmaking that dispenses with certain
formalities traditionally linked to international law,165 coupled with the com-
plicating factor that informality can relate to different elements – actors,
process and output.166 This makes informal lawmaking a multifaceted and
complex phenomenon that is ‘hard to grasp in domestic constitutional
terms’.167 Still, discussion has started on how to extend ‘soft participation
rights’ and whether to grant ‘hard participation rights’ in informal lawmaking.
The Swiss debate turns on ‘soft law’;168 hence, there seems to be common
ground that only ‘legislative’169 informal instruments, and not those dealing
with a concrete situation, should qualify for ‘hard participatory rights’ – even
though this is not the case for treaties.170 Otherwise, Parliament would stray
too far into the territory of the executive, which – despite the far-reaching soft
participatory rights of Parliament171 – retains the ultimate decision-making
power for the ‘operational conduct’ of foreign policy.172 Consensus also seems
164 As has been done for other formal sources of (international) law: Anna Petrig, ‘Sind die
parlamentarische Genehmigung und das Referendum im Außenbereich auf völkerrech-
tliche Verträge beschränkt? Eine Untersuchung anhand von Kompetenztransfers an
Völkerrechtsakteure’ (2018) 78 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 93–146.
165 See definition in text relating to n. 131 above.
166 Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessels and Jan Wouters, ‘An Introduction to Informal
International Lawmaking’, in Joost Pauwelyn and Jan Wouters (eds.), Informal
International Lawmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 2.
167 Peters and Kunz, ‘Voting Down International Law?’, p. 4.
168 See, e.g., Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, passim.
169 The term is defined in Parliament Act, art. 22(4).
170 E.g., a treaty determining a border that is of unlimited duration and that may not be
terminated is eligible for the referendum as per Constitution of 1999, art. 141(1)(d)(1); see
also Publications Act, art. 3(2) stating ‘The Federal Council may decide that treaties . . . that
are not legislative in their nature be published in the AS.’
171 Constitution of 1999, art. 166(1).
172 Lanz, ‘Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik’, p. 223.
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to emerge that the ‘importance’ of an informal instrument should be the
criterion used to decide whether and to what degree democratic legitimacy
is necessary (‘critère de l’importance’, ‘Kriterium der Wesentlichkeit’), which
aligns well with the standard already applying to (domestic and international)
formal law.173 Such a material criterion may dispel the argument that expand-
ing democratic participation to informal law would flood Parliament with
submissions – by comparison, only 5 per cent of all treaties concluded by
Switzerland are approved by Parliament, while the other 95 per cent are of
‘limited scope’ and thus fall in the sole competence of the executive.174 True,
to specify the criterion of ‘importance’ is far from clear and the assessment may
change over time;175 yet the challenge is not idiosyncratic to informal law but
exists equally with regard to formal law. Under domestic law, Article 164(1) of
the Constitution sets out which matters must be regulated in federal acts,
which are enacted by Parliament and subject to the optional referendum. The
provision is applied by analogy in order to assess whether a treaty contains
‘important legislative provisions’ and is thus eligible for the optional
referendum.176 While various commentators have expressed doubt as to
whether Article 164 of the Constitution provides (much) guidance at all,177
having a (partly deficient) abstract definition of the instances where ‘hard
participation rights’ apply is still preferable over putting the decision entirely at
the discretion of the authorities. Apart from considerations of treating equal
cases equally,178 a high value is attached to the idea that the referendum
should not feature a ‘plebiscitary’ character – which, in Swiss parlance,
means that its exercise must not depend on the will of the authorities,179 but
173 See Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, pp. 14–16; the referendum on accession to an IO is an
exception to the rule: see Anna Petrig, ‘Das Referendum zum Beitritt zu internationalen
Organisationen: Nach 40 Jahren Bestand ein (überflüssiges) Relikt?’ (2017) 136/I Revue de
droit Suisse 339–66 at 359–63.
174 Kathrin Alder und Lukas Leuzinger, ‘Schweizer Selbstbestimmung: Die wichtigsten Fakten
zu den internationalen Verträgen’ Neue Zürcher Zeitung online (Zürich, 15 November 2018)
www.nzz.ch/schweiz/die-bedeutung-des-internationalen-rechts-in-zahlen-ld.1433328?redu
ced=true, accessed 6 July 2020.
175 See concerns expressed in Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, pp. 15–16.
176 Bundesamt für Justiz (CH), Gutachten vom 6. Januar 2004 zuhanden der aussenpolitischen
und staatspolitischen Kommissionen vonNational- und Ständerat, überarbeitet imMai 2004,
VPB 2004 Nr. 4, p. 1077, at 1087.
177 See, e.g., Pierre Tschannen, ‘Art. 164’, in Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (eds.), Die
Schweizerische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Zürich: Dike,
2014), vol. II, p. 2684.
178 Constitution of 1999, art. 8(1).
179 This essentially happened with the Migration Pact.
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be granted if predefined criteria are met. For some authors, this even amounts
to a feature of direct democracy.180
Turning back to the requirements for subjecting informal law to ‘hard
participatory rights’, it seems that only those with a high degree of normativity
should qualify: if normativity is low, the impact on the domestic sphere is
negligible and thus no enhanced democratic legitimacy is warranted. In its
‘Soft Law Report’, the Federal Council proposes a matrix for assessing the
normativity of an informal instrument. The y-axis measures the ‘will to shape’
(‘volonté d’agir’, ‘Gestaltungswille’), while the x-axis indicates the degree of
‘will to enforce’ (‘volonté d’imposer’, ‘Durchsetzungswille’) a specific instru-
ment; the higher an instrument figures on the two axes, the higher its
normativity.181 With this, the long-held argument against democratic partici-
pation in the making of ‘soft law’ – that it is not legally binding – seems to have
finally lost its persuasive power and the normativity of informal law is being
recognised.
The Swiss debate has circled around the concept of ‘soft law’ and is thus
mainly concentrated on the output.182 However, in order to conceptualise
democratic participation properly, the focus should not just be on ‘law’ – but
on ‘lawmaking’. Actors and processes – that is, the chain of activities and
decisions leading to a specific output and the forum in which this takes
place – are of equal importance. This is why the concept of ‘informal
lawmaking’, which captures all these dimensions, is more beneficial to
framing the discussion on democratisation ‘from below’ as compared to
‘soft law’ (apart from the fact that there is often nothing particularly ‘soft’
about informal law).183 Since the current debate has been intensified by the
legal quagmire surrounding the Migration Pact, the perception of actors and
processes in informal lawmaking – which impact potential bridges and
boundaries for domestic democratic participation in informal lawmaking –
may be slightly distorted. It is indeed a rather simple game to subject the Pact
to ‘hard participation rights’, that is, to parliamentary approval and even
a referendum. The treaty analogy works well since there is neither actor
informality (states adopted the instrument within the UN system) nor pro-
cess informality (the negotiations took place in proceedings that could
equally apply to a treaty and the Pact was ultimately adopted and signed by
states at an intergovernmental conference). The sole distinction from formal
180 See, e.g., Andreas Auer, Giorgio Malinverni and Michel Hottelier, Droit constitutionnel
suisse, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Berne: Stämpfli, 2013), vol. I, pp. 204–5.
181 Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, p. 12.
182 See, e.g., Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, passim.
183 See, e.g., Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, ‘When Structures become Shackles’, 743.
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law is that the Pact falls short of a treaty.184 In many instances, however, both
process and/or actor informality will be much more pronounced, which
makes democratic participation more challenging – if not entirely meaning-
less or impossible.
In treaty-making, states are the main actors: they negotiate, adopt, sign and
ratify treaties. In informal lawmaking, this may be very different; states may be
just one of the actors involved or even be absent altogether from the negotiat-
ing table. The latter holds true if informal law stems from what Michael Bothe
aptly refers to as ‘private norm entrepreneurs’.185 In the field of the law of
armed conflict, for instance, a series of informal meetings have taken place
over the past decades, during which (often old-fashioned) international rules
were clarified, restated or updated in light of new technological or societal
phenomena.186 Interestingly, Switzerland was an active player in this field of
law in the ‘age of treaties’ and continues to be one in times of informal
lawmaking. The experts attend these processes in a purely personal
capacity,187 and states are not official participants, but may – for the sake of
legitimacy, authority and thus efficiency of the instrument in question – still
be involved, be it consultations on drafts or as observers (especially states
sponsoring the process188).189 Since states do not sit at the negotiating table,
at least not officially, these processes may not even fall under the definition of
informal lawmaking provided above, which requires ‘[c]ross-border cooper-
ation between public authorities’.190 Yet, to pretend that the output produced
has no normative value also seems to miss the point.191 Be that as it may, this
184 Discussing whether it is a treaty or an informal instrument: Anne Peters, ‘The Global
Compact for Migration: to Sign or Not Sign?’ EJIL: Talk!, 21 November 2018, pp. 2–3.
185 Michael Bothe, ‘Private Normunternehmer im Völkerrecht: Gedanken zur Fortentwicklung
des Völkerrechts durch nicht-staatliche Institutionen’, in Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds.),
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 1399–412, passim; the term ‘norm entrepreneur’ seems to go
back to Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 4 Columbia Law Review
903–68.
186 Bothe, ‘Private Normunternehmer’, pp. 1402–4.
187 See, e.g., The Programme on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR),Manual
on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), p. xi.
188 See, e.g., the invitation of donor countries (among them Switzerland) to participate in the
deliberations of the following manual: HPCR, Manual on International Law Applicable to
Air and Missile Warfare, p. xi.
189 Bothe, ‘Private Normunternehmer’, pp. 1407–8; e.g., also in the case of the Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, see p. 1404.
190 See definition in text relating to n. 131 above (emphasis added).
191 See, e.g., the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea;
Natalino Ronzitti, ‘Naval Warfare’ (last updated June 2009), in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.),Max
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type of informal lawmaking suggests that certain features of informal lawmak-
ing may set boundaries for domestic democratic participation.
In terms of process, a key difference between informal lawmaking and
treaty-making is that a formalised procedure exists for the latter.192 For treaties
it is thus much easier to determine where to build bridges along the route from
initiating negotiations to the entry into force of an instrument. Informal
lawmaking is not subjected to a standardised procedure, and this is praised
as its competitive advantage vis-à-vis treaties. Moreover, at the outset, how
a specific process should evolve is often (deliberately) left open and is only
specified as it goes along. Such a ‘wait-and-see approach’ lowers the entry
hurdle for negotiations and allows for adjustments – towards more or less
formality – along the route. The Montreux Document is exemplary as
a process of informal lawmaking in which formality increased over time.
When it was launched by Switzerland and the International Committee of
the RedCross in 2006, a group of only seventeen states – thosemost affected by
the phenomenon – were involved in the negotiations, which were of a rather
informal character.193 Today, the instrument can be ‘supported’ by any state or
IO by submitting a letter or diplomatic note, based on a template, to the Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.194 While very informal at the begin-
ning, the process in the end is nearly the equivalent of signing and ratifying
a treaty. At the outset, domestic democratic control would have only made
sense for the seventeen participating states, while today any state can ‘support’
the document and could, before doing so, request parliamentary approval.
Whether democratic participation ‘from below’ is possible and meaningful
must thus be assessed for a specific process and the answer may change over
time – a striking contrast from the route taken for treaties.
A further (and certainly not last) difference between treaties and informal
instruments pertains to the possibility that states can dodge the latter’s effects
and implement a domestic ‘disapproval’ of the instrument at the international
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online edition, https://opil.ouplaw.com/vi
ew/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e342, accessed 6 July 2020, para. 2,
writes that this ‘private codification’ has ‘over time, acquired considerable weight and several
navy manuals refer to it as an authoritative statement of existing law’.
192 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force
27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331.
193 The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for
States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict,
www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20192511-montreux-d
ocument_EN.pdf, accessed 6 July 2020, pp. 9 and 41.
194 Montreux Document Forum, ‘How to Join’, www.mdforum.ch/en/how-to-join, accessed
6 July 2020.
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level. If Parliament or the people do not approve a specific treaty, the Swiss
Federal Council will simply abstain from ratifying it and no legal obligation
accrues from it for Switzerland. For informal law, it is muchmore difficult to
explain how, why, when and who comes into the maelstrom of its normativ-
ity. At times, it may be possible to formally endorse, sign or support the
instrument – whether refraining from doing so is sufficient to dispel its
effects is debatable. The Federal Council correctly notes in its report that
informal lawmay even impact states not having participated in the making of
a specific instrument.195 This triggers the question of what the executive is
obliged to do at the international level if Parliament or the people rejects
a specific informal instrument.
V CONCLUSION
This discussion suffices to demonstrate that designing meaningful mechan-
isms for generating democratic legitimacy is much more difficult in the
context of informal international lawmaking than it is for formal international
lawmaking. Yet, if these mechanisms shall continue performing their func-
tion, it is necessary to adapt them to structural changes of international law as
expeditiously as possible. Otherwise the pendulum will swing back and the
executive will regain powers in international lawmaking, which have been
pushed back over the years in favour of greater involvement of Parliament, the
people and Cantons.
The expanding horizons of international law in terms of actors and
sources have repercussions on foreign relations law across the globe. The
impact of informal lawmaking on the democratisation of international
law ‘from below’, however, appears to have not yet received the neces-
sary academic and practical attention. This is surprising in light of the
great value attached to the democratisation of international lawmaking
in the context of treaties and the fact that most jurisdictions’ mechan-
isms do not apply to informal law.196 Academic literature is a mirror to
this finding: it is extremely rich in terms of parliamentary involvement
in treaty-making, but very scant when it comes to informal lawmaking.
By way of example, Alejandro Rodiles recently wrote that the trend
towards informal lawmaking ‘has gone completely unnoticed by the
195 Federal Council, ‘Soft Law Report’, p. 8.
196 As per Leonard F. M. Besselink, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: Elaboration and
Implementation in the Netherlands’, in Ayelet Berman et al. (eds.), Informal International
Lawmaking: Case Studies (The Hague: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012), p. 106,
informal law does not require parliamentary approval in any Western state.
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Mexican literature’.197 Jean Galbraith and David T. Zaring likewise note
that in the United States, there is ‘exhaustive academic literature’ on
treaties and that ‘similar literature exists with regard to the foreign
relations law dimensions of customary international law’, but informal
international instruments ‘by contrast, get barely a nod in the foreign
relations law literature’.198 Arguably, the discussions on the lack of
democratic control of the Migration Pact was a catalyst for more intense
debate in the future.199
Comparative foreign relations law certainly has the potential to unearth the
various facets of the problem and to enlarge the pool of potential solutions on
how to democratise informal international lawmaking ‘from below’. Yet, even
if the most perfect bridges were built – in such a combined and common
effort – the very characteristics of international informal lawmaking sets some
insurmountable boundaries. This leads back to the two central questions
raised by the editors in the introduction to this book: ‘To what extent is the
field of foreign relations law shaped by the normative expectations and
structures of international law? Conversely, in how far is international law
a product of the combined processes governed by foreign relations law and
construed in light of domestic law?’
Domestic mechanisms on democratic participation can only fulfil their
purpose if they mirror the structures of international law – notably its sources –
as accurately as possible. The Swiss rules on democratic control of treaty-
making are a good example: having been drafted during the ‘age of treaties’,
they had to be adapted and are still in process of being reviewed so as to be fit
for purpose in the age of informal lawmaking. As regards the impact on
international law ‘from below’, a crucial difference seems to exist between
formal and informal lawmaking. As regards formal sources, notably treaties
and customary international law, states are the masters of their creation.200
Hence, states – through their domestic (foreign relations) law – have a better
grip and control of the process. They may similarly monopolise the creation of
informal law if actors and/or process feature a very low degree of informality
(as in the case of theMigration Pact), but may not be even officially on board if
197 Alejandro Rodiles, ‘Executive Power in Foreign Affairs: The Case for Inventing a Mexican
Foreign Relations Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 128.
198 Galbraith and Zaring, ‘Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law’, 753.
199 See, e.g., Frank Schorkopf, ‘Der Deutsche Bundestag und der Migrationspakt: Anlass zur
Stärkung der parlamentarischen Beteiligung an völkerrechtlichen Soft Law-Prozessen?’
(2019) 3 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 90–96, passim.
200 See Bothe, ‘Private Normunternehmer im Völkerrecht’, p. 1404, on states’ monopoly in the
creation of formal international law.
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the actors and/or processes are characterised by a high degree of informality
(like the example of ‘private norm entrepreneurs’ suggests). Informal lawmak-
ing may thus, in some instances, have much more of a ‘life of its own’ than
formal law and be immune to democratisation ‘from below’. Hence, in the
context of informal lawmaking, bridges can be built, but not every boundary
can be overcome.
Internationalisation came at a cost to democracy in the ‘age of treaties’, and
such costs will increase further in times of informal international lawmaking.
The increased use of informal lawmaking will exacerbate the tension between
sovereignty – understood as a ‘placeholder for constitutional values, in par-
ticular domestic democratic self-determination’201 – and cooperation.
However, when discussing (the limits of) democratisation ‘from below’, one
tends to forget that Switzerland not only ranks number one in certain global-
isation indexes,202 but it is not seldom a driving force behind (laudable)
informal lawmaking processes. This situation is exemplary for Dani Rodrik’s
more generalised finding that ‘we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy,
national determination, and economic globalization’203 – or, to put it more
bluntly, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.
201 See the chapter by Aust and Kleinlein, p. 17.
202 In the KOF Globalisation Index 2019, which measures the economic, social and political
dimensions of globalisation, Switzerland ranks number one in the overall index combining de
facto and de jure globalisation: ETH Zurich, ‘KOF Globalisation Index’, https://kof.ethz.ch/en/
forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html, accessed 7 July 2020.
203 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t
Coexist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. xviii.
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A Constitution Made for Mandela, A Constitutional
Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma
The Erosion of Discretion of the Executive in Foreign Relations
Dire Tladi
I AN INTRODUCTION
The field of law that is the subject of this book, foreign relations law, is referred
to in South Africa simply as constitutional law or, the intersection of constitu-
tional law and international law. It does not concern the rules of international
law as such but may well concern processes that may lead to the making of
international law, whether practice for the purposes of customary inter-
national law and, more often, treaty-making conduct. Contestations over
who participates in international activities on behalf of the state, and under
what circumstances international engagements on behalf of the state may be
pursued (or abandoned) fall within this area.
Three recent cases in South Africa illustrate some of the contestations that
may play themselves out over the limits of the right to engage in foreign
relations. The judgments in question are the Democratic Alliance v. Minister
of International Relations and Cooperation concerning the decision of the
government to withdraw from the Rome Statute (hereinafter the Withdrawal
judgment),1 Law Society of South Africa v. President of South Africa (herein-
after the SADC Tribunal judgment),2 and Democratic Alliance v. Minister of
International Relations and Cooperation concerning the decision of the gov-
ernment to confer or recognise spousal immunities of Grace Mugabe, the
spouse of former late President of Zimbabwe (hereinafter the Grace Mugabe
decision).3 While all three judgments addressed international law questions,
1 Democratic Alliance v.Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017 (3)
SA 212 (GP).
2 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC).
3 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Co-operation and Others 2018
(6) SA 109 (GP).
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these international law questions were not the central legal questions to the
disputes. Rather, the central questions in all three cases concerned the distri-
bution of competence between branches of government in relation to the
conduct of foreign relations – constitutional lawyers may refer to the doctrine
of the ‘separation of powers’. These judgments have a number of things in
common. First, all three concern the powers of the executive in foreign
relations, and the limits thereof. Second, all three judgments concern judicial
review of decisions made by the executive during Zuma administration.
Third, in the judgments, the courts came to the conclusion that the decisions
by the executive had been unlawful. In the interest of full disclosure, I should
declare that I had been involved in some way in all three matters before the
courts – I will describe my personal involvement when discussing each case.
Given space constraints, I will discuss the Constitutional Court judgment in
the SADC Tribunal in detail and only briefly touch upon the other two, which
were not delivered by the apex court.
The decisions, to varying degrees, reflect an interesting trend in which the
courts have slowly but surely eroded the discretion of the executive in foreign
relations to the point where it can hardly be termed discretion. Much of this
erosion has developed, it seems, because of a mistrust of the Zuma adminis-
tration, leading one commentator in a social media platform to quip that
South Africa has a ‘constitution written for a President like Mandela and
a constitutional jurisprudence made for a President like Jacob Zuma’.4 This
chapter will assess the decisions emanating from these cases principally from
the perspective of the distribution of competence in the conduct of foreign
relations. It proceeds from two premises which, decisions in question not-
withstanding, have not been challenged as doctrine and remain, at least in
rhetoric, the law in South Africa. First, the executive, even in the conduct of
foreign relations, is constrained by the Constitution and the courts are not
only permitted, but are duty-bound, to determine whether the executive has
consistently with the Constitution. Second, while the courts are tasked with
holding the executive accountable for its exercise of public power, the
executive has a wide margin of discretion which ought not be interfered
with lightly. In the next section of this chapter, the basis of these two
premises is traced.
4 The phrase ‘A Constitution made for a President like Mandela and a constitutional jurispru-
dence made for a President like Zuma’ is borrowed from a facebook post by the recently
appointed director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Tshepo Mandlingozi.
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II MANDELA’S CONSTITUTION: EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
South African courts, in the Apartheid years – before the international law-
friendly years5 – applied British concepts such as ‘the act of state doctrine’ and
the related ‘prerogatives’ in matters pertaining to the conduct of foreign
relations by the executive, with the result that the executive’s conduct was
beyond review. Under these traditional concepts, the executive had an almost
unfettered discretion in the conduct of foreign relations,6 and, in order ‘to
avoid judicial intrusion into the domain of the political branches’, courts were
required ‘to refrain from sitting in judgment on the acts’ covered by such
doctrines.7 These concepts however, do not fit neatly into South Africa’s
constitutional model which, in addition to being an international law-
friendly framework, has also been termed a deliberative constitution.8 Under
this constitutional framework all exercise of public power, including the
executive’s conduct of foreign relations, must be subject to judicial scrutiny
to ensure compliance with the Constitution.9 This important constitutional
principle raises the question of the appropriate standard for the review of the
executive’s conduct in matters of foreign relations.
In my view, the question was appropriately answered in a well-reasoned and
rigorous judgment by the Constitutional Court in Kaunda v. the President of
the Republic of South Africa.10 In Kaunda the court determined that though
courts are entitled to review decisions of the executive in the exercise of its
5 For the description of the South African constitutional framework as international law-friendly
see Neville Botha, ‘Justice Sachs and the Interpretation of International Law by the
Constitutional Court: Equity or Expediency?’ (2010) 25 Southern Africans Public Law
235–50. See Dire Tladi, ‘Interpretation of Treaties in an International Law-Friendly
Framework: The Case of South Africa’, in Helmut Aust and Georg Nolte (eds.), The
Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
6 See e.g. Michael Bayzler, ‘Abolishing the Act of State Doctine’ (1986) 134 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 325–98; David Gordon, ‘The Origin and Development of the Act
of State Doctrine’ (1976–1977) 8 Rutgers Camden Law Journal 595–616, at 595 (‘As early as
1674, English courts declined to rule on the validity of foreign acts of state. This policy was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court only twenty years after the Court’s inception’).
7 Mark Haugen and Jeff Good, ‘Evolution of the Act of State Doctrine: W.S. Kirkpatrick Co.
v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. and Beyond’ (1991) 13 University of Hawaii Law Review
687–714 at 688.
8 See Dikgang Moseneke, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism: its Implications for the Law of
Contract’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 3–13.
9 The President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), at
para. 13.
10 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC). For discussion of Kaunda see Dire Tladi and Polina Dlagnekova, ‘The Act of State
A Constitutional Jurisprudence Developed for Zuma 217
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mandate in foreign relations, in doing so they should ‘give particular weight to
the government’s special responsibility for and particular expertise in foreign
affairs’ and therefore afford ‘wide discretion . . . in determining how to deal’
with such foreign relations matters.11 According to the Constitutional Court,
the courts could, for example, intervene if a decision was irrational.12
Importantly, the court stressed that the fact that the courts could review
a decision of the executive in the conduct of foreign relations did ‘not mean
that courts would substitute their opinion for that of government’ or order
a particular course of action in the conduct of foreign relations.13
There is a second principle laid out in Kaunda which may be of some
relevance for some of the analysis in this chapter. In rendering its decision, the
court considered whether the Bill of Rights in the Constitution applies extra-
territorially – this is referred to in the court’s decision as extraterritoriality in
a constitutional context.14 The court stated that the Constitution ‘provides
a framework for the governance of South Africa’, is ‘territorially bound and has
no application beyond our borders’.15 Foreigners are entitled to the protection
offered by the constitution while in South Africa but lose any such protection
‘when they move beyond the borders’.16 The court emphasised that the
‘bearers of the rights [in the constitution] are people in South Africa’ and
that ‘[n]othing suggests that it is to have general application, beyond our
borders’.17
Doctrine in South Africa: Has Kaunda Settled a Vexing Question?’ (2007) 22 South African
Public Law 444–56.
11 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 144. Elsewhere the Court stated quoted with approval, a judgment in the
German Federal Constitutional Court in the Hess decision BVerfGE 55, 349–70, at 395–6:
‘. . . the Federal Basic Law grants the organs of foreign affairs wide room for manoeuvre in the
assessment of foreign policy issues . . .’.
12 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 79.
13 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 79.
14 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 36.
15 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 36.
16 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 36.
17 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 37. At para. 54, in a slightly different, but still relevant, context, the Court noted
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Although Kaunda was decided during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, it
was built on jurisprudence developed under the Mandela administration.18
This jurisprudence not only advanced as a matter of principle (rhetoric) the
idea of discretion and the notion that the courts ought to not substitute their
own opinion for that of government, but actually applied said principle. The
only time, during the Mandela–Mbeki administrations, when the rhetoric
appeared not to be followed was in theVon Abo cases – which incidentally has
interesting backstory connection with Law Society of South Africa
v. President.19 The Von Abo cases are interesting series of cases in which one
man, Von Abo, sued the government for failing to protect his farming and
business interests in Zimbabwe. The North Gauteng High Court, though
paying lip-service to the jurisprudence of Kaunda, found that the government
was indeed duty-bound to intervene diplomatically to protect the commercial
interests of Mr Von Abo in Zimbabwe.20 In a subsequent judgment on the
damages, the Pretoria High Court proceeded to hold the government account-
able on the basis of, inter alia, the failure to enter into a bilateral investment
agreement with Zimbabwe (Von Abo II).21
Although the Pretoria High Court judgments in the Von Abo cases were
eventually overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal for not being consist-
ent with the standard for the judicial review of acts of the executive in the
conduct of foreign relations set by the Constitutional Court in, inter alia,
Kaunda,22 it is worth describing the salient themes of theVon AboHigh Court
judgments which, it seems, have been adopted in the new constitutional
jurisprudence on the test for executive decisions in the conduct of foreign
relations. The applicant in Von Abo had sought an order, inter alia, requiring
18 It was built in particular on the jurisprudence on the appropriate test for executive decisions
such as The President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)
and President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. South African Rugby Football
Union andOthers 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) andMohamed and Another v. President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC), although the latter concerned events that took
place a few months after the end of the Mandela presidency.
19 See Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and
Others 2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC).
20 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2008] ZAGPHC 226.
This judgment was the subject of a critique in Dire Tladi, ‘The Right to Diplomatic
Protection, the Von Abo Decision and One Big Can of Worms: Eroding the Clarity of
Kaunda’ (2009) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 14–30. When approached to confirm the order
of the High Court, the Constitutional Court declined on account of procedural grounds not
related to the substance. See Von Abo v. the President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (5)
SA 345 (CC).
21 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2010 (3) SA 269 (T).
22 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Von Abo 2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA).
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the government to, within thirty days, ‘take all necessary steps to have the
Applicant’s violation of his rights by the Government of Zimbabwe
remedied’,23 remedies that the court granted in whole. There had also been
a prayer, which was eventually abandoned by the Applicant but which the
Court still felt the need to address, namely to ‘force the respondent to join
ICSID’ – a treaty regime for the settlement of investment dispute.24 Both of
these prayers seem to be far-reaching, policy matters concerning the conduct
of foreign relations.
Although the Applicant had abandoned its prayer concerning ICSID, the
Court nonetheless proceeds identify reasons why the government should join
ICSID.25 These are policy consideration that courts are ill-equipped to con-
sider. For example, while noting that joining ICSID would be greatly benefi-
cial to South Africans investing in foreign states,26 it does not consider that
joining ICSID opens South Africa to suit from investors from other states that
might challenge basic foundational policies of the government such as Black
Economic Empowerment. The court felt so strongly about this policy ques-
tion of joining ICSID that, notwithstanding the abandonment of the prayer by
the Applicant, it decided to keep it on the table:
The fact that the prayer for this specific relief was abandoned . . . does not
mean, in my view, that the consistent failure on the part of the respondents to
join ICSID and make a serious attempt to enter into a Bilateral Investment
Treaty (‘BIT’) with Zimbabwe with the view to protecting its nationals
investing in that country should not come under the spotlight . . . .27
With respect to the broader question of intervening in executive decisions in
the conduct of foreign relations, without assessing the appropriate standards in
the particular case, the Court simply states that, on the basis of the ‘guidelines’
provided by the Constitutional Court in Kaunda, ‘it appears that there need
not be an actual refusal on the part of the Government to grant diplomatic
protection before a court will intervene . . . ’.28 In assessing the judgment of the
23 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa andOthers [2008] ZAGPHC 226, at
para. 19 et seq.
24 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2008] ZAGPHC 226,
para. 26.
25 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa andOthers [2008] ZAGPHC 226, at
paras. 29–37.
26 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa andOthers [2008] ZAGPHC 226, at
paras. 29 and 31.
27 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa andOthers [2008] ZAGPHC 226, at
para. 37.




Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
Pretoria High Court inVon Abo, I have previously made the following general
critique:
The judgment quotes large extracts from the Kaunda majority [judgment],
dissenting and concurring [opinions], mixes them together in a potpourri
approach and then declares an outcome. The congruence between this
outcome and Kaunda is assumed and therefore never properly examined.
The differences between the majority, minority and concurring [opinions]
are never explored.29
The essence of Von Abo, contrary to the majority in Kaunda, is that the
Government has a duty to provide diplomatic protection. Not only that, the
court in Von Abo orders very specific ways to achieve this objective, including
seeking a bilateral investment treaty or joining ICSID, in a way that makes
nonsense of the Kaunda judgment’s call for wide discretion because of the
nature of the playing arena, namely foreign relations. As noted, this judgment
was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal for its failure to
respect the wide margin of discretion required by Kaunda.30 This respect for
the discretion of the executive in foreign relations has not meant that the
courts have simply found in favour of the executive. In instances where the
executive has clearly violated the constitution, the courts have not been shy to
appropriately censure the executive.31
III ZUMA’S CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: DISCRETION?
WHAT DISCRETION?
A The SADC Tribunal Decision
I begin with the SADC Tribunal judgment, first because it was delivered by
the Constitutional Court and second because of the three decisions, it is the
most problematic and the one whose reasoning most offends the Kaunda
doctrine of a very wide margin of discretion in foreign relations. The SADC
Tribunal judgment concerned the decision of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) heads of state and government to remove
29 Tladi, ‘The Right to Diplomatic Protection’, 24.
30 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Von Abo 2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA).
31 For an example of a decision in which the Court held that the conduct of the executive in
foreign relations was unconstitutional isMohamed and Another v. President of the Republic of
South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) where the court held that the decision to render
a Tanzanian national to the United States where he was subject to the possibility of the
death sentence was contrary to the Constitution.
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the right of access to the SADC Tribunal for individuals and other non-state
entities. The Constitutional Court was approached by the Law Society of
South Africa and others seeking an order to find that the president of South
Africa, by signing the protocol establishing a new tribunal without such access
had violated the constitution. In a hard-to-follow judgment penned by the
chief justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, the court found that the president’s partici-
pation in the ‘decision-making process and his own decision to suspend the
operations’ of the tribunal to be unconstitutional, unlawful and irrational.32
The judgment also found that president’s signing of the 2014 Protocol33 was
unconstitutional, unlawful and irrational and the court, as a result, directed
the president to withdraw his signature.34My criticism of the judgment relates
not only to the outcome, but to the reasoning, and to this point it may be added
that a judgment built around the concurring opinion of justices Cameron and
Froneman would be less objectionable, but ultimately also problematic.35
There is much that is open to critique – and little saving grace – in the
SADC Tribunal judgment, both in terms of the order and the reasoning. But
before delving into the analysis of the judgment, a related case concerning
a South African diamond mining company, Swissbourgh, whose mineral
rights in Lesotho had allegedly been expropriated to make way for the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project, is worth referring to. The owner of the
company, Mr Josias van Zyl, a South African national, first approached the
South African courts (in the pre-Zuma years) seeking diplomatic protection,
but was unsuccessful.36 The cases are related to the SADC Tribunal judgment
because, subsequent to the impugned decision of the SADC Summit con-
cerning the tribunal, Swissbourgh filed an investment claim with the
Permanent Court of Arbitration against the government of Lesotho claiming
that its participation in the decision-making process that led to the taking away
of the right of individual access to the SADC Tribunal – referred to in all the
32 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), para. 97.
33 Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community adopted on
21 February 2014, available at https://ijrcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/New-SADC-
Tribunal-Protocol-Signed.pdf, accessed 30 September 2020. There has not yet been ratifica-
tion by Parliament of this Protocol pursuant to the President’s signature.
34 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), para. 97.
35 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), para. 97; concurring opinion judges Cameron and Froneman,
paras. 98–104.
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relevant papers of those papers as the ‘shuttering of the Tribunal’ – was
a violation of its rights under the SADC Treaty regime, including the invest-
ment protocol. It will be noted that the claims of Swissbourgh are similar to
those raised by South African Law Society before the South African courts. In
the Swissbourgh matter, I served as expert witness for the government of
Lesotho, focusing on the rules of state responsibility under international law
and the decision-making processes in SADC, providing both a written report
and being cross-examined by counsel for Swissbourgh.37 In a majority judg-
ment of two to one, the arbitral tribunal determined that Lesotho’s participa-
tion in the decision-making process to shutter the tribunal did constitute
a violation of international law and that Lesotho could be held liable for the
damages38 – incidentally, the one dissenting opinion came from a former South
African judge of appeal, judge PetrusMillarNienaber.39Because the arbitration
was held under the PCA rules, the courts of Singapore had jurisdiction to review
the arbitration award to determine whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdic-
tion. Lesotho had argued, inter alia, that the arbitral tribunal had not had
jurisdiction precisely because its participation in the decision-making process
did not establish international responsibility. After an earlier high court judg-
ment affirmed Lesotho’s claim, the highest court of Singapore, the Court of
Appeal, finally overturned the arbitral award on the basis, inter alia, that the
participation of Lesotho in the SADC decisions did not breach the relevant of
international law as had been argued by Swissbourgh.40
Consistent with the Kaunda jurisprudence, the SADC Tribunal judgment
begins by acknowledging that while public power must always be exercised
within constitutional bounds, the president ought not to be ‘unnecessarily
constrained in the exercise of constitutional power’.41 Yet, in what follows, the
court departs from the Kaunda line of reasoning in at least two material ways.
37 The expert report is on file.
38 Swissbourgh Diamond Mines and Others v. the Kingdom of Lesotho, Permanent Court of
Arbitration Case-2013–29, Partial Final Award on Merits and Jurisdiction, 18 April 2016. The
judgment remains confidential but is on file with the author. I am able to share the outcome
because, due to the appeals process in the courts of Singapore described further below, the
outcome is for all intents and purposes, public.
39 Swissbourgh Diamond Mines and Others v. the Kingdom of Lesotho, Permanent Court of
Arbitration Case-2013–29, Partial Final Award on Merits and Jurisdiction, 18 April 2016,
dissenting opinion Justice Petrus Millar Nienaber.
40 See Swissbourgh Diamond Mining Company and Others v. the Kingdom of Lesotho,Court of
Appeal of Singapore, 27November 2018. For an accessible summary, see ‘Top court dismisses
appeal on arbitration award’, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/top-court-
dismisses-appeal-on-arbitration-award <30 September 2020>.
41 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), at para. 2.
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First, the court’s reasoning seems to imply that the executive, when acting in
foreign relations, should do so in a manner that protects fundamental rights
extraterritorially. Second, the court’s judgment, both in terms of its reasoning
and in terms of dispositif leaves very little discretion for the executive.
The extraterritorial rationale of the court’s judgment is evident early on when it
states that the ‘only avenue open to those [in Zimbabwe] aggrieved by having been
deprived of their land in that constitutionally sanctioned manner was the
Tribunal’.42 The court then states that the ‘President, together with leaders of
other SADC [states], decided to eviscerate the possibility of the states ever being
held to account for perceivedhuman rights violations, non-adherence to the rule of
lawor undemocratic practices’.43For this reason the court states, that SouthAfrica,
through the actions of its president, ‘were party to denying citizens of South Africa
and other SADC countries access to justice at a regional level’.44 Yet, leaving aside
that this statement ismadebefore anyanalysisof the issues takes place, this seems to
go againstKaunda’s admonition that the ‘bearers of the rights [in theConstitution]
are people in South Africa’ and that ‘[n]othing suggests that it is to have general
application, beyond our borders’.45The impugned decisions are decisions taken at
an international forum, in a foreign country, with no apparent impact in South
Africa at all. The extraterritorial nature of the conduct is buttressed by the assertion
that the unconstitutionality flows from an alleged breach of a rule under inter-
national law.
The judgment, furthermore, leaves very little discretion, if any, for the executive
in the conduct of foreign relations.The judgment’s conclusions that the impugned
decisions are unlawful, irrational and unconstitutional are based on a single pillar,
namely that they are in breach of South Africa’s international law obligations.
Given the far reaching nature of the decision – constraining the executive’s role in
international forums and even declaring the signature of a treaty to be unlawful –
one would have expected a detailed and rigorous assessment of the claim that the
impugned decisions were in breach of international law.46 Yet there is no assess-
ment of this claim at all.
42 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), para. 11.
43 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), at para. 14 (emphasis added).
44 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), at para. 15.
45 Kaunda and Others v. the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235
(CC), at para. 37.
46 A more detailed analysis of the international law questions in the judgment can be found in
a forthcoming article Dire Tladi, ‘The Constitutional Court’s Judgment in the SADC Case:
International Law Continues to Befuddle’ (2020) 10 Constitutional Court Review 129–43.
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There appears to be two possible bases, none of which are really tested, for
the court’s assertion that the treaty has been breached. The first is what the
court refers to as ‘the entrenchment of a human rights culture, a democratic
order and adherence to the rule of law’ and the obligation on the SADC
summit not to disturb these values.47 The content of this ‘obligation’ is never
described nor is it ever explained how the decision to adopt the 2014 Protocol
breaches this obligation. In other words, does this ‘entrenchment-obligation’
require the existence of a tribunal in which individuals will have direct access?
This certainly does not go without saying since the UN Charter itself has
a human rights-entrenchment clause,48 yet the UN does not have a tribunal
with the right of access of all individuals of UNmember states. The closest the
court comes to any sort of description, let alone analysis, of this ‘obligation’ is
a footnote reference to article 4 of the treaty and the preamble. Yet, article 4 of
the treaty simply provides that the SADC and its member states shall act in
accordance with a number of enumerated principles, including ‘human
rights, democracy and the rule of law’.49 None of these principles imply, let
alone require, the existence of a tribunal, even less so one with the right of
individual access.
To the extent that article 4(c) might be said to refer to a right of access to an
effective judicial remedy under international law, this is a right that applies in
national systems. There is no right, whether under the SADC Treaty50 or
general international law, to access to an international tribunal (I include
regional courts under the rubric of international courts).51 It is disconcerting
47 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), at para. 51.
48 See e.g. arts. 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 1
UNTS XVI.
49 See especially art. 4(c) of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community.
50 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Windhoek, 17 August 1992, avail-
able at www.sadc.int/files/5314/4559/5701/Consolidated_Text_of_the_SADC_Treaty_-_scan
ned_21_October_2015.pdf, accessed 30 September 2020.
51 See e.g. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 – Article 14:
Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32,
23 August 2007, commenting on article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: ‘This guarantee not only applies to courts and tribunals addressed in
the second sentence of this paragraph of article 14, but must also be respected whenever
domestic law entrusts a judicial body with a judicial task’ (para. 7); see also para. 18, which
states: ‘The notion of a “tribunal” in article 14, paragraph 1 designates a body, regardless of its
denomination, that is established by law, is independent of the executive and legislative
branches of government or enjoys in specific cases judicial independence in deciding legal
matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature. . . .’ (emphasis added) and the ‘. . . failure of
a State party to establish a competent tribunal to determine such rights and obligations or to
allow access to such a tribunal in specific cases would amount to a violation of article 14 if such
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that the court seems oblivious to, or perhaps simply chose to ignore, the fact
that the African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights had recently
addressed the question of whether the shuttering of the tribunal’s access to
individuals amounted to a breach of the right of access to courts and effective
judicial remedies in an application filed by Luke Munyandu Tembani who,
incidentally was also second applicant in the Constitutional Court
application.52 In its well-reasoned decision, the African Commission con-
cludes that the right of access to courts applied to national courts and not to
international courts and, therefore, that the impugned decision of the SADC
Summit was not contrary to the right of access to courts.53
The second possible basis for the conclusion that the impugned decision
was a breach of South Africa’s international law obligation is that the SADC
summit did not follow the appropriate procedures under the relevant SADC
treaties. According to the court, the adoption of the new 2014 Protocol was
unlawful because ‘the Treaty has never been amended so as to repeal its
provisions relating to individual access to the Tribunal, human rights, the
rule of law and access to justice’.54 In the view of the court, the jurisdiction of
the Court could only be ‘lawfully tampered with in terms of the provisions of
the [SADC] Treaty that regulate (sic) its amendment’.55 The SADC Treaty,
and indeed other SADC instruments including the 2001 Protocol56
limitations are not based on domestic legislation, are not necessary to pursue legitimate aims
such as the proper administration of justice, or are based on exceptions from jurisdiction
deriving from international law such, for example, as immunities, or if the access left to an
individual would be limited to an extent that would undermine the very essence of the right’
(emphasis added). See also art. 8 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
instructive in this respect. It provides that everyone ‘has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights’, UN General
Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III); art. 13 of
the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the right to an ‘effective remedy
before a national authority’, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221.
52 Luke Munyandu Tembani and Benjamin John Freeth (represented by Norman Tjombe)
v. Angola and Thirteen Others, Communication 409/12, www.achpr.org/public/Document/fi
le/English/achpr54_409_12_eng.pdf <30 September 2020>.
53 Luke Munyandu Tembani and Benjamin John Freeth (represented by Norman Tjombe)
v. Angola and Thirteen Others, Communication 409/12, www.achpr.org/public/Document/fi
le/English/achpr54_409_12_eng.pdf <30 September 2020>, at paras. 139, 144 and 146.
54 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), para. 53.
55 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), para. 49.
56 Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community, Windhoek,
7 August 2000, www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_the
reof2000.pdf, accessed 23 September 2020.
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establishing the tribunal, require a two-third majority for amendment and
dissolution of any SADC institutions.57 Yet the court, beyond stating that the
SADC instruments required a two-thirds majority, does not test whether the
procedures under the SADC instruments were complied with or not. The
closest to any kind of assessment of whether the impugned decisions were
made in accordance with a procedure that was consistent with the relevant
instruments is the assertion by the Court that instead of the ‘three quarters
majority’, the Summit ‘sought to amend the Treaty through a protocol, thus
evading compliance with the Treaty’s more rigorous threshold of three-
quarters of all of its Member States’.58 It states, without explanation, that the
decision of SADC ‘evidences a failure to adhere to the provisions or proper
meaning of the Treaty’,59 without applying the methodology for treaty inter-
pretation under international law.
An assessment of the adherence to the procedure of the SADC summit
would require, first, an interpretation of the relevant instruments and second,
the description of the procedure followed. The court does neither of these. It is
the case that the while instruments require a two-thirds majority, the
impugned decision by SADC was adopted by consensus. Whether the con-
sensus procedure falls foul of the two-thirds majority requirement is a matter to
be determined through interpretation. This is particularly the case since
SADC only ever adopts decisions by consensus, even where a two-thirds
majority is required.60 This consensus-decision-making-process arguably
57 See art. 36(1) of the SADC-Treaty provides that an amendment of the treaty ‘shall be adopted by
a decision of three-quarters of all Members of the Summit’. Art. 37(3) Protocol of the Tribunal in
the Southern African Development Community, Windhoek, 7 August 2000, www.sadc.int/files/
1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf, <30 September 2020>,
states that ‘[a]n amendment to this Protocol shall be adopted by a three (3) quarters of all the
members of the Summit . . .’. Moreover, the SADC-Treaty provides that Art. 22(11) provides that
‘[a]n amendment to any Protocol that has entered into force shall be adopted by a decision of
three-quarters of the Member States that are Party to the Protocol’. Article 37(3) of the 2000
Protocol.
58 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), at para. 49. See also at para. 52 (‘More importantly, the Tribunal is an
institution of SADC and the Treaty requires a “resolution supported by three-quarters of all
members to dissolve . . . any institution”’).
59 Law Society of South Africa and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC), at para. 51.
60 See e.g. para. 8.2.4.1 of the Records of the Summit Decision of August 2007 amending the
Tribunal Protocol to ‘facilitate trade disputes in the SADCRegion’; Decision 6 of the Records
of the Summit Decision of August 2008 amending the Treaty to provide for two Deputy
Executive Secretaries and the abolition of the IntegratedCommittee ofMinisters; Decision 10
on the Amendment of Article 6 of the Tribunal Protocol; Summit Decision 15 on the
amendment of SADC Treaty so as not to provide for a specific number of Deputy
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constitutes subsequent practice within the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention, which should be taken into account in determining
whether the SADC decisions are consistent with the relevant instruments.61
As the International Law Commission has noted, subsequent practice under
article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention ‘may serve to clarify the meaning of
a treaty by narrowing, widening or otherwise determining the range of possible
interpretations, including any scope for the exercise of discretion which the
treaty accords to the parties’.62 It is worth mentioning that the Constitutional
Court itself, in Zimbabwe v. Fick, accepted without question the amendment
to article 16 of the SADC Treaty (concerning the tribunal), even though that
amendment was adopted by consensus and not by a recorded vote.63 There is
thus a settled practice, over an extended period of time, in which SADC
member states have made decisions by consensus, even where the requisite
treaty provides for a threshold of two-third majority. This would indicate that
the impugned decisions were adopted consistently with the ‘authentic’64
interpretation of parties to the SADC instruments which ought to have been
taken into account in the assessment of whether those decisions were proced-
urally valid.
In addition to not considering the role of subsequent practice, the court also
failed to consider that adopting a new treaty, even one inconsistent with
a previous treaty is not unlawful under international law. As a general matter,
Executive Secretaries. See Compilation of Summit and Council Records of Decisions,
available at www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/7813, accessed 30 September 2020.
61 Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331.
62 ILC 2018, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation
to the Interpretation of Treaties, Report of the International Law Commission, Seventieth
Session, General Assembly Official Records (A/73/10), Draft Conclusion 7.
63 TheGovernment of the Republic of Zimbabwe v.Louis Karel Fick andOthers,Case CCT 101/12
[2013] (10) BCLR 1103 (CC), at para. 10 (‘The amendment alluded to above was effected by the
Summit in terms of the Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African
Development Community (Amending Agreement). Article 16(2) of the Treaty was amended
to provide for the Tribunal Protocol to be an integral part of the Treaty, obviously subject to
the adoption of the Amending Agreement’.). See art. 18 of the 2001 Agreement Amending the
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. The Agreement was adopted on
14 August 2001. See Communiqué of the SADC Summit of 2001 August, Malawi Blantyre,
para. 23.
64 See draft conclusion 3 of the ILC 2018 Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, Report of the International
Law Commission, Seventieth Session, General Assembly Official Records (A/73/10),
(‘Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, para. 3 (a) and (b) [of
the Vienna Convention], being objective means evidence of the understanding of the parties
as to the meaning of the treaty, are authentic means of interpretation, in the application of the
general rule of treaty interpretation in article 31’.).
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rules of international law, including treaty rules, are jus dispositivum and can
be derogated from ormodified by subsequent rules of international law.65This
includes treaty rules concerning access to courts and certainly includes rules
of amendments. The only exception to this basic rule of international law is
the operation of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens).66
It is clear that the court does not believe that the right of individual access to
the SADC Tribunal is a peremptory norm since it accepts that the provisions
could have been amended through the ‘correct procedure’. Nor does the court
assert that the amendment provisions themselves are of a peremptory charac-
ter. This being the case, the normal rules of successive treaties laid out in the
Vienna Convention would, even if in the absence of the application of article
31(3)(b), be relevant. Article 59 of the Vienna Convention provides for the
termination of one treaty by entry into force of another if ‘it appears from the
later treaty or is otherwise established’ that the parties to the previous treaty
intend for it to be replaced.67 This rule is not subject to the provisions of the
previous treaty.68 The 2014 Protocol is explicit that the 2000 Protocol ‘is
replaced with effect from the date of entry into force of’ the 2014 Protocol.69
Even though the 2014 Protocol is inconsistent with the 2000 Protocol, it is hard
to imagine how the adoption of a subsequent treaty repealing an old treaty –
a situation contemplated by the Vienna Convention – could be unlawful. At
any rate, the problem with the Court is not only its conclusion but also its
failure to engage with the methodology of international law by addressing this
and other rules of interpretation.
It is hard to imagine what policy space, or discretion, is left for the executive,
after the SADC Tribunal judgment. To borrow from the words of Kaunda the
Constitutional Court does not ‘give particular weight to the government’s
special responsibility for and particular expertise in foreign affairs’ and cer-
tainly does not afford it ‘wide discretion . . . in determining how to deal’.
65 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 72. See for discussion First Report of
Special Rapporteur (Dire Tladi) on Jus Cogens (A/CN.4/793), paras. 66–7.
66 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 72. See for discussion First Report of
Special Rapporteur (Dire Tladi) on Jus Cogens (A/CN.4/793), paras. 66–7. See also generally,
Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), Report
of the International Law, General Assembly Official Records (A/74/10), 147.
67 Article 59 of the Vienna Convention (‘A treaty shall be considered terminated if all the parties
to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject and . . . [it] appears from the later treaty
or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the subject matter be governed by that
treaty . . .’).
68 See ibid.
69 Article 48 of the 2014 Protocol.
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Moreover, this judgment, again contrary to the admonition of Kaunda, substi-
tutes its own policy preferences for those of the government: the government,
as a policy matter, accepted the position of other SADC members to have
a tribunal without individual access, but the court preferred a tribunal with
such access. The judgment provides a good illustration for why courts should
avoid replacing their own policy-preferences for the government’s, particularly
in the area of foreign relations. The judgment treats the executive’s participa-
tion in the decision of 2012 to dissolve the SADC Tribunal as a simple choice
between supporting the shuttering or not. It shows a complete ignorance for
the fact that states have other choices, including not blocking consensus of
decisions they are not fully supportive of, or of being agnostic. The court does
not even grapple with the decision-making processes to determine whether
there was a vote, or if the decisions were adopted by consensus, if there was
a vote whether South Africa supported the motion or abstained. Under the
SADC Tribunal judgment, the decision of the South Africa to support, abstain
from or not support, a resolution in any organ of an international organisation,
including the UN General Assembly, the United Nations Security and the
African Union, can be overturned by the courts if the decision does not accord
with the policy preferences of the court.
B The Democratic Alliance cases
The SADC Tribunal judgment is notable not only because it is handed down
by the apex court, but also because of how far-reaching it is. The judgment
concerned the type of decision that one would expect a court to give the
greatest of discretion to the executive – one that took place outside the borders
of the country, concerned organs of an international organisation and had
little impact on South African law or South African circumstances. Yet the
erosion of the discretion of the executive by the courts is not isolated. Two
cases brought by the Democratic Alliance and decided by the High Courts of
Gauteng – the Grace Mugabe and Withdrawal decision – provide further
examples of decisions by courts concerning the exercise of discretion by the
executive in foreign affairs.
The Grace Mugabe judgment concerned the decision of the South African
foreign minister to confer immunities on Grace Mugabe, at the time the
spouse of Robert Mugabe (then head of state of Zimbabwe).70 The decision
emanated from the now infamous alleged assault by Grace Mugabe on
70 In the interest of transparency, I should declare that at the time of the relevant events, I served
as Special Adviser to the foreign minister and was intimately involved in the decision-making.
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a South African woman, Gabriella Engels, in Johannesburg. The assault took
place during the SADC summit of 2017 but before the arrival of Robert
Mugabe – although there is some dispute as to whether Grace Mugabe was
in South Africa for the summit or for personal reasons, this question is in fact
immaterial to the legal issues and the question of the discretion. The decision
was made pursuant to section 7(2) of the Diplomatic Immunities and
Privileges Act71 which provides as follows:
The Minister may in any particular case if it is not expedient to enter into an
agreement as contemplated in subsection (1) and if the conferment of
immunities and privileges is in the interest of the Republic, confer such
immunities and privileges on a person or organisation as may be specified by
notice in the Gazette.
In themidst of amedia storm surrounding the events, and in response to a note
verbal from the Embassy of Zimbabwe, the minister conferred immunity on
the First Lady in accordance with section 7(2) of the act. In a letter to the
National Commission of Police, the Director-General of the Department of
International Relations and Cooperation stated that the discretion accorded to
the minister under the section was not absolute and required ‘the Minister to
consider all the facts and circumstances’ and further noted that any decision
she takes ‘must be reasoned’.72 The letter provides a detailed account of the
facts and circumstances taken into account by the Minister, but these can be
summarised as follows:
(i) the rule of law and the need to ensure that the law protected South
African citizens;
(ii) that Grace Mugabe was the First Lady of neighbouring and that
prosecuting her would negatively affect relations between South
Africa and Zimbabwe and may even affect relations between South
Africa and other African states;
(iii) that South Africa was chair of SADC and the ongoing SADC Summit
would be thrust the SADC Summit into chaos if the First Lady were
arrest and prosecuted; and
(iv) that under customary international law spouses of heads of state were
entitled to derivative immunity.
71 Diplomatic and Immunities Act, No. 37 of 2001, www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_docu
ment/201409/a37-010.pdf <30 September 2020>.
72 The full letter is quoted inDemocratic Alliance v.Minister of International Relations and Co-
operation and Others 2018 (6) SA 109 (GP), at para. 6.
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The court, however, declared that the decision of the minister was unconsti-
tutional and set it aside it. First, it cast doubt on the assertion that spouses of
heads of state are entitled to derivative immunity ratione personae. Although
derivative immunity of the immediate family of a head of state, especially the
spouse, is generally accepted,73 the court dismisses the contention on the basis
that ‘at least two other national courts’ have rejected this view.74 Yet, both cases
relied on by the court are not authority for the view that spouses of heads of
state are not immune from the foreign criminal jurisdiction. First, the Belgian
judgment in Mobutu v. SA Cotoni,75 cited by the court did not concern
immunity from criminal jurisdiction but rather immunity from civil jurisdic-
tion. These two types of immunities are different and cannot just be
conflated.76 An illustration of the fact that, as a matter of international law,
the rules pertaining immunity in civil proceedings ought not to be simply
transposed to immunity in criminal proceedings, is the Jurisdictional
Immunities of States case, where the International Court of Justice, while
concluding that there are no jus cogens exceptions to immunity from civil
jurisdiction, noted that the same was not necessarily true for immunity from
foreign criminal jurisdiction.77 This is not to say that rules relating to civil
73 See for discussion Joanne Foakes, The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 104. While there are discrepan-
cies on the scope, what is not questioned is that spouses benefit from this type of immunity
when in the company of the heads of State. See in this respect, Robert Jennings and
Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., 2 vols. (Harlow: Longman,
1992), Vol. 1: Peace, Parts 2 to 4, 1039 et seq. (‘[With respect to Family members], [e]xcept
in so far as they may regarded as part of the Head of State’s retinue, their exemption from
[jurisdiction is] more questionable, except in the case of the Head of State’s spouse’) (emphasis
added). See also Arthur Watts, ‘The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States,
Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers’ (1994) 247 Recuile de Cours de l’Académie de
Droit International de La Haye 9–30.
74 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Co-operation and Others 2018
(6) SA 109 (GP), at para. 24.
75 Cited in Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
by Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29 May 2008, at para. 126. I note that
the High Court did not consult the judgment itself but rather relied on an account of the
judgment offered in the Kolodkin report and erroneously suggested that the judgment was in
German (‘The judgment is in German. The summary herein is drawn from the report’ of
Roman Kolodkin).
76 See for discussion Third Report of the Special Rapporteur (Dire Tladi) on Peremptory Norms of
General International Law (Jus Cogens) (A/CN.4/714), at para. 124.
77 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2012, p. 99, para. 91 (‘The Court concludes that, under customary international law as
it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that is it is accused
of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed
conflict. In reaching that conclusion, the Court must emphasise that it is addressing only the
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proceedings are not at relevant at all, since they have been used as a basis to
define the head of state as including their spouses.78 Second, the Belgian court
in the Mobutu case did not exclude derivative immunity of the immediate
family. Rather, that Court excluded the children of the president of Zaire from
the scope of such derivative because they had reached and passed the age of
majority and, as such, were not his immediate family. The same is true of the
other authority relied on, namely W v. Prince of Liechtenstein, in which the
Austrian Supreme Court denied derivative immunity.79 As in the Mobutu
case, W v. Prince of Liechtenstein concerned civil immunity and, more
importantly, derivative immunity was excluded not because the Court did
not recognise its existence but rather because sisters and brothers of the head of
state were not regarded as part of the immediate family. If anything, these
authorities would support derivative immunity but restrict its scope of appli-
cation to the immediate family, which the spouse of a head of state wouldmost
certainly be. The relevant part of paragraph 24, in which these two cases are
discussed, is in fact taken, verbatim from the preliminary report of the
International law Commission Special Rapporteur on the topic of immunity
(and sometimes without acknowledgement).80 However, the judgment is
misleading and quotes the report out of context. In the report, in the preceding
paragraph, the special rapporteur confirms the view of the minister that this
‘jurisdictional immunity . . . also extends, in such circumstances, to the closest
accompanying family members . . .’.81Having referred to the two cases utilised
as the only two cases in which derivative immunity was denied,82 the special
rapporteur then places them in context by stating that ‘in the two cases . . . in
which the courts declined to recognise the immunity of the’ the relevant
immunity of the State itself from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States; the question of
whether, and if so to what extent, immunity might apply in criminal proceedings against an
official of the State is not in issue in the present case’) and at para. 87, noting that the Pinochet
case ‘concerned the immunity of a former Head of State from the criminal jurisdiction of
another State, not the immunity of the State itself in proceedings designed to establish its
liability to damages’ (emphasis added). This similar sentiment has been expressed in other
cases, e.g. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 776-77 (4th Cir. 2012), at para. 124. See also ILC
Summary Records, Tladi (A/CN.4/SR.3425), at 14.
78 Foakes, The Position of Heads of State, p. 104.
79 Cited in the Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction by Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29May 2008, at para. 126.
80 Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction by
Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29 May 2008, at para. 126.
81 Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction by
Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29 May 2008, at para. 125.
82 Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction by
Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29 May 2008, at para. 126.
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family members ‘the rulings were based on the fact that the persons concerned
were not among the immediate family of the Head of State and were not
dependent on him’.83 The court’s use of these authorities is thus, at best
a misunderstanding, and at worst a misrepresentation of the authorities in
question. The false impression is also created in the judgment that the
Kolodkin report rejected spousal immunity while the report clearly believed
spousal immunity to be part of customary international law.84
The court’s judgment is based on another significant error. The court relies
on section 6(a) of the Foreign States Immunities Act which, according to the
court, excludes the immunity of Mr Mugabe in cases of ‘death or injury of any
person’.85 If, so the understanding of the court goes, Robert Mugabe did not
enjoy immunity because section 6(a) excludes of the Foreign States
Immunities Act excludes immunity in the case of ‘death or injury’, then
Grace Mugabe could not, herself, have enjoyed immunity as it was derivative.
This reflects a complete lack of understanding not only of international law
but of the immunity legislation in South Africa. Immunity ratione personae
from foreign criminal jurisdiction is not addressed at all in the Foreign States
Immunities Act which addresses the immunity of the state itself from civil
proceedings.86 Immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction
in South Africa is governed by theDiplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act87
and, as recognised by the Supreme Court, it knows no exception both under
international law.88 According to the court, in the Al Bashir judgment, the
only exception is the relation to International Criminal Court arrest and
surrender proceedings.89
83 Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction by
Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29 May 2008, at para. 127.
84 Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction by
Roman Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/604), 29 May 2008, at para. 127.
85 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Co-operation and Others 2018
(6) SA 109 (GP), at paras. 39–40.
86 See John Dugard. ʽImmunity’, in John Dugard et al., (eds.), Dugard’s International Law:
A South African Perspective, 5th ed. (Cape Town: Juta, 2018), p. 347 et seq.
87 Section 4(1)(a) of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act of 2001 provides that a head of
State enjoys such immunity ‘from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the courts . . . in
accordance with rules of customary international law’. I note, though this is not critical, that
even if the Foreign States Immunities Act were relevant, as the later law, the Diplomatic
Immunities and Privilege would trump it.
88 Minister of Justice and Others v. South African Litigation Centre and Others 2016 (3) SA
317 (SCA).
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On the basis of these two flawed bases, the court decides to overturn
a decision of the executive based on a discretion expressly granted by legisla-
tion. It does not even assess whether the discretion was exercised correctly.
The discretion accorded to the executive in the conduct of foreign relations in
Kaunda and confirmed by the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act is
ignored in favour of the policy preference of the judiciary. Let me pause to say,
it is correct that at the time judgment GraceMugabe did not, under customary
international law, enjoy the derivative immunity referred to in the decision of
the minister, because that immunity applies only to the spouse of a sitting
head of state and when in the presence of the head of the state. The question is
not whether Grace Mugabe had immunity or not, the question is whether the
minister had the right, acting under theDiplomatic Immunities and Privileges
Act and in the exercise of the executive competence in foreign relations, to
confer such immunities.
The second Democratic Alliance case, the Withdrawal judgment, con-
cerned the decision of the South African government to withdraw from the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court without parliamentary
approval. The reasoning in the Withdrawal judgment is not as objectionable
as the SADC Tribunal and Grace Mugabe judgment. Indeed, though I don’t
fully agree with the decision, I believe it is a reasonable judgment and, at least
on the surface, perhaps even more rational than what I believe is the object-
ively correct interpretation of the law.90 As the court stated, the Withdrawal
judgment concerned ‘the separation of powers between the national executive
and parliament in international relations and treaty-making’.91 In this case, the
High Court determined that South Africa could withdraw from a treaty
entered into after the approval of parliament, only after parliament itself had
approved the withdrawal. According to the court, ‘there is no question that the
power to conduct international relations and to conclude treaties has been
90 The relevant events also took place while I was adviser to the ForeignMinister. Here, I should
say, my legal views were at variance with my political views. Contrary to my legal views,
expressed in this chapter, my political views were as follows: First, given the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in the Al Bashir judgment, it was unnecessary to withdraw.
A careful reading of the Al Bashir judgment suggested that the problem was not the Rome
Statute at all, but rather South Africa’s domestic implementation legislation. Rather than
withdraw, all South Africa needed to do was to amend it’s the Rome Statute Implementation
Act and its problems would disappear. If, however, it was deemed necessary to withdraw,
parliamentary approval should be obtained because, while my legal position was that it was
unnecessary, it was difficult to imagine a South African court accepting such an argument,
even in the absence of the ‘Zuma-jurisprudence’.
91 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017
(3) SA 212 (GP), at para. 1.
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constitutionally conferred upon the executive’.92 This power, however, is not
unfettered and requires ‘the national power to engage parliament’.93 In this
context, it accepts that ‘the formulation of a policy to withdraw from the Rome
Statute therefore no doubt falls within the national executive’s province’.94
However, in the view of the court, the ‘approval of an international agreement’
by parliament ‘creates a social contract between the people of South Africa’
and the national executive, requiring parliamentary approval before the
executive seeks to withdraw from an agreement so approved.95
Although I do not share in this interpretation, I am not inclined to be too
critical of this decision, nor would I ascribe it necessarily solely to the emer-
gence of the ‘Zuma jurisprudence’. This is because the reasoning seems
logical and is not based on any obviously flawed logic. There is, however, an
alternative construction of section 231(2) of the Constitution96 which would
grant greater autonomy to the executive in the conduct of foreign relations –
for the record, this alternative interpretation was never presented by counsel
for the government whose argument were rather convoluted.97 My own
reading of section 231(2) is that it requires parliament to approve international
agreements before the executive can ratify such agreements. Yet, the approval
by parliament is nothing more than that – an approval or, to put it more
colloquially, permission to ratify. The approval itself does not bind the repub-
lic to the obligation contained in the treaty nor does it bind the executive into
ratifying the relevant treaty. The approval is intended to confirm that the treaty
is consistent with South Africa’s legal framework and that the executivemay, if
92 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017
(3) SA 212 (GP), para. 35.
93 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017
(3) SA 212 (GP), at para. 35.
94 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017
(3) SA 212 (GP), at para. 45.
95 Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 2017
(3) SA 212 (GP), at paras. 52 and 53.
96 Section 231 of the South African Constitution provides as follows: ‘An international agreement
binds the Republic only after it has been approved by a resolution in both the National Assembly
and the National Council of Provinces . . .’, www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/images/a108-96
.pdf, accessed 30 September 2020.
97 The government, in essence, argued that ‘parliament approval is only required in order for
a treaty to become binding’. See, Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations
and Cooperation and Others 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP), at paras. 38–9. There was also a similarly
confusing argument that a notice of withdrawal under international law does not require
parliamentary approval (at para. 40). This latter point is accurate but irrelevant. The question
was not whether the notice of withdrawal was valid under international law, surely it was.
Rather the question was whether it was valid under domestic law.
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it wished, proceed with the ratification process.98 If approval is nothing more
than permission to become party, then whether South Africa becomes a party
to the said treaty or not, or becomes party and then decides to withdraw, does
not undermine the parliamentary approval. To put it simply, parliamentary
approval establishes a right to join the treaty not an obligation to become (or
remain) a party. This, however, is only one possible approach to section 231(2) –
one which would give the executive greater discretion tomake policy choices in
foreign relations – and the Court chose another, equally reasonable approach.
IV CONCLUSION
Under the South African constitutional framework, all exercise of public
power is subject to judicial review to ensure consistency with the constitution.
This includes the executive’s conduct of foreign relations. Yet the
Constitutional Court has, in several judgments, recognised that the nature
of foreign relations requires significantly more discretion for the executive
than the exercise of public power in other contexts. The test established by the
Court to determine whether that conduct in foreign relations is consistent
with the Constitution is rationality. Under this general test, the executive
should be given a wide margin of discretion and the courts should interfere
with policy choices made by the executive only in exceptional cases.
Moreover, the courts should avoid substituting their own policy preferences
for those of the executive. With the exception of one case of the High Court,
which was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal,99 in the
pre-Zuma era, the courts did not unnecessarily intervene unless there was
a clear and unjustified breach of the constitution.100
In the Zuma era, while the courts have continued to pay lip-service the
constitutional doctrine of deference, they have shrunk the discretion accorded
to the executive to the extent that it is nothing but an empty shell. Under this
new judicial oversight framework, it is the courts, based on the policy prefer-
ences of the judges, who determine what treaties South Africa may or may not
enter into, whether to call for a vote or accept consensus in international
forums, how and whether to vote where a vote is called for in such forums and
whether to accord or not to accord immunities. While, given the Zuma
98 See in this regard Earthlife Africa v. Minister of Energy 2017 (5) SA 227, at para. 114 noting
agreements requiring approval of parliament are those that ‘generally engage or warrant the
focussed attention or interest of Parliament’.
99 Von Abo v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2008] ZAGPHC 226.
100 An example of a case where the Court did intervene isMohamed and Another v. President of
the Republic of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).
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administration’s corruption-riddled tenure, very often the courts’ policy pref-
erences are understandable, it is a dangerous path when courts begin to
assume the role of policy-maker, no matter how laudable the policy may
be – after all, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
It is still too early to tell whether the Zuma-era approach will continue in the
Ramaphosa era, particularly since not a single foreign relations-related deci-
sion of the Ramaphosa administration is yet to be challenged. However,
because the courts have, while constraining the discretion of the executive,
maintained, at least as rhetoric, the Kaunda balance, underdoing the Zuma-
era jurisprudence should not be too difficult.
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11
From Scope to Process
The Evolution of Checks on Presidential Power in US Foreign
Relations Law
Jean Galbraith
A core challenge for foreign relations law – as with all public law – is how to
constrain decision-makers and yet enable them to be effective. Power and
flexibility are necessary to successful governance, but they are also the keys to
despotism. The challenge of this conundrum underlies much of political
theory and constitutional law.
In the United States, the original solution was an innovative distribution of
powers between various branches of government. The Framers of the US
Constitution gave certain powers to Congress, as set forth in the Constitution’s
Article I, and certain powers to the President, as set forth in its Article II.1
A third branch – the courts – could resolve constitutional disputes between
these branches in appropriate cases. By disaggregating government into separ-
ate strands, the Framers believed that these ‘constituent parts may, by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places’.2
Over time, however, this distribution of powers has changed with respect to
foreign affairs. The core story, often told, is of the rise of presidential power.3 The
original constitutional design sought to require congressional approval for non-
defensive uses of force, Senate approval for important international agreements,
congressional control over international commerce, and arguably a general prin-
ciple of congressional control with respect to foreign affairs. Yet in today’s world,
the President has considerable authority to initiate non-defensive uses of force,
1 See US Constitution, arts. I and II.
2 James Madison, ‘Federalist No. 51’, in Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers (New York:
New American Library, 1961).
3 For two of many such accounts, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive
Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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make international agreements without Senate approval, act in relation to foreign
commerce without the assent of the current Congress, and more generally assert
the ‘lion’s share’ of control over foreign affairs.4
As the scope of the President’s power has grown, however, it has also
become subject to more process-based requirements. Transparency and regu-
larity are now often expected and not infrequently mandated with respect to
uses of executive power related to foreign affairs. These requirements do not
stem from the US Constitution but rather from a web of diffuse sources,
including US congressional law, US executive branch practice, and various
aspects of international law. This new set of constraints serves to some degree
as a substitute for the original constitutional constraints.
This book chapter describes these twin developments in relation to presi-
dential foreign affairs power – the erosion of scope-based checks and the rise of
process-based checks. It argues that international law has played a role in both
developments. In closing, it considers the extent to the changes described here
may have relevance for the practice of other nations.
Throughout the chapter, the terms ‘scope-based’ and ‘process-based’ are used
in a distinct and perhaps idiosyncratic way. They are used not in relation to the
entire power of the federal government, but rather more narrowly in relation to
the power of the President and the executive branch that works under him or her.
The term ‘scope-based’ (and related terms) refer towhat the President has the legal
authority to do as a matter of domestic law amid congressional silence. The term
‘process-based’ (and related terms) refer to how this legal authority is to be
exercised. By way of example, the question of whether the President has the
domestic legal authority to bomb Syrian government facilities in response to
Syria’s use of chemical weapons against its own citizens is treated here as an issue
of scope. By contrast, the question of whether, with respect to such a use of force,
the President has satisfied any legal requirements relating to notice, consultation,
reporting, and reasoned decision-making is treated as an issue of process.
Distinctions between scope and process are always complicated at the margins,
but the two concepts nonetheless serve as useful frames for thinking about the
scope of executive power.5
4 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948, 3rd ed. (New York: New York
University Press, 1948), p. 208.
5 The use of these concepts inevitably depends on one’s vantage point. Because I focus here on the
power of the executive branch rather than on the power of the federal government as a whole,
I consider the President’s power to use force to be a ‘scope-based’ issue – a question of what the
President can do unilaterally. If I were focusing on the power of the federal government as a whole,
I might consider the overall extent of the US government’s power to use force under the US
Constitution and international law to be a ‘scope-based’ issue but the question of how power is
divided within the various branches of the federal government to be a ‘process-based’ issue. And if
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I THE EROSION OF SCOPE-BASED CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS
ON THE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN RELATIONS POWERS
Perhaps inevitably, consideration of US foreign relations law starts with the US
Constitution. Its Framers sought to provide the US government with a full
panoply of foreign affairs powers, but they spread control over these powers
between Congress and the President. In the years since, however, the scope of
presidential power has increased. The President now considers himself or
herself able as matter of scope to undertake a vast swath of decision-making
related to US foreign affairs without the affirmative approval of Congress.
By way of illustration, consider the following four foreign affairs powers:
- Uses of Force.The text of the Constitution allocates to Congress numerous
powers related to war, including the power to declare war, while making
the President commander-in-chief.6 Over time, however, the President
has come to assert more and more concurrent power with respect to the
initiation of uses of force.7 The US executive branch still recognizes that
a full-scale war likely requires congressional authorization, but many
substantial uses of force in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have
been initiated without congressional authorization.8
- International Agreements. The text of the Constitution provides that
the President shall have power to make treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.9 While some agreements do still
go through this process, in practice Presidents have also come to make
international agreements, including very important ones, through sev-
eral other alternative processes. Some of these agreements are made
with clear congressional authorization, but others are made by the
executive branch acting either alone or in reliance on a vague statutory
I were focused on the power of the United States rather than of its government, I might consider it
a ‘process-based’ issue whether the US government had a particular power or instead would need
a constitutional amendment to have that power. My focus throughout this chapter, however, is on
the power of the presidency.
6 US Constitution, arts. I § 8, cll. 11–14 and II § 2, cl.1.
7 For a discussion of this development and of its relationships to international law on the use of
force, see generally Curtis A. Bradley and Jean Galbraith, ‘Presidential War Powers as an
Interactive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change’
(2016) 91 New York University Law Review 689.
8 For a recent articulation of the legal views of the executive branch on this issue, see Steven
A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, ‘April 2018 Airstrikes Against
Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities: Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the
President’, US Department of Justice, May 31, 2018, www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551
/download, accessed April 3, 2020.
9 US Constitution, art. II § 2, cl. 2.
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provision.10 These agreements may not have the power to alter US
domestic law, but they can serve as binding international commit-
ments on the part of the United States.
- Commerce. The text of the Constitution provides Congress with the
authority to regulate foreign commerce.11 Unlike with respect to uses of
force and international agreements, the President typically does not assert
independent constitutional authority over foreign commerce.
Nonetheless, the President has very substantial control in practice over
the regulation of foreign commerce, as existing congressional statutes
delegate considerable authority in this domain to the President. The
imposition of the various tariffs by the Trump administration are recent
examples.12
- Overall Control over Foreign Affairs. The text of the Constitution does not
set forth a general foreign affairs power. It is at best debatable whether the
text of the Constitution should be read as granting such a power to the
President, and indeed there is considerable evidence from the timing of
the Framing suggesting that if such a power exists, it should lie with
Congress.13 Nonetheless, such a power is often asserted by the executive
branch to lie with the President.14
10 See generally Jean Galbraith, ‘From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing
Landscape of Foreign Relations Law’ (2017) 84 University of Chicago Law Review 1675
(discussing the development of these agreements and the extent to which they are subject to
separation-of-powers constraints).
11 US Constitution, art. I § 8, cl. 3.
12 See Timothy Meyer and Ganesh Sitaraman, ‘The Power To Declare Trade War’, Lawfare
Blog, March 23, 2018, www.lawfareblog.com/power-declare-trade-war, accessed April 3, 2020
(describing how vaguely worded preexisting statutes have served as authorizations for these
tariffs).
13 This evidence includes Congress’s constitutional power to make laws ‘necessary and proper’
for executing the constitutional powers of the US government, US Constitution, art. I § 8, cl.
18; the President’s obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’, US
Constitution, art. II § 3; and the broader backdrop underlying the concept of executive
power at the time, see generally Julian Davis Mortenson, ‘Article II Vests Executive Power,
Not the Royal Prerogative’ (2019) 119 Columbia Law Review 1169.
14 See Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, ‘Memorandum
Opinion for the Attorney General Regarding the President’s Compliance with the “Timely
Notification” Requirement of Section 501(b) of the National Security Act’, US Department of
Justice, December 17, 1986, www.justice.gov/file/23891/download, accessed April 3, 2020
(concluding that the President has ‘plenary authority to represent the United States and to
pursue its interests outside the borders of the country, subject only to limits specifically set
forth in the Constitution itself and to such statutory limitations as the Constitution permits
Congress to impose by exercising one of its enumerated powers’); see also, e.g., Stephen
E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Letter to Eliot L. Engel,
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The rise of the President’s foreign affairs powers undoubtedly has multiple
causes. In a famous concurring opinion written during the 1950s, Supreme
Court Justice Robert Jackson pointed to the political prestige of the President,
the rise of the party system, and the perceived need to address urgent situations
over time as likely causes for ‘the gap that exists between the President’s paper
powers and his real powers’.15
The structure of the international legal system may itself have contributed
to the rise in the President’s foreign affairs powers vis-à-vis Congress.16 At
various points in time Presidents or their lwyers have pointed to international
law in justifying claims of presidential power. With respect to war powers, for
example, executive branch actors drew on nineteenth-century international
legal conceptions of sovereignty in defending a unilateral presidential author-
ity to use force in the protection of citizens abroad.17 Also in the nineteenth
and later in the twentieth century, Presidents and their lawyers pointed to
international law in arguing for a narrow construction of what amounts to
a ‘war’ requiring congressional approval.18 With respect to international
agreements, executive branch decision-makers also sometimes drew on inter-
national legal principles in defending the domestic constitutional right of the
President to enter into these agreements without the advice and consent of the
Senate.19
That the President’s scope-based foreign affairs powers have grown vis-à-vis
Congress does not mean that these powers are without scope-based limits.
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Department of Justice, May 7, 2019, www
.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1160886/download, accessed April 3, 2020 (citing this 1986memoran-
dum in claiming that draft legislation would be unconstitutional to the extent that it ‘require-
[d] the President to adopt a [particular] foreign policy’).
15 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 651–54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
16 For an elaboration of this argument, see generally Jean Galbraith, ‘International Law and the
Domestic Separation of Powers’ (2013) 99 Virginia Law Review 987.
17 Bradley and Galbraith, ‘Presidential War Powers’, 712–18 (giving examples).
18 Galbraith, ‘International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers’, 1021–23, 1024–25
(giving examples).
19 Galbraith, ‘International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers’, 1028–33. Similarly,
executive branch lawyers pointed at times to international legal practice in justifying the
unilateral domestic constitutional power of the President to terminate treaties made with the
advice and consent of the Senate. See, e.g., Memorandum from Green Haywood Hackworth,
Legal Advisor of the Department of State, Abrogation of Treaties (27 January 1936), quoted in
(1943) 5 Digest of International Law 328 (‘A contention that the action of the President in
denouncing a treaty must be submitted to . . . the Senate . . .would seem to be questionable for
the reason that when the President has given notice of the desire of this Government to
terminate a treaty, the failure of . . . the Senate to approve does not alter the situation . . . [as]
the foreign government may decline to accept a withdrawal of such notice’).
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There remain some situations in which the President needs congressional
approval in the domain of foreign affairs, although the contours of these
situations are often ill-defined. And while preexisting congressional law
often serves to authorize presidential action with respect to foreign affairs –
as in the example of tariffs – there are also some statutes that place limits on the
President’s foreign affairs powers.20 Additionally – and importantly – there are
limits on presidential power separate and apart from those grounded in the
separation of powers. The President is also subject to limits stemming from
international law and from constitutional protections for individual rights.21
For all these limits, however, the scope of presidential power remains vast with
respect to foreign affairs.
II THE RISE OF PROCESS-BASED CHECKS
ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER
There is a corollary to the rise of the President’s scope-based powers. This
is the development of more process-based rules with respect to how the
President should exercise foreign affairs powers. These rules are not
grounded in US constitutional law, but rather come from congressional
statutes, executive branch regulations, and broader principles of public
law manifested through the practice of the US administrative state.
Significantly, some of these process-based limits also stem from inter-
national law or more generally from the way in which the US executive
branch interfaces with the international legal system. Although the limits
imposed by these process-based checks are different in nature from scope-
based checks, they nonetheless have a constraining effect on presidential
power.
20 One notable example is the provision in the War Powers Resolution requiring that the
President withdraw US armed forces from hostilities after sixty days unless the President has
received affirmative approval from Congress to continue the hostilities. 50 USC § 1544(b).
Some administrations have questioned the constitutionality of this provision and even more
administrations have interpreted it narrowly. Nonetheless, it is thought to have had some
constraining effect on practice. David P. Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, ‘Ballotbox
Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force’ (1997) 41 International
Studies Quarterly 505.
21 The enforcement of these limits can be a challenge. The United States has pulled away from
the jurisdiction of international courts, and US domestic courts have imposed various barriers
to review over claims tied to foreign affairs, particularly ones rooted in international law. See,
e.g., Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 US 491 (2008) (holding that certain types of international treaty
obligations require congressional implementing legislation in order to give rise to domestic
legal claims enforceable by the federal courts).
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A Process-Based Checks Grounded in US Domestic Law and Practice
The Framers of the US Constitution were not solely interested in deciding
who had the power to do what. They also had an interest in how power was
exercised. They were conscious of the values of transparency and orderly
process, though recognizing that aspects of some foreign affairs might benefit
from secrecy. This consciousness, however, did not manifest itself in the form
of procedural rules set out for the executive branch about how to conduct its
business, including its foreign policy. What few procedural rules there were
instead were aimed at Congress, including a clause encouraging Congress to
establish Rules of Proceedings and another clause requiring it to publish
Journals of Proceedings.22 The issue of process rules for the executive branch
was not one which they addressed in the text of the Constitution, other than
some thin provisions about consultation with ministers and with Congress that
left considerable room for presidential discretion.23
The absence of process-based requirements on the executive branch in the
text of the US Constitution does not mean that such requirements are absent
from US foreign relations law. Rather, these process-based requirements exist,
but they are deemed to be nonconstitutional in nature.
Congress is one important source of process-based limits on the President’s
foreign affairs powers. The War Powers Resolution passed by Congress in the
1970s requires the President to meet certain consultation and reporting
requirements with respect to the initiation of hostilities.24 The Case-
Zablocki Act similarly sets out various process-based requirements for the
executive branch to follow with respect to international agreements that are
not made through the process set out in the Constitution’s Treaty Clause,
including a reporting requirement.25 Both of these statutes were passed against
22 US Constitution, art. I § 5, cll. 2 and 3 (‘Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy’).
23 US Constitution, art. II § 2, cl. 1 (‘[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices’) and § 3 (‘He shall from time to time give to the Congress
information of the State of the Union’).
24 50 USC § 1542 (‘The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . and after every such introduction
shall consult regularly with Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged
in hostilities’); 50USC § 1543 (requiring the President to give notice to Congress within forty-
eight hours of various actions, including the introduction of US troops into hostilities, and to
subsequently provide periodic updates to Congress).
25 1 USC § 112b (requiring that the text of such agreements be transmitted to Congress or the
relevant congressional committee within sixty days of their entry into force and imposing other
procedural requirement, including that ‘an international agreement may not be signed or
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a backdrop of congressional recognition that the President’s foreign affairs
powers had grown in scope since the time of the Framing. They therefore
reflect, at least in part, a deliberate choice to make process-based limits
available as a partial substitute for now eroded limits on scope. Similarly, in
the trade context, trade statutes delegating power tend to fold in some process
requirements.26 In these statutes, Congress is both providing the executive
branch with increased scope to exercise power and setting out requirements
with respect to how it is to be exercised. Finally, separate and apart from
statutes, the ‘soft’ oversight powers that congressional committees have in
terms of opening investigations and holding hearings can serve as process-
related incentives for thoughtful executive branch decision-making.27
A second important source of process-based requirements is the executive
branch itself. The President is the head of an enormous bureaucracy (or
perhaps more aptly of many enormous bureaucracies). In the foreign affairs
decision-making space, as with domestic affairs, the executive branch has
developed numerous internal rules and procedures for how its affairs are to
be conducted. Some such processes are set forth in executive orders issued by
the President, which typically last across administrations in the absence of
repeal.28 Others lie within specific agencies. With respect to international
agreements, for example, the State Department has long-standing regulations
addressing the process by which these are to be made.29
The importance of regular process can potentially be amplified by the
expectations of US domestic courts. As mentioned earlier, US courts have
otherwise concluded on behalf of the United States without prior consultation of the Secretary
of State’).
26 By way of example, the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on
many nations were done pursuant to a statute that requires the US Secretary of Commerce to
follow certain procedural steps in investigating whether to recommend the imposition of
tariffs. See 19 USC § 1862 (providing, among other things, that the Secretary of Commerce is
to undertake interagency consultations as appropriate and ‘if it is appropriate and after
reasonable notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity
to present information and advice relevant to such investigation’).
27 See generally Josh Chafetz, ‘Congress’s Constitution’ (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 715 (discussing these oversight powers).
28 By way of example, Executive Order 12,333 from 1981 continues to provide a regulatory
framework for the conduct of US intelligence activities related to foreign affairs. See
Executive Order 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981). For a broader discussion of US intelligence
practice, see Samuel J. Rascoff, ‘Presidential Intelligence’ (2016) 129Harvard Law Review 633;
see also at 637 (describing ‘presidential intelligence’ as ‘the White House’s sustained, routin-
ized, and process-driven governance of American spying’).
29 Known as the C-175 Procedure, these regulations can be found at 11 FAM §§ 720–27. The
original C-175 procedure was promulgated in the 1950s. See US Department of State Circular
No. 175 of 13 December 1955, in (1956) 50 AJIL 784.
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developed a variety of doctrines related to jurisdiction and justiciability that
can prevent them from reaching the merits of cases, and these doctrines can
have particular power in cases related to foreign affairs. Where courts do have
jurisdiction, however, they may be open to claims of procedural irregularity or
pretextual decision-making. The fast-and-loose approach to procedure that
characterized so much of the Trump administration was plainly a source of
concern to many judges, even though one of its most dubious decisions was
upheld by a closely divided Supreme Court.30
B Process-Based Checks Grounded in the Interface with International Law
The international legal system itself provides some process-based checks as
well. So much of foreign relations law is about engagement through inter-
national organizations. With engagement through these systems comes
acceptance of their process-based requirements. This is another way through
which certain procedural norms, including transparency, can be brought to
bear on the US executive branch.
One set of such process-based checks is tied to participation in the ordinary
business of an international organization.While plenty of diplomacy is carried
out in back rooms, various international legal regimes incorporate forms of
transparency into their operating procedures. To give a simple example, the
US executive branch cannot unilaterally keep all observers out of a major UN
conference.31More generally, to the extent that international legal regimes are
premised around open dialogue, the executive branch must engage in such
dialogue in order to act effectively through the regimes.32 Just as US executive
30 In Trump v. Hawaii, 585US __, 138 S Ct 2392 (2018) the SupremeCourt upheld the travel ban
imposed by the Trump administration on immigrants and visitors seeking to enter the United
States from several Muslim-majority countries by a 5–4 vote. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor
aptly argued that evidence of President Trump’s animus towardsMuslims, combined with the
shaky administrative process by which the travel ban was imposed, would lead ‘a reasonable
observer [to] conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by anti-Muslim animus,
rather than by the Government’s asserted national-security justifications’. Trump v.Hawaii, at
2438–44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
31 For discussion of the process by which observer status is granted, see ‘Formal Procedures for
Granting Observer Status’ (2008) UN Juridical Yearbook 439 (‘In practice, the General
Assembly has adopted resolutions granting observer status to various organizations and
entities’).
32 Constraints through dialogue can exist in bilateral relations as well, although this dialogue is
presumably less likely to be conducted in the public sphere. See Ashley Deeks, ‘Checks and
Balances from Abroad’ (2016) 83 University of Chicago Law Review 65, 68 (observing that if
‘one recognizes that US national security increasingly relies on relationships with foreign
partners, then the idea that the executive responds to foreign critiques and concerns to enable
ongoing partnerships has bite’).
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branch actors are aware of the prospect of congressional oversight, so too are
they aware of the prospect of international criticism. If the President chooses
to invade Grenada, for example, his representatives must be prepared to
defend this choice to the Security Council – and to cast a public veto of
a resolution condemning this action.33 Although the executive branch repre-
sentatives are nominally defending the decisions of the United States, in
practice the decisions they are defending are often ones made specifically by
the President as opposed to ones that are also explicitly authorized by
Congress.
A further set of process-based checks could potentially stem from the way in
which international legal regimes use reporting and review mechanisms as
enforcement devices. Partly because of the difficulty in getting states to agree
to other remedies, treaty regimes rely heavily on reporting requirements. This
is true with regard to many substantive areas of international law and espe-
cially in the human rights context.34 The reporting process can both shine
a light on state behavior and serve as a focal point for international and
domestic pressure aimed at particular state polices.35 Because of the relative
insularity of the United States and the various other ways in which information
related to the United States is transparent, it is unclear how much additional
transparency these reporting requirements bring to US practice. But at least in
33 See Richard Bernstein, ‘U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution “Deploring” Grenada Invasion’,
New York Times, October 29, 1983, www.nytimes.com/1983/10/29/world/us-vetoes-un-
resolution-deploring-grenada-invasion.html, accessed April 3, 2020 (noting the 11–1 vote,
with 3 abstentions and noting that ‘[a]mong the 63 countries that requested to speak in the
Security Council debate, only a small number of Caribbean nations defended the invasion . . .
[and n]early all the rest condemned it with varying degrees of harshness’).
34 For a general discussion, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 154 (describing the role of reporting requirements and
noting that their ‘incidence . . . is so high that they seem to be included almost pro forma in
many [international] agreements, with little concern about cost or implementing capacity’).
For some of the considerable literature on human rights reporting requirements, see, e.g.,
Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds.), The Future of UNHuman Rights Treaty Monitoring
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Gudmundur Alfredsson, Jonas Grimheden,
and Bertrand G. Ramcharan (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms:
Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009);
Jasper Krommendijk, The Domestic Impact and Effectiveness of the Process of State
Reporting under UN Human Rights Treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland:
Paper-pushing or policy prompting? (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014).
35 See Cosette D. Creamer and Beth A. Simmons, ‘The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on
Women’s Rights’ (2018) 81 Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (finding that ‘self-reporting [by
states] has a significant positive effect on women’s rights’ and considering themechanisms that
might underly such an effect).
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theory, they are another way in which the executive branch must publicly
account for its choices – and more generally for US behavior.
C Presidential Power in an Age of Process-Based Checks
As Congress’s scope-based checks on presidential power have dwindled, pro-
cess-based checks have grown. It is difficult to measure the practical effect of
this trade-off. Process-based checks are not as formally robust as scope-based
checks. They do not serve as an absolute bar to action, but rather go to how the
decision to undertake this action should be reached and to what extent the
action and the related decision-making process should be done in a way that is
transparent and therefore subject to evaluation and criticism. Are these lighter
process-based checks more or less normatively desirable than robust scope-
based checks? The answer may depend upon the particular context. It is
possible, for example, to be supportive of the current system with respect to
the making of international agreements yet more skeptical about it with
respect to uses of force.
The presidency of Donald Trump tested the power of process-based checks.
Executive branch lawyers in the Trump administration took robust positions
on the scope of presidential powers. This was true both with respect to the
President’s constitutional powers and with respect to how broadly to read
preexisting delegations in congressional statutes. At the same time, the
Trump administration showed little respect for orderly internal process within
the executive branch.36 Yet the Trump administration remained subject to
process constraints in other ways, including from Congress. With respect to
the use of force, for example, Congress lacked the votes necessary to override
a presidential veto and impose scope-based checks on presidential power.37
But in 2018 and 2019 Congress legislated to incorporate stronger reporting
requirements with respect to the legal and policy justifications offered by the
36 See, e.g., W. Neil Eggleston and Amanda Elbogen, ‘The Trump Administration and the
Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process’ (2018) 127 Yale Law Journal Forum 825, 847
(discussing these challenges, including the ones that arise when ‘a President wakes up one
morning and decides to change a policy by tweet without involving [the] extensive apparatus’
of ‘a full array of experts at the National Security Council, the State Department, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and
other agencies’).
37 See Jean Galbraith, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States: U.S. Drone Strike in Iraq
Kills IranianMilitary Leader Qasem Soleimani’ (2020) 114 AJIL 313, 320 (describing how both
the House and the Senate passed resolutions stating that the executive branch lacked the
authority to use force aggressively against Iran, but that there were not enough votes for these
resolutions to overcome a presidential veto).
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executive branch for uses of force.38 It remains to be seen what long-term
effects, if any, such process-based requirements have on the outcomes of
presidential decisions with respect to foreign relations.
III SCOPE, PROCESS, AND COMPARATIVE PRACTICE
US foreign relations law offers a unique set of bridges and boundaries. With its
presidential system of government, eighteenth-century constitutional text, and
distinctive role on the international stage, the United States has developed
a set of foreign relations law practices that are all its own and that are often
impenetrable. For the lay person, the well-educated lawyer, the foreign prac-
titioner – maybe everyone but the expert in the specific field, US foreign
relations law is excruciatingly hard to understand. Indeed, one of the ironies of
the shift from scope-based limits to process-based limits described above is that
it is untransparent to most observers.
Other countries undoubtedly strike different balances between scope-based
checks and process-based checks on the power of the executive. In the United
Kingdom, for example, there has been a recent rise in scope-based checks on
executive power, including the developing constitutional convention requir-
ing parliamentary authorization for certain uses of force and the UK Supreme
Court’s decision that parliamentary approval would be required for the treaty
withdrawal underlying Brexit.39 In Germany, the Basic Law was amended in
the 1990s such that the new Article 23 set forth both scope-based and process-
based limits on executive branch decision-making with respect to German
participation with the European Union.40 These developments place
38 See Scott R. Anderson and Erica Newland, ‘Why the Trump Administration May End up in
Court Over War Powers Reporting’, Lawfare Blog, February 28, 2020, www.lawfareblog.com
/why-trump-administration-may-end-court-over-war-powers-reporting, accessed April 3, 2020
(describing these new requirements).
39 See, e.g., Katja S. Ziegler, ‘The Use of Military Force by the United Kingdom: The Evolution of
Accountability’, University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 18–09, December 12,
2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300107, accessed April 3, 2020 (dis-
cussing the rising constitutional convention with respect to parliamentary approval for at least
certain kinds of uses of force); R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 2017
[UKSC] 5, www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2017/5.html, accessed April 3, 2020 (concluding that
parliamentary approval was necessary prior to the government’s giving the requisite treaty notice
of withdrawal from the Treaty on European Union); see also Curtis A. Bradley and Laurence
R. Helfer, ‘Treaty Exit in the United States: Insights from the United Kingdom or South Africa’
(2018) 111 AJIL Unbound 428 (discussing not only the UK Supreme Court decision but also
a similar decision reached by the High Court of South Africa).
40 German Basic Law, art. 23 (providing as translated, for example, that ‘[b]efore participating in
legislative acts of the European Union, the Federal Government shall provide the Bundestag
with an opportunity to state its position’ and setting out various ground rules regarding the
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constitutional limits on executive power in foreign affairs, unlike the US
pattern of long-standing erosion of such limits.
Although the US trajectory of limits on executive power in foreign relations
law may be distinctive to the United States, the impact of this trajectory has
broader implications. The transition between the Obama administration and
the Trump administration demonstrated the instability that can come from
the combination of strong presidential foreign affairs powers and a polarized
US electoral process. In the future, it is possible that the US Supreme Court
will restore more scope-based checks on the President’s foreign affairs powers
or that Congress will reclaim some powers with respect to trade and other
economic sanctions that it has delegated to the President. But unless and until
that happens, continuity in US foreign relations practice will depend heavily
on process-based constraints.
roles to be played by the Bundestag, Bundesrat, and Länder in the course of decision-making);
see also BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 19 June 2012 – 2 BvE 4/11 -, www.bverfg.de
/e/es20120619_2bve000411en.html, accessed April 3, 2020 (reading art. 23 broadly to apply to
certain other international agreements closely connected with the European Union).
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Division of Competences in the Field of Foreign Relations
in the Polish Constitutional System
Stanisław Biernat
I INTRODUCTION
The legal issues of foreign relations fall within the area between international
law and the national law of particular states.1These problemsmay therefore be
analyzed from both or either of these points of view. The following consider-
ations will be conducted from the perspective of Polish law. In this legal
system, foreign relations law is not treated as a separate branch but as part of
constitutional law. Along the axis: exceptionalism – normalization,2 Polish law
is situated on the side of the latter.
The political and socioeconomic transformations of the state began in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. The foundations of liberal democracy and market
economy were laid then. As early as in 1989, the first changes to the then
binding Communist constitution were introduced and developed in the
following years. The current Constitution dates from 1997.3 It should be
added that Poland joined the European Union in 2004.4
1 See the chapter by Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, this volume.
2 Aust and Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, at pp. 6, 14.
3 ‘Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997’ [‘The Constitution of the
Republic of Poland’] (1997) 78 Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] item 483 as amended.
4 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of
Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the
European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus,
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, concerning the
accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the
European Union, OJ2003, No. L 236, September 23, 2003, p. 17.
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An examination of the rules concerning foreign relations in a state that
regained its sovereignty relatively recently, after the liberation from Soviet
domination, deserves attention. Poland was previously unable to pursue an
independent foreign policy. The following considerations will focus on how
foreign relations are regulated in the provisions of the Polish Constitution and
constitutional practice and analyze both executive powers and activities of the
Parliament in the field of foreign relations. This matter will be presented in the
broader context of the features of the state’s political system which have been
shaped and have been evolving since 1989.
II THE POLISH CONSTITUTION, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
There is an important provision in the Constitution which determines the
place of international law in the national legal order.5 Pursuant to article 9,
‘[t]he Republic of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it’. In
addition, the Constitution regulates the functions, tasks and competences of
state authorities in the field of foreign relations. It is worth noting that the
aforementioned issues were not regulated in the Constitution during the
communist times.
Foreign relations form a separate area of state activity. Their specificity lies
in their being directed outside of the country and towards foreign partners.
Despite these specificities, foreign relations should be treated as a part of the
general policy of the state together with its internal policy or, rather, withmany
policies in particular areas of the state’s activity.6 Consistency of all policies
and rules and compliance with constitutional values is therefore required.7
The starting point for further analysis is one of the main principles of the
Polish constitutional and legal system: the separation of powers. It is expressed
in article 10 of the Constitution of 1997:
5 Andrzej Wasilkowski, ‘Przestrzeganie prawa międzynarodowego (art. 9 Konstytucji RP)’
[‘Observance of international law (article 9 of the Polish Constitution)’] in
Krzysztof Wójtowicz (ed.), Otwarcie Konstytucji RP na prawo międzynarodowe i procesy inte-
gracyjne [Opening of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland to international law and
integration processes] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2006), pp. 9–30.
6 Leszek Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’ [‘The Constitution and “external
affairs”’] (2007) 4 Przegląd Sejmowy, pp. 195–96.
7 Ryszard Piotrowski, ‘Konstytucyjne uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej’ [‘Constitutional
determinants of foreign policy’], in Ryszard M. Czarny and Kamil Spryszak (eds.), Państwo
wobec współczesnych wyzwań. Zagadnienia prawa konstytucyjnego [The state in the face of
contemporary challenges. Issues of constitutional law] (Torun:Wydawnictwo AdamMarszałek,
2012), pp. 272–87.
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(1) The system of government of the Republic of Poland shall be based on
the separation of and balance between the legislative, executive and
judicial powers.
(2) Legislative power shall be vested in the Sejm and the Senate, executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the
Council of Ministers, and the judicial power shall be vested in courts
and tribunals.
The principle of separation of powers was restored in Poland in the early 1990s.
Previously, the principle of ‘unity of state power’ had applied for several
decades. The highest authority of state power was formally the Sejm
(Parliament), although in reality the state was governed by the communist
party.
An analysis of the current legal arrangements in the field of foreign relations
shows that the tasks and competences in this area are granted to authorities
belonging to different branches although their participation is unequal. The
roles that have been provided for the various state authorities in this area are,
on the one hand, a manifestation and, on the other, a result of the constitu-
tional system which has been adopted.
III EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
The executive power is of the utmost importance in this area and will receive
a great deal of further attention. This is not surprising; on the contrary, it is
a typical situation in many states with a long tradition.8
A characteristic of the executive branch in Poland is its duality expressed in
article 10(2) of the Constitution. Functions, tasks and competences are vested
separately in the President and the Council of Ministers (the Government).
The duality was introduced by the first constitutional amendments after the
collapse of the communist system in 1989. The constituent authorities of the
executive are separated from each other and each have their own legitimacy.
Article 127(1) and (2) provide
(1) The President of the Republic shall be elected by the Nation, in
universal, equal and direct elections, conducted by secret ballot.
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected for a 5-year term of office
and may be re-elected only for one more term.
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The President therefore derives his democratic legitimacy directly from the
will of the sovereign nation.
In turn, the Council of Ministers (the Government) benefits from the
support of the parliamentary majority in the Sejm – the first chamber of the
Polish Parliament. The Government’s legitimacy therefore derives from the
principles of representative democracy (articles 4(2), 154 and 155).
The issues of foreign relations law in Poland concern largely the distribu-
tion of tasks and competences between these two segments of the executive
power. The tasks and competences of both segments in the area in question
have undergone a characteristic evolution after the change of the political
system in 1989.
A The Temporary ‘Small Constitution’ of 1992 and Separation of Powers
between the President and the Council of Ministers
In 1992, a law of constitutional rank, commonly referred to as the ‘Small
Constitution’, was passed, which was intended to be temporary.9 The need
to issue it came about when it turned out that it would take more time to pass
a new, ‘full’ Constitution, because of the controversy surrounding its future
content.10
It is important to note that the tasks and competences in the field of foreign
relations were not clearly separated in the Small Constitution between the two
executive segments, that is, the President and the Council of Ministers. They
were assigned to both of these authorities.11
The Small Constitution stated in article 28 that:
(1) The President of the Republic of Poland shall be the supreme represen-
tative of the Polish State in internal and international relations.
9 ‘The Constitutional Act of 17October 1992 on themutual relations between the legislative and
executive institutions of the Republic of Poland and on local self-government’ (1992) 84
Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] item 426. The adoption of ‘Small Constitutions’ for
transition periods during the political changes became a Polish tradition in the twentieth
century. Such statutes were passed in 1919, 1947 and 1992.
10 Ryszard Chruściak, ‘Mała konstytucja z 1992 r.’ [‘The Small Constitution of 1992’] (2007) 5
Przegląd Sejmowy, pp. 89–110.
11 On the position of the President before the entry into effect of the Constitution, Piotr Tuleja
and Krzysztof Kozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126 Konstytucji’ [‘Commentary to Article 126 of
the Constitution’], in Marek Safjan and Leszek Bosek (eds.), Konstytucja RP Komentarz
[Constitution of the Republic of Poland, A Commentary] (Warsaw: C. H. Beck, 2016), vol. II,
p. 566; Marian Grzybowski and Anna Dobosz, ‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP a jego
kompetencje w stosunkach zewnętrznych państwa’ [‘The President’s political position and
his competences in the State’s external relations’] (2018) 9 Horyzonty Polityki pp. 132–37.
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(2) The President shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard
the sovereignty and security of the State, the inviolability and integrity of
its territory as well as upholding international treaties.
In addition, article 32(1) provided that ‘The President shall exercise general
control in the field of foreign relations.’
In turn, as regards the second segment of the executive, the Small
Constitution provided in article 51(1) that ‘[t]he Council of Ministers shall
conduct the internal and the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland’.
Furthermore, article 52(2) point 7 stated that ‘[t]he Council of Ministers
shall maintain the relations and shall conclude treaties with governments of
other states and with international organisations’.
It followed from the cited provisions that the separation of tasks and
competences between the President and the Government was difficult.12 It
was impossible to easily separate the ‘exercising of the general control in the
field of foreign relations’ which was the competence of the President, from
‘conducting the internal affairs and the foreign policy of the Republic of
Poland’ which, in turn, was the responsibility of the Council of Ministers.
The reasons for the imperfections of these provisions were largely due to the
complex political situation. Many small parties were represented in the
Parliament in the early 1990s, which made it difficult to achieve a stable
majority for a clear concept of executive power. As a result, compromise
solutions were adopted, which were not very consistent though.13 The state
of the then constitutional provisions posed a risk of establishing two separate
foreign policies, specifically when the President and the Government came
from different political parties.14 The legal concepts contained in the Small
Constitution could create conflicts and tensions, especially as the President
sought to expand his competences at the expense of those of the
Government.15 It also had to do with the strong personality of President
Lech Wałęsa. For example, the President caused the development of the
practice of his consenting to the appointment of the Foreign Minister and
the National Defence Minister by the Sejm. It happened, although according
to its article 61, the Small Constitution provided for the President expressing
only a legally nonbinding opinion. It should be concluded, however, that
12 Ryszard Mojak, ‘Stanowisko konstytucyjne Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Małej
Konstytucji’ [‘Constitutional position of the President of the Republic of Poland in the
Small Constitution’], (1993) 2 Przegląd Sejmowy, pp. 68–110.
13 Chruściak, ‘Mała konstytucja z 1992 r.’, pp. 96–97.
14 Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, pp. 136–37.
15 Chruściak, ‘Mała konstytucja z 1992 r.’, p. 103.
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despite the aforementioned problems and controversies, the unity of Polish
foreign policy was not threatened.16
B The Constitution of 1997 and ‘Rationally Modified Parliamentarianism’
1 Predominance of the Council of Ministers in Foreign Affairs
The legal structures of the presently binding Constitution of 1997 are partly
a reaction to the above mentioned provisions of the Small Constitution and
doubts as to their application.17
The intention of the founders of the Constitution was to eliminate the
overlap of tasks and competences between the Government and the President
and avoid the danger of potential conflicts. Therefore, the Constitution made
a stricter separation of the role of the two segments of executive power. This
pertained not only to the area of foreign relations even though it became most
conspicuous there.18
During several years of work on subsequent draft constitutions, various
political models and relations between the authorities were considered, refer-
ring to both the experiences of previous years of political transformation and
models taken from other states. The proposals included both the presidential
system with a dominant role of the President, and the parliamentary and
cabinet system with a strong government and a ceremonial role of the
President. Various intermediate solutions were also proposed.19
As a result, a concept was adopted which is not the realization of any of the
above models in their pure form. The constructions expressed in the
Constitution are referred to as the adoption of the model of ‘rationally
modified parliamentarianism’,20 even though it is not a commonly used
16 Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, p. 198.
17 Tuleja and Kozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126 Konstytucji’, p. 570; Dariusz Dudek,
‘Komentarz do art. 146 Konstytucji’ [‘Commentary to article 146 of the Constitution’], in
Marek Safjan and Leszek Bosek (eds.), Konstytucja RP Komentarz [Constitution of the
Republic of Poland, A Commentary] (Warsaw: C. H. Beck, 2016), vol. II, pp. 729–32.
18 Maria Kruk, ‘Konstytucyjny system rządów. Założenia i praktyka’ [‘Constitutional system of
government. Assumptions and practice’], in Ewa Gdulewicz, Wojciech Orłowski and
Sławomir Patyra (eds.), 25 lat transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce i Europie Środkowo-
wschodniej [25 years of political transformation in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe]
(Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2015), pp. 13–62 at 34–35.
19 Tuleja and Kozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126 Konstytucji’, pp. 568–70.
20 Anna Chorążewska, ‘Dualizm egzekutywy i jego konsekwencje: Casus sporu o reprezentację
Polski w Radzie Europejskiej’ [‘Dualism of the executive power and its consequences: Casus
of the dispute over the representation of Poland in the European Council’], in
Tadeusz Mołdawa and Jarosław Szymanek (eds.), Instytucja prezydenta. Zagadnienia teorii
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expression. It is characterized by a strong position of theCouncil ofMinisters and
of the Prime Minister, supported by the parliamentary majority. The President
does not play a decisive role in this model. However, his functions and tasks are
not purely representative and decorative. They are more important, although
limited.21 It can only be added, as a side note, that the aforementioned expression
departs from the term parlementarisme rationalisé known in the French constitu-
tional law literature.22 A comparison of the two segments of the executive power
leads to the conclusion that the Constitution gave priority to the Council of
Ministers (the Government). In particular, the Council of Ministers, headed by
the Prime Minister, was entrusted with conducting foreign policy.23
The limitation of the President’s competences in the field of foreign rela-
tions resulted from the already mentioned intention to eliminate the phenom-
enon of overlapping tasks and competing powers by both segments of the
executive. It should be noted that the inconsistencies that occurred before the
i praktyki na tle doświadczeń polskich oraz wybranych państw obcych [The institution of the
president. Issues of theory and practice against the background of Polish and selected foreign
countries’ experiences] (Warsaw: Elipsa Dom Wydawniczy 2010), pp. 29–52 at 35;
Jerzy Ciapała, ‘Spór kompetencyjny’ [‘The dispute of competence’], in Leszek Garlicki,
Marta Derlatka and Marcin Wiącek (eds.), Na straży państwa prawa. Trzydzieści lat orzecz-
nictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Guarding the rule of law. Thirty years of the Constitutional
Tribunal’s jurisprudence] (Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2016), pp. 760–81 at 767; Dudek,
‘Komentarz do art. 146 Konstytucji’, p. 724.
21 Ciapała, ‘Spór kompetencyjny’, p. 769; Tuleja and Kozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126
Konstytucji’, pp. 563–64, 570.
22 In France, this termmeans a parliamentarian system of government modified by the mechan-
isms introduced in the constitutional solutions after World War II to limit the political game
between the Parliament and the Government to provide protection against system degenera-
tions and government instability. See Louis Favoreu et. al., Droit constitutionnel 10th ed.
(Paris: Dalloz, 2007), p. 360.
23 Małgorzata Masternak-Kubiak and Artur Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego podziału
kompetencji organów państwa w stosunkach zewnętrznych’ [‘Implementation of the constitu-
tional division of competences of state authorities in external relations’], in
Krzysztof Wójtowicz (ed.), Otwarcie Konstytucji RP na prawo międzynarodowe i procesy
integracyjne [Opening of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland to international law and
integration processes] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2006), pp. 109–36 at 114; Garlicki,
‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, p. 196; Piotrowski, ‘Konstytucyjne uwarunkowania
polityki zagranicznej’, p. 273; Lech Mażewski, ‘Prowadzenie polityki zagranicznej
w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej’ [‘Conducting foreign policy in the Republic of Poland’] (2009)
3 Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, pp. 9–18 at 9; Bartłomiej Opaliński,
‘Funkcjonowanie władzy wykonawczej z perspektywy 15 lat obowiązywania Konstytucji
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 r.’ [‘Functioning of the executive power from the perspective
of 15 years of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland’], in Stanisław Biernat (ed.),
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku wobec wyzwań poli-
tycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych i społecznych [The Constitution of the Republic of
Poland in the first decades of the 21st century in the face of political, economic, technological and
social challenges] (Warsaw: Biuro Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 2013), pp. 217–30 at 219–20.
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entry into force of the Constitution could theoretically be removed by granting
a dominant position to either the Council of Ministers (government) or the
President. The decision of the authors of the Constitution to adopt the first of
these solutions can be partly explained by the intention to weaken the influ-
ence of President Lech Wałęsa, who, for all that, had lost the presidential
election even before the Constitution was passed.
The provisions of the Constitution illustrate the assessment presented above.24
In accordance with its article 146(1), ‘[t]he Council ofMinisters shall conduct the
internal affairs and foreign policy of the Republic of Poland’. Furthermore, the
Council of Ministers ‘exercise[s] general control in the field of relations with
other States and international organizations’ (article 146 paragraph 4 item 9) and
‘conclude international agreements requiring ratification as well as accept and
renounce other international agreements’ (article 146 paragraph 4 item 10). The
provisions set out above were supplemented by a general clause in article 146(2),
according to which ‘[t]he Council of Ministers shall conduct the affairs of the
State not reserved to other State authorities or local government’. This implies
a presumption of competence for the benefit of the Council of Ministers,
amongst others, in matters of foreign relations, unless another provision explicitly
confers competence on another state authority. The position of the Prime
Minister who is the head of the Council of Ministers is also strong.25
It follows from the abovementioned provisions that the Constitution
granted to the Council of Ministers certain tasks and competences which
had previously been vested in the President under the Small Constitution.
This reduced the risk of conflicts which, however, could not be entirely
avoided, as it would yet transpire.26
2 The Constitutional Role of the President of the Republic in Foreign Affairs
The President’s role in the field of foreign relations based on the Constitution
of 1997 is not unequivocal.27 Generally speaking, his role has weakened in
24 Mażewski, ‘Prowadzenie polityki zagranicznej w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej’, pp. 9–11;
Bartosz Szczurowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 133 Konstytucji’ [‘Commentary to article 133 of the
Constitution’], in Marek Safjan and Leszek Bosek (eds.), Konstytucja RP Komentarz
[Constitution of the Republic of Poland, A Commentary] (Warsaw: C. H. Beck 2016), vol. II,
pp. 632–35; Dudek, ‘Komentarz do art. 146 Konstytucji’, pp. 760–63; Grzybowski and Dobosz,
‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, pp. 138–42.
25 Chorążewska, ‘Dualizm egzekutywy i jego konsekwencje’, pp. 35–36.
26 Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, p. 197; Ciapała, ‘Spór kompetencyjny’, p. 768.
27 Marian Grzybowski and Piotr Mikuli, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnych kompetencji Prezydenta
RP w sferze stosunków międzynarodowych’ [‘Implementation of the constitutional compe-
tences of the President of Poland in the sphere of international relations’], in
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comparison with the previous legal status. The earlier formula that the
President exercises general control in the field of international relations was
not maintained because this task was assigned in the Constitution to the
Government.
In order to present the role of the President in the light of the Constitution,
it is necessary to distinguish his functions and tasks from his powers (compe-
tences). This distinction extends to the whole activity of the President, includ-
ing the field of foreign relations.
The President’s most important functions defining his position in the
constitutional setup of the state are set out in article 126(1) of the Constitution:
The President of the Republic of Poland shall be the supreme representative
of the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of the continuity of State
authority.
In turn, the President’s main tasks are defined in article 126(2):
The President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the Constitution,
safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability
and integrity of its territory.
Commentators stress that article 126 of the Constitution indicates the symbolic
role of the President as the authority embodying the state and the majesty of
the Republic of Poland also in external relations.28 The President performs
this role, on a continuous basis, in various forms at home and abroad, often in
a solemn manner. The above-mentioned provisions indicate the general
position of the President as a defender of the most fundamental values of the
state.
However, the provisions cited above alone are not a sufficient source of the
powers for the President to adopt legal acts or undertake other activities having
legal effects.
Marian Grzybowski (ed.), System rządów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Założenia konstytucyjne
a praktyka ustrojowa [System of government of the Republic of Poland. Constitutional assump-
tions and political practice] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2006), pp. 51–64; Masternak-
Kubiak and Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego podziału kompetencji organów państwa
w stosunkach zewnętrznych’, p. 111; Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, pp. 196–97;
Piotrowski, ‘Konstytucyjne uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej’, pp. 274–75; Mażewski,
‘Prowadzenie polityki zagranicznej w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej’, pp. 11–13; Opaliński,
‘Funkcjonowanie władzy wykonawczej z perspektywy’, p. 222; Dudek, ‘Komentarz do art.
146 Konstytucji’, pp. 743–44; Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’,
pp. 137–42.
28 Chorążewska, ‘Dualizm egzekutywy i jego konsekwencje’, pp. 37–38; Ciapała, ‘Spór kompe-
tencyjny’, p. 773; Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, pp. 137, 142–47.
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With regard to the President’s powers, the Constitution has adopted the
concept expressed in article 126(3):
The President shall exercise his tasks within the scope of and in accordance
with the principles specified in the Constitution and statutes.
This means that for the President’s actions to have legal effects there must be
legal basis contained in specific provisions of the Constitution apart from
article 126 or in the legislative acts of Parliament.29 There is therefore no
presumption that the President has the competence for the performance of its
tasks, since such presumption is provided for the Council of Ministers (article
146(2)). The actions of the President which have legal effects are referred to in
the Constitution as ‘official acts’ (article 141(1)).
An analysis of the Constitution shows that the provisions that define
the President’s competence to undertake actions that have legal effects in
the field of foreign relations are not numerous. Such is the nature of
article 133(1):30
The President of the Republic, as representative of the State in foreign affairs,
shall:
1) ratify and renounce international agreements, and shall notify the Sejm
and the Senate thereof;
2) appoint and recall the plenipotentiary representatives of the Republic of
Poland to other states and to international organizations;
3) receive the Letters of Credence and recall diplomatic representatives of
other states and international organizations.
These are competences traditionally held by the Head of State. It is note-
worthy that ratification of some international agreements is of paramount
importance, although the actual conclusion of agreements is a competence
of the Council of Ministers (article 146(4) point 10). In turn, the President’s
power to appoint ambassadors gives him the possibility to influence the staff
policy in the foreign service.
The requirement for the President to have a specific legal basis for the
exercise of his powers includes acts which produce legal effects (official acts).
However, there are no restrictions for the President to undertake various types
of activities that do not produce legal effects, but generate political conse-
quences, domestically and abroad. From the legal point of view, they are
29 Masternak-Kubiak and Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego podziału kompetencji organów
państwa w stosunkach zewnętrznych’, p. 112; Chorążewska, ‘Dualizm egzekutywy i jego
konsekwencje’, p. 37; Tuleja and Kozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126 Konstytucji’, p. 575.
30 Grzybowski and Mikuli, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnych kompetencji Prezydenta RP’, pp. 52–54.
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treated as nonbinding actions.31 They consist in making visits abroad, receiv-
ing representatives of other states, making speeches, declarations, etc.
Sometimes the mere presence of the President in a particular place and
time demonstrates the great importance Poland attaches to a given event.
Such activity of the President serves the purpose of carrying out the functions
and tasks contained in article 126(1) and (2) of the Constitution.
With regard to actions which have legal effects, that is to say, official acts, an
important distinction should be made between the ways in which the
President exercises his powers.32
Some competences are carried out independently and do not require the
approval of other state authorities. They are referred to in the legal literature as
the President’s prerogatives. A closed catalogue of prerogatives is contained in
article 144(3) of the Constitution. In the field of broadly defined foreign
relations it is only the ordering of the promulgation of an international
agreement in the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of the Republic of
Poland that is in the nature of a prerogative (article 144(3), (7)).
In principle, however, official acts of the President require for their validity
the signature of the Prime Minister (article 144(2)).
All of the aforementioned powers of the President set out in article 133(2) of
the Constitution are exercised following this procedure. Making the issuance
of the acts listed therein dependent on the countersignature of the Prime
Minister additionally limits the role of the President in the field of foreign
relations. It is the Prime Minister who bears political responsibility before the
Sejm.33
It should be noted that the dominant role of the Council of Ministers in the
exercise of the executive power compared to that of the President, not only in
the area of foreign relations, leads to the identification of a significant
inconsistency.34 As already mentioned, the President is elected by citizens in
direct and universal vote. This model of election determines his strong
democratic legitimacy, which, as a natural consequence, should give him
broad powers. In the light of the Polish Constitution, however, despite the
recognition of the President as the supreme representative of the Republic of
31 Chorążewska, ‘Dualizm egzekutywy i jego konsekwencje’, pp. 38–39; Szczurowski,
‘Komentarz do art. 133 Konstytucji’, pp. 631–32; Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja ustrojowa
Prezydenta RP’, pp. 139, 142–44.
32 Szczurowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 133 Konstytucji’, p. 631; Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja
ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, p. 143.
33 Grzybowski and Mikuli, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnych kompetencji Prezydenta RP’, p. 59;
Kruk, ‘Konstytucyjny system rządów’, p. 42.
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Poland, his powers to carry out actions that produce legal effects are limited.35
In such a state of affairs, Presidents have attempted to strengthen their position
and reduce the discrepancies between the broad democratic mandate of the
President and his political role on the one hand and the real influence in the
field of internal policy and foreign relations on the other.36 This happened
especially in cohabitation situations when the President and the Prime
Minister came from other political formations and that caused tensions.37
The most conspicuous example of a conflict caused by the President’s belief
that his powers are excessively limited was the dispute over the representation
of Poland in the European Council.
3 Overlapping Competences and Duty to Cooperate
Despite the delineations made in the Constitution, some tasks in the field of
foreign relations belong to both segments of the executive power.38 The
tensions this may cause between them could potentially be mitigated by the
introduction of an obligation for the President to cooperate with the
Government.39 It is already the preamble that characterizes the Constitution
35 Kruk, ‘Konstytucyjny system rządów’, p. 35.
36 Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, p. 198.
37 Dudek, ‘Komentarz do art. 146 Konstytucji’, p. 743–44; Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja
ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, p. 141.
38 Grzybowski and Mikuli, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnych kompetencji Prezydenta RP’, pp. 61–64;
Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, p. 197; Opaliński, ‘Funkcjonowanie władzy
wykonawczej z perspektywy’, pp. 223, 225–26; Tuleja and Kozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126
Konstytucji’, p. 575.
39 Masternak-Kubiak and Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego podziału kompetencji organów
państwa w stosunkach zewnętrznych’, pp. 110–12.; Zbigniew Witkowski, ‘Dyrektywa
“współdziałania władz” jako element organizujący życie wspólnoty państwowej w świetle
Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 r.’ [‘Directive of the “cooperation of authorities” as an
element organizing the life of the state community in the light of the Polish Constitution of
2 April 1997’], in Jan Wawrzyniak and Marzena Laskowska (eds.), Instytucje prawa konstytu-
cyjnego w dobie integracji europejskiej [Institutions of constitutional law in the era of European
integration] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2009, pp. 139–45; Chorążewska, ‘Dualizm
egzekutywy i jego konsekwencje’, p. 40–41; Opaliński, ‘Funkcjonowanie władzy wykonawczej
perspektywy’, pp. 224–25; Maciej Pach, ‘Dyrektywa współdziałania władz w Konstytucji RP
z 1997 roku jako przykład ustrojowego wishful thinking’ [‘Directive on the cooperation of the
authorities in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 as an example of political
wishful thinking’], in Stanisław Biernat, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w pierwszych
dekadach XXI wieku wobec wyzwań politycznych, gospodarczych, technologicznych
i społecznych [The Constitution of the Republic of Poland in the first decades of the 21st century
in the face of political, economic, technological and social challenges] (Warsaw: Biuro
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 2013), pp. 205–16; Ciapała, ‘Spór kompetencyjny’, pp. 775–77;
Szczurowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 133 Konstytucji’, pp. 634–35; Grzybowski and Dobosz,
‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, p. 141.
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of the Republic of Poland as ‘the fundamental law for the State, based on . . .
cooperation between the public powers’.
The obligation in question has been made concrete in the context under
consideration here in article 133(3) of the Constitution: ‘The President of the
Republic shall cooperate with the Prime Minister and the appropriate minis-
ter in respect of foreign policy.’
This provision is to be understood as an obligation of the President to
cooperate with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
various forms. The obligation to cooperate is assumingly not unilateral, but
lies with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, too. The
provisions of the Constitution do not clarify what the cooperation is about:
whether it is about mutual information, coordination of activities or whether it
is required to bring about a consensus of positions. Cooperation may include
agreeing on foreign policy directions as well as coordinating actions on the
international arena. It should be conducted in good faith with a view to
avoiding conflicts.40
C Constitutional Conflict over the Representation of Poland
in the European Union
The Constitution was passed seven years before Poland acceded to the
European Union. Therefore the Constitution does not contain any provisions
relating to the EU and Poland’s membership therein. However, there are
provisions in the Constitution that enabled Poland to become a member of
the Union.41 Article 90 of the Constitution contains ‘European clause’ which
served as the political and legal basis for the accession to the Union. In turn,
article 91 defined the position in the legal system in force in Poland of
international agreements, including EU Treaties and the law established by
international organizations, that is, also EU secondary law.
In 2009, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled on the conflict concerning who
is to represent Poland in the European Council.42 The President was of the
opinion that it was his responsibility. The Prime Minister, on the other hand,
40 Such position was taken by, e.g., the Constitutional Tribunal in its decision of 20 May 2009
(Ref. No. Kpt 2/08).
41 Stanisław Biernat, ‘Offene Staatlichkeit: Polen’ [‘Open Statehood: Poland’], in Armin von
Bogdandy, Pedro Cruz Villalón and Peter M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum
Europaeum (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2008), pp. 243–75.
42 Maria Kruk, ‘Glosa do postanowienia TK z 20maja 2009 (sygn. akt Kpt 2/08)’ [‘Annotation on
the Constitutional Court decision of 20 May 2009 (Ref. No. sygn. akt Kpt 2/08)’] (2010) 1
Przegląd Sejmowy 174–88; Jerzy Jaskiernia, ‘Współdziałanie Prezydenta i Rady Ministrów
w sferze polityki zagranicznej’ [‘Cooperation between the President and the Council of
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who came from another political party, considered this to be a competence
vested in the Government and did not agree to change the practice under
which the Prime Minister sat on the European Council. The President was
even denied access to a government plane to travel to Brussels. However, the
President took part in the European Council meeting together with the Prime
Minister. Thereafter, the Prime Minister applied to the Constitutional
Tribunal to resolve the dispute over the competence to represent Poland in
the Council. The Tribunal issued its first ever decision of this kind, based on
article 189 of the Constitution.43
In this ruling, the Tribunal settled the competence dispute by considering it
in the wider context of the role of the state authorities in dealing with the EU
institutions. It was important to establish whether the division of tasks and
competences between state authorities in EU matters was the same as in the
field of foreign relations. As the Constitution does not contain provisions on
the separation of tasks and competences of both segments of the executive in
relations with the EU, the Constitutional Tribunal decided to settle the
competence dispute submitted to it on the basis of general constitutional
provisions. The starting point was the conviction that relations with the
European Union do not fall within the scope of either internal policy or
external relations, but show, at the same time, the characteristics of both areas.
An analysis of the Constitution led the Constitutional Tribunal to the
conclusion that it is the Council of Ministers (the Government) that is
generally competent in European affairs due to its position as an authority
with general power in the field of both home affairs and foreign relations. The
PrimeMinister, who heads theGovernment, is authorized to represent Poland
in the European Council and to express Poland’s position in this forum.
However, there can be no question of the Government’s exclusivity in
Europeanmatters. The constitutional position of the President as the supreme
representative of the Republic of Poland and his tasks specified in article 126(2)
of the Constitution, is not without relevance either. The Constitutional
Tribunal stated that in (rather exceptional) cases, when issues falling within
the scope of the President’s tasks would be discussed by the European
Council, he may decide to represent Poland in this EU institution. In such
Ministers in the sphere of foreign policy’] (2010) 6 Państwo i Prawo, pp. 3–18; Mażewski,
‘Prowadzenie polityki zagranicznej w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej’, pp. 14–15; Ciapała, ‘Spór
kompetencyjny’, pp. 760–81; Tuleja andKozłowski, ‘Komentarz do art. 126Konstytucji’, p. 571;
Dudek, ‘Komentarz do art. 146 Konstytucji’, p. 744.
43 Judgment of May 20, 2009 Ref. No. Kpt 2/08, http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omo
wienia/Kpt_02_08_EN.pdf, accessed June 26, 2020.
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situations, however, the President would be obliged to present the position
determined by the Council of Ministers.
The Tribunal stressed that the state cannot pursue two foreign or European
policies and the division of competences while ensuring the consistency of
operation by all state authorities is essential.44 An important place in the
judgment under discussion is occupied by considerations concerning the
obligation of the President to cooperate with the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs resulting from the already mentioned provisions
of the preamble and article 133(3) of the Constitution.
The final conclusions of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling may be summar-
ized as follows: in the first place the Tribunal put forward the principle of
cooperation between the public powers, expressed in the Preamble and art-
icle133(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The obligation to
cooperate rests with the President of the Republic of Poland, the Council of
Ministers and the Prime Minister (who presides over the Council of Ministers),
while exercising their constitutional duties andpowers. As a rule it is theCouncil of
Ministerswhichdetermines the stanceof theRepublic ofPoland tobepresented at
a given session of the European Council. The PrimeMinister presents the agreed
stance there (article 146(1), article 146(2) and article146(4), (9) of theConstitution).
The President, as the supreme representative of the Republic, may, however,
decide to participate in a particular session of the European Council, if he finds
it useful for the exercise of his duties, specified in article 126(2) of theConstitution.
The participation of the President in a given session of the European Council
requires his cooperation with the Prime Minister and the competent minister in
order to ensure uniformity of actions taken on behalf of the Republic of Poland in
the relations with the EuropeanUnion. Such a cooperation enables the President
to refer to the stance of the Republic of Poland determined by the Council of
Ministers. It also makes possible to specify the extent and manner of the intended
participation of the President in a session of the European Council.
D The Role of the President of the Republic in Practice
1 The President As the Supreme Representative of the Republic of Poland
The constitutional arrangements outlined above according to which the
President has a strictly defined and limited power to take actions with legal
effect do not mean that successive Presidents are passive in the field of foreign
44 This attests to the adoption of the concept of ‘normalization’ in foreign relations law. See Aust
and Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, p. 14.
266 Stanisław Biernat
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
relations. Indeed, Presidents are very active in this area.45This can be illustrated
by the endeavors of Polish President Andrzej Duda in several months of 2019.
During this time, the President made many foreign visits and met with his
counterparts from other states. Sometimes the anniversaries of various import-
ant events were an opportunity to make such visits.46 A separate category were
multilateral conferences with Heads of State on a variety of political or social
issues.47 The President’s participation was aimed at emphasizing the signifi-
cance and rank of these meetings and conferences for Polish interests.
The results of these visits were various documents signed by the Polish
President and his partners from other countries. However, these were not
international agreements and were not legally binding. They expressed the
political will of the Republic of Poland and other participating countries.
2 The President As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Poland
Separate mention should be made of events in external relations with the
participation of the Polish President where he acted not only as the supreme
representative of the Republic of Poland (article 126(1)) guarding the sover-
eignty and security of the state (article 126(2)), but also as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (article 134(1)). An
example of such activity is the participation of the Polish President in the
meeting of theNorth Atlantic Council in London (3–4December 2019) on the
70th anniversary of NATO and the signing of the London Declaration issued
by the Heads of State and Government.48 The Declaration reaffirmed, inter
alia, the commitment to article 5 of theWashington Treaty. It should be noted
in this context that the practice developed in the past of Poland being
represented at NATO summit meetings by the President. The President is
always accompanied by the Minister of National Defence, which reflects the
requirements for cooperation provided for in the Constitution (article 133(3)).
45 In early 2021, it was even announced the plan to create an Office of International Policy in the
Chancellery of the President.
46 www.president.pl/en/news/art,1079,joint-statement-by-the-presidents-of-the-republic-of-lithu
ania-and-the-republic-of-poland-on-the-occasion-of-the-450th-anniversary-of-the-union-of-lub
lin.html, accessed June 26, 2020; www.president.pl/en/news/art,1144,president-commemor
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Poland’s foreign policy is largely aimed at strengthening state security
considering the sense of threat from Russia. The United States is considered
to be the main guarantor of state security within NATO as well as beyond the
framework of this Alliance. In the area of political and military cooperation
with the United States, successive Polish Presidents have been very active. The
result of many years’ efforts is the presence of 4,500 American soldiers on the
Polish territory. The President’s activity was also maintained in 2019. It was
manifested by two joint declarations of the Presidents of both countries. These
were the Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation Regarding US Force
Posture in Poland (June 2019) and the Joint Declaration on Advancing
Defense Cooperation (September 2019).
In the first of these declarations of June 12, 2019,49 the United States
announced an increase in its military presence in Poland in the near
future by about 1,000 additional soldiers. This will was sustained in
the second declaration. Poland, on the other hand, promised to provide
and maintain the jointly agreed infrastructure for an initial package of
additional projects at no cost to the United States. Poland is also plan-
ning to provide additional support to the US Armed Forces, going beyond
the NATO standard of support by the host country. The declaration then
listed the intended specific undertakings for increasing defense cooper-
ation in Poland. The second declaration of September 23, 2019 is an
extension and detail of the first one.50 It lists the locations of particular
US military units in Poland.
These declarations are important political documents for Poland, but do
not have direct legal effects. This is evidenced by the emphasis in both
declarations on the common will to strive for the conclusion of international
agreements and arrangements necessary for the implementation of increased
cooperation in the field of infrastructure and defense, including improvement
of the functioning of the US armed forces in Poland. It follows therefrom that
the declarations under discussion have a preparatory value in relation to future
international agreements.
The above review shows that the President’s role in the field of foreign
relations is not limited to his formal competence to undertake actions with
legal effects. The political implications are no less important. It should be
added that the current President of Poland is considered by many observers as
49 www.president.pl/en/news/art,1069,joint-declaration-on-defense-cooperation-regarding-us-for
ce-posture-in-the-republic-of-poland.html, accessed June 26, 2020.
50 www.president.pl/en/news/art,1107,joint-declaration-on-advancing-defense-cooperation.html,
accessed June 26, 2020.
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a politician who is not independent, but subject to the influence of the ruling
Law and Justice (PiS) party and its powerful Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński.
IV ACTIVITIES OF THE PARLIAMENT IN THE FIELD
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
The dominance of the executive in the field of foreign relations is undeniable.
However, this does not mean exclusivity in this area. Relevant is also the
activity of the Parliament51 which in Poland consists of two chambers: the
Sejm and the Senate. The role of the Parliament in the field of foreign
relations deserves attention because of its democratic legitimacy stemming
from direct elections.
1 Declaration of a State of War and Conclusion of Peace and Ratification
of Treaties
The Sejm – the Parliament’s first chamber – has, in the light of the
Constitution, a two-fold competence to take decisions in the field of foreign
relations. First, under article 116(1), ‘the Sejm shall declare, in the name of the
Republic of Poland, a state of war and the conclusion of peace’.52 The
Constitution details it in article 116(2):
The Sejm may adopt a resolution on a state of war only in the event of armed
aggression against the territory of the Republic of Poland or when an obliga-
tion of common defence against aggression arises by virtue of international
agreements. If the Sejm cannot assemble for a sitting, the President of the
Republic may declare a state of war.
Second, the Parliament gives its consent in the form of a statute to the
ratification of major international agreements.53 In accordance with art-
icle 89(1)
ratification of an international agreement by the Republic of Poland as well
as renunciation thereof, shall require prior consent granted by statute – if
such agreement concerns:
51 Masternak-Kubiak and Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego podziału kompetencji organów
państwa w stosunkach zewnętrznych’, pp. 118–21; Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zew-
nętrzne”’, pp. 198–201; Mażewski, ‘Prowadzenie polityki zagranicznej w Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej’, p. 13.
52 Masternak-Kubiak and Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego podziału kompetencji organów
państwa w stosunkach zewnętrznych’, pp. 118–20.
53 Grzybowski and Mikuli, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnych kompetencji Prezydenta RP’, pp. 54–61.
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1) peace, alliances, political or military treaties;
2) freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens, as specified in the
Constitution;
3) the Republic of Poland’s membership in an international organization;
4) considerable financial responsibilities imposed on the State;
5) matters regulated by statute or those in respect of which the
Constitution requires the form of a statute.
In addition, specific, more demanding rules for ratification with the participa-
tion of both chambers of the Parliament refer to the international agreement
based on article 90(1) of the Constitution. Pursuant to this provision, ‘[t]he
Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an
international organization or international institution the competence of State
authorities in relation to certain matters’. This provision concerned the
Accession Treaty of Poland joining the EU.
A statute, granting consent to the ratification of such an agreement shall be
passed by the Sejm by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half
of the statutory number of its Members, and by the Senate by a two-thirds
majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of
Senators. The consent to the ratification may also be granted in
a nationwide referendum (article 90(2) and (3)).
2 Control over the Activities of the Council of Ministers in the Field of Foreign
Relations and the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee
From the parliamentary perspective, noteworthy is the competence to exercise
control over the Government. In accordance with article 95(2) of the
Constitution, the Sejm shall exercise control over the activities of the
Council of Ministers within the scope specified by the provisions of
the Constitution and statutes. Clearly, the scope of parliamentary control is
broader than the field of foreign relations. The activities of the Parliamentary
Foreign Affairs Committee are of great practical importance. The Committee
discusses current issues of the Government’s foreign policy. In addition, the
Committee initiates legislative work, expresses its opinion on the correctness
of procedures for the ratification of international agreements and provides its
opinions on candidates for positions related to the state’s foreign policy.54
54 Jerzy Jaskiernia, ‘Charakter prawny i funkcje Komisji SprawZagranicznych SejmuRP’ [‘Legal
nature and functions of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm’] (2004) 6 Polski
Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 25–130; Masternak-Kubiak and Preisner, ‘Realizacja konstytucyjnego
podziału kompetencji organów państwa w stosunkach zewnętrznych’, p. 121; Garlicki,
‘Konstytucja a “sprawy zewnętrzne”’, p. 200.
270 Stanisław Biernat
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
Periodically, the Sejm holds debates on the foreign policy which is presented
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This provides an opportunity for the
parliamentary opposition to take a stand. It should be stressed, however, that
the President’s activity in the field of foreign relations remains beyond the
Parliament’s control.55
It can be concluded that, apart from the Parliament’s competence in the
process of ratification of international agreements, the Parliament’s role in the
field of foreign relations lies in providing opinions and inspiring the activities
of the Council of Ministers. Control over the Government is general in its
nature. The Parliament’s real influence on the executive in this area depends
largely on the qualifications and determination of Members of the Sejm
dealing with international affairs in a given term of office.
3 Parliamentary Activity in EU Affairs
Poland’s membership in the European Union has opened new fields of
parliamentary activity. As already mentioned, EU affairs do not fall within
the division of state activities into internal and external affairs and contain
elements of both. The role of the Parliament in the European affairs is defined
by EU and Polish law. The Lisbon Treaty has significantly strengthened the
position of national parliaments. The various forms of participation of national
parliaments in the Union’s political life and the related competences are
formulated in the extensive article 12 TEU which should be mentioned in
the first place.56 In this context, reference should also bemade to two protocols
which have the legal power of treaties. They regulate the procedures for EU
institutions to observe the principle of subsidiarity and assessment, in this
respect, of draft EU legislation by the parliaments of theMember States.57The
Polish Parliament is also involved in these procedures.
As far as Polish law is concerned, reference should be made to the Act of
2010 on the Cooperation of the Council ofMinisters with the Sejm and Senate
on Matters Related to the Membership of the Republic of Poland in the
European Union.58 Pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the Council of
55 Grzybowski and Dobosz, ‘Pozycja ustrojowa Prezydenta RP’, p. 145.
56 Tobias Lock, ‘Articles 10–12’, in Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert and Jonathan Tomkin
(eds.). The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 108–23 at 118 ff.
57 Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union (OJ 2016 No.
C202, 7 June 2016, pp. 203–05 and Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality (OJ 2016 No. C202, 7 June 2016, pp. 206–09).
58 ‘Ustawa z dnia 8 października 2010 r. o współpracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem
w sprawach związanych z członkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej’
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Ministers is obliged to cooperate with both chambers of the Parliament in
a number of areas: making European Union law, bringing actions before the
Court of Justice of the European Union by the Sejm and the Senate, creating
Polish legislation implementing European Union law, giving opinions on
candidates for certain posts in the European Union as well as in connection
with representatives of the Council of Ministers holding the presidency of the
Council. The cooperation according to the statute in question consists mainly
in the provision by the Government of information, to a broad extent, to
parliamentary committees competent for European affairs, consultations
and opinions on the Government’s intended activities. The statute in question
introduces procedures to ensure efficient cooperation.
V CONCLUSION
The above considerations have illustrated the existence of various factors
determining the performance of tasks and competences in the field of foreign
relations in a country which just over thirty years ago gained the possibility to
act independently on the international and European arena. The arrangement
of political forces reflected in the parliamentary composition during the
drafting and adoption of the Constitution determined the choice of the
structure of the state system, including the dualism of the executive power
and, within it, the relationship between the Council of Ministers (the
Government) and the President. In addition to the constitutional solutions,
of great relevance are the changing external conditions as well as the person-
ality traits of politicians performing the functions of president, primeminister,
ministers or members of parliament. Thanks to these characteristics, even in
the unchanged constitutional state, there may be differences in the real
significance of particular authorities in such an important and sensitive area
as foreign relations.
Worth noting at this point are the processes of transformation of the Polish
state system towards authoritarianism noticeable after 2015.59 These processes
are taking place without any amendment to the Constitution, although with
an interpretation of its provisions departing from what was commonly
approved previously. Essentially, undemocratic changes are being made
through new statutes and changes in the application of the old ones. Most
(2010) 213 Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] item 1395. Dudek, ‘Komentarz do art. 146
Konstytucji’, pp. 747–48.
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observers assert that certain of these statutes are unconstitutional. This uncon-
stitutionality, however, cannot be effectively examined considering the loss by
the Constitutional Tribunal of its prestige and public trust. The independence
of courts, including the Supreme Court, has been significantly weakened.
The aforementioned political transformations have an effect on Poland’s
foreign relations. They result in impairing the state’s reputation in the inter-
national arena due to the undermining of the principles of democracy and the
rule of law. The European Union responded to these developments.60
Proceedings under article 7 TEU have been pending before the Council of
the European Union since 2018.61 These were initiated by the European
Commission which believes that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by
this Member State of the values referred to in article 2 TEU, and in particular
the rule of law. The ECJ has issued several judgments ruling on the violation
by Poland of the rule of law with regard to the judiciary.62 Poland’s position in
the European Union has weakened. Even if there is no formal Polexit, its
increasing marginalization is to be expected.
The developments in Poland are also condemned by numerous inter-
national organizations. Poland is getting more and more isolated on the
international arena.
The changes in the practice of Poland’s foreign relations in recent years are
invisible in an analysis limited to constitutional considerations only. In the
exercise of their constitutional tasks and competences, including in the field of
foreign policy, both the President and the Government headed by the Prime
Minister as well as the parliamentary majority, are subject to the will of the
Chair of the ruling party (PiS).
60 Armin von Bogdandy, Piotr Bogdanowicz, Iris Canor, Christoph Grabenwarter,
Maciej Taborowski, Matthias Schmidt, Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member
States,Taking Stock of Europe’s Actions, (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2021), https://link
.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-662-62317-6.
61 Armin Hatje and Lubos Tichý (eds.), Liability of Member States for the Violation of
Fundamental Values of the European Union, Europarecht Beiheft 1 (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2018).
62 Judgments of the Court of Justice: Case C-619/18,EuropeanCommission v.Republic of Poland
[2019], ECLI:EU:C:2019:531; Case C-192/18, European Commission v. Republic of Poland
[2019], ECLI:EU:C:2019:924; Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A. K. and Others
v. Sąd Najwyższy [2019], ECLI:EU:C:2019:982.
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The Role of Parliaments in Creating and Enforcing
Foreign Relations Law
A Case Study of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ajla Škrbić
I INTRODUCTION
The growing importance of foreign relations law raises the question of
whether the traditional exclusion of parliaments from a country’s foreign
affairs is wrong and utterly flawed. While there are practical benefits in
seeing foreign relations as belonging only to the executive branch, this
approach undermines the potential for national parliaments to engage in
developing this area of law.1 Hence, in this chapter I examine the role of
parliaments in foreign relations law taking Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
as an example.
BiH is particularly interesting in this regard for several reasons. Firstly, BiH
has a unique constitutional framework and special relationship with
international law due to the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).2 Even though
this uniqueness is in a certain tension with the approach to discuss the general
question of the role of parliaments in foreign relations law, the example of BiH
is interesting because it can show that the impact of parliaments on foreign
relations law depends on parliaments’ role in a state and effective use of their
competencies. Secondly, BiH has an extremely complex and multilevel sys-
tem of state organisation as a result of the same treaty. Finally, the complex
internal structure combined with weak institutions and the absence of
1 This doctrine has its origin in Locke’s ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (1689) and is later
confirmed in Montesquieu’s ‘The Spirit of Laws’ (1748), Blackstone’s ‘Commentaries on the
Laws of England’ (1765), as well as Dicey’s ‘Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution’ (1885). Cf. Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 149–218.
2 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace
Agreement), Paris, 14 December 1995, (1996) 35 ILM 89, 172.
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a dedicated law on foreign relations3 leads to a large number of actors
(international and domestic) that can and has a major role in creating and
implementing foreign policy.
In this chapter, I will first provide some general information on the consti-
tutional design in BiH, on the institutions established by the Constitution, and
the general separation of powers as arranged by the Constitution. I will further
examine the foreign relations law of BiH and the respective competencies of
the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH (PA) in the implementation of the foreign
policy. I argue that foreign affairs should be analysed as a matter of the
distribution of powers between the executive and legislative branch, and not
the exclusion of the foreign affairs power from the legislature.4 Finally, the
chapter will turn to foreign relations law as a field of scholarship and research
in this country. The chapter ends with conclusions and recommendations.
This part of the chapter addresses some of the practical issues related to the
smaller and larger role of the legislature in shaping foreign policy. It also
addresses the future perspective of the role of parliaments in the issue under
examination.
II A GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
IN BIH
BiH is rather unique when it comes to (subsection A) its internal organisation
and (subsection B) its relation to international law. This special position of
BiH is owed to a violent international armed conflict that lasted on Bosnian
territory from 1992 to 1995 and ended with the signing of the DPA with the
Annex 4 serving as the Constitution for BiH.
A Internal Organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
One of the main questions raised during the negotiations of the DPA was
a question of how to organise the internal structure of BiH. In an effort to end
the war, the DPA was negotiated and signed by all three parties to the conflict,
3 Even though this is also the case with many other states, I believe it is a problem when it comes
to weak and divided states such as BiH. Namely, the existence of a distinct law with clear rules
and guidance could introduce a cohesion in foreign policy and reduce the possibilities for
excuses for self-interested conduct of political parties in foreign policy. Or, referring to what
Dire Tladi has addressed in his chapter, I believe that current BiH statutes that deal with
foreign relations are written for strong, independent and rule-of-law committed actors, whereas
in BiH, quite the opposite is true.
4 This goes in line with the finding of Campbell McLachlan (Cf. McLachlan, Foreign Relations
Law, p. 150).
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that is BiH, Croatia, and Serbia (along with the representatives from the
European Union (EU), France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States). With so many parties to the agreement,
the provisions therein represented a compromise of the parties’ respective
interests. Consequently, the DPA achieved its main purpose of ending the
war, but it left in place the ethnic division established by war. More specific-
ally, the solutions provided by the DPA succeeded in preserving BiH as
a sovereign state; however, it divided BiH into two parts: the Federation of
BiH (decentralised and predominantly with Bosniac and Croat population)
and Republika Srpska (relatively centralised and predominantly with Serb
population). Furthermore, the Federation of BiH was divided into ten cantons
with great powers and competencies. However, the complexity of the state
organisation does not end there. In addition to these two Entities (and cantons
in Federation of BiH), the town of Brčko became an independent district in
1999, being the only part of BiH not governed by the DPA.
As regards the institutions established by the Constitution and the issues of
separation of powers as arranged by the Constitution, they are weak and reflect
the ethnic divisions in BiH.5 This is an expression of a balance of power and
a drafting compromise between the warring DPA parties.6 Against this back-
ground, all governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the
institutions of BiH are within the jurisdiction of the Entities.7 As
a consequence, many important areas such as education or the police appar-
atus have been constitutionally placed under the jurisdiction of the Entities,
which is not the case for the field of foreign policy, however.8
The weak position of national institutions is further complicated by
their ethnically defined structure.9 In addition, each of the constituent
5 The institutions on the state level include the PA, the government (Council of Ministers), the
Presidency, the Constitutional Court, and the Central Bank (BiH Constitution, Articles
IV–VII).
6 Marko Joseph, ‘Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A First
Balance’ (2004) European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 7/2004, p. 6.
7 BiH Constitution, Article IV(3)(a).
8 BiH Constitution, Article III(1)(a).
9 For example, the PA is bicameral and encompasses a House of Representatives and a House of
Peoples (BiH Constitution, Article IV). The members of the House of Representatives are
directly elected in the Federation of BiH (two-thirds of members) and in the Republika Srpska
(one-third of members), while the members of the House of Peoples are indirectly elected by
the parliaments of the Entities [BiH Constitution, Article IV(1) and (2)]. Here, two-thirds of
members are elected from the Federation of BiH (and include five Bosniacs and five Croats),
while the remaining one-third of members are elected from Republika Srpska (five Serbs).
Even the Constitutional Court for which the Constitution does not contain express rules on
an ethnic quota has ethnically defined structure. Namely, the Court has nine members. Six of
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peoples10 has a veto power over all essential decision-making, that is, is
entitled to invoke the ‘vital interest’ that enables them to block every
proposal they deem harmful to their respective peoples.11 This may, and
very often does, paralyse the national institutions. It is worrying also for
foreign policy which is a responsibility of the tripartite Presidency.12 Even
though the Constitution of BiH declares that the Presidency shall endeav-
our to adopt all Presidency decisions by consensus, and the conducting of
foreign policy is particularly emphasised in this regard,13 this procedure
may lead to stalemate of the Presidency and foreign policy. Namely, if no
consensus is reached, two members of the Presidency may adopt
a decision. However, the dissenting member may then declare
a proposed decision to be destructive of a ‘vital interest’ of the Entity
from the territory from which he/she was elected.14 In that case,
a separate proceeding for the resolution of a dispute will be initiated.15
Accordingly, each of the constituent peoples may have a final say in the
Presidency and foreign policy, which goes in line with my claim regard-
ing a large number of actors that can have a major role in foreign policy
in BiH.
them are selected by the Entities, while the remaining three members are appointed by the
President of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), again pointing to the unique
openness to international law. And although there is no constitutional or other rule on an
ethnic quota for local judges, for the two positions allocated to the Republika Srpska, the
judgeships are always filled by Serbs; and for the four positions allocated to the Federation of
BiH, two judgeships are filled by Bosniacs while two are filled by Croats.
10 Pursuant to the Preamble of the Constitution, Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are described as
‘constituent peoples’.
11 The fact that the term ‘vital national interest’ is not defined in the BiH Constitution presents
a further challenge.
12 BiH Constitution, Article V(3)(a).
The Presidency has to comprise one Bosniac, one Croat and one Serb. Hence, anyone
identifying other than a member of constituent peoples is ineligible for Presidency. However,
it is noteworthy that the candidates for every function in BiH are ‘self-defined’ and can even
change their ethnic affiliation throughout the time. This issue was raised after it came to light
that several individuals (in connection to some prominent functions at the state and Entity
levels) have changed their ethnicity in order to be eligible for certain functions and to be ‘a
representative’ of a certain constituent peoples.
13 Cf. Article V(2)(c) of the Constitution.
14 Again, this is supposed to ensure equality of the ethnic groups.
15 Pursuant to the Article V(2)(d) of the Constitution, such a decision will be referred immedi-
ately to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska (if the declaration was made by the
member from that territory), to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of Peoples of the
Federation (if the declaration was made by the Bosniac member), or to the Croat Delegates
of that body (if the declaration was made by the Croat member). Finally, if the declaration is
confirmed by a two-thirds vote of those persons within ten days of the referral, the challenged
Presidency decision will not take effect.
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Finally, in addition to these state-level institutions, both Entities, the
Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska, have their own separation of powers-
structures.16 Furthermore, the Brčko District has its own division of powers.17
Also, both Entities have their own Constitutions, while the Brčko District has
the Statute of the Brčko District of BiH.18
B BiH and International Law
The Constitution of BiH and the DPA have led to a special situation of BiH
vis-à-vis international law. The fact that the Constitution is a part of an
international treaty enables it to be interpreted as a treaty defined by the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.19 Furthermore, its content
makes BiH uniquely open to international law. This is the result of the DPA
makers trying to develop and to guarantee pluralism and non-discrimination
of both the majority and minority in BiH with respect to the application and
protection of the whole range of different legal instruments and human rights
and freedoms. This is best demonstrated by:
- The direct applicability of the fundamental freedoms of the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its Protocols;20
16 They have their own parliaments, governments, presidents and an extensive network of courts.
17 Its legislative power is exercised by the District Assembly, the executive power is exercised by
the District Government, while the judicial power is exercised by the District courts.
18 Hence, even though having a very complex administrative division, BiH does not have
a supreme court, or any other court of last resort or court of appeal, ensuring a uniform
application of laws in BiH. Along with the Constitutional Court, the only court on the state
level is the so-called State Court. Quite interesting and in line with my claim regarding
Bosnian internationalised structure, the judges and prosecutors of the State Court were until
2012 appointed from international staff. This certainly fostered easier introduction of inter-
national legal solutions into national legal framework and institutions.
On the other hand, Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska do have their own Supreme
Courts, as well as lower courts.
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980,
1155 UNTS 331; (1969) 8 ILM 679; UKTS (1980) 58.
20 BiH Constitution, Article II(2), sentence 1. Although there are differing views on what the
obligation to directly apply the ECHR means, the prevalent conclusion is that the rights and
freedoms under the ECHR form directly applicable law which require no special transform-
ation procedure. For different conclusion see Decision on Admissibility andMerits, U 106/03,
27October 2004, where theConstitutional Court comprehended ‘direct applicability’ in a way
that ordinary courts are under the obligation to directly apply the rights and freedoms set forth
in the ECHR without taking into account the laws which are contrary to them and without
forwarding the issue of the constitutionality of those laws to the Constitutional Court
(Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits,
U 106/03, 27 October 2004, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_bs/u-106–03-26086.pdf, accessed
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- The provision on the absolute supremacy of ECHR and its Protocols over
all other law;21
- The provision on an additional fifteen international conventions on
human rights and protection of national minorities to be applied in
BiH;22
- The provision stating that the general principles of international law shall
be an integral part of the law of BiH and the Entities;23
- The provision that highlights that no amendment to the Constitution
may eliminate or diminish any of the rights and freedoms referred to in
Article II, or alter this provision.24
Furthermore, the DPA has established the Office of the High Representative
(OHR)25 as an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing
implementation of civilian aspects of the DPA.26 The OHR has the status of
17 July 2020, in English: www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/u-106–03-26086.pdf, accessed
17 July 2020). However, the Court later changed its position (see Constitutional Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits, AP 1603/05,
21 December 2006, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_hr/AP-1603–05-102456.pdf, accessed
17 July 2020, para. 37). Cf. Christian Steiner et al., Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Commentary (Sarajevo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010), pp. 105–7.
21 BiH Constitution, Article II(2), sentence 2. This provision was contested among some scholars
due to its ambiguity. The first issue was whether the ECHR has priority over the laws of BiH or
both in relation to the laws and the Constitution. Since the BiH Constitution was written in
English and has not been officially translated in the official languages of BiH, the problem
could have not been solved by reading the respective constitutional provision. However, it
seems that the Constitutional Court of BiH is of view that the ECHR is not above the
Constitution (see Decision on Admissibility, U 5/04, 27 January 2006, where the
Constitutional Court held that the ECHR cannot have superior status over the
Constitution, since the superior status and constitutional power of the ECHR in BiH stem
from the BiH Constitution itself, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_bs/u-5–04-71799.pdf,
accessed 21 April 2020, in English: www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/u-5–04-71799.pdf,
accessed 26 April 2020).
The second issue was whether this provision invokes all ECHR Protocols or just the ones
that were in force on the day of entry into force of the BiH Constitution. It seems logical that
the Constitution drafters had all protocols in mind since they used the notion of ‘protocols’
without enumeration, as was the case with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for example. (cf. Christian Steiner et al., Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Commentary (Sarajevo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010), p. 159).
22 Annex I to the BiHConstitution. Since they are integral part of the Constitution, they too have
priorities over all other laws in BiH.
23 BiH Constitution, Article III(3)(b).
24 BiH Constitution, Article X(2).
25 The Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko has filled this post since March 2009.
26 The civilian aspect of the DPA is a non-military aspect of the peace settlement set forth in
Annex X of the DPA. It entails a wide range of activities, including the continuation of
humanitarian aid efforts for as long as necessary, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and
reconstruction of the economy, the establishment of political and constitutional institutions
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a diplomatic mission to BiH and its main task is to ensure that BiH evolves into
a peaceful and viable democracy, as well as to serve as the final authority for
interpretation of the DPA on the civilian implementation of the peace
settlement.27 The High Representative has the power to impose decisions in
cases where BiH authorities are unable to agree or where important issues are
being considered or require resolution. Consequently, in the past, the High
Representative has removed elected officials from office, imposed numerous
laws and bylaws, and banned individuals from running for office, among other
measures.28
Its work has been challenged in front of different courts. Themain takeaway
from these efforts has been that the foundation for the OHR’s legislative acts
lies in international law29 and, therefore, it cannot be challenged by courts
(whether it is the Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH or Republika
Srpska, the State Court of BiH, the Constitutional Court of BiH or even the
ECtHR).30 However, it is worth noting that after its adoption, relevant
in BiH, the promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and
refugees, and the holding of free and fair elections.
27 Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex X, Article V.
28 The laws he imposed or amended are many and even include amendments to the Entity
constitution and the declaring unconstitutional a law adopted by the PA. For instance, he
imposed the laws on the transfer of competencies from the Entities to the state level, laws on
privatisation, new currency, citizenship, the freedom of movement, the customs tariffs sched-
ule, the law on foreign investment, the law on the flag, on the coat of arms of BiH, the laws on
privatisation of banks and enterprises, on telecommunications, on the common driving
licence, the Law on the Court of BiH, etc. Among the most challenged OHR decisions
were the ones on removing from office civil servants or elected public officials (that even
included a member of the Presidency of BiH and the President of an Entity) – mostly for non-
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but
also for corruption, mismanagement of public assets, interference with the judiciary, or not
carrying out duties as a judge. The number of his interventions is indeed extensive. For
example, only in one day in 2004, the OHR removed fifty-nine members of the political
leadership of Republika Srpska because of their non-cooperation with the ICTY (list available
at: www.ohr.int/list-of-removed-and-conditionally-removed-officials-by-the-high-representa
tive/). The number of interventions reached 153 per year at the high point of the OHR’s
activities (see Constance Grewe and Michael Riegner, ‘Internationalized Constitutionalism
in Ethnically Divided Societies: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo Compared’ (2011) 15 Max
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 56, and Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Restructuring
Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Model with Pit-Falls’, in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds.),
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 9 (The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill,
2005), pp. 179–224 at 208).
29 Its mandate derives from Annex X of the DPA, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations
(UN) Security Council, and the Bonn Declaration.
30 See, e.g., ECtHR, Kalinić and Bilbija v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Appl. Nos. 45541/04 and
16587/07), Admissibility Decision (Fourth Section), 13 May 2008, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001–86652, accessed 21 April 2020; Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and
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legislation becomes part of domestic law and is consequently reviewable by
the Constitutional Court.31 More specifically, although the OHR is acting on
the basis of international law, legislation that it adopts replaces acts of the PA
and becomes part of domestic law (and, in accordance with the Constitution,
all acts, regardless of who adopts them, are reviewable by the Constitutional
Court). Therefore, the Constitutional Court can review the constitutionality
of the content of legislation enacted by the OHR, but not whether there was
enough justification for the OHR to enact the legislation in the first place.
It is thus not surprising that the work of the OHR has been, and still is,
highly criticised.32 Themain criticism is that the OHR has de facto, unlimited
legal powers that are contrary to the essential democratic principles it pro-
motes. On the other hand, there are also legitimate arguments that, due to the
ethnic composition of BiH institutions and institutions on the substate level,
the intervention of the OHR is welcome and often necessary.
Inmy view, even though the objections to the OHR are justified, its work (as
well as the work of other international actors in BiH) is indeed still necessary.
However, three points of concern stand out: first, its role should be more
transparent and better explained to the citizens. Second, it should use its
powers more effectively in critical situations for which it is made (which has
been not the case since the former and most active High Representative Paddy
Ashdown has left office). Finally, it should work towards enabling domestic
actors to work fully independently.
Not only BiH, but also the Brčko District has a ‘special supervisor’.
However, in 2012 the High Representative announced that the Brčko
Supervisor would suspend his functions while retaining all his authority, as
he believed that the District’s institutions now have the capacity to address
their challenges on their own. Thus, while the Special Representative position
Herzegovina, Order on the Implementation of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of
Bosnia andHerzegovina in the Appeal ofMilorad Bilbija et al, No. AP-953/05, 23March 2007,
www.ohr.int/?p=64783, accessed 21 April 2020; Constitutional Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Decision No. U 26/01, 28 September 2001, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_h
r/u-26-01-51291.pdf, accessed 21 April 2020, in English: www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/u-
26-01-51291.pdf, accessed 26 April 2020.
31 See, e.g., Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision U 9/00, 3 November 2000,
www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_bs/u-9-00-12134.pdf, accessed 26 April 2020, in English: www
.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/u-9-00-12134.pdf, accessed 26 April 2020, 83–93.
32 In August 2019, leaders of BiH’s leading political parties have signed an Agreement on the
Principles of Establishing Authorities in BiH, which includes the creation of preconditions for
the OHR’s departure from BiH. Nevertheless, this departure is explicitly conditioned by
a positive assessment of the political situation in BiH based on full respect for the DPA,
which the OHR itself, along with the UN Security Council and the Peace Implementation
Council should assess.
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continued to exist, the full responsibility for the District’s affairs were devolved
to local administration.
Finally, the Constitution has articles that deal with the Entities’ relations with
international law. Namely, the relations between them and foreign states are
regulated in Article III(2)(a) and (d) of the Constitution. Pursuant to these
provisions, Entities may establish ‘special parallel relationships’ with neighbour-
ing states if these relationships are consistent with the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of BiH. Each Entity may also enter into agreements with states and
international organisations with the consent of the PA. However, the PA may
provide by law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent.33
C Shortcomings of the Current System
Although very open to international law and explicitly securing the enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms to all persons in BiH without discrimination on any
grounds, the BiH Constitution should and has been subject to a large amount
of criticism. The main reason is its discriminatory nature, since it discrimin-
ates the very persons it should protect. The citizens not belonging to the
mentioned ‘constituent peoples’ are being discriminated against, since they
are ineligible to stand for election for certain prominent positions in BiH.
However, it is not just them: Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs are also discrimin-
ated against based on the territory in which they live (e.g. a Serb member of
the Presidency may only be directly elected from the territory of Republika
Srpska, thus discriminating all Serbs in the Federation by disabling them to
choose ‘their’ representative in the Presidency).
This has led to several lawsuits against BiH before the ECtHR.34 The most
famous and widely discussed case among them is theCase of Sejdić and Finci.35
33 Several agreements on these special parallel relationships were signed. However, some of
them (between Republika Srpska and Serbia in particular) were criticised due to their alleged
unconstitutionality (see, e.g., Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision
U 42/01, 26 March 2004, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_bs/u-42-01-12264.pdf, accessed
26 April 2020, in English: www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/u-42-01-12264.pdf, accessed
26 April 2020).
34 See ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Appl. Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06),
Judgment (Grand Chamber), 22 December 2009, ECHR 2009-VI, 273; Zornić v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Appl. No. 3681/06), Judgment (Fourth Section), 15 July 2014, http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145566, accessed 21 April 2020; and Šlaku v. Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Appl. No. 56666/12), Judgment (Fifth Section), 26 May 2016, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?
i=001-163056, accessed 21 April 2020.
35 It was the first time the ECtHR declared a constitutional provision of a state party to be in
violation of the ECHR. Namely, Mr Sejdić (Bosnian national of Roma ethnicity) and Mr
Finci (Bosnian national of Jewish ethnicity) complained that the BiH Constitution prevented
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However, even after more than ten years since the delivery of this judgment, the
necessary reforms in BiH have not been adopted.36 This has led to the charac-
terisation of the situation in BiH by the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe as a manifest breach of the country’s obligations under the ECHR, as
well as of its undertakings as a member state of the Council of Europe.37 Thus,
even though the BiH Constitution is continuously described as uniquely open
to international law, the truth is that not all of its provisions are in line with
international law. The scars of the war in the 1990s remain deeply enshrined in
how BiH functions in general and the DPA continues to be the basis for the
present political divisions of BiH.
The ‘world’s most complicated system of government’38 has consequences
for the foreign policy as well. The prominent role of the constituent peoples in
them from being candidates for the Presidency of BiH and the House of Peoples of the PA
solely on the ground of their ethnic origins. The ECtHR held that BiH had violated Article 14
of the ECHR and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 as regards to the applicants’ ineligibility to stand
for election to the House of Peoples of the PA, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 as regards
to the applicants’ ineligibility to stand for election to the Presidency. And while the ECtHR
judgment recognised that BiH has a particularised system designed to ensure peace in the
1990s, it noted that a mechanism of power sharing with careful balancing of the rights of all,
not just some, communities is possible and needs to be introduced (ECtHR, Sejdić and Finci
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Appl. Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06), Judgment (Grand Chamber),
22 December 2009, ECHR 2009-VI, 273, para. 48.).
36 Status of Execution of the Judgment in Sejdić and Finci, http://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=004-
3141, accessed 21 April 2020.
The amendments to the BiH Constitution were introduced only once in 2009 with an
Amendment that established the constitutional status of the Brčko District (Amendment I to
the Constitution of BiH, Official Gazette of BiH, 25/09). All other attempts to amend the
Constitution were unsuccessful since, pursuant to Article X(1), the Constitution may be
amended only by a decision of the PA, including a two-thirds majority of those present and
voting in theHouse of Representatives. Hence, BiH political leaders (through BiH institutions
and with the agreement of all three ‘constituent peoples’) need to reach an agreement on the
content of reforms. It is evident, though, that the nationalist political leaders want the status
quo to be preserved as it enables them to stay in power. Thus, it does not seem likely that the
Case of Sejdić and Finci will be implemented in the near future.
37 Council of Europe, Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights, ‘Sejdić and Finci – After 10 years of absence of progress, new hopes for
a solution for the 2022 elections’, 22 December 2019, www.coe.int/en/web/execution/-/sejdic-
and-finci-after10-years-of-absence-of-progress-new-hopes-for-a-solution-for-the-2022-elections,
accessed 21 April 2020.
Also, in the following cases on similar issues, the ECtHR stated that the failure of BiH to
introduce constitutional and legislative reforms is not only an aggravating factor as regards to
the BiH’s responsibility under the ECHR for an existing or past state of affairs, but also a threat
to the future effectiveness of the ECHR machinery (see, e.g., ECtHR, Zornić v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Appl. No. 3681/06), Judgment (Fourth Section), 15 July 2014, http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145566, accessed 21 April 2020, para. 40.).
38 Alberto Nardelli, Denis Džidić and Elvira Jukić, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: the World’s Most
Complicated System ofGovernment?’, TheGuardian, 8October 2014, www.theguardian.com
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the national institutional system combined with the substantial involvement
of the international community leads to foreign policy being governed by
a number of different and sometimes opposing actors. The domestic ethnic-
ally divided institutions (controlled by the same political parties for thirty
years) disable genuine political change, making it impossible to reach deci-
sions against the will of the ruling elites. On the other hand, the power of the
international community represented through the OHR not only makes BiH
foreign relations law dependent on international law but it also allows the
previously mentioned domestic political actors to evade the political responsi-
bility for their (in)actions. This reality does not lead to strengthened capacities
of BiH institutions in exercising foreign affairs, nor does it lead to creation and
implementation of common external goals. It only undermines institutional
actions in the domain of foreign affairs and leads to political stalemate and
institutional ineffectiveness.
Interestingly, the dependency of BiH foreign relations law on inter-
national law seems to be somewhat similar to the states in the ‘Global
South’, as explained by Michael Riegner in his chapter. Notwithstanding
the fact that BiH does not belong to the Global South, its foreign
relations law, just like foreign relations law of the states in the ‘Global
South’, does not shape the outside world as much as the outside world
shapes their internal sphere. And although BiH’s constitutional structure
adds a new layer of complexity to the study of foreign relations law, there
is a similarity in terms of the openness to and acceptance of international
law, which is expressed in their respective constitutions. By allowing
a special status of international law within their domestic legal systems,
these states try to derive the formal validity of their constitutions from
international law, to modernise their image and to build up their reputa-
tion within the international community. Hence, the transnational and
hybrid categories of their foreign relations law transcend the binary
opposition between national and international, political and economic,
while the normative functions of their foreign relations law include
enhancing economic self-determination, socio-economic development
and equality.39 All these states also share a similar goal: to take a more
prominent role in the international community, which makes their for-
eign policy issues more relevant over time.
/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-
system-of-government, accessed 21 April 2020.
39 See the chapter by Michael Riegner, p. 69.
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III BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
The foreign policy of BiH is implemented through the Presidency of BiH,40
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH,41 and the resident and non-resident
diplomatic and consular missions of BiH.42 There is no dedicated law on
foreign relations in BiH yet.43Moreover, until March 2018, the only document
specifically regulating foreign relations law in BiH were the three-pages-long
General Guidelines on and Priorities of Conducting the Foreign Policy of
BiH.44 However, there are many other laws (including the Constitution) that
deal implicitly with foreign relations.45
‘The General Guidelines on and Priorities of Conducting the Foreign
Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ established the following as the priorities
of BiH’s foreign policy:
- Preservation and protection of the independence, sovereignty, and terri-
torial integrity of BiH within its internationally recognised borders;
- Full and consistent implementation of the DPA;
40 See the responsibilities of the Presidency in Article V(3) of the BiH Constitution.
41 See the responsibilities of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs in Article 8 of Zakon o ministarstvima
i drugim tijelima uprave Bosne i Hercegovine [Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of
Administration of BiH], Official Gazette of BiH, 83/17, available in English at: www.ohr.int
/laws-of-bih/public-institutions/.
42 There are also other local bodies that indirectly deal with foreign relations of BiH, such as the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH, the Ministry of Defense of BiH,
the Ministry of Security of BiH, theMinistry of Human Rights and Refugees and theMinistry
of Communications and Transport.
43 However, its adoption is foreseen in the new Foreign Policy Strategy of BiH 2018–2023, www
.predsjednistvobih.ba/vanj/?id=80826, accessed 21 April 2020, p. 2.
Also, a significant part of foreign relations law is covered by Zakon o postupku zaključivanja
i izvršavanja međunarodnih ugovora [Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution
of International Treaties], Official Gazette of BiH, 32/13 (see part IV of this chapter).
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia andHerzegovina, ‘TheGeneral Guidelines on and Priorities
of Conducting the Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 26March 2003, www.mvp.gov.ba
/vanjska_politika_bih/osnovni_pravci_vanjske_politike_bih/?id=2, accessed 21 April 2020.
45 Some of them are the previously mentioned Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the
Execution of International Treaties, Law onMinistries and Other Bodies of Administration of
BiH, Zakon o Vijeću ministara BiH [Law on the Council of Ministers of BiH], Zakon
o državnoj službi u institucijama BiH [Law on Civil Service in the institutions of BiH], etc.
Further, throughout the years, there were several legal acts that dealt with foreign relations law
in BiH (e.g. Platforma za djelovanje Predsjedništva Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u ratnim
okolnostima [Platform for the Action of the Presidency of the Republic of BiH under War
Conditions] and Uredba sa zakonskom snagom o vršenju inostranih poslova [Decree with the
Force of Law on Conducting Foreign Policy and the Rules on Inner Organization of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs]). More on that in: Jasmin Hasić and Dženeta Karabegović (eds.),
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy Since Independence (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan,
2019), pp. 27–30.
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- BiH inclusion into European integration processes;
- Participation of BiH in multilateral activities; and
- Promotion of BiH as a partner in international economic relations.46
However, in March 2018, the Presidency of BiH decided to revise these
guidelines and it adopted ‘The Foreign Policy Strategy of Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2018–2023’ (hereinafter Strategy) establishing a wider framework
on the activities of the relevant institutions of BiH in the realm of foreign
relations law.47 The Strategy was adopted in accordance with the constitu-
tional competencies of the Presidency,48 and the institutions of BiH are
obliged to implement it.
Given that the global situation has changed since 2003 (the growing prob-
lem of terrorism and radicalism, the refugee crisis, challenges that the EU
faces, etc.), the Strategy proposes several novel approaches to address these
global challenges. However, it does not bring anything that has not been
previously confirmed as foreign policy goal by the competent legislative and
executive bodies of BiH.
Hence, this document states as its goal the establishment of a wider
framework and guidelines on the activities of the relevant institutions of
BiH in the realm of foreign policy.49 It also emphasises the necessity for
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH to prepare every two years a draft
action plan with detailed objectives and priorities on the implementations
of the Strategy.50 In addition, it reiterates the obligation of the same
Ministry in monitoring the implementation of the Strategy, as well as
the Ministry’s duty to annually inform the Presidency of BiH on the
46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia andHerzegovina, ‘The General Guidelines on and Priorities
of Conducting the Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 26March 2003, www.mvp.gov.ba
/vanjska_politika_bih/osnovni_pravci_vanjske_politike_bih/?id=2, accessed 21 April 2020.
47 It is unknown when and where the consultations for the adoption of such an important
document took place or who was involved in the process since the media, academia, experts
and relevant non-governmental organisations were surprised when this was announced (cf.
Davor Vuletić, ‘Towards New Foreign Policy Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018–2023’,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Sarajevo, November 2018, http://vpi.ba/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
Towards-New-Foreign-Policy-Strategy-of-BiH-2018-2023.pdf, accessed 21 April 2020, p. 6).
Concurrently, the 2003 General Guidelines on and Priorities of Conducting the Foreign
Policy of BiH were adopted with the consultations with the academia, nongovernmental
organisations and business community (see Vuletić, ‘Towards new Foreign Policy Strategy’).
48 BiH Constitution, Article V(3)(a).
49 The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy of Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2018–2023’, 13 March 2018, www.predsjednistvobih.ba/vanj/?id=80826, accessed
21 April 2020, p. 2.
50 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 2.
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efficiency of its implementation and suggests measures on redefining of
the Strategy.51
As regards the principles of the foreign policy of BiH, the Strategy empha-
sises openness, equality, reciprocity, peaceful cooperation, and non-
interference in internal affairs of other countries, as well as the protection
and promotion of the BiH’s own basic constitutional principles, such as
constitutionality, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the rule of law.52 Also,
the respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and
the fight against all forms of violent extremism are stated as priority
principles.53 In addition and due to the uniquely complex political structure
of BiH, the Strategy underlines the importance of the principle of consensus in
every public appearance of foreign policy actors in the country.54 Finally,
efficiency, transparency, responsibility for the results achieved, together with
the universally endorsed principles of international law and the general
principles of diplomatic practice are among the principles of the implemen-
tation of BiH’s foreign policy.55
The central part of the Strategy refers to the pillars of BiH’s foreign policy.
Those pillars are the strategic directions and dynamic guidelines of the foreign
policy of BiH within which the objectives of the Strategy shall be pursued.
These pillars are, first ‘security and stability’, second ‘economic prosperity’,
third the ‘protection of the interest of BiH’s nationals abroad and international
legal cooperation’ and fourth and finally the ‘promotion of BiH in the world’.56
These pillars are intertwined and depend on one another. Thus, economic
prosperity cannot be achieved without the security and stability of BiH, while
the promotion of BiH in the world is not possible without the protection of
BiH’s interests and cooperation of BiH in international institutions.57
In addition, the importance of BiH’s integration in EU and NATO, as well
as dedication to values of the UN are highlighted.58 Indeed, it can be said that
51 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 2.
52 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, pp. 3–4.
53 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 4.
54 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 3.
55 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 4.
56 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, pp. 5–13.
57 The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 5.
58 This was followed by the accusations by the then President of Republika Srpska Milorad
Dodik (and current Serb member of the Presidency of BiH) towards the then Serb member of
the Presidency Mladen Ivanić that, by accepting NATO integration provisions, he attempted
to rebut the 2017 Resolution on the Protection of the Constitutional Order and the
Proclamation of the Military Neutrality of Republika Srpska. The Resolution is available at:
www.narodnaskupstinars.net/?q=la/akti/ostali-akti/rezolucija-o-zaštiti-ustavnog-poretka-i-pro
glašenju-vojne-neutralnosti-republike-srpske, accessed 21 April 2020.
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from 1997 onwards,59 all foreign relations policies of this country have been
focused on BiH’s membership in the EU, and anything done by the relevant
actors in BiH is expected to be done with the EU integration as a primary goal
in mind.60
There are both legal and political considerations associated with the compli-
ance of Bosnian institutions and political actors with EU foreign policy declar-
ations. Each country aspiring to become an EUmember has committed itself to
gradually align its policies and practices with the EU’s foreign policy activities,
which is demonstrated through the adoption of foreign policy declarations and
the eventual implementation of the measures that may result from them.
Therefore, the majority of agreements signed jointly between BiH and EU, as
well as BiH acts passed after its decision on the accession to the EU, highlight the
duty of an increasing convergence of positions of BiHwith the EU.61 In addition,
this is important as it shows that BiH is trustworthy and can act in accordance
with the obligations arising from concluded and accepted agreements as well as
from any other obligation stemming from the European integration process.
However, the practice of the BiH institutions shows something different.
Political actors in BiH work on the above-mentioned priorities and principles
in only a declaratory fashion (and sometimes not even that). This has been
emphasised by the European Commission, too.62 For example, the Strategy
highlights the membership in NATO as one of the BiH’s priorities. However,
59 In 1997, the EUCouncil of Ministers established political and economic requirements for the
development of bilateral relations with BiH.
60 The Strategy also emphasises that the foreign policy of BiH should work more intensely to
achieve:
- More comprehensive and efficient participation in important international events;
- Promotion of tourism and business trips to Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Promotion and capacity building of the ‘country of origin’ concept aimed at exporters
of goods and services;
- Better and more comprehensive presentation in the international media;
- Usage of contemporary communication technologies for promotion of Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s values;
- Further enhancement of cultural relations with other states and regions.
(Cf. The Presidency of BiH, ‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2018–2023’, p. 13).
61 See, e.g., the Foreign Policy Strategy itself, or Article 10(2) of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement Between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, Luxembourg, 16 June 2008, in force
1 June 2015, http://dei.gov.ba/dei/bih_eu/sporazum/glavni_text/default.aspx?id=1172&langTa
g=en-US, accessed 21 April 2020.
62 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Bosnia and Herzegovina
2018 Report, Accompanying the document: Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
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the current chairman of the Presidency of BiH Milorad Dodik almost daily
declares that BiH membership in NATO is unacceptable.63
The second problem is that the three-member Presidency of BiH (as well as
other BiH’s institutions) do not share the same views on a number of domestic
and international issues. This is a major obstacle for every decision that must
be made in BiH. For example, BiH has not yet recognised Kosovo as an
independent state due to the lack of unanimity within the Presidency of
BiH. Namely, Serb members of the Presidency throughout the years have
always opposed this recognition as their policies are usually in line with
Serbia.64 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is united with them on this issue as
well.65 Their stance is determined by the stance of Republika Srpska, which is
strongly opposed to the recognition of Kosovo.66 BiH is therefore currently the
govina-report.pdf, accessed 21 April 2020, p. 3: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with EU
Common Foreign and Security Policy has yet to be improved’.
63 A significant amount of research confirms that BiH is not acting in accordance with what it has
committed to. For example, in the period 2014−17, BiH did not support any of the more than
20 EU declarations related to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and cyber-attacks directed at the
EU member states for which the EU accuses Russia (Denis Hadžović, ‘Where is the Foreign
Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina Shaped?’, Centre for Security Studies – BH,
7 February 2018, http://css.ba/press-release-where-is-the-foreign-policy-of-bosnia-and-
herzegovina-shaped/, accessed 21 April 2020, p. 2.). Furthermore, between January 2018 and
January 2019, in fourteen cases political actors in BiH did not join foreign policy positions or
EU declarations directed against Russia’s actions that endangered the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia (S. Degirmendžić, ‘The Conduct of Foreign Policy
Shows the Pro-Russian Commitment of our Officials’, Avaz, 7 April 2019, https://avaz.ba/vij
esti/bih/473386/hadzovic-vodenje-vanjske-politike-pokazuje-prorusku-opredijeljenost-nasih-
zvanicnika, accessed 21 April 2020). Given that many important political actors from
Republika Srpska and the media they control are openly endorsing Russia against the EU,
and taking into account slow progress made by BiH on its road towards EU accession, many
civil society organisations in BiH claim that even after the adoption of the Strategy, the foreign
policy of BiH is more in line with the pro-Russian than pro-European views.
64 For example, current Serb member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik has made threats even
while he was a Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, stating that he will act on secession of
Republika Srpska from BiH if Kosovo becomes independent (comparing the secession of
Kosovo from Serbia with the potential secession of Republika Srpska from BiH).
65 Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bosnian Serb) highlighted that the issue of recognising Kosovo
will not even be considered while he occupies the office and during the mandate of the
current Council of Ministers. See Oslobođenje, ‘Crnadak: No recognition of Kosovo or
decision on MAP’, 30 April 2019, www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/crnadak-nema-priznanja-
kosova-niti-odluke-o-map-u-453466, accessed 21 April 2020.
66 In 2008, National Assembly of Republika Srpska even adopted a resolution denouncing the
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and declaring that, if a majority of EU and
UN states recognise Kosovo’s independence, it would consider it as a precedent and signal it could
declare its own secession from BiH. This resolution also called upon all officials from Republika
Srpska to prevent BiH from recognising Kosovo’s independence. See Narodna skupština
Republike Srpske, ‘Rezolucija o nepriznavanju jednostrano proglašene nezavisnosti Kosova
i Metohije i opredjeljenjima Republike Srpske’, 22 February 2008, www.narodnaskupstinars.net
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only country in the region other than Serbia that has not recognised Kosovo.
This complicates not only the movement of people (‘it is easier to get to
London than to Priština’) but also economic cooperation (e.g., in response,
Kosovo at one point introduced 100 per cent Tariff on the import of goods
from BiH).
The situation in BiH foreign affairs is nevertheless not all bad. From its
independence onwards, BiH has presided over the UN Security Council and
the Council of Europe, has been preparing applications for admission to
memberships in NATO and EU, has contributed to international crisis
management, peacekeeping and peace building missions worldwide, and
has been solving its disputes with other states before international courts.67
BiH has demonstrated that, even though it has been grappling with its own
uniquely complex system of government, it has somehow succeeded in
implementing some of its foreign policy goals. However, it is without ques-
tion that BiH lacks an effective institutional apparatus and a clear strategy on
foreign relations.68
IV THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA IN BOSNIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
The role of the PA in the foreign policy of BiH is not much emphasised in the
Constitution or any of the BiH laws. Pursuant to the Constitution, foreign
policy is a responsibility of the institutions of BiH,69 more specifically of the
Presidency. Thus, the Presidency is responsible for conducting the foreign
policy of BiH, for appointing ambassadors and other international representa-
tives of BiH, for representing this country in international and European
organisations and institutions and for seeking membership in such organisa-
tions and institutions of which BiH is not a member.70 Furthermore, the
/?q=la/akti/ostali-akti/rezolucija-o-nepriznavanju-jednostrano-proglašene-nezavisnosti-kosova-i-me
tohije-i-opredjeljenjima-republike-srpske, accessed 21 April 2020.
67 Hasić and Karabegović, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy, p. 3.
68 Hasić and Karabegović, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy, p. 4.
69 In contrast to matters that fall into the responsibilities of the Entities.
70 BiH Constitution, Article V(3)(a)–(c).
The Constitutional Court however emphasised that the PA has responsibility for enacting
legislation as necessary to implement decisions of the Presidency in the area of foreign policy
(see Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits,
U 9/07, 4October 2008, paras. 16, 18 and 21, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_bs/U-9-07-214754
.pdf, accessed 13 July 2020, in English: www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/U-9-07-214754.pdf,
accessed 13 July 2020).
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Presidency is also responsible for negotiating, denouncing and ratifying treat-
ies of BiH.71 Finally, its competencies include coordination of the country
with international and nongovernmental organisations in BiH.72
The Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH details
these issues further. It regulates that theMinistry of Foreign Affairs is responsible
for the implementation of the foreign policy of BiH and development of BiH’s
international relations.73 However, it sets out that this should be done in
accordance with the positions and directions of the Presidency of BiH. What
is more, the sameMinistry is responsible for proposing the adoption of positions
concerning the issues of interest for foreign policy activities and the inter-
national position of BiH, as well as for representing BiH in foreign relations,
and carrying out the professional tasks in relation thereto.74 Pursuant to the
regulations set out in the same Law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is respon-
sible for proposing to the Presidency of BiH the establishment and termination
of diplomatic or consular relations with other states, the cooperation with
international organisations, as well as the preparation and organisation of
international meetings and agreements.75 Moreover, its competencies also
include preparing documents, analyses, information, and other materials serv-
ing the needs of the bodies competent for the foreign policy implementation.76
Nevertheless, for the reasons listed below, the role of the PA in the foreign
policy of BiH is not insignificant.
Firstly, it has been highlighted that the Presidency is responsible for negoti-
ating, denouncing, and ratifying treaties of BiH. However, it cannot do so
without the consent of the PA.77 This is confirmed by the Law on the
Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties.78
Hence, even though the Law stipulates that international treaties on behalf
of BiH are concluded by the Presidency of BiH,79 the Presidency must, for the
71 BiH Constitution, Article V(3)(d).
72 BiH Constitution, Article V(3)(h).
73 Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH, Article 8 (available in English
at: www.ohr.int/laws-of-bih/public-institutions/).
74 Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH, Article 8.
75 Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH, Article 8.
76 Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH, Article 8.
77 BiH Constitution, Article V(3)(d).
The consent of the PA is published in the Official Gazette of BiH (see Council of Europe,
Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI), Expression of Consent
by States to be Bound by a Treaty, Analytical Report and Country Reports, 23 January 2001,
https://rm.coe.int/168004ad95, accessed 11 July 2020, p. 226).
78 Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties, Articles
15–17.
79 Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties, Article 3(1).
The Role of Parliaments in Creating & Enforcing Foreign Relations Law 291
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
purpose of obtaining the prior approval for ratification, submit the concluded
international treaty to the PA. The Presidency should also submit a detailed
explanation of the need and conditions for concluding a considered treaty.80
Thus, the PA decides to give (or not) prior consent for the ratification of an
international treaty, while the Presidency, upon obtaining that consent,
decides on the ratification of an international treaty. Additionally, the
Council of Ministers is responsible for implementing international treaties,
and shall notify the Presidency and the PA about said implementation at least
once a year.81
Secondly, even though the Presidency shall decide on the cancellation or
withdrawal from an international treaty (either on its own initiative or at the
proposal of the Council of Ministers), it cannot do so without the prior
approval of the PA.82
Thirdly, it has been emphasised that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
responsible for proposing the adoption of positions concerning the issues of
interest for foreign policy activities and the international position of BiH, as
well as for representing BiH in its foreign relations, and carrying out the
professional tasks in relation thereto. However, it should report on these
activities to, among others, the PA.83
The controlling role of the House of Representatives of the PA is also
reflected in its authority to confirm the appointment of the Council of
80 Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties, Article 15.
81 Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties, Article 30.
The Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties
stipulates that the Council of Ministers of BiH is responsible for the execution of international
treaties through the competent institutions of BiH and the Entities. International treaties
which establish direct obligations for BiH are executed by the competent institutions of the
state administration whose competence covers areas regulated by those treaties, while the
treaties which are concluded by BiH, and which establish obligations for domestic legal
persons, are directly executed by those legal persons.
There is however no explicit provision defining the rank of international treaties in domestic
law or provision regulating the introduction of international treaties in domestic law as
condition for their applicability. The Constitution also does not provide any clarification on
the matter (see generally Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on
Admissibility and Merits, U 5/09, 25 September 2009, www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_bs/U-
5-09-290456.pdf, accessed 10 July 2020, in English: www.ustavnisud.ba/dokumenti/_en/U-5-0
9-290456.pdf, accessed 10 July 2020). The ratified and published international treaties are
directly applicable and incorporated into domestic law by promulgation and publication in
the Official Gazette of BiH (see Council of Europe, Expression of Consent by States to be
Bound by a Treaty, pp. 225–7).
82 Law on the Procedure of Concluding and the Execution of International Treaties,
Article 33(2).
83 Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH, Article 8.
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Ministers of BiH, to oversee and control its work, and to vote no confidence
when deemed necessary.84
Furthermore, the House of Representatives has several Permanent
Committees, including, among others, the Committee on Foreign Affairs.85
Its jurisdiction is to monitor the conduct of foreign policy and to consider all
issues in the field of international relations and foreign affairs.86 This includes
a role in adopting legislation in the field of foreign affairs.87 This also includes
engaging with the cooperation of BiH with international organisations and the
international community, as well as inter-parliamentary cooperation with the
respective parliamentary committees of other countries. In addition, the
Committee considers granting and revoking consent to the ratification of
international treaties, agreements and conventions.88 The role of the
Committee can also be important when it comes to the cancellation or
withdrawal from an international treaty.89 Therefore, perhaps the biggest
influence of the PA on BiH’s foreign policy may be made through the work
of this Committee. Nevertheless, this influence will depend on its very mem-
bers. In fact, some of its Chairs have done everything in their power to
minimise the role of the Committee.90 As a result, the internal division and
complexity of BiH have its impact on the work of this Committee as well.91 It
seems as this Committee in BiH exists only formally. For example, the 2017
annual report of the Committee states that the Committee has held twelve
sessions and adopted four conclusions. The average attendance of its members
84 See the responsibilities of the PA in Article IV(4) of the Constitution.
85 They are not defined in the Constitution but in Poslovnik Predstavničkog doma Parlamentarne
skupštine BiH [Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives], Official Gazette of BiH,
97/15.
86 Article 43 of Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives.
87 The Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives requires this Committee to be
consulted ‘for the purpose of obtaining its opinion on the principles on which the proposed
law is based’ (Articles 106 and 109). If the House does not accept opinion of the Committee, it
must request that the Committee provides a new opinion (taking into account the debate
conducted at the session of the House). This process can be repeated two times at most, after
which the legislative procedure shall be suspended in case that the opinion is not adopted (see
Articles 113 and 121).
88 For the full list of Committee’s competencies see Article 45 of the Rules of Procedure of the
House of Representatives of the PA.
89 In accordance with Article 139 of the Rules of Procedure of theHouse of Representatives, prior
approval of the PA which is required in this regard means, among others, that the House of
Representatives will have to seek the opinion of the competent committee on the matter.
90 The Secretary of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, personal communication, April 2019.
91 For example, it is not uncommon for Committee members to form a single-ethnic delegation
when meeting with members of other countries’ foreign affairs committees (Hasić and
Karabegović, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy, p. 235).
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to its sessions was 70 per cent, and the sessions lasted on average 39.5 minutes.
Therefore, the members of the Committee spent only eight hours in a whole
year working on their tasks. Moreover, in the same year, this Committee had
a meeting only with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament of
Italy. If compared to the previous reports, it seems also that the work of the
Committee is decreasing and becoming less influential.92 Even though the
Committee’s dependence on the work of other state organs is one of the reasons
of its lack of efficiency, one of the main reasons is certainly the reluctance of its
members to use the competencies given to them in the realm of foreign
relations. Therefore, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has never effectively
scrutinised the actions of the executive and its work is without practical effect in
shaping the BiH’s foreign affairs.93
In conclusion, it is obvious that the PA has instruments to influence the
foreign policy of BiH. Certainly, a function that is primarily linked to the PA
is the legislative function.94 However, in executing such a role the PA has
ways to influence the foreign relations, too. Thus, the role of PA in this area is
indirect but can be significant. I believe that this is primarily due to two
explanations: first, the legislature may slow down the executive in the
conduct of foreign policy (and thus should not have any bigger role in this
area). Second, it is important to have a certain level of control of the
executive in carrying out the functions entrusted to it (ensuring therefore
that the PA has a system of checks and balances). Namely, the PA’s size and
probable non-expertise in foreign relations law are not practicable for foreign
policies to be made by parliament directly. Members of the PA are not used
to making and dealing with foreign policies. However, they are representa-
tives of the people. On the contrary, the government and the ministries are
used to working on foreign aspects and to doing so quickly. Since ‘good
92 For example, in 2016, the Committee held fifteen sessions and adopted two conclusions. The
average attendance of Committee members to its sessions was 81.66 per cent, and the sessions
lasted forty-one minutes on average. Further, the Committee considered and granted positive
opinions for the ratification of sixty-three international treaties and had meetings with three
foreign committees on foreign affairs. As regards the legislative activity, the Committee did not
do activities proposed in theWork Plan because the draft laws did not enter the parliamentary
procedure.
In 2015, the Committee held eighteen sessions and adopted eleven conclusions. The
average attendance of Committee members to its sessions was 74 per cent, and the sessions
lasted fifty minutes on average. Further, the Committee considered and granted positive
opinions for the ratification of seventy-seven international treaties. Finally, in 2015, the
Committee did not do activities proposed in the Work Plan either because the draft laws
did not enter the parliamentary procedure.
93 Similar in Hasić and Karabegović, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy, p. 235.
94 BiH Constitution, Article IV(4).
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scrutiny makes for good government’,95 the PA should and does have the
means at its disposal to monitor the executive, to scrutinise its practice, and
to keep it in appropriate bounds, ensuring both openness and efficiency. Its
members should not be indifferent to issues of foreign relations. This does
not mean they challenge executives but that they strengthen them.96
However, the PA is currently mostly interested in domestic politics and the
ethnic divisions, which brings foreign relations barely in its focus. Its members
were largely elected because of their nationalist sentiment andmembership in
a particular political party, allowing the ruling elites to capture the PA. Also,
the peculiar relationship between the international community and the PA (as
well as other national institutions) has consequences for BiH foreign relations
law too. The power of the OHR to act in substitution for the domestic
institutions makes it a very relevant actor in BiH foreign affairs. Moreover,
while acting as domestic institution, the OHR places himself above the
domestic legal system, making BiH a unique example in this regard. Even
though the OHR acts only if the PA had failed to act, and although his actions
are less frequent than before, the mere fact that he possesses these powers
contributes to the erosion of the boundaries between the domestic and
international domain. Consequently, BiH foreign relations law is developing
in the various and quite special connection between international and domes-
tic law.
V FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW AS A FIELD OF SCHOLARSHIP
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
When it comes to the foreign relations law as a field of scholarship and
research in BiH, it has been seen mostly as a part of the political and not
legal scholarship. There have been virtually no scholars with exclusive and
foremost expertise in this area. Most of the scholars have seen it as a part of
some other, ‘bigger’ discipline, such as international relations or political
science.
As far as law professors are concerned, international law professors and
national law professors are partly isolated from each other, and they mostly
teach one discipline or the other, although it is not uncommon that the same
95 Robin Cook, Leader of the House of Commons, ‘Modernisation of the House of Commons:
A Reform Programme for Consultation’, December 2001, www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmmodern/440/44003.htm, accessed 21 April 2020.
96 Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, ‘Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International
Actors’, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–15 at 103.
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professor teaches courses in both public international law and public law
fields. In addition, curricula for the courses are generally separated from one
another and provide little connection between the disciplines.97 Therefore,
most courses either do not touch upon foreign relations law at all, or only
sporadically mention it (for example, Public International Law curricula and/
or Constitutional Law curricula). Thus, foreign relations law is taught scarcely
and mostly within Public international law or/and Constitutional Law
courses.
The state of affairs in BiH is comparable to other jurisdictions like China. As
Congyan Cai explains with respect to Chinese foreign relations law,98 few
international lawyers at Chinese universities know constitutional law well and,
vice versa, few constitutional law professors have much knowledge of inter-
national law.99 Another similarity concerns the manner in which China and
BiH conduct foreign relations; namely, the fact that political expediency is
routinely invoked to justify the obscurity and low transparency in activities in
foreign relations.100 Finally, as in China, in BiH, there are two recent devel-
opments in foreign relation law that merit attention. The first concerns
a recent important legislative initiative concerning foreign relations
(explained earlier in this chapter). The second is related to the fact that
recently this area began to grow in academic importance. Specifically, there
has been an increase in the number of books and papers on the subject.101Also,
there are growing numbers of faculties and special study programs with
a particular focus on foreign relations.102 Accordingly, it can be said that
with the rise of BiH foreign relations, the interest for this topic is expanding
97 Unlike for example law schools in theUnited States, which have amore flexible structure that
allows faculty to more easily cross historic subject matter divides. See the chapter by Curtis
A. Bradley, p. 343.
98 Congyan Cai, ‘Chinese Foreign Relations Law’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 336. See also
Section II in JI Hua, ‘China and Global Environmental Governance: Coordination,
Distribution and Compliance’, in this volume.
99 Cai, ‘Chinese Foreign Relations Law’, 336.
100 Cai, ‘Chinese Foreign Relations Law’, 336–7.
101 See, e.g., Hasić and Karabegović, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy; and
Bernhard Stahl and Soeren Keil (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From
Yugoslavia to Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
102 See, e.g., the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at the Sarajevo School
of Science and Technology, the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the
University of Herzegovina, or special study programs such as International and Public
Relations at the International University of Sarajevo, International Relations and
Diplomacy at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Tuzla, and Master’s degree
program in International Relations and Diplomacy at the American University in BiH.
296 Ajla Škrbić
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as well. Yet, this still remains a largely unexplored research area in the legal
discipline.
VI CONCLUSION
My main conclusion is that the impact of parliaments on foreign relations law
depends on their role in a state and effective use of their competencies. Their
means to impact the conduct of foreign relations become more diverse with
the strengthening of their role in a state. Looking at the example of BiH, it
seems that this impact can be seen mostly in the ratification of international
treaties, in the use of committees on foreign affairs, and in the annual checks
and reports. Nevertheless, the development of foreign relations law demands
constant adaptation of methods of its implementation. I believe this compe-
tency should be used to a full extent as the increase in this practice can
improve the quality and transparency of foreign affairs. However, both internal
and external factors affect this effectiveness. Individual members of parlia-
ment (and its committee on foreign affairs) can also make a major contribu-
tion to this effectiveness. As a result, their personal views are vitally important.
This is especially true for BiH because its complicated internal system adds
another layer of complexity to BiH foreign relations. Here, not only the
political parties but also state institutions (as well as institutions on the substate
level) are mainly organised along ethnic lines. With the general lack of trust
between different ethnic groups, it is almost impossible to reach consensus on
many questions. This makes BiH ineffective on a daily basis, including on
foreign relations law. In this regard, a solution must be found to enact
a constitution that institutes a legitimate form of government and guarantees
the protection of all ethnic groups, while at the same time creating the shared
political identity that transcends the dominant ethnic allegiances.103
However, Bosnia’s extremely complex and multilevel system of state organ-
isation is not the only feature that makes BiH special when it comes to foreign
relations. Its constitutional structure also creates unique relationship between
international and domestic sphere and has consequences for foreign relations
law too. In particular, the OHR’s powers make BiH dependent on foreign
actors’ decision-making process. The OHR can substitute himself for the
national authorities, including the PA, and can even overrule the PA’s deci-
sions. This makes the boundaries between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ more
fluid and can greatly affect the foreign relations law as well.
103 Grewe and Riegner, ‘Internationalized Constitutionalism in Ethnically Divided Societies’, 4.
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When it comes to foreign relations law in BiH, it is necessary to strengthen
co-operation between the PA and the executive branch in the creation and
implementation of foreign policy, as well as to strengthen the co-operation of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs with parliamentary counterparts from other
states. In addition, the importance of foreign relations law and major changes
in the world order require an assessment of the effectiveness of the current
system in achieving the goals set out in the 2018 Strategy. Currently, each and
every conduct constituting relations of BiH with other countries is actually the
result of improvisation arising from this general document. It is necessary to
regulate this field by a more comprehensive act, which is also something that
professional diplomats have been lobbying for since 2001.104 It is also import-
ant to involve all relevant actors in drafting this act (from the academic
community to business actors). This could reduce the possibilities for self-
interested conduct of political parties in foreign policy, while leading to the
development of foreign policy that is in the interest of BiH and its citizens.105 It
is therefore necessary to concretise the 2018 Strategy with clear directives for
foreign affairs on the basis of the priority interests of BiH. The executive
should remain the main figure in foreign relations law, but the scrutiny,
guidance, and support of the PA must be enhanced. Otherwise, the potential
of the PA will be wasted unnecessarily.
In conclusion, it is true that the traditional doctrine generally excludes
parliaments from any role in the conduct of foreign affairs and that there are
indeed practical benefits in seeing foreign relations as belonging only to the
executive branch. However, the traditional approach seems much less persua-
sive today as it undermines the potential for national parliaments to engage in
developing this field of law. The legislative branch can certainly add another
layer of scrutiny and expertise to the foreign relations law. Therefore, the
emphasis needs to be on the construction of more ‘bridges’ and the erection
and shifting of fewer ‘boundaries’, respectively.
104 Davor Vuletić, ‘Towards New Foreign Policy Strategy’, p. 7.
105 Of course, discretion based on coordination and consensus is required in the conduct of
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War, International Law and the Rise of Parliament
The Influence of International Law on UK Parliamentary
Practice with Respect to the Use of Force
Veronika Fikfak
In foreign relations law, the power to wage war is inherently an executive
power.1 It is the government that declares war or sends the military forces into
battle. Yet, increasingly, the prerogative to engage in military action has been
open to scrutiny by domestic parliaments. This trend was first noted in 1990,
when Lori Damrosch argued that there was a trend ‘towards parliamentary
control over the decision to introduce troops into situations of actual or
potential hostilities’.2 In relation to the Gulf War she noted a ‘striking pattern
of parliamentary approvals for decisions to commit military support, including
votes in the US Congress, the French Assemblée nationale, and the
Parliaments of Italy, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Greece, Turkey
and Spain’.3 Similarly, the NATO bombing against the then Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 triggered ‘intensive parliamentary
1 The latest in the series of reports, which affirm this position is: ‘The Role of Parliament in the
UK Constitution: Authorising the Use of Military Force’, Report of the Public Administration
and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 06 August 2019, www.parliament.uk/business/commit
tees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-and-constitutional-affairs-commit
tee/news-parliament-2017/parliament-military-force-report-published-17–19/, accessed on
30 September 2020. Prior reports are mentioned throughout this paper and include: Ministry
of Justice, ‘The Governance of Britain’, Policy paper, CM 7170; Ministry of Justice, ‘The
Governance of Britain: War Power and treaties: Limiting Executive powers’, CM 7239;
Ministry of Justice, ‘The Governance of Britain: Constitutional Renewal’, White Paper, Cm
7342-I; Ministry of Justice, ‘The Governance of Britain: Review of the Executive Royal
Prerogative Powers: Final Report’, October 2009; House of Lords, Constitution Committee,
‘Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force’, 2nd Report 2013 – 14, HL Paper 46;
and Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Government’s policy on the use of drones for
targeted killing’, 2nd Report 2015 – 16, HC 574.
2 Lori F. Damrosch, ‘Is There a General Trend in Constitutional Democracies Toward
Parliamentary Control over War-and-Peace Decisions?’ (1996) 90 ASIL Proceedings 36, 36.
3 Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro, Tim Haesebrouck, ‘Parliamentary War Powers and the Role of
International Law in Foreign Troop Deployment: Decisions the US-Led Coalition against
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deliberations’ in all participating states4 as did the 2003 Iraq invasion.5 In
relation to both conflicts, the legality of intervention was highly disputed.
Since then, the involvement of parliaments around the world has become
a fait accompli. The Netherlands Constitution, for example, was revised to
require the Government to inform Parliament prior to deployment of forces
abroad,6 the French Constitution also similarly strengthened the position of
Parliament,7 whilst other countries changed legislation to define the precise
role of the legislature in the context of deployment of armed forces abroad.8 In
all of these cases, the role of Parliament has been strengthened so that it could
provide support or approval for military action and for troops on the ground.9
The votes in national parliaments provide legitimacy to the decisions made
and give the impression that the Government was held to account by the
people’s representatives.10 In some cases, for example when national parlia-
ments had effectively vetoed the Government’s plans for military actions,
“Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria’ (2019) 17 ICON 118–50 citing Lori F. Damrosch,
‘Democratization of Foreign Policy and International Law, 1914–2014’ (2014) 21 ILSA Journal of
International and Comparative Law 281, 287–8; see also Lori F. Damrosch, ‘The Interface of
NationalConstitutional Systemswith International Law and Institutions onUsingMilitary Forces:
Changing Trends in Executive and Legislative Powers’ in Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson
(eds.), Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 50; Michael Bothe and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘The
Dimensions of Domestic Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Use of Military Force’ in
Michael Bothe, Mary E. O’Connell and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), Redefining Sovereignty: The Use
of Force after the Cold War (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2005) p. 203.
4 Bothe, Fischer, ‘The Dimensions of Domestic Constitutional and Statutory Limits’, p. 203.
5 Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters and Cosima Glahn, ‘Parliamentary War Powers Around the
World, 1989–2004 A New Dataset’ (2010) DCAF Occasional Papers No. 22, p. 25.
6 See Article 100, which was included anew into the Dutch Constitution, see: The Netherlands,
Raad van State, Rijkswet van 22 juni tot verandering in de Grondwet van de bepalingen inzake
de verdediging, 22 June 2000, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargang 2000,
p. 294.
7 France, Congrès, Loi constitutionelle n˚ 2008–724 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve
République, 24 July 2008, Journal Officiel de la République Française, NOR: JUSX0807076L
(amending Article 35 of the French Constitution of 28 September 1958, which before only
provided for involvement of Parliament in cases of declaration of war).
8 German Parliamentary Participation Act: Germany, Bundestag, Gesetz über die parlamentar-
ische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland, 18 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 775.
9 Philippe Lagassé, ‘Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada:
Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative Control’ (2017) 70
Parliamentary Affairs 280, 280.
10 Ruys, ‘Parliamentary War Powers and the Role of International Law in Foreign Troop’, 118;
Damrosch, ‘Democratization of Foreign Policy and International Law’, 288 and 292;
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979) p. 64.
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there is even talk of a quasi-sharing of powers between the Executive and the
Legislature.11
In the context of the United Kingdom, these developments are captured in
my recent monograph, Parliament’s Secret War (co-authored with Hayley
Hooper).12 In the monograph, we contextualise the recent emergence of
a constitutional convention, which requires that the House of Commons
should have an opportunity to debate an intervention before troops are
committed. The Convention, which was adopted in response to the Iraq
invasion and recognised by subsequent Governments, has been hailed as
historic and is said to represent a real shift in power from the Government to
Parliament. In this context, the book makes a strong argument about how
international institutions and international lawmore generally have facilitated
this move: on one side, by failing to provide legal bases for interventions on the
international level (e.g. Security Council) thus creating a lacuna for national
legislatures to step in, and on the other side, by giving parliamentarians the
necessary international law terminology on the basis of which they could
assess the legality (and legitimacy) of the use of force. The book makes clear
that ‘international law’ has influenced domestic parliamentary discourse in
several ways.
This chapter presents the empirical evidence to support the arguments
made in and serves as a precursor to Parliament’s Secret War. Through
discourse analysis, I seek to empirically trace how international law influences
domestic parliamentary language. In this regard, I am interested in how
members of Parliament understand and explain their role in the context of
decisions to use force. I show how by merely looking at the debates in
Parliament, one can conclude that after Iraq there has been a change in
power-relations between the Government and Parliament. Tracing the ter-
minology used by MPs, I reveal the decline of the term ‘Government’ and the
rise of the reference to the ‘House’. This terminology suggests a shift of focus
(and perhaps power) from the Government to the House. The chapter maps
out how this shift is mirrored in the increased relevance of international law
and specifically the question surrounding the legality of the military interven-
tion. It is this question – and particularly the experience of Iraq – that has
reshaped the debates in the UK Parliament vis-à-vis the Government. When
11 Veronika Fikfak and Hayley Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War (Bloomsbury: Hart Publishing,
2018).
12 Fikfak and Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War; Some of the international law points are also
previously made by Nigel White Democracy goes to War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009). For the historical argument on the topic, see Rosara Joseph, The War Prerogative:
History, Reform, and Constitutional Design (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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the legal basis is ambiguous, Parliament reaches for the ‘international law’
toolbox to assert its responsibility. The presence of ‘international’ concerns in
parliamentary discourse then fluctuates depending on the clarity of the basis
for the intervention. The investigation also reveals that as MPs become more
and more involved and informed on issues of war, the deference shown to
international institutions and their evaluation of the situation decreases. MPs
appear to become more confident in referring to traditional international
terms and more competent to make decisions about interventions themselves.
I WHO HAS POWER?
Prior to the Iraq war, the involvement of the House of Commons in debating
a potential military intervention was limited. The House was traditionally
engaged after the Government made its decision on intervention and more
specifically, after the start of hostilities. According to Tony Blair, this tradition
required that the PrimeMinister make a statement in the House of Commons,
followed by a question and answer session or a potential debate. Yet, these
debates never ended in a vote, which would explicitly support or reject the
military engagement. Instead, a procedural motion of adjournment was
called, allowing the Government to preserve face even when seriously
criticised.
In 2003, the questions surrounding the legality of the intervention in Iraq
without an explicit Security Council Resolution triggered an important debate
in the UK as to the role of theWestminster Parliament. In response to previous
disputes, such as Suez and Kosovo, in which MPs were denied an opportunity
to debate or have a meaningful vote, concerns were raised that ‘The question
of whether British troops are committed to action ought to require the dignity
of a more meaningful procedure’.13 In face of a strong revolt from Labour
backbenchers and the resignation of Robin Cook, MPs were – for the first
time – given an opportunity to vote prior to the start of hostilities about whether
they supported the war or not.
The Iraq example could be an anomaly in an otherwise consistent practice
of governments from both sides of the isle which had sidelined Parliament.
Yet, the eventual discovery that no nuclear weapons existed, and the clear
illegality of the invasion triggered a period of introspection in the UK.14
A number of committees and inquiries debated the issue of the appropriate
13 Robin Cook, The Point of Departure (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2003) pp. 187–8.
14 Andrew Blick, ‘Emergency Powers and the Withering of the Royal Prerogative’ (2014) 18 The
International Journal of Human Rights 195–210.
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role for Parliament on questions of military action. The reports (aptly called as
Taming the Prerogative andGovernance of Britain) underlined the need for the
Government to be ‘accountable to Parliament for the use of prerogative
powers just as for things done under statutory or common law authority’.15
The main complaints made against the traditional arrangements were that the
Government was usually only ‘accountable after the event’.16This allowed it to
take decisions in a vacuum and escape accountability by providing a reason for
intervention only when troops were already on the ground. By that point, most
of the strategic decisions had already been taken and a step back from military
action would be potentially embarrassing and dangerous for the troops. The
involvement of Parliament only at this late stage – effectively as a confirmatory
organ – greatly demeaned the House of Commons.17 In this regard, the 2003
Iraq vote could not be treated only ‘as an act of generosity by the Government
for which we had to be grateful at the time’18 but had set a precedent for the
future.
As a consequence, by 2011 consensus had arisen around the position that
‘any major military action should have explicit parliamentary approval’.19 The
Government acknowledged this in the Cabinet Manual by recognising a new
‘convention . . . that before troops were committed the House of Commons
should have an opportunity to debate the matter and said that it proposed to
observe that convention except when there was an emergency and such action
would not be appropriate’.20 This recognition of the role of Parliament in
sending troops into battle redefines the relationship between the Government
and the House of Commons. The convention puts the traditional arrange-
ments under which the Government is the sole source of the deployment
power under question and as a consequence, the old arrangements are no
longer sufficient. If ‘Parliament should be the source of Government’s power’,
this requires a different role for the Commons.21 In this context, the timing of
15 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, ‘Taming the Prerogative:
Strengthening Ministerial accountability to Parliament’, 4th Report, 2003–04, HC 422, p. 8.
16 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, ‘Taming the Prerogative’, p. 8.
17 Hansard, HC, vol. 398, col. 373, 22 January 2003, Tam Dalyell.
18 House of Commons, ‘Taming the Prerogative’, [22], William Hague MP, later Foreign
Secretary, who argued in favour of a statutory basis for parliamentary approval.
19 House of Commons, ‘Taming the Prerogative’, p. 8.
20 HM Government, The Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the
operation of Government, 1st ed. (London: The Stationary Office, 2011) [5.38]. House of
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, ‘Constitutional Implications of
the Cabinet Manual’, 6th Report of 2010–2011, HC 734, [61]; Andrew Blick, The Codes of the
Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016).
21 House of Lords, Select Committee on Constitution, ‘Waging War Parliament’s role and
responsibility’, 15th Report, 2005–06, [43] and S Payne, vol. II: Evidence, 17.
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its involvement is key – the Commons has to be involved prior to deployment.
In this case, the debate and vote can serve to question the Government about
its decision and strategy and Parliament can ultimately provide approval for
the exercise of the deployment power. The whole issue can ‘be better scrutin-
ised, better thought through, better prepared and the decision would be better
made’.22
Since the Manual’s publication in 2011, the House of Commons has been
given the opportunity to debate military deployments in relation to Syria,
against Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and most recently against IS in Syria. Instead
of voting on procedural motions, these are now put as substantive questions of
support and approval of governmental actions. Today, MPs could argue that
the practice of putting the question to the House on a substantive motion has
developed into a binding convention, which requires theHouse’s involvement
every time the Government contemplates military action.23 Although the
timing of this debate and vote is still inconsistent (sometimes prior, other
after the fact), the substantive involvement suggests a fundamental shift in the
role of Parliament.
This story of the birth of the constitutional convention and the role and
responsibility of the House of Commons in the context of decisions to use force
can also be traced in the choice of terminology used by MPs in debates of the
House. Nine debates are mapped out on the graph below – from Korea 1950, to
Suez 1956, Gulf 1991, Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2013, ISIL in
Iraq 2015 and Syria 2018.24 The picture reveals a clear story of the decrease in
the (linguistic) relevance of ‘Government’, eclipsed by an increase in the
22 House of Lords, Select Committee on Constitution, ‘Waging War’ Evidence, 17, citing Clare
Short.
23 On constitutional conventions: John A. G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42
Modern Law Review 1; David Feldman, ‘Constitutional Conventions’ in Matt Qvortrup (ed.),
The British Constitution: Continuity and Change and the Influence on Europe – A Festschrift
for Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 94, 94; A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the
Political Constitution’ (2002) 22Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 157–75 and Graham Gee and
Grégoire C. N. Weber, ‘What Is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 273–99; Joint Committee on Conventions, ‘Conventions of the UK Parliament’, HL
265-I (2006).
24 I employ a basic frequency analysis, which counts the number of times a certain word appears
in the text analysed, followed by a word-in-context analysis. I also look at the relative import-
ance of the words studied, taking into account how long the debate was (e.g. how many terms
appear in it and how frequently). In total, I analyse nine debates on the use of military force:
Hansard, HC, vol. 477, col. 485–596, 05 July 1950, (Korea); Hansard, HC, vol. 558, col. 2–149,
12 September 1956 (Suez); Hansard, HC, vol. 183, col. 734–826, 15 January 1991 (Gulf);
Hansard, HC, vol. 329, col. 573–668, 19 April 1999 (Kosovo); Hansard, HC., vol. 401, col.
760–858, 18 March 2003 (Iraq); Hansard, HC, vol. 525, col. 700–807, 21 Mar 2011 (Libya);
Hansard, HC, vol. 566, col. 1425 ff. 29 Aug 2013 (Syria 2013); Hansard, HC, vol. 603, col.
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relevance of ‘the House’. After the experience of Iraq in 2003, the importance
of the House of Commons can be visible as a slight bump on the graph.
A further and considerable increase in the relevance of the ‘House’ can be
seen in the context of the 2013 vote in which MPs vetoed the proposed
intervention of the Government in Syria against Assad, a day labelled as
a ‘historic night’ and ‘a victory for Parliament’.25 After this defeat of the
Government’s motion to deploy troops to Syria, commentators even argued
that the decision of Prime Minister Cameron to comply with the vote in the
House suggests the so-called ‘consultation’ convention has solidified into
a binding constitutional convention regulating relationship between two
institutions of the constitution and that as a consequence Westminster
Parliament had acquired a type of veto-power over decisions on military
action.26 This, however, appears to have been the peak of Parliament’s
power. Since then, subsequent governments (under Theresa May) appear
to have taken a step back and the extent of power that Parliament has over
these issues remains unclear.27 This fluidity is visible on Figure 14.1 as
references to ‘the House’ decrease after 2013.
The terms ‘House’ and ‘Government’ cannot be seen in isolation from what
they require: The growing reference to the ‘House of Commons’, for example, is
mirrored by the relevance of the terms such as ‘responsibility’ and ‘duty’ to refer to
MPs’ role, as well as the appearance of the terms ‘constitutional convention’,28 all
of which become more widely used after 2003. For example, although MPs
323–501, 02 December 2015; Hansard, HC, vol. 639, col. 39 ff., 16 April 2018: https://hansard
.parliament.uk/commons/2018–04-16/debates/92610F86-2B91-4105-AE8B-78D018453D1B/Syri
a, accessed on 30 September 2020. More generally on frequency textual analysis, see
Martin Weisser, ‘Basic Frequency Analysis – or What Can (Single) Words Tell Us About
Texts?’ in MartinWeisser (ed.), Practical Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction to Corpus-Based
Language Analysis (Bridgewater: Wiley, 2015) p. 146. Textual analysis is increasingly used in
law: Jack G. Conrad and L. Karl Branting, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on Legal Text
Analytics’ (2018) 26 Artificial Intelligence Law 99–102.
25 Tim Stanley, ‘Syria Vote: This Historic Night Was a Humiliation for David Cameron But
a Victory for Parliament’, The Telegraph (29 August 2013); Robert Hutton and Thomas Penny,
‘Historic Vote Sees Cameron Defeated by Lawmakers on Syria’, Bloomberg Online (20 August
2013); James Hallwood, ‘The Syria Vote Was a Triumph of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ New
Statesman (30 August 2013).
26 Gavin Phillipson, ‘“Historic” Commons Syria Vote: the Constitutional Significance (Part I)’,
UK Constitutional Law Association blog (19 September 2013), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org
/2013/09/19/gavin-phillipson-historic-commons-syria-vote-the-constitutional-significance-part-
i/, accessed on 30 September 2020.
27 Veronika Fikfak and Hayley J. Hooper, ‘Whither the War Powers Convention?What Next for
Parliamentary Control of Armed Conflict after Syria?’, UK. Const. L. Blog (20 April 2018),
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/, accessed 30 September 2020.
28 This is not shown on the graph but the line overlaps with ‘responsibility’.
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initially had no ‘legal or constitutional right to decide the matters [of military
deployment]’, they had a ‘duty to represent the people’.29 In contrast, after 2011
MPs insist that ‘the new convention places a responsibility on Members of
Parliament to weigh up the arguments and vote according to their
conscience’.30 ‘Being a Member of Parliament is a great honour, but it carries
responsibility: the responsibility for deciding whether one agrees with the
Government of the day’.31 If before the focus was on helping and supporting
Government, now this new responsibility requires parliamentarians to hold the
Government to account. If military intervention will be waged with the approval
of Parliament, then ‘with deeper engagement comes greater responsibility’,32
a responsibility, which MPs cannot abdicate.
The convention therefore not only appears to shift the discourse about the
power from the Government to Parliament, it also very clearly changes how
MPs perceive their own function.
II THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE
When the constitutional convention was emerging, the most frequently
asserted reason for its birth and recognition was the idea of increasing the
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government duty house power responsibility
figure 14.1 Who has power? Relative frequency of terms
29 Hansard, HC, vol. 177, col. 774–5, 6 September 1990 (Tony Benn).
30 Hansard, HC, vol. 603, col. 367, 2 December 2015, Alan Johnson, emphasis added.
31 Hansard, HC, vol. 329, col. 609, 19 April 1999, Tony Benn, emphasis added.
32 Hansard, HC, vol. 639, col. 8, 16 April 2018, Jo Swinson, emphasis added.
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accountability of the Government to the House.33 The aim was therefore to
democratize the prerogative power. Yet, in Parliament’s Secret War, we put
forward a different argument – one that questions whether the idea of account-
ability was the main driving force in the recognition of the convention.
Instead, we argue that the consistent failure of the Security Council to act
and support military action in certain conflicts, created a ‘lacuna’, which
‘could be filled by domestic legislatures’.34 The failure of the international
community to provide authorisation for action in the context of Kosovo, Iraq,
Syria and Yemen, etc., had prompted subsequent governments to turn inwards
and look to their own parliaments to provide legitimacy for their action. The
developments on the international sphere have therefore triggered
a ‘domestication’ of decision-making.35 In the UK, this has placed
Westminster Parliament centre stage and has made MPs primary decision-
makers on decisions to use force.36
The shift of decision-making from the international sphere to the domestic,
however, ‘has not resulted in a more domestically focused discourse. Instead,
the discussions in the House have focused precisely on those questions which
the international community should have resolved – questions of the legality
of the use of force’.37 In many ways, Westminster Parliament appears to be
carrying out similar functions as the Security Council – for example, testing
whether there is enough basis to support military action proposed by their
Government.
33 Charlotte Ku, Harold K. Jacobson, Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in
International Law; Hans Born, H Hanggi, ‘The Use of Force under International Auspices:
Strengthening Parliamentary Accountability’, DCAF, Policy Paper No 7, 2005.
34 Fikfak, Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War, p. 52. See also James Strong, ‘The Accidental
Prerogative: Why Parliament Now Decides on War’ (2015) 17 British Journal of Politics and
International Relations 604 ff.; Julian Borger and Bastien Inzaurralde, ‘Russian Vetoes Hurt
UN Security Council’s Legitimacy, says US’, The Guardian (23 September 2015), www
.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-council-legitimacy-at-
risk-says-us, accessed 30 September 2020.
35 Jean Galbraith and Curtis Bradley, ‘Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic:
International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change’ (2016) 92 NYU.
L. Rev. 689 at 689; the ‘domestication’ of course allows for unilateral interventions: Colin
R. G. Murray and Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘Towards Unilateralism? House of Commons
Oversight of the Use of Force’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
305–41; Nico Krisch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the
Security Council’ (1999) 3 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 59–103.
36 Note, for example, how PresidentObama drops the planned intervention in Syria in 2013, after
Westminster Parliament fails to support Cameron’s motion for military action; See film by
Greg Barker, The Final Year (HBO, 2017); Kenneth R.Mayer, ‘Executive Power in the Obama
Administration and the Decision to Seek Congressional Authorization for a Military Attack
against Syria: Implications for Theories of Unilateral Action’ (2014) Utah Law Review 821 ff.
37 Fikfak, Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War, p. 48.
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This can be clearly seen in the graph below.38 Looking at the different
disputes of the last seventy years, it is clear that those which have a clear
international authorisation (Gulf War and Korea),39 raise little if any concerns
about international law. For example, in relation to Korea, MPs talk about the
‘authority of international law’ and the need for Britain to ‘act up to [its]
supreme international obligations’.40 In these cases, the additional support
and legitimacy that a national parliament could provide to an already author-
ised international action is minimal and MPs therefore appear not to be too
concerned or worried about international norms. References to ‘international’
law are minimal.41
In contrast, the peaks of debate about international law can be seen clearly
(on Figure 14.2) in cases where the international basis for the intervention is
unclear or ambiguous: after Iraq 2003, most references to international law are
made in the context of the 2013 Syria debate and in 2018. However, the most
visible peak of concern about ‘international’ legality of military action can be
seen in relation to the 1956 Suez crisis, in which Britain helped Israel and
France in the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The action was condemned
by the international community, but the Security Council failed to condemn
the nationalisation due to France and Britain’s veto.42 In the Suez debate,
which followed in the House, there were 302 references to ‘international’ law.
Later, in 2003, Iraq generated 98 references.
Developments on the international level have therefore created space for
domestic parliaments, but they have also – at least indirectly – imposed
a responsibility on MPs to not allow themselves to be used strategically in
a manner that enables the Government to fill the void at international law
level. As the Constitutional Committee in its Waging War Report found:
Given the absence of legal restraint on the deployment power under
domestic law, the rules of international law on the use of force take on an
enhanced significance as the only apparent limitation on the prerogative.
Domestic legality does not pre-empt international law. In other words,
38 Note also the change in how the intervention is referred to. The termwar appears to be limited
to situations in which ground troops are sent into battle. This is different when airstrikes are
debated – there the terminology turns to ‘action’.
39 SC Resolution 82 (1950) and SC Resolution 660 (1990), followed by SC Resolution 661 (1990)
imposing economic sanctions, and SC Resolution 665 (1990) authorizing naval blockade to
enforce embargo against Iraq.
40 Hansard, HC, vol. 477, col. 493, 5 July 1950 (Attlee).
41 These generate the fewest absolute references to ‘international law’ and ‘international’: e.g.
twenty-eight and seventy-one.
42 Vetoes used on 30 October 1956 at Security Council meetings nos. 749 and 750.
308 Veronika Fikfak
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
action, which may not be unlawful under domestic law, could be in viola-
tion of international law.43
In fact, looking closely at debates, international law appears to provide MPs with
the framework and language with which they can carry out their functions. In
Suez, for example, MPs underlined that the UK as a member of the United
Nations had ‘steadfastly avoided any international action which would be in
breach of international law or, indeed, contrary to the public opinion of the
world. We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we
might be denounced in the Security Council as aggressors, or where themajority
of the Assembly were against us.’44 Others equally recognized what was at stake:
‘are we to live under a regime of international anarchy or international law? . . .
We all recognise that [the Charter] has its limitations. . . . But nevertheless it has
sufficient authority for one to say that no action that we take . . . should be in
derogation of the Charter, much less in contradiction of it’.45
In Iraq, when debating potential military action, MPs objected that ‘The
action against Iraq is, I believe, pre-emptive, and therefore demands even
greater international support and consensus than other sorts of intervention.
We do not have it. Such isolation entails a genuine cost and danger. It
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International and war/action: Relative frequency of
terms
figure 14.2 International and war/action: relative frequency of terms
43 House of Lords, Select Committee on Constitution, ‘Waging War’ Evidence, 17, p. 15.
44 Hansard, HC, vol. 558, col. 19, 12 September 1956, Hugh Gaitskell.
45 Hansard, HC, vol. 558, col. 114, 12 September 1956, J. E. S. Simon.
46 Hansard, HC, vol. 401, col. 798, 18 March 2003, John Denham.
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These concerns run through the debates that seek to fill the void left by
unauthorised, unilateral military interventions. In fact, MPs appear to have
internalised international concerns about the legality of the proposed action and
worry about how they will be perceived by the international community.47 For
this reason, when the Government makes its case to MPs, it does so in a similar
manner as it would before the United Nations – by referring to the Charter and
presenting the intervention as ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. In turn, MPs – in
effect invited to step into the shoes of the Security Council and support the use
of force – pick up on this international language of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportion-
ality’ and use the same terminology to assess and evaluate the legitimacy of the
proposed military intervention. The graphs below show clearly how in the
debates of the Commons the use of the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’ –
to refer to the appropriate extent and scope of the use of force – have
skyrocketed since the Iraq War.48 Before 2004, MPs barely made use of this
terminology to discuss the use of military action (bar the blatant exception of
Suez). Even in relation to the Falklands Islands, where the intervention was
defined as one of self-defence, the necessity and proportionality were not high
on the agenda. After 2004, both terms ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’ feature
prominently as seen in Figure 14.3 (e.g. in the context of debates concerning
Libya 2011 – ‘necessary’, Syria 2013 – ‘proportionate’, Syria 2015 – both).
The graphs in this section portray the lessons from Iraq clearly: since 2004,MPs
regularly require that the Government seek a legal opinion about potential
military action and make a clear case as to the legality of the intervention.49
But their expectations do not stop there – an assessment of proportionality of the
action is also expected and MPs themselves will query this element of the
47 The idea of internalisation of international norms into domestic sphere is best made by
H. Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181; Compare for example the
efforts to internalise international norms through domestic courts: Veronika Fikfak, ‘English
Courts and the “Internalisation” of the European Convention on Human Rights – Between
Theory and Practice’ (2013–14) 5 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law –
The UK Supreme Court Yearbook (2015) 183–214; ‘ International Law Before English and Asian
Courts: Finding the Judicial Role in the Separation of Powers’ (2013) 3(2) Asian Journal of
International Law 271–304.
48 Though note the variations in the use of the term ‘necessary’: aside from Suez, the peaks
appear to be consistent with internationally authorised actions (Libya and ISIS in Iraq). On
who gets to define meaning to terms, see Benedict Burnett and Veronika Fikfak, ‘Domestic
Courts’ Reading of International Norms: A Semiotic Analysis’ (2009) Int J Semiot Law 22, Art.
no. 437 and Veronika Fikfak, ‘Judicial Strategies and their Impact on the Development of the
International Rule of Law’ inMachiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper, The Rule of Law at
the National and International Levels (Bloomsbury: Hart Publishing, 2016) p. 45.
49 Hansard, HC, vol. 566, col. 1426, 29 August 2013, Caroline Lucas asking about why only two
paragraphs of Attorney General’s opinion in relation to Syria 2013 were published.
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intervention throughout the debate. The ‘proportionality’ graph shows beautifully
how before 2003, no assessment of proportionality took place in the Commons.
Since then, however, MPs are not only informed about what international law
requires but also concerned that the country complies with its requirements.
It is clear from what has been said that whilst international concerns have
always been at the heart of debates in Parliament (partly due to the inter-
national nature of war), with the birth of the War Powers Convention after
2003, interest in international law has steadily increased, driven by the need for
accountability. This need was more pronounced in situations where military
intervention had no clear authorisation from the Security Council, that is, in
the case of Syria 2013 and airstrikes in Syria in 2018. The graph below shows
clearly how the enhanced involvement of the ‘House’ (and the power associ-
ated with it) and the need to hold the Executive to account for the proposed
‘action’ directly correlates with the House’s attention to ‘international’ con-
cerns. Since 2003, when the Pandora’s box for enhanced parliamentary
involvement was opened, the three lines (and seen on Figure 14.4) appear to
move almost in parallel. The strong link between the ‘international’ and the
power and relevance of the ‘House’ is therefore clear.
III THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
Governments have turned to domestic parliaments strategically, inviting them
to fill the lacuna left by the international community (e.g. Security Council).
MPs appear to have accepted this challenge and have become increasingly
more confident and more competent to discuss the use of military action in



















1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040
Necessary
figure 14.3 Use of terms ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’
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as to whether the new role of the Commons has – at least internally – increased
or decreased the relevance of the United Nations and the Security Council.
And what does Westminster Parliament’s decision to act instead of the Security
Council mean for the international community and for international law?
From the view of debates in Parliament, it is clear that references to the
‘United Nations’ have importantly decreased. If in Korea, Suez and during the
Gulf war, the United Nations was in the forefront of MPs minds, this is no longer
the case. Since 2011, when the War Powers Convention was officially recognised
and the position of the Commons solidified in relation to decisions to use force,
these references have fallen even further. A similar trend can be seen in relation
to the ‘Security Council’. Whilst references to the Council have remained steady
throughout the sixty years, since 2011 there has been a steep drop in their
appearance in debates in the House (as seen in Figure 14.5). It is this drop
which is perhaps themost remarkable: once the issue of the use of military action
is ‘domesticated’ through theWar Powers Convention, references to the UN, the
Security Council and even the ‘international community’ become so rare that
regardless of whether the use of force is authorised or not, these external bodies/
audiences appear to become less relevant in the domestic debate.50 As the
position of the Commons to have a say on the matter is solidified and MPs
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figure 14.4 House, action and international law: relative frequency of terms
50 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ Speech in Economic Club (Chicago,
24 April 1999), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297,
accessed 30 September 2020; more generally on the disappearance of the international
community: Georges Abi Saab, ‘Whither the International Community’ (1998) 9 EJIL
248–65; Sean D. Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence’ (2005) 50 Villanova
Law Review 699–748; W. Michael Reisman, ‘Unilateral Actions and the Transformations of
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become more involved and informed on issues of war, the deference shown to
international institutions and their evaluation of the situation decreases.
This is confirmed by the most recent 2019 report of the Public
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which investigates
the role of Westminster Parliament in debates to authorise the use of military
force. The aim of the report is to explore the scope of the War Powers
Convention and the role of Parliament vis-à-vis the Government after the
Iraq, Libya and Syria 2013, 2015 and 2018 experiences. Although the report
mentions the UN Charter (once and in footnotes!), it does not refer to the
United Nations, the Security Council or the international community.51 Even
more, the term ‘international law’ does not appear in the report.52 The
document is therefore clearly concerned to situate Parliament in the domestic
sphere, rather than define its role vis-à-vis international institutions or the
international community. In the domestic sphere, Parliament can claim to
have a say in authorising military action, or as some commentators asserted
even a ‘de facto veto power’,53 but its role – which emerged due to a lacuna
created by the international community – does not remain inextricably linked
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figure 14.5 The UN and international community
theWorld Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 11
EJIL 3–18.
51 ‘Role of Parliament’ Report, which refers to the National Security Council, para. [72].
52 There are some references to international coalitions, audiences and once even to obligations.
’Role of Parliament’ Report, paras. [19], [85] and footnote 48.
53 ‘Role of Parliament’ Report, S Payne in para. [44].
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by Parliament to assess the legal basis for an intervention, international actors
do not appear to feature in Hansard debates.
The shift of decision-making from the international sphere to the domestic
has important implications for international law. The sidelining of inter-
national institutions not only as fora of decision-making but as fora with
expertise in international law signposts a move towards unilateralism and
isolationism.54 As Murray and O’Donoghue put it:
We challenge the underlying assumption that Parliament’s interventions
mark an indisputably positive development in constraining the use of force.
When coupled with the focus upon the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion which has accompanied many controversial exercises of UK military
force since the end of the Cold War, the involvement of Parliament in the
decision-making process risks hollowing out UN Charter safeguards. . . .
Relying upon domestic assemblies to provide the sole necessary authorization
point for certain uses of force might appear to offer a means to unblock
international institutional processes – but this course turns away from inter-
national constraints upon the use of force and opens the door to new forms of
unilateralism.55
Murray and O’Donoghue for example show that in the domestic legislatures
claims to self-defence have been stretched far beyond what international law
envisages, to include collective self-defence in relation to Afghanistan, situ-
ations of pre-emptive self-defence, and targeted killings.56 Similarly,
Parliament’s Secret War maps out how multiple legal bases are being used
by the Government before UK Parliament to make claims about the legality of
military action, even though international law excludes accumulation of such
arguments (e.g. self-defence versus authorised action).57 Both of these prac-
tices ‘complicate the question of whether a use of force complies with
54 Reisman, ‘Unilateral Actions and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process’,
p. 12; Kenneth R. Mayer, ‘Executive Power in the Obama Administration and the Decision to
Seek Congressional Authorization for a Military Attack against Syria: Implications for
Theories of Unilateral Action’ [2014] Utah Law Review 821 at 821; Harold Hongju Koh,
‘Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention Part II: International Law and the Way
Forward’ Just Security (2 October 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2,
accessed 30 September 2020; Carsten Stahn, ‘Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making:
Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and “What the Law Ought to Be”’ (2014) 19 J. CSL 25 at 46.
55 Murray and O’Donoghue, ‘Towards Unilateralism?’, pp. 305 and 341.
56 Hansard, HC, vol. 599, col. 26, 7 September 2015 (Cameron).
57 Fikfak andHooper, Parliament’s SecretWar, p. 61, which links the issue to one of expertise: see
pp. 58 ff. More generally, on the interaction between international and domestic levels and
‘who knows best’, see Veronika Fikfak, ‘Kadi and the Role of the Court of Justice of the




Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
international law’.58 On international level, such claims would not be (or
indeed are not successful) since the UK cannot control action of other States,
yet domestically they succeed because the legislature is ‘more susceptible to
executive influence’.59 This is especially true in the UK, where due to the
fusion of power between Government and Parliament and the control the
former enjoys in the Commons, its decisions are regularly upheld by the
House.60
Ultimately, the victim of the process of ‘domesticating decisions on military
action has been international law, and in particular the UNCharter. By acting
instead of the UN and by using international law language, governments have
sought to sideline the international community and invited parliamentarians
to aid them in redefining what is legally permissible’.61 These examples have
contributed to the development of customary international law on the use of
force, which lives in parallel to and competes with the UN Charter. In this
regard, as Hans Blix has commented, national governments – supported by
their own legislatures – have become ‘global policemen’, acting without or
even contrary to UN mandate, writing their own rules for the use of force.62
Such unilateralism undermines the original basic tenets of the Charter,
undermines the international institutions that are responsible for its enforce-
ment, and ultimately leads to fragmentation of international law.
IV CONCLUSION
This chapter traces the influence of international law on the birth of the
consultation convention, which has allowed the UK Parliament to be increas-
ingly involved on questions of war. Through discourse analysis, it shows how
the way in which members of Parliament understand and explain their role in
the context of decisions to use force changed, especially after Iraq. Tracing the
terminology used by MPs, I reveal the decline of the term ‘Government’ and
the rise of the reference to the ‘House’. MPs speak of their own ‘duty’ and
‘responsibility’ to weigh up arguments on the use of force and hold the
58 Murray and O’Donoghue, ‘Towards Unilateralism?’, p. 307.
59 Murray and O’Donoghue, ‘Towards Unilateralism?’, p. 305.
60 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 11;
O. Hood Phillips ‘A Constitutional Myth: Separation of Powers’ (1977) 93 LQR 11–13;
Stanley Alexander De Smith, ‘The Separation of Powers in New Dress’ (1966–67) 12 McGill
Law Journal 491–6. The debates on Brexit are really the rare anomaly in the history of the
Commons, but are reflective of a deep division in the Commons and around the country.
61 Fikfak and Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War, p. 64, slightly reworded.
62 Hansard, HC, vol. 566, col. 1464, 29 August 2013 (Llwyd).
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Government to account. This shift in terminology is mirrored in the increased
relevance of international law and specifically the question surrounding the
legality of the military intervention. The presence of ‘international’ concerns
in parliamentary discourse fluctuates depending on the clarity of the basis for
the intervention. When the legal basis is ambiguous, Parliament reaches for
the ‘international law’ terms like ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ to assert its
responsibility and hold the Government to account. The importance of
international law, however, is not limited to the ‘borrowing’ of the inter-
national law toolbox. Indeed, the failure of international institutions to pro-
vide legal bases for interventions in cases like Kosovo, Iraq, Syria and Yemen,
has created room for national parliaments to be involved on these questions in
the first place. But as questions on the use of force are ‘brought home’ and
‘domesticated’, this has not led to a reinforced relevance of the international
community or its institutions. The investigation for example reveals that as
MPs become more informed and confident to discuss issues of war, the
deference shown to international institutions and their evaluation of the
situation decreases. References to the ‘United Nations’ and the ‘Security
Council’ disappear from Hansard debates. Even more, the Government is
able to persuade MPs about the legality of the use of force in ways that would
not be acceptable at international level. These examples show how increas-
ingly international law is being developed at domestic level independently of
international institutions and often unilaterally, by Governments acting only
through and with the support of their own parliaments. Gradually, from
conflict to conflict, such unilateral action is contributing to the development
of customary international law on the use of force, which competes and
potentially contradicts with arrangements under the UN Charter. Although
hailed as a historic step in the direction of heightened accountability, the
recent empowerment of domestic parliaments on issues of the use of force
counterintuitively suggests that the future of the international law on the use of
force appears to be ‘domestic’.
316 Veronika Fikfak
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
15
China and Global Environmental Governance
Coordination, Distribution and Compliance
Ji Hua*
I INTRODUCTION
Foreign relations law defines the foreign relations power of subjects of inter-
national law.1 It encompasses the domestic law of each nation that governs
how that nation interacts with the rest of the world.2 In China, there is no field
of foreign relations law recognised as such. Rather, the questions animating
foreign relations law are deeply entrenched in fragmented provisions among
hundreds of different legal texts. Given this fragmentation, this chapter
focuses on the negotiation, conclusion, approval and implementation of
international environmental treaties and agreements. In 1972, the opening of
the Stockholm Environmental Conference marked the beginning of inter-
national environmental law and global environmental cooperation. As a part
of international law, the functioning of international environmental law
largely depends on the willingness and national capacities of states. Since
many environmental problems have consequences that reach beyond national
jurisdictions, domestic environmental laws and policies will impact other
states and global environmental governance. The focus of this chapter is on
law and practice concerning Chinese foreign relations law on global environ-
mental governance. It will look into how China has been constructing its
foreign relations law relating to environmental governance both nationally
* The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of my university or
any of its components. Unless otherwise indicated, translations of Chinese law provisions are
not official.
1 Thomas Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law
(January 2011).
2 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
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and globally and will propose that Chinese foreign relations environmental
law and policy be conceived as a basic structure of foreign relations law.
The next part of this chapter will demonstrate the current status of Chinese
foreign relations law and how Chinese international law scholarship perceives it
(Section II). It will be highlighted that a comprehensive field of Chinese foreign
relations law is so far only a product of scholars’ efforts. The third part of the
chapter will address whyChinese law does not include a general foreign relations
statute (Section III). I maintain that traditional doubts, caution and silence from
the law constitute three main factors. Yet, since 1972, the relationship between
environmental governance in China and its global counterpart has turned out to
be rather dynamic. This dynamic relationship has been developed and reinforced
by ‘Chinese environmental diplomacy’, which helps to explain its role inChinese
‘foreign relations environmental law and policy’ (Section IV). As Campbell
McLachlan wrote, the ‘distribution of foreign relations power between the organs
of government’ is one of the functions of foreign relations law.3 Therefore, in the
fifth part of the chapter, I will explore how powers of Chinese public authorities
have been allocated with regard to the negotiation, conclusion, approval and
implementation of international environmental treaties and global environmen-
tal institutions (Section V). I propose that Chinese administrative organs have
developed a coordinated approach to ‘external environmental relations’. In part
six, I will discuss the legal status of environmental treaties in China, their place in
Chinese law and mechanisms of implementation (Section VI). The conclusion
will briefly summarise the main findings on the encounters between global
environmental law and governance and Chinese ‘external environmental rela-
tions’ (Section VII).
II DEBATES ON CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
The history of foreign relations law as a field of study in China is relatively
short. A Chinese international law scholar, Professor Liu Renshan of
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, pinpointed that Chinese for-
eign relations law is an important part of the Chinese legal system. He
proposed that ‘foreign relations law’ entails an interconnected and composite
legal system comprised of laws, regulations and other normative legal docu-
ments dealing with external relations.4 According to his account, this field of
3 CampbellMcLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law’, in Curtis
A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 25.
4 Liu Renshan (刘仁山), ZHONG GUO DUI WAI GUAN XI FA SHI ZHONG GUO FA LV
TI XI DE ZHONG YAO ZU CHENG BU FEN (中国对外关系法是中国法律体系的重要
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the law fulfils two specific functions: first, it defines the allocation of powers in
foreign affairs, such as which public organs have the right to declare war,
deploy peacekeeping forces, send envoys or negotiate and approve inter-
national treaties. Second, it governs how international law becomes a part of
Chinese law. With regard to these two functions, he listed three categories of
sources in Chinese law, the constitution, special laws5 and provisions6 con-
cerning foreign relations. Furthermore, he emphasised that Chinese inter-
national lawyers should explore relationships between international law and
Chinese domestic law. In May 2016, a conference on ‘Chinese Foreign
Relations law: A New Agenda’ stressed the importance of international legal
research and practice, especially on matters affecting China and the Chinese
people. From then on, a few Chinese scholars have devoted themselves to the
topic. Based on his previous research, Liu Renshan extended his proposals on
current drawbacks of China’s foreign relations law – namely lack of systema-
ticity, illogical legislative gaps and lack of applicability – andmade suggestions
how to organise it in a more systematic manner.7On the basis of his analysis of
Chinese courts’ contributions to international law,8Cai Congyan, Professor of
International Law at Xiamen University School of Law, emphasised the
组成部分) [Chinese Foreign Relations Law is one of important part of Chinese Legal System]
(2009) Law and Social Development 151–53 at 151.
5 In general, there are ten basic laws in the Chinese legal system, which are ‘Constitution’,
‘Administrative Law’, ‘Social Law’, ‘Economic Law’, ‘Civil Law’, ‘Criminal Law’,
‘Commercial Law’, ‘Environmental law’, ‘Litigation and non-litigation procedure Law’ and
‘Military Law’. In China, a ‘special law’ is a single law regulating a specialised legal issue. For
example, in order to specify the legislative power and procedure of ‘the National People’s
Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’ stipulated in the
‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, the National People’s Congress promulgated
‘Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China’. The law on legislation is one of the
‘special laws’. For readers who may be interested, see Lin Li, The Chinese Road of the Rule of
Law (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press & Springer Nature Singapore, 2018), pp. 80–4.
6 ‘Provisions’ in this chapter refers to specified articles resolving foreign relations or foreign-
related legal issues. An example for a special provision is Article 9 of the ZHONGHUA REN
MIN GONG HE GUO XING FA 2017 XIU ZHENG (中华人民共和国刑法2017修正)
[Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017 Amendment)] (promulgated by the
National People’s Congress, 4 Dec. 2017, effective on 4 Dec. 2017). It provides that Chinese
Criminal Law is applicable to universal crimes under international treaties.
7 He proposed three arguments in his article: (a) taking ‘Foreign Relations Law’ as one essential
part in Chinese legal system by legislation; (b) clarifying territorial application of international
treaties and customs; (c) upholding roles of international law in cultivating new lawyers. See
Liu Renshan(刘仁山), ZUO WEI YI FA ZHI GUO ZHI FA DE ZHONG GUO DUI WAI
GUAN XI FA (作为依法治国之法的中国对外关系法) [Chinese Foreign Relations Law as
a law ruling the country] (2016) 3 Studies in Law and Business 131–42.
8 Cai Congyan, ‘International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of China’ (2016) 110
American Journal of International Law 269 at 269–88.
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importance of Chinese foreign relations law, mapped its current structure9
and sketched the functions of Chinese domestic courts in the interpretation
and implementation of international law.10Overall, current voices in Chinese
scholarship focus primarily on the ‘significance, status and proposed structure’
of Chinese foreign relations law. The current work of these scholars is mostly
constructive and extrapolated from theoretical considerations. There is no
statute on foreign relations law in the current Chinese legal system. However,
that does not mean that foreign relations law does not exist or does not have
practical relevance. To the contrary, the questions animating foreign relations
law are deeply entrenched in fragmented provisions among hundreds of
different legal texts.
Recently, China has proposed a programme on rule of law in foreign
relations, which may lead to the official establishment of foreign relations
law as a field of law in the near future. On 31 October 2019, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted fifteen major decisions
on ‘Adhering to and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese
Characteristics and Promoting the Modernization of the State Governance
System and Capabilities’.11 Among these, the thirteenth decision focused on
‘independent foreign policy of peace and promotion of the building of one
community of human destiny’, advocating five objectives on foreign relations
and law, which are ‘establishment of foreign-related institutional mechan-
isms’, ‘coordination of foreign exchanges on part of the People’s Congress, the
central government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the
military, local governments, and people’s organizations’, ‘strengthening
the Party’s overall planning and coordination of all Party external work’,
‘strengthening the rule of law in foreign relations’ and ‘establishment of
a legal system for work related to foreign states’. The thirteenth decision
symbolises that the Chinese government is pursuing a systematic construction
9 Cai Congyan, ‘Symposium on Comparative Foreign Relations Law: Chinese Foreign
Relations Law’ (2017) 111 American Journal of International Law Unbound 336–40.
10 Cai Congyan (蔡从燕), ZHONGGUOQUEQI DUIWAI GUAN XI FA YU FA YUANDE
GONG NENG ZAI ZAO (中国崛起、对外关系法与法院的功能再造) [Rise of China,
Foreign Relations Law and the Re-construction of Functions of Courts] (2018) 71 Wuhan
University Journal 130–43.
11 The Central Committee of the Communist Party, ‘Decisions on Adhering to and Improving the
Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting the Modernization of the State
Governance System and Capabilities’ (Chinese Version), available at www.xinhuanet.com//m
rdx/2019–11/06/c_138532143.htm, accessed 30 September 2020. The Central Committee of the
Communist Party is the core authority branch in China. According to the ‘Constitution of the
Chinese Communist Party’, the Party exercises overall leadship over all areas of endeavor in
every part of the country including developing the rule of law.
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of ‘foreign relations law’. For the Chinese government, the next step is how to
shape its structure and define its scope of application.We will need to assess in
the future the impact of this ambition of the government.
III THE ‘UNDERDEVELOPED’ FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
IN CHINA
Two factors contribute to explaining why foreign relations law is so far
underdeveloped in China: China’s traditional perspectives on international
law (subsection A) and the silence of Chinese law (subsection B).
A Traditional Perspectives on International Law: Doubt and Caution
China’s traditional perspectives on international law depend on the historical
experience of certain diplomatic practices.12 Some authors have characterised
the Chinese modern period (from 1840 to 1949) to be ‘semi-colonial and semi-
feudal’.13 During this period, the first acquaintance with international law is
the treaty of Nanking (1842),14 the first unequal treaty in Chinese diplomatic
history influencing Chinese attitudes towards international law.
After 110 years of fighting against aggressors, the government of the People’s
Republic of China, established in 1949, perceived international law as a Western
instrument against socialism. Until 1966, China adopted a strategy of ‘Start All
Over Again’, which means that the new Chinese government would stay away
from the Western legal system. During the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976),
China’s diplomacy was still in progress, for example, to retrieve legal rights in the
UN and participate in the Stockholm environmental conference, even if inter-
national legal research had been ceased. From 1949 to 1978, before the ‘Reform
and Opening-up Policy’ was adopted, two characteristics were constitutive for
China’s approach towards international law: first, a suspicion towards traditional
international law that primarily protected developed states to the detriment of
most undeveloped nations and, second, respect for the principles of ‘sovereignty’,
‘territorial integrity’, ‘independence’, ‘equality’ and ‘mutual respect’. After the
12 For the history of Chinese international law, see Xue Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary
Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and International Law (Leiden, Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 13–67; Cai Congyan, The Rise of China and
International Law: Taking Chinese Exceptionalism seriously (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2019), pp. 41–99.
13 Duan Jielong (ed.), International Law in China: Cases and Practices (Beijing: Law Press China,
2011), p. 164. For a history of the ‘Semi-Feudal and Semi-Colonial’ in China, see e.g. Immanuel
C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 168–613.
14 Cai, The Rise of China and International Law, p. 52.
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adoption and implementation of the ‘Reform and Opening-up Policy’ in 1978,
China revived international law research and teaching and promoted interactions
between international law and diplomacy. From 1979 on, China became
a participant of and contributor to the international legal order, for example, it
joined over 300 multilateral treaties and 130 international organisations.15 With
the expansion of its opening-up policy, China became aware of the role of
international law in protecting national interests. In its foreign relations, China
successfully requested the Alabama Court of the United States of America to
dismiss the case of the Huguang Railway Bonds16 on the grounds of absolute
jurisdictional immunity and non-payment of odious debts by appointing its legal
counsel to make an appearance on behalf of China in 1984.17 Another example,
the Guanghua Dormitory (or Khoka-ryo student dormitory) case (1987–2007)18
portrays China’s recognition and succession practices in international law.
In 2014, the Chinese government adopted a strategy of a ‘socialist rule of
law’.19 The strategy emphasised that ‘China will vigorously participate in the
formulation of international norms, promote the handling of foreign-related
economic and social affairs according to the law, strengthen its discourse power
and influence in international legal affairs, . . . safeguard the proper interests of
its citizens and legal persons abroad, and foreign citizens and legal persons in
China’.20 It can be taken from this that China is serious about shaping a new
international law order based on their understanding of the principles of
‘sovereignty’ and ‘cooperation’.21 While the idea of a ‘socialist rule of law’ as
15 Wang Zonglai and Hu Bin, ‘China’s Reform and Opening-up and International Law’ (2010) 9
Chinese Journal of International Law 193–203 at 194.
16 Russel Jackson, et al. v. The People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (U.S. District Court,
N. D. Ala. 1982).
17 For general description on the process of the case, see Xue,Chinese Contemporary Perspectives
on International Law, p. 87 (footnote 180 included).
18 The entire case has not been officially reported yet. As for factual and legal analysis, see
Shen Jianming, ‘Revisiting the Disability of the Non-Recognized in the Courts of the
Non-Recognizing States and Beyond: The Departure of the in re Guanghua Liao Courts
from the Rules’ (1990) 5 Florida International Law Journal 401–70. For a general account of
the procedural history of the case, see Xue, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on
International Law, p. 51 (footnote 84 included).
19 Rogier Creemers and Jeremy Daum, ‘CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some
Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law
Forward’, available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-
committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-govern
ing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/, accessed 30 September 2020.
20 See above, note 19.
21 Anne Peters, ‘After Trump: China and Russia move from norm-takers to shapers of the
international legal order’, available at www.ejiltalk.org/after-trump-china-and-russia-move-
from-norm-takers-to-shapers-of-the-international-legal-order/, accessed 30 September 2020.
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such cannot tell us how China will attain these objectives through specific
actions, it forms the background also for the growing scholarly interest in
a Chinese foreign relations law.
B The Silence of Chinese Law on Foreign Relations
As far as international law is concerned, China’s Constitution only specifies
which organs have the authority to conclude and approve a treaty.22 The ‘Law
on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties’, adopted by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress in 1990, enumerates three
categories of treaties that shall be concluded by three corresponding public
authorities23 but does not stipulate the status of treaties in the Chinese legal
system. There is also no systematic law concerning how an approved treaty will
be implemented in the Chinese legal order. The Civil Procedure Law pro-
vides that international treaties shall prevail unless China has formulated
reservations.24 But the logic of ‘primacy’ cannot be applied to other areas of
the law. InWTO law and the law of sea, China adopts the mode of ‘transform-
ation’, which means that specific domestic laws ensure compliance with
approved treaties. Consequently, fragmentation and unpredictability charac-
terise the current status of international treaty application in China. As
Professor Cai has pointed out, fragmentation and unpredictability also imply
22 ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUOXIAN FA 2018 XIU ZHENG (中华人民共和国
宪法2018年修正) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2018 Amendment)]
(promulgated by the National People’s Congress, 11 Mar. 2018, effective on 11 Mar. 2018).
Article 89 (8) provides that the State Council governs foreign affairs and concludes treaties and
protocols with foreign countries. Article 67 (15) entails that the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress decides on the ratification or abrogation of treaties and important
agreements concluded with foreign states.
23 ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUODI JIE TIAO YUECHENGXUFA (中华人民
共和国缔结条约程序法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of the
Conclusion of Treaties 1990] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, Dec. 28, 1990, effective on Dec. 28, 1990). Article 6–8 identify three
categories of treaties signed in the name of: (i) the People’s Republic of China; (ii) the
Central People’s Government; (iii) a Governmental Sub-division or Department. The 1990
Law is ‘lex specialis’ to the ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2018Amendment)’
on the conclusion of treaties.
24 ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUOMINSHI SU SONGFA 2017XIUZHENG (中
华人民共和国民事诉讼法2017年修正) [The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China (2017 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, 27 Jun. 2017, effective on 1 Jul. 2017). Article 260 provides that ‘[w]here
there is any discrepancy between an international treaty concluded or acceded by the People’s
Republic of China and this law, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail, except
clauses to which the People’s Republic of China has formulated reservations’.
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flexibility,25 and the purpose of this flexible attitude and approach is to
progressively find adequate solutions.
IV CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY
While Foreign Relations Law in general is still underdeveloped in China,
it can be said that Chinese foreign relations environmental law and
policy conforms to a basic structure of foreign relations law. Before
discussing the allocation of China’s public powers in global environmen-
tal governance and the legal status of environmental treaties in China as
key topics of foreign relations law in Sections V and VI of this chapter,
I will sketch the encounters of international and domestic environmental
law and governance that have resulted from Chinese environmental
diplomacy since the 1970s (subsection A) and have led to congruent
basic legal principles of Chinese and international environmental law
(subsection B).
A Chinese Environmental Diplomacy
Chinese environmental diplomacy has contributed to international and
national environmental law. Chinese environmental diplomacy began in
1972,26 which also marks the beginnings of international environmental law.
In 1972, the Chinese government sent delegations to participate in the
Stockholm Conference. It was also the first time that China participated in
a multilateral conference for the protection of the environment.
Unfortunately, the issues in this conference were not deeply discussed in
China because of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. This ‘revolution’ plunged the
legal system and social order into chaos. However, it did not stop the progress
of Chinese diplomacy, for example, the Government of the People’s Republic
of China was recognized as ‘the only legitimate representatives of China to the
United Nations’ in 1971.27 The reason why China still participated in the
Stockholm Conference was that China expected the conference to open
valuable opportunities for interacting with the Western world without
25 Cai, ‘International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of China’, 273.
26 Zhang Haibin (张海滨), LUN ZHONG GUO HUAN JING WAI JIAO DE SHI JIAN JI QI
ZUO YONG (论中国环境外交的实践及其作用) [The Practice and Function of China’s
environmental diplomacy] (1998) 3 International Politics 38–44 at 38.
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damaging core national interests.28 The first Prime Minister of the People’s
Republic of China, Zhou Enlai (周恩来), asked delegations to positively
express ideas, policies and understanding and promote independence, econ-
omy and solidarity with ‘third-world’ countries.29
Stockholm turned out to offer an opportunity for pushing forward domestic
environmental protection in China. Learning from global environmental
problems at the conference, the delegations reported to Prime Minister
Zhou that China also experienced serious environmental degradations. In
1973, the State Council opened the first conference on national environmen-
tal protection in Beijing, which put environmental protection on the national
agenda. In its aftermath, China adopted a series of laws and regulations.
China’s Constitution (1978) firstly provided that China protects the environ-
ment and natural resources, prevents and eliminates pollution and other
public hazards.30 The most remarkable evidence is that the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the first comprehen-
sive environmental protection law in 1979.31
Chinese environmental diplomacy was not limited to be a learner. From
the 1990s onwards, China became active in promoting its understanding of
international cooperation. At the 1992 Rio Conference, China and other
developing countries insisted that the notion of ‘Common but differentiated
Responsibilities’ be one of the guiding legal principles in global environmen-
tal governance.32 China proposed that industrialised countries should take
leading responsibilities for tackling global environmental problems not only
for their historical contributions but also for their comparative higher capabil-
ities. At last, the Rio legal instruments reflect this proposal.33 The principle of
28 Lv Jie (吕杰), ZHONGGUOHUAN JINGWAI JIAO YUGUONEIHUAN JINGBAOHU
(中国环境外交与国内环境保护) [China’s Environmental Diplomacy and Domestic
Environmental Protection] (2003) 13 China Population, Resources and Environment 11–15.
29 Wang Zhijia (王之佳), ZHONG GUO HUAN JING WAI JIAO (中国环境外交) [China’s
environmental diplomacy] (Beijing: China Environment Press, 1999), p. 107.
30 Article 11, ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUOXIANFA 1978 (中华人民共和国宪法
(1978)) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1978)] (promulgated by the National
People’s Congress, 5 Mar. 1978, effective on 20 Sep. 1978, invalidated on 4 Dec. 1982).
31 ZHONGHUA RENMINGGONGHEGUOHUAN JING BAO HU FA SHI XING (中华
人民共和国环境保护法试行) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of
China (For Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, 26 Dec. 1989, effective on 26 Dec. 1989).
32 ‘Statement byH.E.Mr. Li Peng, PrimeMinister of the People’s Republic of China’, in ‘Report
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Statements Made by
Heads of State or Government at the Summit Segment of the Conference’, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. III), p. 36.
33 Principle 7 of the ‘Rio de Janeiro Charter/Declaration on Environment and Development’,
UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26.
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‘Common but differentiated Responsibilities’ has been one of guiding prin-
ciples in Chinese environmental diplomacy.34
B Congruent Basic Legal Principles of Chinese and International
Environmental Law
To better understandChinese foreign relations environmental law and policy, it
is necessary to take into account those Chinese environmental legal principles
which overlap with international environmental law. This exercise helps to
identify connections and understand official attitudes towards Chinese foreign
relations law on environmental governance. Articles 4 and 5 of the Chinese
‘Environmental Protection Law (2014 Revision)’ manifestly stipulate four basic
legal principles.
The first principle is the ‘coordination of economic and social development
with environmental protection’.35 Before the 2014 revision, Chinese environ-
mental protectionwas coordinated with economic and social development.36 In
other words, the purpose of environmental protection is to fully realise eco-
nomic development. After the revision, environmental protection shall be equal
to economic development. The principle of coordination, in essence, is consist-
ent with the principle of sustainable development in international law.37
The second principle is ‘prevention first’. Generally, the principle holds that
any pollution and risk of pollution should be prevented or controlled before they
34 Wang, China Environmental Diplomacy, p. 205. For the latest state practice, please see
‘Statement by China on Behalf of BASIC at the Opening Plenary of COP25’, available at w
ww4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201912111926–STATEMENT%20BY%
20CHINA%20ON%20BEHALF%20OF%20BASIC%20AT%20THE%20OPENING%20PLE
NARY%20OF%20COP25.pdf, accessed 30 September 2020.
35 ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUOHUAN JINGBAOHUFA 2014XIUDING (中华
人民共和国环境保护法2014修订) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of
China (2014 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress, 24Apr. 2014, effective on 1 Jan. 2015). Article 4 provides that ‘protecting the environment
is a fundamental national policy of the state. The state shall adopt economic and technological
policies and measures conducive to economically and cyclically utilizing resources, protecting
and improving the environment and enhancing the harmony between mankind and nature to
coordinate economic and social development with environmental protection’.
36 Article 4 of the ‘Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1989)’:
‘The plans for environmental protection formulated by the state must be incorporated into the
national economic and social development plans; the state shall adopt economic and techno-
logical policies and measures favourable to environmental protection so as to coordinate the
work of environmental protection with economic construction and social development’.
37 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14,
para. 177. See Jin Ruilin (金瑞林) and Shu Min (舒旻), HUAN JING FA DE JI BEN YUAN
ZE (环境法的基本原则) [Basic Principles in Environmental Law] in Jin Ruilin (ed.),
Environmental Law (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2016), p. 35.
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are created. In international environmental law, prevention as a principle only
underscores the obligation of states to prevent environmental damage within and
beyond their own jurisdiction. Article 5 of theChinese Environmental Protection
Law provides that environmental protection should be focused on prevention.
Both public and private entities and individuals should take responsibilities for
preventing risks and damages. The three techniques usually applied under the
principle in China – environmental impact assessment, environmental standards
and environmental monitoring – are consistent with international environmental
practices.
The third principle, ‘public participation’, as enshrined in Principle 10 of the
Rio Declaration, has been transformed into Chinese environmental law. It is
applied in public information, environmental management and impact assess-
ment, class action etc. In 2015, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued
an order on ‘Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Protection’,
which portrays special communication channels (letters, faxes, email, ‘12369’
tip-off hotline, public hearings, notification and financial support) to facilitate
the participation of non-state actors in environmental decisions.
‘Polluter pays’, the fourth principle, evolved from the Organisation for
EconomicCo-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and highlights the ‘intern-
alization’ of environmental costs and the assumption of the ‘burden’ by envir-
onmental polluters and beneficiaries.38 Based on the OECD
Recommendations39 and the Rio Declaration,40 Chinese environmental law
broadens its contents by incorporating an environmental tax law,41 rules on the
insurance for environmental liability42 and a compensation mechanism for
ecological protection.43
38 Principle 16 of Rio de Janeiro Charter/Declaration on Environment and Development.
39 OECD ‘Recommendation on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic
Aspects on Environmental Policies’ (26 May 1972) OECD Doc C (1972) 128, (1972) 12 Acts
of the Organisation 225; OECD ‘Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-
Pays Principle’ (14 Nov. 1974) OECD Doc C (74) 14 Acts of the Organisation 535; OECD
‘Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution’
(25 Jul. 1989) OECD Doc C (89) 88, 28 ILM 1320.
40 Jin and Shu, ‘Basic Principles in Environmental law’, p. 45.
41 ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE GUO HUAN JING BAO HU SHUI FA 2018 XIU
ZHENG (中华人民共和国环境保护税法2018修正) [Environmental Protection Tax Law of
the People’s Republic of China (2018 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress, 26 Oct. 2018, effective on 26 Oct. 2018).
42 Article 6 of ZHONGHUA RENMINGONGHEGUOHAI YANGHUAN JING BAOHU
FA 2017 XIUZHENG (中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法2017修正) [Marine Environmental
Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amendment 2017)] (promulgated by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 4Nov. 2017, effective on 5Nov. 2017).
43 GUOWU YUAN BAN GONG TING GUAN YU JIAN QUAN SHENG TAI BAO HU BU
CHANG JI ZHI DE YI JIAN (国务院办公厅关于健全生态保护补偿机制的意见)
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The above four principles are stipulated in both international and Chinese
environmental law. The normative congruence on the level of principles has
been recognised in the Chinese official position on national and international
environmental governance in general.44
V THE ALLOCATION OF CHINA’S PUBLIC POWERS
IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
The allocation of powers to negotiate, conclude and approve treaties and
agreements is one of the core issues in foreign relations law. Due to fragmen-
tations and complexities in international environmental law, and silences in
Chinese constitutional law, Chinese departmental regulations provide for
different functions for the respective public authorities in individual treaty
regimes.45 This section will analyse the allocation of China’s public powers in
global environmental governance. In 2018, China has completed the ‘State
Council Institutional Reform Plan’.46 After the reform, the power to negotiate
all multilateral environmental treaties was transferred to the Ministry of
Ecology and Environment. However, the competence of the Ministry is not
exclusive. I will first set out the administrative actors involved in China’s
‘external environmental relations’ (subsection A) before I turn to the alloca-
tion of powers in the conclusion and approval of environmental treaties and
agreements (subsection B) and in international cooperation with global envir-
onmental institutions (subsection C).
A Administrative Organs Involved in ‘External Environmental Relations’
More than one Chinese administrative organ is taking action in global envir-
onmental governance, such as negotiations, conclusion and approval of inter-
national environmental treaties and international cooperation. These
collective and coordinated actions of administrative organs are based on
their allocated powers.
[Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Compensation
Mechanism for Ecological Protection] (promulgated 28 Apr. 2016, effective on 28 Apr. 2016).
44 See n. 32 above; LiuNengye, ‘China’s Position on International Environmental Issues’, in Qin
Tianbao (ed.), Research Handbook on Chinese Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 368–94; Wang, China Environmental Diplomacy, pp. 201–5.
45 Before 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission took the leadership in
climate change negotiations.
46 NPC Observer, ‘A Guide to 2018 State Council Institutional Reforms (Further Updated)’,
available at https://npcobserver.com/2018/03/14/a-guide-to-2018-state-council-institutional-
reforms/, accessed 30 September 2020.
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In general, it is the State Council that conducts Chinese foreign affairs
including the negotiation and conclusion of international treaties.47 In prac-
tice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been empowered to negotiate inter-
national environmental treaties on behalf of the People’s Republic of China
and the Chinese government. To achieve division of powers and goal congru-
ence, China has devised a scheme of ‘external coordination’ in multilateral
environmental agreements negotiations. In other words, there is not one single
public organ that is empowered to negotiate global environmental treaties or
agreements.
At present, there are over ten administrative departments involved in the
process of external coordination, which consists of three steps. First, theMinistry
of Foreign Affairs plays a role as the ‘Window Unit’. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs traces and notifies the everyday development of all issues. Secondly, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will contact public authorities and assign specific
issues to them on the basis of relevance and expertise. For example, matters
involving green technologies or forestry will be assigned to the Ministry of
Science and Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
respectively. The authorities entrusted with the exercise of these assigned
powers will set up specialised study groups to propose ideas and draft documents
on their own. After respective investigations, all these groups will gather together
to exchange ideas, draft, revise and finalise position papers for international
negotiations. However, this coordination does not work well all the time.Due to
the multifaced nature and complexity of environmental issues, different public
organs might propose conflicting environmental policies and goals affecting the
process of ‘external coordination’ in environmental diplomacy.48
B Allocation of Powers on Conclusion and Approval of International
Treaties and Agreements
Article 89 of China’s Constitution provides for the functions and powers
exercised by the State Council. Item 8 of this article clearly empowers the
Council to conduct foreign affairs and conclude treaties and agreements with
foreign states, which is also provided in Article 3 of the ‘Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties’.
47 Article 89(9) of China’s Constitution (2018 Amendment).
48 Li Jinhui (李金惠), Jia Shaohua (贾少华) and Tan Quanyin (谭全银) (eds.), HUAN JING
WAI JIAO JI CHU YU SHI JIAN (环境外交：基础与实践) [Environmental Diplomacy:
Basis and Practice] (Beijing: China Environmental Press, 2018), p. 119.
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Questions of approval are more complex. According to the Constitution, two
public authorities shall be involved, the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress49 and the President of the People’s Republic of China.50
Article 3 of the Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties stipulates
that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress is competent to
approve treaties and important agreements, while the President shall approve
treaties and important agreements in pursuance of the decisions of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress. The authority of approval of the
President of the People’s Republic of China is derived from the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress. In practice, none of China’s
international treaties and agreements has been approved by the President. It is
noteworthy that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress only
approves ‘treaties and important agreements’.51
1 Approval of Certain Treaties by the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress
The ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of the
Conclusion of Treaties’, literally understood, fully empowers the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress to approve all international
treaties. Article 7 enlists the ‘treaties and important agreements’ that shall be
approved by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress:
(1) treaties of friendship and cooperation, treaties of peace and other
treaties of a political nature;
(2) treaties and agreements concerning territory and delimitation of
boundary lines;
(3) treaties and agreements relating to judicial assistance and extradition;
(4) treaties and agreements which contain stipulations inconsistent with
the laws of the People’s Republic of China;
49 See n. 23 above.
50 See n. 23 above.
51 In Chinese law, treaty (TIAO YUE, 条约) and agreement (XIE DING, 协定) have different
meanings. Strictly speaking, a treaty is a written agreement between states and relates to
matters of general concern. An agreement, written or unwritten, usually prescribes in detail
the line of conduct which will be followed between states or between states and foreign legal
persons with regard to specific issues. Also see George Grafton Wilson, Handbook of
International Law (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1910), pp. 191–4. In international law, the
two terms can be used interchangeably, however, agreement is more general. See Robert Kolb,
The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), p. 24.
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(5) treaties and agreements which are subject to ratification as agreed by
the contracting parties;
(6) other treaties and agreements subject to ratification.
The following remarks will focus on environmental treaty practice with
respect to Article 7 paragraphs 4 to 6.
Firstly, according to Article 7 paragraph 4 of the ‘Law of the People’s Republic
of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties’, if provision(s) in an
international environmental treaty or agreement depart from existing national
law, the Standing Committee has exercised the power of approval over the
instrument, for example, the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (approved in 1991),52 the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (approved in
1992)53 and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (approved in 1992).54
Secondly, Article 7 paragraph 5 provides that the Standing Committee shall
approve an international treaty or agreement that shall clearly be subject to
ratification as agreed by the contracting parties. For example, the Committee
approved the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage55 in 1988.56 The most recent case is the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques,57 which was approved in 2005.
In practice, the Standing Committee has exercised its power according to
Article 7 paragraph 6, the so-called ‘miscellaneous clause’. The Committee is
competent if a new agreement or protocol substitutes an old one that was
subject to approval or actually approved by the Committee. For example, in
2006, the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter58 was approved based on
the notion of ‘succession of treaty’59 because the 1972 Convention was also
52 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal, Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 1673 UNTS 57.
53 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9May 1992, in force
21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107.
54 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993,
1760 UNTS 79.
55 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris,
16 November 1972, in force 17 December 1975, (1972) 11 ILM 1358.
56 Article 31 (1) of the UNESCO Convention.
57 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, New York, 10December 1976, in force 5October 1978, 1108UNTS 151.
58 Protocol to theConvention on the Prevention ofMarine Pollution by Dumping ofWastes and
Other Matter, London, 7 November 1996, in force 24 March 2006, (1997) 36 ILM 1.
59 Article 23 of the 1996 Protocol to the 1972Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter stipulated that ‘the protocol will supersede the
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subject to approval by the Standing Committee. Two further recent examples
are the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury60 and the 2015 Paris
Agreement,61 which were approved by the Committee in 2016. Although
both treaties were neither subject to the national constitutional procedure
nor successors of earlier treaties, the Committee still approved them because
of their significant implications to environment and human health.62
2 Approval of Other Agreements by the State Council
Article 7 of the ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of the
Conclusion of Treaties’ defines the realm of agreements that shall be approved
by the Standing Committee. Those agreements that do not fall under one of
the six items of Article 7may be subject to approval by the State Council. For
example, the State Council approved the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity63 in 2005. The question
is when does the State Council exercise its power. No statute specifies those
circumstances that empower the State Council.
It is unclear how allocated powers function in international environmental
agreements that do not fall under Article 7 of the Law of the People’s Republic
of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties. The Standing
Committee virtually approved several environmental agreements affecting
human health or environment that do not fall under Article 7 without further
legislation. As for the State Council, no statute supports its power of approval
even if the power has been practically exercised. I would prefer to identify
these practices as ‘unpredictable’ consequences caused by ‘legal lacuna’. To
achieve predictability, Chinese law should further clarify how to allocate the
two public authorities to exercise powers on approval on the grounds of
existing practices.
Convention as between Contracting Parties to this Protocol which are also Parties to the
Convention’.
60 Minamata Convention on Mercury, Kumamoto, 10 October 2013, in force 16 August 2017,
available at www.mercuryconvention.org/ (last accessed: 30 September 2020).
61 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris,
12 December 2015, in force 4 November 2016, Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.
62 Yi Li (易立), LUNQUANGUORENDACHANGWEIHUI JUEDINGPI ZHUNHE JIA
RU HUAN JING BAO HU LEI TIAO YUE DE QUAN LI (论全国人大常委会决定批准和
加入环境保护类条约的权力) [The Powers of Conclusion and Acceptance of International
Environmental Agreements of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress]
(2017) 39 Journal of China Three Gorges University (Humanities & Social Sciences) 67–73
at 70.
63 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal,
29 January 2000, in force 11 September 2003, 2226 UNTS 208.
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C Allocation of Powers in International Cooperation with Global
Environmental Institutions
Apart from concluding international environmental treaties or agreements,
China has been also active in cooperating with global environmental institutions.
Among these, two institutions, the ‘Global Environmental Facility’ and the
‘South-South Cooperation Fund’ reflect how Chinese public powers interact in
international environmental cooperation, as shown in Table 15.1 below.
1 Cooperation with the ‘Global Environmental Facility’
Allocation of powers is also an issue with regard to the operation of the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF), which is advocated by China.64 As a founding
member, contributing and recipient country, China has carried out a productive
cooperationwith theGEFsinceMay 1994.65Until the endof 2019,Chinahas been
granted 1,855.84 million US dollars funding from the GEF for 213 projects
concerning, inter alia, climate change, land degradation and biodiversity.66
Without financial assistance from global contributions, it would be difficult to
upgrade Chinese environmental governance. The Chinese government
announced that it will prepare to implement all plans supported by the GEF.
The GEF can be the major financial resource to realise national environmental
protection with bilateral cooperation.67
In practice, the Ministry of Finance plays the role of a ‘Focal Point’ in the
GEF. Due to its financial nature, all plans and activities should be in accord-
ance with considerations of the national macro-economy, which is instructed
by the National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展与改革委
员会). To achieve efficient collaboration, the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Ecology and Environment jointly established the ‘Secretary Office
of China-GEF’ in 2002.68 The Office identifies, reviews, monitors and assesses
all programmes proposed by the Ministry of Finance. If a proposed
64 The ‘Global Environmental Facility’ is the largest and a permanent financial mechanism to
assist developing countries to implement programmes regarding international environmental
protection. See Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Global Environmental Facility (GEF)’, Max Planck
Encyclopedia of International Law (2010).
65 China is one of thirty-six donor countries to the GEFTrust Fund. However, no data shows the
specific donation amounts until submission.
66 See the website of the ‘GEF’, available at www.thegef.org/country/china, accessed
30 September 2020.
67 Lin Gan, ‘Global Environmental Policy in Social Contexts: The Case of China’ (1992) 5
Knowledge and Policy 30–50 at 34.
68 See the website of ‘GEF and China’, available at www.gefchina.org.cn/gefyzg/xmgk/201603/
t20160316_24277.html, accessed 30 September 2020.
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programme is accepted by the Secretary Office, the Ministry of Finance will
notify GEF. GEF finally decides whether the programme would be approved.
2 Launching and Building the ‘South-South’ Cooperation Fund
China is not only receiving assistance, but also contributing to environmental
financing. In 2015,ChinesePresidentXi Jinping launched theproposition to set up
a ‘South-South’ Cooperation Fund at the United Nations Development Summit.
In his speech, he proposed that China would contribute two billion dollars to
support developing countries to implement the ‘2030 Sustainable Development
Goals’. To effectively implement the fund, the Ministry of Commerce promul-
gated the ‘Consultative Draft on Application and Administration of the South-
South Cooperation Fund’ in 2016.69 According to this draft, the Ministry of
Commercewill administer the approval,management and supervision of funding
programmes. If a foreign entity intends to receive assistance, it shall submit
application files to its corresponding commercial organ or representative office
inChina.TheCommercialRepresentativeOffices affiliated toChinese embassies
and consulates abroad will assist the Ministry to manage and supervise the
programme when the international application is approved.
VI THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATIES IN CHINA
By the end of 2019, China is a state party to ninety-nine multilateral, seventy
regional and bilateral environmental treaties, agreements and protocols,
which almost cover all environmental areas. With the increasing number of
international environmental agreements particularly two questions arise,
which are another core issue of foreign relations law: the place of international
environmental agreements in the Chinese legal system (subsection A) and
how international treaty provisions become part of Chinese law (subsection B).
This section of the chapter will address these two issues in the light of the
applicable Chinese law, with a focus on international environmental law.
69 In China, before a new legislative instrument is introduced, the administrating organ will
promulgate it online and ask for public participation. The ‘Consultative Draft on Application
and Administration of the South-South Cooperation Fund’ was promulgated on
9 September 2016, and open to public participation from 9 October 2016. The draft has not
been transformed into law until submission. An English translation is not available. The
Chinese text can be found at the website of the ‘Department of Treaty and Law of the
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China’, http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/a
s/201609/20160901387579.shtml, accessed 30 September 2020.
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A The Place of Environmental Agreements in Chinese Law
An approved international treaty occupies an uncertain place under Chinese
law. Under constitutional law, the hierarchy in the system of Chinese envir-
onmental law follows the hierarchy of public authorities:71 comprehensive
environmental law and standards adopted by the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress; environmental regulations and standards adopted
by the State Council; departmental regulations adopted by Central Ministries
and Commissions.72 Very few Chinese scholars contend that the legal nature
of approved treaties or agreements depends on the hierarchy of public author-
ities. According to this view, for instance, an international environmental
treaty can be equal to environmental law when it was approved by the
table 15.1 Allocated Functions of China’s Public Authorities in International
Environmental Issues70
Name of Public Authority General Allocated Functions
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Convening of negotiations on international
conventions
Ministry of Ecology and
Environment
Negotiation of Multilateral Environmental
Agreements
Ministry of Science and
Technology
Administration and Implementation of ecological
scientific technologies
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Affairs
Sustainable development in rural and agricultural
matters
Ministry of Finance Collecting and allocating international finance
Ministry of Transport Building and promoting digital and low-carbon
transportations
Ministry of Water Resources Hydropower stations constructions
Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development
Energy efficient housing
Ministry of Commerce Attracting environmental-related international
trade and investment funds
China Meteorological
Administration
International climate sciences cooperation
70 The content of the table is compiled by the author. For more detailed information, see n. 48
above.
71 For ‘the legislative structure and hierarchy of public authorities of the People’s Republic of
China’, see Chen Jianfu, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff,
2016), pp. 229–78; Perry Keller, ‘Sources of Order in Chinese Law’ (1994) 42 The American
Journal of Comparative Law 711–59 at 728.
72 See Jin Ruilin and Shu Min, ‘Basic Principles in Environmental law’, pp. 49–56.
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Standing Committee.73 I am very sceptical about this proposition. The standard
of ‘hierarchy’ shall be strictly limited in the context of Chinese lawmaking. It is
implausible that the status of treaties or agreements could be arbitrarily deter-
mined by the hierarchy of the approving authority without any basis in a statute.
B Methods of Implementation
China has been always upholding that it will conform to international law
irrespective of whether this contradicted its national law and policy. Yet,
current Chinese law does not provide a specific approach to implement
international legal obligations. In accordance with existing practice, some
legal scholars contend that there are three ways for international treaty provi-
sions to become part of China’s domestic law: transformation through legisla-
tion (subsection 1), execution by administrative measures (subsection 2) and
direct application of international treaties (subsection 3).74These observations
are confirmed by the practice of Chinese environmental law.
1 Transformation through Legislation
The process of transformation generally takes place in two alternative ways. A first
option is the enactment of special legislation.Generally, it is theStateCouncil that
promulgates departmental regulations. For example, in order to implement the
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal,75 the Regulations on the Safety Management of
Hazardous Chemicals76 were adopted in 2013. The second approach is the
incorporation of treaty obligations into existing laws by amendment or revision.
73 See e.g. Jiang Hong (江虹), GUO JI FA YUGUONEI FA GUAN XI DE SI KAO (国际法与
国内法关系的思考) [Reflections on Relationships between International Law and Domestic
Law] (2014) 3 Journal of Liaoning Administration College 43–5; WuHui (吴慧), GUO JI TIAO
YUE ZAIWOGUOGUONEI FA SHANGDEDIWEI JI YU GUONEI FA CHONGTU
DE YU FANG HE JIE JUE (国际条约在我国国内法上的地位及与国内法冲突的预防和
解决) [Status of International Treaties in the Chinese Law System and How to Prevent and
Manage Conflicts] (2000) 2 Journal of the University of International Relations 23–8.
74 Xue Hanqin and Jin Qian, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’
(2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 299322; Charles R. McElwee, Environmental
Law in China:Managing Risk and Ensuring Compliance (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010), pp. 689.
75 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal, Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 1673 UNTS 57.
76 WEI XIAN HUA XUE PING AN QUAN GUAN LI TIAO LI 2013 XIU DING (危险化学品
安全管理条约2013修订) [Regulations on the Safety Management of Hazardous Chemicals
(2013 Revision)] (promulgated and amended by the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, 7 Dec. 2013, effective on 7 Dec. 2013).
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The typical example is that the StateCouncil adopted the 2018Amendment of the
Regulation on the Administration of Ozone Depleting Substances77 to fulfil legal
obligations under the ViennaConvention for the Protection of theOzone Layer78
and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.79
2 Execution by Administrative Measures
Sometimes, administrative measures may be adopted to address harsh environ-
mental problems, since it is time-consuming to transform international legal
obligations into statute. Hence, administrative organs or offices may be author-
ised to promulgate regulatory documents.80 Themost recent case is the Chinese
government’s ‘no’ to foreign garbage, which is a matter governed by the Basel
Convention. In 2017, under the approval of the State Council, the General
Office of the State Council issued a ‘Notice on the Issuance of the
Implementation Plan for Prohibiting the Entry of Foreign Garbage and on the
Advancement of the Reform of the Solid Waste Import Administrative System’.
3 Direct Application
Chinese environmental laws provide for general objectives, obligations and
accountabilities. Normally, supplementary provisions address how an inter-
national environmental treaty will be dealt with when it is not in conformity
77 XIAOHAOCHOUYANGCENGWUZHIGUANLI TIAO LI 2018 XIU ZHENG (消耗臭
氧层物质管理条例2018修正) [Regulations on the Administration of Ozone Depleting
Substances] (promulgated and amended by the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, 19 Mar. 2018, effective on 19 Mar. 2018).
78 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force
22 September 1988, 1513 UNTS 293.
79 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal,
16 September 1987, in force 1 January 1989, 1522 UNTS 3.
80 To implement the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ in the Kyoto Protocol, two administrative
measures were issued.QING JIEFAZHAN JI ZHIXIANGMUYUNXINGGUANLIBANFA
2011XIUDING (清洁发展机制项目运行管理办法2011修订) [Measures for theOperation and
Management of Clean Development (2011 Revision)] (promulgated by the National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance, 3 Aug. 2011, effective on 3 Aug. 2011); ZHONG GUO
QING JIE FAZHAN JI ZHI JI JINGUANLI BANFA 2017XIUZHENG (中国清洁发展机制
基金管理办法2017修正) [Measures for the Administration of the Clean Development
Mechanism Fund (2017 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and
Technology, Ministry of Environment and Ecology (formerly referred to as ‘Ministry of
Environmental Protection’), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (formerly referred to as
‘Ministry of Agriculture’) and China Meteorological Administration, 29Dec. 2017, effective on 1
Jan. 2018).
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with national laws. Out of twenty-seven national laws only two explicitly
define the status of international environmental treaties in case of conflicts.81
Article 96 of theMarine Environmental Protection Law (2017 Amendment)
states that:
Where an international treaty regarding marine environment protection
concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains provi-
sions differing from those contained in this Law, the provisions of the
international treaty shall apply; however, the provisions about which the
People’s Republic of China has reservations shall be excepted.82
This provision reflects that international environmental treaty law prevails
over national law in the field of marine protection. It also proves that direct
applicability of environmental treaties has been presupposed in Chinese
environmental law, although very few environmental laws directly pinpoint
the approach. Since most provisions in environmental treaties are vague,
national law normally is not in conflict with treaty provisions but concretises
them for special circumstances.
VII CONCLUSION
China does not have a systematic law and practice concerning foreign rela-
tions. Its two characteristics of fragmentation and unpredictability can be
explained by historical doubts and cautions towards international law,
a western-dominated discourse and system of international law, and silence
on the part of China’s Constitution. Chinese environmental diplomacy helps
to further comprehend Chinese foreign relations environmental law and
policy. While there is no field of foreign relations law recognised as such in
China, Chinese foreign relations environmental law and policy conforms to
a basic structure of foreign relations law. China devised and operated distrib-
uted authorities through external coordination in international environmental
treaty negotiations. According to the law and administrative regulations, the
Standing Committee and the State Council are empowered to ratify or
conclude international environmental treaties or agreements under special
81 Another example: Article 90 of ZHONGHUARENMINGONGHEGUOGUTI FEIWU
WURAN HUAN JING FANG ZHI FA 2016 XIU ZHENG (中国人民共和国固体废物污染
环境防治法2017修正) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control
of Environmental Pollution Caused by Solid Wasters (2016 Revision)] (promulgated by the
StandingCommittee of theNational People’s Congress, 7Nov. 2016, effective on 7Nov. 2016).
82 See n. 42 above.
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conditions. A ratified treaty becomes part of the Chinese legal system. To
achieve compliance, Chinese legislative authorities may adopt transform-
ation, executional measures or direct application.
The overall picture painted in this chapter hence points to a nuanced
answer to the question of the existence of a Chinese foreign relations law: it
does not exist as a separate field, but there are many components of Chinese
domestic law which fulfil typical functions of a foreign relations law. In
particular, they help to construct bridges and establish boundaries between
public international law and the Chinese legal framework. Further research
on the prevalence of similar conditions of the Chinese legal framework for
other fields of international cooperation would be a welcome addition to the
global scholarship on foreign relations law as well as public international law.
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16
The Dynamic and Sometimes Uneasy Relationship
Between Foreign Relations Law and International Law
Curtis A. Bradley
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law, published in
2019, ambitiously sought ‘to lay the groundwork for a new field of study and
teaching’.1 The present volume usefully complements that effort by focusing,
from a comparative perspective, on how foreign relations law interacts with
international law. In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the relationship
between these two bodies of law, drawing on examples from this volume and
also from the Handbook. As will become evident, foreign relations law and
international law have important and often underappreciated effects on each
other, sometimes in ways that are constructive andmutually reinforcing, but at
other times in ways that produce potential conflict.
I DEFINING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
As defined in theOxford Handbook, foreign relations law is ‘the domestic law
of each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the
world’.2 Such domestic law can take a variety of forms, including constitu-
tional law, statutory law, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions. It
can also include constitutional customs, or ‘conventions’, that may or may
not have legal status.3 Much of this law, at least in constitutional
1 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Preface’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
2 Curtis A. Bradley, ‘What Is Foreign Relations Law?’ in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 3.
One can also describe certain international institutions, most notably the European Union, as
having a body of foreign relations law. See Bradley, ‘Preface’.
3 For example, in Japan, the distinction between treaties that need to be submitted to the
legislature for approval and agreements that can be concluded unilaterally by the executive
branch is regulated by the ‘Ohira Principles’, a nonbinding set of standards promulgated by
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democracies,4 concerns allocations of authority between political actors,
such as the authority to represent the nation in diplomacy, to conclude
and terminate international agreements, to recognize foreign governments
and their territories, and to initiate or end the use of military force.5 In
federal systems, these allocation issues are not only horizontal but also
vertical, extending to the relations between national and subnational insti-
tutions. Foreign relations law also encompasses issues relating to the role of
the courts in transnational cases, such as whether certain issues are ‘non-
justiciable’ and thus subject entirely to political branch determination,
whether and to what extent courts should give deference to the views of the
executive branch, and the types of relief that courts are allowed to issue when
they find that the executive branch has acted unlawfully.
Because foreign relations law under this definition is a type of domestic law, it is
analytically distinct from a nation’s international legal obligations.6 This distinc-
tion between foreign relations law and international law is not meant to suggest
anything about the status of international law within a domestic legal system.
Nations differ in the extent to which they are positioned towards either the
‘monistic’ or ‘dualistic’ ends of the spectrum with respect to the domestic status
of international law, and these differences are themselves part of their foreign
relations law.
One virtue of defining foreign relations law as a form of domestic law is that
it facilitates comparative analysis. Unlike international law, foreign relations
a Japanese foreign minister. See Tadaatsu Mori, ‘The Current Practice of Making and
Applying International Agreements in Japan’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019),
ch. 11.
4 Comparative study may reveal differing national conceptions of what is or should be encom-
passed by foreign relations law. See, for example, Michael Riegner, ‘Comparative Foreign
Relations Law between Centre and Periphery: Liberal and Postcolonial Perspectives’, this
volume, p. 60, which suggests that postcolonial states may have a different perspective than
liberal democracies about the functions of foreign relations law.
5 There are allocation issues even in non-democracies. For discussion of foreign relations law
issues relating to China, see, for example, Ji Hua, ‘China and Global Environmental
Governance: Coordination, Distribution and Compliance’, this volume, p. 317;
Congyan Cai, ‘International Law in Chinese Courts’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019),
ch. 31.
6 See also Thomas Giegerich, ‘Foreign Relations Law’ (January 2011), in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, available at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/l
aw:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e937 (‘The concrete form and content of a State’s
foreign relations law is within its domestic jurisdiction and thus beyond the range of inter-
national law.’).
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law makes no claim of universality and instead accepts that nations can and
will have different approaches.7 And there are many reasons why the content
of foreign relations law might vary from nation to nation. It is not surprising,
for example, to find differences between constitutional arrangements devel-
oped after World War II and those developed earlier. Parliamentary and
presidential systems are also likely to reflect somewhat different approaches
to questions of the separation of powers. In addition, understandings of the
judicial role likely differ among countries, including as between civil law and
common law countries. The particular domestic politics of a country can also
have an important influence on the content of its domestic law, including its
foreign relations law. Furthermore, foreign relations law may be affected by
a nation’s geopolitical status and sense of its national interest, and these will
obviously vary, both among individual countries and over time.8
Another virtue of treating foreign relations law and international law as
analytically distinct is that it allows for a consideration of the relationship
between these bodies of law, including a consideration of the ‘bridges’ and
‘boundaries’ that are the focus of the present volume. As discussed below, there
is an interactive dynamic between foreign relations law and international law,
with each body of law having effects on the other.
Despite the benefits of using this definition for purposes of analysis, it
should be emphasized that any sharp distinction between foreign relations
law and international law will be artificial in practice. International law can
and often is applied as domestic law, either directly or through some act of
domestic incorporation.Moreover, even when international law is not applied
directly, courts often construe domestic law in light of international legal
obligations, and executive actors often exercise their discretion with such
obligations in mind. Foreign relations law, as defined in the Oxford
Handbook, includes the domestic rules governing such application and inter-
pretation but not the international legal obligations themselves. The term
could be defined more broadly, however, to include at least some aspects of
international law.9
7 To be sure, even when nations ostensibly have the same international obligations, they may
interpret them differently, and it may be fruitful to explore such differences. See, for example,
Anthea Roberts et al., Comparative International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
8 See also Frédéric Mégret, ‘Foreign Legal Policy as the Background to Foreign Relations Law?
Revisiting Guy de Lacharrière’s La politique juridique extérieure’, this volume, p. 108, which
suggests that in studying differing national approaches to foreign relations, it is important to
consider not only a nation’s domestic law but also its particular policy orientation towards
international law.
9 Any attempt to include international law within the definition of foreign relations law will
encounter difficult line-drawing questions. Does one include all of a nation’s international
The Relationship Between Foreign Relations Law & International Law 345
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
Foreign relations law, however it is properly defined, has long been a more
developed field of study and teaching in the United States than in most other
countries. It is not entirely clear why this is so. The United States has the
oldest written Constitution in the world, and accommodating that
Constitution to a radically changed international environment, as well as
a substantially different US role in that environment, may present unique
challenges. In addition, the United States has a unique brand of federalism
that tends to generate complex legal issues, especially as globalization has
blurred the line between foreign and domestic affairs. Law schools in the
United States also may have a more flexible structure than in many other
countries, allowing faculty to more easily cross historic subject matter
divides.
Whatever the reasons, there now appears to be growing interest outside
the United States in foreign relations law. In 2014, Campbell McLachlan
published an important and wide-ranging treatise on Commonwealth
foreign relations law, a treatise cited by the UK Supreme Court in its
landmark Miller decision concerning Brexit.10 A number of important
works have also been published in recent years focusing on EU foreign
relations law, addressing issues such as the process for concluding inter-
national agreements and the role of federalism that are similar to the
foreign relations law issues faced by individual nations.11 The Oxford
Handbook, which has forty-six chapters by authors from around the
world, will hopefully stimulate further international interest in the sub-
ject. Likewise, the present volume highlights the potential interest in
foreign relations law by scholars from a wide variety of countries. As
a result, this is an especially good time to be thinking both about the
nature of this body of law and about similarities and differences in how
nations address it.
legal obligations? Only those that have the status of domestic law? Only those that are
enforceable by the courts?
10 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), cited in R (on the Application of Miller and another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting
the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, para. 57, www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016–
0196-judgment.pdf, accessed September 30, 2020.
11 See, for example, Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008); Piet Eeckhout, EU External
Relations Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Ramses A. Wessel and
Joris Larik, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2020). See also Joris Larik, ‘EU Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Scholarship’ (2017) 111 AJIL
Unbound 321.
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II FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW’S EFFECTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW
There a variety of ways in which foreign relations law can affect international
law. Most directly, a nation’s foreign relations law can affect the manner in
which a nation engages with international law – for example, the domestic
process that it must follow in order to join or implement a treaty. Sometimes
such foreign relations law will, at least as a practical matter, act as a constraint
on a nation’s ability to engage or comply with international law – for example,
by requiring that multiple domestic institutions agree on such engagement or
compliance. If so, this will have an impact on international law’s
development.12 In some cases, domestic courts may even require that govern-
mental actors take certain actions to ensure the compatibility of international
law with domestic constitutional law. A noteworthy example is the Colombian
Constitutional Court’s 2019 decision conditioning the constitutionality of
a bilateral investment treaty between Colombia and France on the issuance
of a particular interpretive declaration by the two countries.13
Sometimes foreign relations law will affect not only international law’s
primary rules, but also its secondary rules that govern how international law
is made. Indeed, this has long been the case. For example, when some nations
began separating the treaty power between executives and legislatures after the
American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth century, international
law began to relax expectations that signature of a treaty carried with it an
obligation to ratify the treaty.14 Similarly, in part spurred by American practice
arising from its divided treaty power, international law came to allow for treaty
reservations at the time of ratification (and international law on that subject
has since evolved to take account of changes in the nature of treaty-making,
including most notably the rise of multilateral conventions).15 Today, the
12 In other instances, a nation might be able to use its foreign relations law to its advantage in
international negotiations, as Felix Lange notes in his chapter for this volume, ‘Foreign
Relations Law As a Bargaining Tool?’ See also Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’ (1988) 42 International Organization 427.
13 See Gustavo Prieto, ‘The Colombian Constitutional Court Judgment C-252/19: A new frontier
for reform in international investment law’, EJIL: Talk!, July 29, 2019, www.ejiltalk.org/the-
colombian-constitutional-court-judgment-c-252-19-a-new-frontier-for-reform-in-international-
investment-law/, accessed September 30, 2020. See also Angelo Jr. Golia, ‘Judicial Review,
Foreign Relations and Global Administrative Law. The Administrative Function of Courts in
Foreign Relations’, this volume, p. 130.
14 See J. Mervyn Jones, Full Powers and Ratification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1946), pp. 76–80.
15 See Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020), p. 38.
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foreign relations laws of many countries divide the treaty power between the
executive branch and the legislature, at least for certain types of agreements,16
making these international law rules even more significant.
Importantly, the normative goals of foreign relations law will not always
align with the normative goals of international law. For example, there is an
effort in some countries to give their legislatures a stronger role in foreign
relations decision-making, such as with respect to treaty-making and the use of
military force. Doing so might lead to greater deliberation and democratic
input, but it will not inevitably promote greater international cooperation. It is
not uncommon, for example, for legislatures to fail to approve treaties or other
international law efforts favored by the executive branch. There may also be
a recent trend towards making foreign relations law more ‘administrative’ in
nature, and thus potentially subject to greater judicial oversight. But, as
Angelo Jr. Golia notes in his chapter for this volume, such a shift ‘does not
always imply greater coordination among systems, but can rather bring more
disorder, conflict and unpredictability’.17
Sometimes a greater role for legislative or judicial involvement in foreign
relations law will even lead to breaches of international law that might not
have occurred under executive control. This is one way of understanding the
much-discussed Medellin v. Texas litigation in the United States. In holding
that legislative action was needed in order to convert the US obligation to
comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice into domestic
law,18 the SupremeCourt made it muchmore difficult for the United States to
comply. Indeed, even now, many years after the decision, Congress has still
not enacted the requisite legislation.19 The US experience with amendments
to its sovereign immunity statute in recent years similarly highlights how
legislatures may not always prioritize international law compliance. The US
Congress has created various exceptions to sovereign immunity for terrorism-
related conduct, despite concerns raised by the executive branch that such
16 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and
Treaty Withdrawal’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign
Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), ch. 8.
17 See Golia, ‘Judicial Review, Foreign Relations and Global Administrative Law’, p. 158.
18 See Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 US 491, 525–26 (2008) (‘The responsibility for transforming an
international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to
Congress.’).
19 Proposed legislation designed to facilitate US compliance with the obligations of consular
notice that were at issue inMedellinwas introduced inCongress in 2011, but the legislation was
not adopted. See Consular Notification Compliance Act, S. 1194, introduced in Senate on
June 14, 2011.
348 Curtis A. Bradley
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/34AA7CB3CED3622EE3B8F02579701E9B
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin, on 25 May 2021 at 09:35:31, subject to the Cambridge
exceptions may not be consistent with international law and might expose the
United States to reductions in its own sovereign immunity abroad.20
Another widely discussed example is the 2014 Italian constitutional court
decision issued in response to the ICJ’s decision in Germany v. Italy concern-
ing the international law of sovereign immunity. In holding that the inter-
national law of immunity recognized by the ICJ was incompatible with Italian
constitutional law and thus inapplicable in the domestic legal order, the court
contributed to placing Italy in potential breach of its international obligations.
In doing so, it acted contrary to the position of both the executive and
legislative branches in Italy, which were prepared to accept the ICJ’s
decision.21 In these and other examples of potential conflict between foreign
relations law and international law, there can be reasonable debates about
which body of law should bear more of the blame. One interesting issue for
future scholarly analysis would be whether and to what extent each of the two
bodies of law has some responsibility to coordinate with the other.22
III INTERNATIONAL LAW’S EFFECTS ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW
Not only does foreign relations law affect international law, but international
law also in turn affects foreign relations law. As an initial matter, the foreign
relations powers that must be allocated under foreign relations law are
20 For example, in 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act over
President Barack Obama’s veto. In his veto message, Obama expressed concern that, by
creating a new exception to immunity, the Act ‘would upset longstanding international
principles regarding sovereign immunity, putting in place rules that, if applied globally,
could have serious implications for U.S. national interests’. See Barack Obama, ‘Veto
Message from the President, S. 2040’, the White House, September 23, 2016, https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040, accessed
September 30, 2020. Of course, sometimes legislatures do play close attention to international
law or are otherwise influenced by it. See, for example, Veronika Fikfak, ‘War, International
Law and the Rise of Parliament – The Influence of International Law on UK Parliamentary
Practice with Respect to the Use of Force’, this volume, p. 299.
21 See Golia, ‘Judicial Review, Foreign Relations and Global Administrative Law’, p. 153 et seq.
See also Andrea Bianchi, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities, Constitutional Values, and System
Closures’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign
Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), ch. 38.
22 Another interesting example of domestic foreign relations law imposing a limit on the
implementation of an ICJ ruling is a 2014 decision from Colombia’s constitutional court
requiring that a treaty be concluded in order to implement an ICJ decision limiting
Colombia’s maritime rights. See Monica Garcia, ‘Colombia Court Backs Santos in Sea
Boundary Dispute with Nicaragua’, Reuters, May 3, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/colom
bia-nicaragua-dispute/colombia-court-backs-santos-in-sea-boundary-dispute-with-nicaragua-i
dUSL2N0NP03L20140503, accessed September 30, 2020.
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themselves often defined by international law, which regulates the rights and
obligations of sovereign nations.23 For example, if a national constitution
assigns the power to ‘declare war’ to a particular national actor, one would
need to consult international law in order to have a full understanding of the
potential scope and significance of this authority. More generally, as a matter
of explication, it will often be necessary to know the international law back-
drop in order to understand elements of foreign relations law, such as foreign
relations law relating to treaty-making and interpretation, extraterritorial regu-
lation, and sovereign immunity.24
Moreover, while international law generally purports to be agnostic
about domestic constitutional arrangements, in fact it sometimes assumes
or favors certain arrangements. In particular, international law tends to
assume, at least as a default, executive control over aspects of foreign
relations. As a result, international law can make it more difficult for
nations to rein in executive authority in the foreign relations area. This is
evident, as Edward Swaine notes in his chapter for this volume, in the
international law governing treaty termination.25 The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties presumes that notices of treaty withdrawal
received from heads of state are valid and, unlike for treaty formation,
does not provide for any domestic process justification for voiding such
notice. To be sure, international law does not require that states give
unilateral withdrawal authority to their executives, and it is possible that
domestic institutions could resist the exercise of such authority. In recent
years, national courts in both the United Kingdom and South Africa
famously insisted on legislative involvement in treaty withdrawals. But
the effectiveness of such domestic checks will depend on a state’s
23 See, for example, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 318 (1936) (‘As
a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in that field are
equal to the right and power of the other members of the international family. Otherwise, the
United States is not completely sovereign.’).
24 The American Law Institute’s (2018) Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States 2, observes that, because it ‘deals with two distinct legal systems, namely
domestic law bearing on foreign relations and relevant portions of international law, it must
address both’.
25 See Edward Swaine, ‘International Foreign Relations Law: Executive Authority in Entering
and Exiting Treaties’, this volume, p. 46. See also HannahWoolaver, ‘State Engagement with
Treaties: Interactions Between International and Domestic Law’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019) ch. 24; Hannah Woolaver, ‘From Joining to Leaving: Domestic Law’s Role in the
International Legal Validity of TreatyWithdrawal’ (2019) 30European Journal of International
Law 73.
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particular laws and institutions.26 International law, as currently struc-
tured, does not itself facilitate legislative involvement in treaty
withdrawals.
Executive authority is favored under international law in other ways as well.
The Vienna Convention sets forth only very narrow grounds for invalidating
treaties concluded in violation of domestic law: according to article 46 of the
Convention, the violation must not only concern ‘a rule of [the nation’s]
internal law of fundamental importance’, but the rule must also be ‘manifest’.
In part because of this provision, the US Senate did not approve the
Convention when President Nixon submitted it in the 1970s: the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee was concerned that this provision might bind
the United States to international agreements made by the president without
the two-thirds Senate consent required by article II of the Constitution,
because that requirement might not be considered ‘manifest’ given the
extensive US practice of concluding agreements outside of this process.27
Again, of course, national institutions could resist executive aggrandizement
in this area. In 2017, for example, the Ghanaian Supreme Court held that
Ghana’s president had acted unconstitutionally in concluding an agreement
with the United States without obtaining parliamentary approval, and it
specifically declined to follow the US practice of allowing executive
agreements.28 But, as for treaty withdrawal, any such domestic resistance will
obtain little support from international law.
Yet another way that the Vienna Convention may empower executives is its
treatment of signing obligations. Under article 18 of the Convention, a nation
that signs an international agreement is ‘obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose’ of the treaty ‘until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty’. This is true even for nations
that require legislative approval prior to the ratification of treaties. As a result,
executives in such nations can potentially create treaty-related obligations
through unilateral action. In the United States, this may have happened
when the Clinton administration signed the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court in 1999, knowing that the incoming Bush
26 For an explanation of why the United Kingdom and South African decisions are unlikely to
have much relevance to US law, see Curtis A. Bradley and Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Treaty Exit in
the United States: Insights from the United Kingdom or South Africa?’ (2017) 111 AJIL
Unbound 428.
27 See Anna M. Frankowska, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties before United
States Courts’ (1988) 28 Virginia Journal of International Law 281 at 296–98.
28 See Banful v. Attorney General and Another, (J1/7/2016) [2017] GHASC 21 (June 22, 2017),
available at https://ghalii.org/gh/judgment/supreme-court/2017/21, accessed September 30,
2020.
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administration was not supportive of the Statute. The Bush administration
then ‘unsigned’ the Convention by announcing that it had no intention of
ratifying it.29
These examples also suggest that, especially in nations in which the scope of
executive authority over foreign relations is unclear, executives may be able to
leverage international law as a way around domestic constraints. Another
potential example of this phenomenon concerns the use of military force.
Even in nations that require legislative approval for some uses of force,
executives may seek to rely on international law, such as UN Security
Council authorization, as an alternative or supplementary source of authority.
This happened in the United States, for example, in connection with the
Korean War.30
Another example of international law’s potential effect on foreign relations
law concerns the increasingly administrative nature of international law.
A significant amount of international law is made today not through high-
level negotiations between foreign ministries but rather through international
institutions, lower-level negotiations between domestic administrative agen-
cies, and various forms of ‘soft law’.31 This development tends to further
enhance executive authority over foreign relations, for a number of reasons:
executive agents tend to represent nations in international institutions, admin-
istrative law tends to be centered in the executive branch, and less formal
agreement-making may not be subject to the usual domestic requirements for
treaty-making.32 In response to this development, as Jean Galbraith notes in
her chapter for this volume, legislatures may need to enhance process-based
constraints on the exercise of executive authority.33
29 See Curtis A. Bradley, ‘Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution’
(2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 307 at 311–12.
30 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jean Galbraith, ‘Presidential War Powers as an Interactive
Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change’ (2016) 91
New York University Law Review 689 at 735–36.
31 See Anna Petrig, ‘Democratic Participation in International Law-Making in Switzerland after
the “Age of Treaties”’, this volume, p. 180 (discussing how ‘informal law-making greatly
complicates the relationship between sovereignty (including domestic democratic self-
determination) and international cooperation’).
32 For an account of increased executive branch control over international law in the United
States, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘Presidential Control Over International
Law’ (2018) 131 Harvard Law Review 1201.
33 See Jean Galbraith, ‘From Scope to Process: The Evolution of Checks on Presidential Power
in U.S. Foreign Relations Law’, this volume, p. 239. For discussion of a legislative effort in
Spain along these lines, see Carlos Espositó, ‘Spanish Foreign Relations Law and the Process
for Making Treaties and Other International Agreements’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2019), ch. 12.
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Sometimes international law itself requires or favors certain processes of
decision-making, and when it does so this can also affect foreign relations law.
In their introductory chapter for this volume, Helmut Aust and Thomas
Kleinlein give the example of a requirement of environmental impact
assessments,34 a requirement that may as a practical matter empower certain
administrative agencies at the domestic level. Investment law is another
example where international law may in effect mandate certain domestic
processes, as well as the substance of some aspects of the domestic law applied
in these processes.35 The ICJ’s 2004 decision in Avena, which was at issue in
the Medellin litigation referenced above, is also an example of international
law being construed to impose a domestic process requirement, namely
judicial review of the convictions and sentences of certain individuals who
had been imprisoned without proper consular notice,36 although the United
States still has not implemented the requirement.
In addition to these horizontal separation of powers effects, international
law may also affect vertical issues relating to federalism. In a variety of ways,
international law tends to favor national over subnational control over foreign
relations. For example, unless a treaty provides otherwise, it is deemed, as
noted in article 29 of the Vienna Convention, to apply throughout the entire
territory of a party. Similarly, under the international law of state responsibil-
ity, nations are viewed as responsible for the conduct of their territorial units,
and they are not allowed to rely on their internal law, including internal law
relating to federalism, as a justification for a failure to comply with their
obligations.37 Although these presumptions in favor of national rather than
subnational control of foreign relations law are understandable in a system of
Westphalian nation-states, they can make it more difficult for constitutional
values relating to federalism to be maintained, especially as international law
increasingly overlaps with matters of traditional domestic regulation.
34 See Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Introduction’, this volume, p. 3.
35 See, for example, Julian Arato, ‘The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law’
(2019) 113 American Journal of International Law 1 at 50 (arguing that ‘[international invest-
ment law] and [investor-state dispute settlement] have together generated rudimentary, but
surprisingly broad, swathes of international private law – disciplining domestic policy space in
underappreciated ways, and distorting the logic and functions of whole fields of domestic
private law in relation to foreign investors’).
36 See Avena andOtherMexicanNationals (Mexico v.United States of America), Judgment, I.C.
J. Reports 2004, para. 140. (‘[T]he legal consequences of this breach have to be examined and
taken into account in the course of review and reconsideration. The Court considers that it is
the judicial process that is suited to this task.’).
37 See International Law Commission, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts’, 2001, arts. 4(1), 32, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 2005, https://legal.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf, accessed September 30, 2020.
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IV CONCLUSION
One of the virtues of studying foreign relations law, as noted at the outset of
this chapter, is that it allows for an exploration of the rich and evolutionary
relationship between foreign relations law and international law, a topic that
has been under-explored in the literature. The present volume makes an
important contribution in addressing that relationship from a range of per-
spectives, and it will undoubtedly spur additional scholarship on the topic. In
addition to its scholarly value, the volume should be of interest to lawyers and
policy-makers in both the domestic and international domains because it
highlights how legal rules developed in one of these domains can have
important, and not always beneficial, effects in the other.
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The Present Salience of Foreign Relations Law
Campbell McLachlan
I POPULISM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW’S EXTERNAL FACE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The choices that states make about how their internal constitutional systems
relate to the world outside – the international – are not accidental. They reflect
fundamental decisions about how open or closed the state is to international
law1 and about the level at which governance decisions that affect societies are
made. Despite this, the legal relationship between the domestic and the
international is under-theorised. It has been characterised by a ‘dichotomy
[which] remains perhaps the least investigated of all the fundamental divisions
in our political lives’.2
The fissure between the municipal and the international has been exposed
to view – and exploited – by the contemporary rise of so-called ‘populism’ in
many states. A key tenet of populism has been a form of exclusionary identity
politics that, mobilising popular sovereignty, creates a division between ‘the
people’ and the other, seen in Hobbesian terms as the enemy outside.3
Populism makes a claim to sociological legitimacy – that society should not
be controlled by external forces – that leads to a turn against ‘elites, supra-
national agreements, international judicial institutions or economic powers’.4
The result is a context in which ‘international law is invoked, but in what
1 Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘The Democratic Challenge to Foreign Relations Law in Transatlantic
Perspective’, in Jacco Bomhoff, David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole (eds.), The Double-
Facing Constitution: Legal Externalities and the Reshaping of the Constitutional Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 345.
2 David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), p. 10.
3 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (London: Penguin Books, 2017), p. 3.
4 Paul Blokker, ‘Populist Governments and International Law: A Reply to Heike Krieger’ (2019)
30 EJIL 1009 at 1012.
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seems an increasingly antagonistic way, amounting often to a dialogue of the
deaf’.5
Despite the central importance of the external face of populism, surpris-
ingly little attention has been paid to its legal significance, in comparison to its
internal constitutional implications.6 The populist challenge to international
law is particularly concerned with the boundary between the international and
the domestic, in which national sovereignty – linked with the popular sover-
eignty of ‘the people’ – is invoked as the key concept. In legal terms, this means
that the challenge presented by the external face of populism is not only about
the way in which states interact on the plane of international law, in the
discourse between states and in their engagement with and within inter-
national institutions. It is also, perhaps even principally, about the relation
between the internal law and institutions of the state on the one hand and
international law on the other. This is the domain of foreign relations law.
The result is that the renewed attention given to foreign relations law as
a field of comparative study (and not merely an American Sonderweg)7 comes
at a time when the legal doctrines are being tested and debated to an unprece-
dented extent in many states in ways that expose to view the underlying
policies and principles served by the law in this area. Yet this is not only
a linear story about the enlargement of executive power fuelled by popular
mandate. In constitutional democracies, it also is an account of the ways in
which the other organs of government, the legislature and the courts, articu-
late their own role.
The publication of the present collection of chapters – the fruit of a well-
conceived symposium – therefore presents an opportunity to reflect on the
manner in which foreign relations law mediates the relation between the
domestic and the international legal realms at a time when this is a hotly
contested boundary. This is not simply an exercise in comparing legal tech-
niques. Rather, it invites consideration of a larger question: what is foreign
relations law for?
It is possible to examine that question (as I have done elsewhere) as one of
the perspective or conception of the function of foreign relations law with
5 James Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’ (2018) 81
Modern Law Review 1.
6 But see for important interventions: Philip Alston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human Rights’
(2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 1; Heike Krieger, ‘Populist Governments and
International Law’ (2019) 30 EJIL 971. For a more general survey: (2018) 49 Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law 1–220.
7 Detlev F. Vagts, ‘American International Law: A Sonderweg?’, in Klaus Dicke et al. (eds.),
Weltinnenrecht. Liber Amicorum Jost Delbrück (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2005), p. 835.
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which the field is approached.8 Seen in this way, both the scope of the field
and the development of specific legal doctrines will be affected by whether
foreign relations law is conceived as designed to maintain the exclusion of the
international from the domestic realm; or alternatively to facilitate the recep-
tion of international law into the domestic sphere. It may bring the conduct of
foreign relations within the domestic constitutional sphere or concern itself
with the external conduct of diplomatic relations between states. Finally, it
might be reconceived as a conflict of laws for public law, performing an
allocative function on questions of jurisdiction and applicable law as they
arise in the external exercise of public power. In this latter perspective, the
field draws upon elements of public and private international law as well as
constitutional law, even if (like private international law itself) it must always
remain a part of the domestic law of each state.
This book shines a specific spotlight on the relationship between compara-
tive foreign relations law and public international law. Amidst what Edward
Swaine describes as ‘the considerable, and understandable, excitement regard-
ing the nascent field of comparative foreign relations law’,9 it is worth pausing
to ask what implications this might have for the development of international
law itself. Is the turn to foreign relations law, as Anthea Roberts has suggested,
‘an inherently conservative move’?10 After all, foreign relations law had been
until recently hardly recognised as a field outside the United States. There it
has taken a pronounced inward turn in the most recent generation of scholar-
ship. Is it not more than coincidental that it should be exported as
a comparative field at a time when the rise of populism, in the United States
and elsewhere, increasingly resists the role of the international in the domestic
polity?
What effect might the development of comparative foreign relations law as
a field have on public international law itself? Helmut Aust and Thomas
Kleinlein argue in their Introduction that ‘it is precisely this by now estab-
lished narrative of an “Ersatz international law” that should be challenged
critically’.11 But in order to do so, it is first necessary to consider that narrative.
Section II will enquire whether, and if so how, an increased focus on foreign
8 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law’, in
Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 21.
9 See the chapter by Edward T. Swaine, p. 46.
10 Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (New York: Oxford University Press,
2017), p. xx.
11 See the chapter by Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, p. 1 at 8.
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relations law might itself undermine international law or create an ‘Ersatz
international law’.
The balance of this chapter considers two lines of response. Its central
argument is that a renewed focus on the relation between international law
and foreign relations law, which the present collection adopts, might in fact
address such a critique.
Section III argues that, once the more extreme rhetoric of the populist
critique of international law is stripped away, the debate exposes to view the
importance of reconnecting the external and internal aspects of sovereignty.
Populist leaders have adopted (and often appropriated for their own purposes)
a much more deep-seated and genuine concern about the exercise of popular
sovereignty vis-à-vis governance at the global level, which should not be
dismissed. Brexit is emblematic of the reignition of a much larger and critic-
ally important debate about how ‘the people’ of a nation are to determine the
manner in which they are to engage with the world. This is not a new issue,
though it has been sharply re-exposed to view in the present era. In this debate,
there is no necessary dissonance between international law – which retains as
a peremptory norm the principle of self-determination12 – and the viability of
a national constitution founded on representative democracy. On the con-
trary, it is the populist claim of an exclusive executive right to speak for the
people in foreign relations that we should question.
Section IV then suggests a second important line of response. This is
precisely that recognising the concerns of foreign relations law to be legal
concerns (as opposed to the exercise of executive discretion in a zone of non-
law) enables consideration of the interaction between the domestic constitu-
tion and international law as one concerned with the interaction of legal
systems. In other words, it necessitates treating international law as law and
the domain of foreign relations as not being purely political but as bounded by
law. This is not about treating all exercises of foreign policy as constrained by
law, still less as necessarily subject to domestic adjudication. Rather it requires
us to take seriously the extent to which the executive foreign affairs function is
bound by the international law obligations that it assumes on behalf of the
state.
The diverse chapters collected in the present volume cast important light on
a set of legal questions that arise out of a governance dilemma that many states
now face with increasing urgency. It may well be impossible, as Dani Rodrik
12 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
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has suggested, to have ‘hyperglobalization, democracy and self-determination
all at once’.13 But, even if we put aside ‘hyperglobalisation’, we must still find
a way to reconcile popular engagement in the process of government at the
national level with the necessity of international cooperation.
II AN ERSATZ INTERNATIONAL LAW?
In order to challenge critically the idea that foreign relations law is a kind of
Ersatz international law, as the editors of this volume invite us to do, it is first
necessary to examine the nature of the charge. How might it be said that the
emergence of foreign relations law, as a discipline on a global comparative
scale, could adversely affect international law itself? Here experience in the
United States, as the country in which foreign relations law as a distinct
subject has the greatest prominence, may be instructive.
In an important contribution to the debate about the emergence of the field
of comparative foreign relations law, Karen Knop identifies three anxieties
about the effect of the creation of such a field on public international law itself
in light of the American experience.14 In the first place, she notes that the study
of foreign relations law has displaced international law in many American law
schools, with the consequence that students are ‘less likely to approach public
international law as a legal system than instrumentally as one possible tool in
the legal toolkit for solving transnational problems’.15 In the second place, she
suggests that foreign relations law may end up taking dualism to its ultimate
end. This ‘deep dualism’16 discounts the legal quality of international law,
such that ‘the field of foreign relations law is structured as a divide between an
internal realm in which law is the default and an external realm in which
foreign relations is the default’.17 In the third place, she identifies the risk that
foreign relations law distorts the operation of international law: by inserting
domestic concerns into the operation of international law; by encouraging
non-compliance with international law at the national level, inserting bound-
aries derived from domestic constitutional law; or by opening the potential
that domestic courts will simply misconstrue its obligations.
13 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), p. 200.
14 Karen Knop, ‘Foreign Relations Law: Comparison as Invention’, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019), p. 3.
15 Knop, ‘Comparison as Invention’, p. 51.
16 Citing Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, ‘Cultural Relativism the AmericanWay: TheNationalist
School of International Law in the United States’ (2005) 5 Global Jurist Frontiers 1.
17 Lorite Escorihuela, ‘Cultural Relativism the American Way’, 54.
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These concerns cannot be ignored, at least insofar as they are observable in
the contemporary American context. Jens Ohlin argues in his book The
Assault on International Law that the development of doctrines in US consti-
tutional law that enhance executive discretion in foreign relations went hand-
in-hand with scholarship that sought to undermine the determinate and
binding character of international law.18
Recent experience also exposes the risk of blurring important lines of distinc-
tion between the operation of international and national law. Naz Modirzadeh
describes how, after 9/11, international humanitarian law became ‘at best a set of
tools that could be operationalized alongside constitutional law, human rights
law, and criminal law and procedure’ in a form of ‘folk international law’.19
Nor are these trends limited to the United States. John Finnis, arguing that
the executive in the United Kingdom has no obligation to abide by the state’s
international law obligations, writes: ‘International law remains, like it or not,
a defective example of law. The criteria for its formation and identification
remain opaque, controverted, and manipulable without redress’.20
Chapters in this volume bear out some of the concerns that Knop identifies.
Felix Lange shows how the insertion of the domestic constitutional law
limitations of the United States into the negotiations shaped the outcome of
the Paris Agreement on climate change at the international level, while
providing no subsequent constraint on the executive decision to withdraw at
the domestic level.21
Foreign relations law may also encourage the priority of constitutional law
concerns over international law obligations. Angelo Golia recounts the refusal
of the Italian Constitutional Court to give effect to the judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the dispute between Germany and Italy on
sovereign immunity for acts committed in World War II, in which it cited
supreme principles of the constitution.22 As Curt Bradley observes, ‘the
18 Jens David Ohlin, The Assault on International Law (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015). For an early important essay calling attention to this trend see: Peter J. Spiro, ‘The New
Sovereigntists, American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets’ (2000) 79 Foreign Affairs 9.
19 Naz K. Modirzadeh, ‘Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the
Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance’
(2014) 5 Harvard National Security Journal 225 at 257.
20 John Finnis, ‘Ministers, International Law, and the Rule of Law’, Judicial Power Project,
2 November 2015, https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/ministers-international-law-and-the-
rule-of-law/, accessed 5 May 2020.
21 See the chapter by Felix Lange.
22 See the chapter by Angelo Jr Golia, discussing Decision No. 238/2014 of 22 October 2014
(Italian Constitutional Court); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99.
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normative goals of foreign relations law will not always align with the norma-
tive goals of international law’.23
A closer embrace of international law at the national law level may also lead
to its misapplication. Dire Tladi argues in his critique of the South African
Constitutional Court judgment in the SADC Tribunal case that ‘the problem
with the Court is not only its conclusion but also its failure to engage with the
methodology of international law’.24
To these concerns, the rise of populism adds the prospect of an increasing
outright withdrawal of states from the international legal system, facilitated by
the exercise of an unbound executive discretion to withdraw within many
domestic constitutions.25 This is a trend of which President Trump’s
announced withdrawals from the Paris Agreement and the Iran Nuclear
Accord – both so recently and painstakingly negotiated – are emblematic.
Yet the evidence of withdrawal, in particular from submission to international
dispute settlement, is in fact much more widespread.26 Examples include the
United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice under Brexit; the increasing challenge to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights; the threatened collective withdrawal of
African states from the International Criminal Court; and the withdrawal of
a number of key states from investment treaty arbitration.27 In each case, there
is a striking similarity in one of the key strands in the arguments for withdrawal.
Those objecting to the conferral of a power of adjudication over states upon
international tribunals allege that this creates a democratic deficit.
International judges, described as unaccountable international elites, are
said to take decisions that constrain the power of peoples to exercise their
popular sovereignty by determining the direction of their societies for them-
selves. They assert that this undermines the essence of the sovereignty of states.
International law has seemed curiously impotent in the face of these newly
emboldened assertions of sovereignty, though I have argued elsewhere that
international law does place checks on withdrawal, recognising that it is an act
that is not a matter of purely unilateral discretion, since of its nature it affects
the interests of other states parties.28The question that this phenomenon raises
23 See the chapter by Curtis A. Bradley, p. 345.
24 See the chapter by Dire Tladi, p. 229, discussing Law Society of South Africa and Others
v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2019 (3) BCLR 329 (CC).
25 See the chapter by Edward T. Swaine.
26 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Assault on International Adjudication and the Limits of
Withdrawal’ (2019) 68 ICLQ 499, and the detailed references therein.
27 McLachlan, ‘The Assault on International Adjudication’, 507–10.
28 McLachlan, ‘The Assault on International Adjudication’, pt. IV.
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in the present context is whether a closer engagement between international
law and foreign relations law is capable of nourishing new insights into the
concept of sovereignty in its double-facing aspect: external and internal.29
Such a constructive engagement might furnish one possible set of responses to
the critique outlined above. It is to this question that we must now turn.
III IS SOVEREIGNTY INDIVISIBLE?
Modern international lawyers have a tendency to regard the sovereignty of
states as something of an embarrassment – an inconvenient truth. In the last
edition of Oppenheim that he edited in 1955, Hersch Lauterpacht concludes
a passage on ‘The problem of sovereignty in the twentieth century’ with the
optimistic suggestion that ‘progress in International Law, the maintenance of
international peace and, with it, of independent national States, are in the
long run conditioned by a partial surrender of their sovereignty’.30 Forty years
later, Louis Henkin concluded in 1995 that ‘for legal purposes at least, we
might do well to relegate the term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic
from an earlier era’.31 James Crawford insists in 2005 that the term sovereignty
as a legal term can onlymean ‘the totality of powers that States may have under
international law. By contrast, as a political term its connotations are those of
untrammelled authority and power and it is in such discourse that the term
can be problematic’.32
The view of international lawyers that sovereignty is unhelpful in legal
terms stands in stark contrast to its persistence. This is not only in international
political discourse, in which, for instance, Brexit was cast as ‘a fight for the very
sovereignty of our nation’;33 and President Trump repeatedly invoked at the
rostrum of the UN General Assembly the notion that: ‘The future does not
belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to
sovereign and independent nations . . .’.34 It also finds its way into international
legal discourse. The Beijing Declaration adopted by the first South-South
Human Rights Forum in 2017 resolves that: ‘The international community’s
29 The author is indebted to David Dyzenhaus for the term ‘the double-facing constitution’. See
Bomhoff, Dyzenhaus and Poole (eds.), The Double-Facing Constitution.
30 Lassa Oppenheim and Hersch Lauterpacht (eds.), International Law: A Treatise, 8th ed.
(London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1955), pp. 122–4 at para. 70.
31 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1995), p. 10.
32 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), p. 33.
33 The Spectator, 15 December 2018.
34 Statement of President Trump to the UNGA, 24 September 2019, UN Doc. A/74/PV.3, p. 11.
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concern for human rights matters should always follow international law and
the universally recognized basic norms governing international relations, of
which the key is to respect national sovereignty’.35 So too the proposal for
collective withdrawal from the International Criminal Court considered by an
Open-ended Ministerial Committee of the African Union in January 2017,
invoked the need to ‘[p]reserve the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of
Member States’.36
The comparative failure of international lawyers to engage with the concept
of sovereignty, in both its internal and external aspects, may, as John Jackson
presciently warned in 2003, actually promote the persistence of sovereignty
fictions such as ‘the notion that absolute power is concentrated at the head of
a nation-state’. Jackson argued that an attempt to bury the concepts of sover-
eignty ‘without adequate replacements could lead to a situation in which pure
power prevails: that, in turn, could foster chaos, misunderstanding, and
conflict, like Hobbes’ state of nature, where life is “nasty, brutish, and short”’.37
Jackson was writing at a time of great expansion in the ambition of inter-
national institutions and was driven by a perception of the entirely new set of
pressures that this was creating for ‘nation-state governments trying to deliver
the fruits of their important achievements to their constituents’.38 In other
words, he was concerned about the effect of exercises of sovereignty on the
plane of international law on the maintenance of popular sovereignty in
national constitutions. Seen in this light, the rise of populism has simply
exposed to view what Blokker calls a ‘deeper, intrinsic tension in the post-
war international legal order between democratic self-government on the one
hand, and a universalistically understood international regime, on the
other’.39
This is a serious concern that lies at the heart of several of the chapters in
this volume. It is not to be dismissed as mere populist rhetoric. Aust and
Kleinlein suggest in their Introduction that ‘Sovereignty often serves as
a placeholder for constitutional values, in particular domestic democratic self-
determination’.40 As Anna Petrig puts it, discussing the Swiss constitutional
debate about the Migration Pact: ‘To shrug off the call for “hard
35 Beijing Declaration, 8 December 2017, p. 8.
36 African Union, ‘Withdrawal Strategy Document – Draft 2’, 12 January 2017.
37 John H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97
AJIL 782 at 794.
38 Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-Modern’, 797.
39 Blokker, ‘A Reply to Heike Krieger’, 1014.
40 See the introductory chapter by Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, p. 17.
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participation”, which took shape in the context of the Migration Pact, as
a purely populist manoeuvre would not do the matter justice’.41
International law resists conflating the question of the sovereignty of a state
on the international plane with the ‘constitutional lawyer’s question of
supreme competence within a particular State’.42 At the same time, there is
a strong strain in foreign relations law, which finds its philosophical origins in
John Locke’s idea of the ‘federative power’ that would leave the conduct of
foreign relations in the hands of the executive.43 On the face of it, these two
claims seem to contradict rather directly the notion, now so widely exploited
by the populist leaders, of the importance of a direct link between ‘the people’
and the exercise of independent sovereignty on the international plane, for
which the Brexit referendum is emblematic.
Yet a closer focus on the relation between the international and the
domestic dimensions of sovereignty and on the contribution of, respect-
ively, international law and constitutional law might assist our under-
standing of this relationship. In his highly original monograph Sovereignty
published in 1933, Hermann Heller argued for the indivisibility of sover-
eignty. He wrote:
If a state is sovereign, it is the universal decision-making unit in its territory;
the existentiality of the decision-making unit prohibits splitting sovereignty
into the sovereignty of a state law and a separate international law
sovereignty. . . . The highest independent decision-making power is always
the mark of one and not two facts.44
In his view, it was essential to liberate the idea of the sovereign person from
the ‘bloodlessness’ of a ‘conceptual phantom labelled the state’.45 He located
sovereignty in the people as the body politic, but, distancing himself fromCarl
Schmitt’s conception of a ‘voluntaristic dictatorship’ he insisted that the
people may only govern through the appointment of representatives ‘juristi-
cally dependant magistrates’ that represent the common will.46
Several of the chapters in this volume examine the development of mech-
anisms that seek to enhance and protect democratic involvement in the
decisions of states on the international plane, which comparative research
41 See the chapter by Anna Petrig, p. 203.
42 Crawford, The Creation of States, 33.
43 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise (London 1690), II, para. 147.
44 Hermann Heller, Sovereignty: A Contribution to the Theory of Public and International Law,
English translation of the 1927 original edition, edited and introduced by David Dyzenhaus
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 140.
45 Heller, Sovereignty, pp. 104, 106.
46 Heller, Sovereignty, p. 108.
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shows is a global trend.47 Both Ajla Škrbić and Stanislaw Biernat consider the
case for an enlarged parliamentary role in controlling the executive’s use of the
foreign affairs power.48 Niki Aloupi shows how the Conseil Constitutionnel in
France mediates the effect of international commitments upon national
sovereignty, through its decisions on whether a constitutional amendment is
required as a condition for the ratification of a treaty.49
Veronika Fikfak, who considers the development of British parliamentary
practice on the use of force against the background of a much broader
comparative trend, argues that this development is not only about the account-
ability of the executive to Parliament. Examining the parliamentary debates,
she suggests that, in the process, a direct link has been forged between the
questions of the lawful use of force at international law and Parliament’s
responsibility at the national level to decide to authorise the use of force.50
In the process, the international law issues become domesticated.
These trends, important though they are, still fall short of Heller’s concep-
tion of indivisible sovereignty through the exercise of the ultimate power of
decision on foreign affairs by the elected representatives of the people.
Nevertheless, recent experience in the United Kingdom concerning the deci-
sion to withdraw from the European Union gives support to this idea. Brexit
concerned an exercise of the foreign affairs power: the decision to withdraw
from a Treaty (and the whole complex of international arrangements that flow
from it). The process in the United Kingdom began with that most un-British
of constitutional devices: a resort to direct popular democracy through the
medium of a referendum. Immediately thereafter the executive (vociferously
backed by elements in the Press) attempted to treat this as a mandate that
could be executed by a straightforward exercise of its foreign affairs
prerogative.51
In two landmark cases, the Supreme Court demurred, decisively finding in
favour of Parliamentary sovereignty, that is: the principle that the sovereignty
of the people may only be exercised through their representatives (however
chaotic the results may be) and that this principle applies as much to foreign
47 Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘International Law in National Legal Systems: An
Empirical Investigation’ (2015) 109 AJIL 514; Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg,
‘Separation of Powers, Treaty-Making, and Treaty Withdrawal: A Global Survey’, in Curtis
A. Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 135.
48 See the chapters by Ajla Škrbić and Stanislaw Biernat respectively.
49 See the chapter by Niki Aloupi.
50 See the chapter by Veronika Fikfak.
51 For a detailed account of the background see: Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Foreign Relations
Power in the Supreme Court’ (2018) 134 Law Quarterly Review 380.
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relations as it does in other spheres. The first case directly concerned the
decision to notify withdrawal. The second concerned a decision to prorogue
Parliament while withdrawal negotiations were ongoing.
In Miller (No. 1),52 the Court rested its decision on the ground that the
decision of the executive to withdraw would necessarily change the law
applicable within the United Kingdom, something that only Parliament was
competent to do. In this way, the Court could present the outcome as
upholding the ‘dualist system’ that separated the international from the
national and in turn the executive foreign affairs function from the legislative
function of Parliament. It was only because the nature of withdrawal from EU
law necessarily transgressed that line that the court had to intervene, since ‘the
dualist system is a necessary corollary of Parliamentary sovereignty . . . it exists
to protect Parliament not ministers’.53
In Miller (No. 2),54 however, the issue could not be analysed as an applica-
tion of dualism in law-making. The Court recognised that what was really at
stake in the prorogation of Parliament was not merely an internal question of
the distribution of powers between the executive and Parliament, but also one
that went to the heart of Parliament’s ability to scrutinise the executive
conduct of foreign affairs. The constitutional significance of that power of
supervision was one that Dicey early identified. He accepted that ‘it is not
Parliament but the Ministry, who direct the diplomacy of the nation’.55 At the
same time, Ministers were constantly accountable to the House of Commons
for the exercise of that power. In this way, he thought ‘The prerogatives of the
Crown have become the privileges of the people’.56 For the Supreme Court,
the principle of ‘Parliamentary accountability’ is ‘no less fundamental to our
constitution than Parliamentary sovereignty’ since: ‘By these means, the pol-
icies of the executive are subjected to consideration by the representatives of
the electorate, the executive is required to report, explain and defend its
actions, and citizens are protected from the arbitrary exercise of executive
power’.57
Does this mean that the sovereignty of Parliament now includes the sover-
eign power of decision on all matters of foreign affairs? The answer is still
52 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61.
53 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61
at [57].
54 R (Miller) v. Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373.
55 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 2nd ed. (London:
Macmillan & Co., 1886), p. 394.
56 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, p. 396.
57 R (Miller) v. Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373, 406 at [46].
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probably not: the gradual increase in Parliamentary supervision of treaty-
making and the growth of a convention with regard to prior consultation on
the war power do not amount to a full assumption of power. Nor would this be
consistent with the important value of the separation of powers in constitu-
tional government that requires a balance to be maintained between the three
organs of government. Nevertheless, the ‘crisis’ test that Heller invites us to
apply has demonstrated, at least in this one contemporary example, the need
in the last resort to find a single holder of sovereign power within the state.
Within a democratic state, that holder can only be the constitutionally
appointed representatives of the people.
How, then, can this domestic constitutional law point be connected with
international law in a way that supports the idea of an indivisible sovereignty?
The answer lies in one of the most central organising principles of the post-
War system of international law: the principle of self-determination.
The principle is enshrined in the United Nations Charter as one of the
principal purposes of the Organisation, being ‘respect for the principle of
equal rights and the self-determination of peoples’.58 It has been subsequently
developed through law-making resolutions of the General Assembly on
Colonial Peoples59 and on Friendly Relations60 and as the first human right
in the International Covenants.61 In the latter, in common article 1, it finds its
expression in the following way:
(1) All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.
(2) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out
of international economic co-operation, based on the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence.
58 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, entered into force
24 October 1945, 1 UNTS 16, Art. 1(2).
59 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’,
UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), UN Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
60 UNGA, ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’, UNGA
Res. 2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 (‘Friendly Relations
Declaration’).
61 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York City,
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3, Art. 1; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York City, 16December 1966, entered into force
23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 1.
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(3) The States Parties to the present Convention, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right to self-
determination and shall respect that right, in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
In turn it has been developed and implemented through the practice of the
United Nations. No single principle has more profoundly transformed the
international legal system.62 Respect for it as ‘one of the essential principles of
contemporary international law’63 is an obligation erga omnes, which all states
have a legal interest in protecting.64
The point here is that the self-determination creates an explicit link between
international law and the ‘people’ who are and remain the holders of the
right.65 Self-determination as a legal principle has both driven the emergence
of new States and limited the validity of attempts to create new states that do
not meet its criteria. But for present purposes, its significance lies in its
enduring application internally within the framework of an existing state.66
In this way, international law supports the essential connection between the
internal and the international role of self-determination: between the people
and their right to determine their political organisation. So, renewed attention
to the connection between international law and foreign relations law may
shed new light on the meaning of popular sovereignty and its relation to the
right to self-determination.
This point is important because the international law principle of self-
determination is no populist charter, licensing the will of the majority to the
exclusion of the human rights of individuals. Its expression as a matter of
customary international law in the Friendly Relations Declaration includes the
provision that: ‘Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate
action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in accordance with the Charter’.67 The same principle adds, in its
savings clause, that the consequence of due observance of the principle of equal
62 Crawford, The Creation of States, Ch. 3; Marcelo Kohen, ‘Self-Determination’, in
Jorge Viñuales (ed.), The UN Friendly Relations Declaration at 50 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2020), Ch. 7.
63 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, para. 29.
64 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965,
Advisory Opinion, 25 February 2019, para. 180.
65 For a recent exploration of this idea in the context of election interference see: Jens
David Ohlin, Election Interference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), Ch. 4
‘The Promise of Self-Determination’.
66 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, 282 at [126].
67 Friendly Relations Declaration, principle 5, paragraph 3.
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rights and self-determination of peoples is that the State is ‘thus possessed of
a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour’.68 The insertion of the right in the
international human rights covenants has the same consequence that it is to be
read together with all of the other rights protected thereunder.
There is a second respect in which a focus on the relationship between
international law and foreign relations law may also prove productive. That
lies in treating seriously its starting premise: that international law constitutes
a distinct legal system, and that part of the function that foreign relations law
may perform within a domestic legal system is to provide rules of reception, or,
put more broadly, rules that manage the interaction between legal systems by
determining which legal system has jurisdiction over which issues and what
law applies. It is to this aspect that we must now turn.
IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW
In their Introduction, Aust and Kleinlein reject the idea that international law
or foreign relations law are ‘hybrid in nature’. They seek to uphold ‘the rather
traditional view that international law is indeed international and that foreign
relations law is part of a given domestic legal system’. Nevertheless, they argue
that ‘foreign relations law encapsulates the rules of domestic law about the
reception of international law’ and that ‘upholding the traditional criteria . . .
does not preclude investigating the hybrid zone that is created by the encoun-
ters of public international law and foreign relations law’.69
This approach may provide a potential way of pursuing Knop’s suggestion
that ‘[o]ne way forward may lie in noticing and questioning the strong law/
politics distinction at play in both foreign relations law and the international
law that it threatens to displace, discount, or distort’.70 In other words, it may
answer the distinction – implicit or explicit in some contemporary foreign
relations law scholarship – between a relatively positivist approach to binding
law at the domestic constitutional level and the assumption that, beyond the
state, the international arena can be characterised only by foreign relations
and not by binding law.
The partially revised American Law Institute Restatement (Fourth) Foreign
Relations Law 2018 makes the point that, because a restatement of foreign
relations law ‘deals with two distinct legal systems, namely domestic law
68 Friendly Relations Declaration, principle 5, paragraph 7.
69 See the chapter by Helmut Philipp Aust and Thomas Kleinlein, p. 12.
70 Knop, ‘Comparison as Invention’, p. 58.
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bearing on foreign relations and relevant portions of international law, it must
address both’.71
Howmight a renewed focus on treating the interface between international
law and domestic constitutional law as one of the interaction between legal
systems actually make a difference? In the first place, it might challenge the
utility of conventional ways of analysing the reception of international law in
domestic legal systems as one determined by the distinction between dualist
and monist systems. Recent comparative research has shown that this trad-
itional distinction does not correctly explain the actual rules of recognition
applicable in states that are traditionally regarded as being ‘monist’ or
‘dualist’.72 The true position is much less black and white.
‘Monist’ states must still maintain procedures for treaty review and ratifica-
tion to ensure legislative control over the making of laws that are to be
applicable internally within the state. ‘Dualist’ states, even if they maintain
strict rules of separation between treaty obligations and domestic law may still
accept that customary international law is ‘part of the law of the land’.73When
they do so, this is not because international law is referred to in the interpret-
ation of a norm of municipal law. Rather it is because international law is
applicable to the determination of the issue within themunicipal legal system.
It is applicable because a rule of recognition of municipal law so provides, and
therefore subject to the terms on which municipal law admits the inter-
national law rule. But it is nevertheless applicable as law.74
A consideration of the internal effect of the international legal obligations
assumed by states might also lead us to question deep dualism in another
respect. It would challenge another mistaken dualist proposition that inter-
national law obligations sound only on the international plane and produce
no domestic effects. It would do so by demonstrating that the essential corol-
lary of the allocation to the executive of the power to conduct foreign affairs
and to enter into treaties is that the executive assumes a concomitant obliga-
tion to comply with the international law obligations that it has assumed. Such
a requirement (which is supported in the case of the United Kingdom by
several centuries of practice) ensures that the state abides by the international
71 American Law Institute, Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (2018), Introduction.
72 Verdier and Versteeg, ‘International Law in National Legal Systems’, 514.
73 William Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws of England, 9th ed. reprint (Oxford: Strahan,
Cadell and Prince, 1783) Bk IV, p. 67. See the Indian Supreme Court authorities cited in the
chapter by Prabhakar Singh.
74 The point is developed fully in Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), Ch. 3.
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law obligations that it has assumed through the persons that contract on its
behalf and represent it in foreign relations.75
The result of treating foreign relations law as concerned with the interaction
of the different legal systems that are in play in questions of foreign relations
‘admits of a larger variety of relevant bodies of law. It also has the potential to
develop a more complex account of dualism’.76 In rejecting a ‘fixed law/
politics opposition’ it would subject foreign relations questions to the principle
of legality, not conceived narrowly as the municipal law of any particular state,
but rather as determining the issue according to the applicable law, whether
that be municipal law or international law.
A further benefit of such a focus is that it may provide a better means of
doing comparative foreign relations law on a global basis. Michael Riegner, in
his chapter for this volume, highlights the contingency of the set of choices for
foreign relations law created by the Western constitutional tradition.77 He
points out that this tradition assumes the pre-existence of the state and then
poses the foreign relations law question as a set of choices about the relation of
the state to international law at the interface. He argues that ‘the distinction
between international and national is applied rigidly to the political sphere but
not to the economic sphere’.78
By contrast, in the colonised ThirdWorld, ‘foreign relations did not begin as
inter-state relations but as dealings between chartered trading companies like
the East India Company and local rulers. The experience of statehood was also
quite different: for many postcolonial states, the international preceded the
national: peripheral statehood was produced and defined by international law
during decolonization’.79 A search for models of foreign relations law in the
Global South would, as the Latin American example that he discusses illus-
trates, open up the possibility of transformational constitutionalism, a model
of regional integration that emphasises social not economic rights, which
remain much more closely subject to national control.80 We might note in
this regard how closely the formulation of the right to self-determination in
Article 1 of the International Covenants links the right of peoples to determine
75 CampbellMcLachlan, ‘TheDouble-Facing Foreign Relations Function of the Executive and
Its Self-Enforcing Obligation to Comply with International Law’ in Bomhoff, Dyzenhaus and
Poole (eds.), The Double-Facing Constitution, Ch. 13.
76 Knop, ‘Comparison as Invention’, p. 60.
77 See the chapter by Michael Riegner, pp. 60 et seqq.
78 See the chapter by Riegner, pp. 65–66.
79 See the chapter by Riegner, p. 69.
80 See the chapter by Riegner, p. 74.
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political status (paragraph 1) to their right to control economic resources
(paragraph 2).
V CONCLUSION
If comparative foreign relations law proves itself really capable of embracing
different perspectives as to the relation between a national constitution and
international law that treats both as law, it might rise above a mere comparison
of differences. It might then dispel the concern that, as a discipline, it may
cannibalise the study of international law, creating in the process an Ersatz or
‘folk’ international law. In doing so it may shed new positive light on
a compelling issue of our age on which foreign relations law sits, whether as
bridge or boundary, namely: how to redefine the relation between the nation
state and the international realm in ways that give real meaning to both the
right of peoples to self-determination and the community interest shared by all
humanity to secure our common future.
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created by foreign relations law, 1–2
immunity
sovereign immunity. See sovereign
immunity
India
common law, 86, 87, 102, 107
borrowing from jurisdictions other than
England, 102
inherited, 89
Constitution, 86, 88, 89
Article 51 and international law, 91–4
directive principles, 93–4
independence, 94
Supreme Court, 91, 95
uti possidetis, 103–6
dualism, 93, 94
exclusion of foreign relations from judicial
scrutiny, 98–102
Sikkim case, 101–2
Supreme Court and UN Charter, 99–101
executive, powers of, 92–4
foreign relations law, 86–107
concord of Western peoples, as, 87–91
Constitution and uti possidetis, 103–6
foreign relations, exclusion from judicial
scrutiny of, 98–102




international law in Indian legal system, 23
judicial review, 95–6
executive actions, of, 98
Parliament, powers of, 92–4
Sikkim, 87, 101–2




dissenting judgments and opinions, 91
embedded common law and colonial
continuity, 94–6
extradition of aliens, 96–8
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India (cont.)
international law, 91–4, 99–101
political questions doctrine, 101–2




role of executive, 44
uti possidetis, 87, 103–6
constitutional perfecting of, 103–4
declaratory perfecting of, 105–6
indigenous peoples
constitutional land rights, 73
human rights, 75
transnational corporations, and, 73
individuals
consequences of international legal
instruments for, 5
protection of individual rights, international
law and, 6
subjects of international law, as, 10
informal instruments, 5, 11–12
informal instruments/law, 205–10
compliance-monitoring, 204
importance of informal instrument as
criterion for democratic legitimacy,
205–6
informal international law superseding
formal international law, 199–200
informal law-making complicating
relationship between sovereignty and
international cooperation, 181
‘legislative’ informal instruments, 205
nature of, 205
participants, nature of, 208–9
process, nature of, 209
rejection of, 209–10
states as just one actor, 208
transnational corporations, and, 200
treaties, and, 209
international agreements
states not opting for, 11
treaties. See treaties
international comity, 141, 150, 151
International Court of Justice, 348
de Lacharrière, and, 111, 123
heads of state to be presumed competent, 52
India, and, 103–6
Italian Constitutional Court, and, 153–5,
349, 360
state immunity, 13
International Criminal Court, 128, 234
discontent of some African states with, 125
French Constitution, and, 175–6
South Africa’s attempted withdrawal. See
under South Africa
threatened collective withdrawal of African
states from, 361, 363
United States, and, 351
international environmental law
environmental impact assessments, 3, 353
Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 337
no harm principle, 3
Rio Conference/Declaration, 325, 327
Stockholm Environmental Conference,
317, 324
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 337
international institutions and organizations, 3
deference to, 302
decreasing, 313, 316
far reaching implications of, 5
new states, and, 70
paying increasing attention to domestic
procedures, 3–4
secondary law creating, 5
subjects of international law, as, 10
international investment. See foreign
investment
International Labor Organization
restricting withdrawal from treaties, 58
international law
armed drone missions, 14–15, 130–1,
145–6, 155
comparative international law. See com-
parative international law
deformalization. See deformalization of
international law
domestic constitutional principles, and, 6
domestic law, and. See international law and
domestic law
environmental law. See international envir-
onmental law
European Union law, and, 172
expansion of, 10–11
far-reaching implications of, 5
foreign legal policy, and. See under foreign
legal policy
foreign relations law, and. See foreign rela-
tions law and international law
international law as law, 369–72
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nature and meaning of, 2, 10–12






states as main players in, 180
subjects of, 10–11
use of force
role of international law in domestic
parliamentary discourse, 306–11
state decisions on use of force,
implications for international law of,
311–15
international law and domestic law, 2–5
distinction between as doctrinal remnant, 5
distinction rooted in laws of treaties and state
responsibility, 2
foreign relations law as bridge builder
between, 29
foreign relations law as site of encounter, 4
hybridity of international and domestic law
created by foreign relations law, 1–2
international law not deferring to domestic
law, 47
proceduralization of interface between,
3–4, 14
role of domestic law, 8
states’ implementation of international legal
obligations, 2–3
International Law Commission, 2
Articles on State Responsibility
State acts as internationally wrongful, 2
Guiding Principles 2006, 52, 53
unilateral acts doctrine, 52
VCLT, and, 54




mineral deposits as property of state, 73
Italy
state immunity, 13, 153–5, 349
use of force, 299
judicial review, foreign relations and global
administrative law, 130–58
administrativisation of jurisdiction and
juridification of foreign relations,
130–5, 156–8
bringing together foreign relations law and
global administrative law, 135–40
global administrative law as analytical
approach to foreign relations law,
138–40
legal standards used on the merits, 144–7
standing, 143–4
struggles of foreign relations law with scope,
sources, and functions, 135–8






minerals and mineral oils as public land, 73
Kosovo, 289–90
Kyoto Protocol, 25, 38
Lacharrière, Guy Ladreit de
background and experience, 111–12
La politique juridique extérieure, 108–29
assessment of, 125–9
consequences for international law,
119–25
elements in determining foreign legal
policy, 113–15
foreign legal policy existing in relation to
broader national interest, 112–13
foreign legal policy operating at interface
of the domestic and international,
115–16
nature of, 110–11
primacy of foreign legal policy, 112–16
role and function of foreign policy law,
116–19
strength of analysis of, 122–4
League of Nations, 51, 106
legal advisers
advice on torture or use of force, 128
de Lacharrière, as, 110, 111, 117, 123, 126,
127, 128
international law, and, 127
legal personality
European Union, 172
international legal personality, 10, 169,
181, 200
liberalism
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liberalism (cont.)
liberal and postcolonial perspectives. See
comparative foreign relations law
liberal internationalism, 76
neo-liberal structural adjustment, imposing, 69
separation of economy and politics by
domestic constitutionalism, 66
Locke, John, 25, 131, 364
margin of appreciation, 150, 165
Mexico, 211
Constitution, 68
state ownership of natural resources, 73
Minamata Convention on Mercury, 41, 332
monism, 17, 109, 114, 370
Montreux Document, 209
multinational corporations. See transnational
corporations
national parliaments
authorisation of treaty-making, 190–1
earlier information about imminent foreign
policy decisions, 18
implementation of secondary law, and, 5
parliamentary participation in foreign
affairs, 14
state decisions on use force, implications for
international law of, 311–15
use of force
role of international law in domestic
parliamentary discourse, 306–11
use of force, involvement in decisions on,
299–301
natural resources. See under sovereignty
Netherlands
climate change, duty of care to citizens
and, 146
Constitution, 300
use of force, 299
deployment of forces abroad, 300
New International Economic Order, 72
Allende’s 1972 speech as milestone
towards, 61
Declaration, 68
no harm principle, 3
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 181
opinio juris, 112, 121
Pakistan, 87
foreign relations law, 86
parallelism, 180, 182
Switzerland, in. See under Switzerland
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 11, 58
United States, 16, 31, 34–7, 42–5
non-bindingness of commitments,
24–5
real risks and bargaining tool, 37–42
withdrawal, 45
Permanent Court of International Justice, 10
domestic law, 46
Pinochet, Augusto, 61, 152
Poland
authoritarianism, movement towards, 272–3
Constitution, 252
Constitution of 1997, 257–64
duality, 254
executive powers, 254–69
international law and separation of
powers, and, 253–4
small Constitution of 1992, 255–7
Council of Ministers
predominance in foreign affairs, 257–9
separation of powers, President and, 255–7
division of competences in foreign relations
law, 19, 252–73
Constitution, international law and
separation of powers, 253–4
foreign relations, executive powers in,
254–69
Parliament’s activities in foreign relations,
269–72
executive powers in foreign relations, 254–69
Constitution of 1997 and rationally
modified parliamentarianism, 257–64
constitutional conflict over Poland’s
representation in European Council,
264–6
constitutional role of President in foreign
affairs, 259–63
overlapping competences and duty to
cooperate, 263–4
predominance of Council of Ministers in
foreign affairs, 257–9
role of President in practice, 266–9
small Constitution of 1992 and separation
of powers President/Council of
Ministers, 255–7
Law and Justice party (PiS), 269
Chair’s power, 269, 273
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control over Council of Ministers and
Foreign Affairs Committee, 270–1
declaration of state of war, conclusion of




constitutional role in foreign affairs,
259–63
role in practice, 266–9




exclusionary identity politics, key tenet
as, 355
international law, and, 355–8
sovereignty, and, 355–6
Portugal
India, and, 99–101, 102
postcolonialism
decolonization. See decolonization
India, and. See India
national liberation, 85
postcolonial constitutions allowing for
nationalization of assets, 72
privatization, 18
property disputes between investors and
states, 77
proportionality, 134, 141, 145
foreign relations, and, 149, 151
substantive ground, as, 141
United Kingdom. See under United
Kingdom
United States. See under United States
public international law. See international law
reasonableness, 141, 145, 152








Switzerland. See under Switzerland
United Kingdom, 364, 365
rule of law, 10
foreign relations, and, 132
international law, and, 6
invoking sovereign immunity, and, 81
original theories of, 131
Poland’s breaches of, 273
principle of legality, and, 188–90
Scelle, Georges, 109, 123
dédoublement fonctionnel, 7
secondary law, 5, 264
self-determination, 372
collective self-determination, 69, 70, 84
economic self-determination, 69, 284
hyperglobalization, and, 359
India, Sikkim and, 102
International Covenants, in, 371
newly decolonized states, and, 119
peremptory norm in international law,
as, 358
principle of international law, as, 367–9
sovereignty, and, 181, 212, 363, 368
UN Charter, 367–8
separation of powers, 10, 15, 65, 66, 83, 216
BiH, 276–8
distinctive feature of modern
constitutionalism, as, 131
encompassing pushs and pulls, 83
foreign affairs, in, 23
withdrawal from treaties, 58
Sikkim. See under India
soft law, 5, 11, 352
demands for hard participatory rights for,
202–5
development of soft participatory rights for,
200–2
transnational corporations, soft law code of
conduct for, 82
Solange doctrine, 139, 150, 152
South Africa, 18, 215–38
Constitution, 149
Bill of Rights, 218
deliberative constitution, 217
foreign relations, 216
international law, and, 27
Constitutional Court
Kaunda case, 217–19, 220–1
SADC Tribunal case, 146–7, 215,
221–30, 361
foreign relations, executive discretion in,
215–16, 217–37
Democratic Alliance cases, 230–7
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South Africa (cont.)
SADC Tribunal case, 221–30
Grace Mugabe case, 215, 230–5
International Criminal Court, attempted
withdrawal from, 55, 149, 235–7
legislature supporting foreign policy
approach of government, 44
Mandela administration, 18, 219
Mbeki administration, 219
Ramaphosa administration, 238
Von Abo cases, 219–21
Withdrawal case, 149, 215, 235–7
Zuma administration, 216, 237
mistrust of, 216
sovereign immunity, 150, 152
state-owned enterprises, and, 81
sovereignty, 15, 65, 70
colonization, and, 70
concluding treaties as exercise of, 167
Conseil Constitutionnel jurisprudence. See
Conseil Constitutionnel jurisprudence
on limitations of sovereignty
economic self-determination, and, 70
economic sovereignty, 71
external, 131, 358
hybrid foreign relations and state-owned
enterprises, 80–1
internal, 131, 132, 358
international tribunals, and, 361
liberal foreign relations law, in, 65–6
natural resources
foreign relations law, and, 71–3
UN Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 68
parliamentary, 148
placeholder for constitutional values, as,
17, 212
popular sovereignty, 66




limiting or legitimizing, 82–4
rebalancing sovereignty and property in
foreign investment law, 77–9
self-determination, and, 181






state responsibility, law of, 2
Articles on State Responsibility. See under
International Law Commission
state-owned enterprises
constitutional rights of, 81
globalization of Chinese state-owned
enterprises, 80
hybrid foreign relations, and, 80–1
property rights of, 81





courts. See domestic courts
domestic law. See domestic law
executive entering/exiting treaties. See
executive authority in entering and
exiting treaties
external relations. See foreign relations law
foreign investment. See foreign investment
foreign legal policy. See foreign legal policy
heads of state to be presumed competent, 52
impact of domestic politics on international
negotiations, 30–1
international community (of states), as part
of, 8
main players in international law, as, 180
not opting for binding international
agreements, 11
regulatory autonomy, 5





subsidiarity principle, 139, 150, 171, 271
Switzerland
allocation of powers for treaty-making,
democratisation and, 190–9




reaction to legalisation of world politics,
190–1
strong treaty focus, 197–9
Constitution, 183, 188–90
direct democracy as main feature of
constitutional system, 180, 193
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foreign policy, 184–5, 201–2
horizontal separation of powers, 186–8
optional referendums, 206–7
parliamentary approval for specific
treaties, 191, 195–6
vertical separation of powers, 185–6
democratic participation in international
law-making, 18, 180–212
allocation of powers for treaty-making,
democratisation and, 190–9




foreign relations law, 182–90
allocation of powers on foreign policy,
185–8
nature of, 181–2
substantive guidance for conduct of
foreign policy, 184–5
towards normalisaton of foreign relations,
188–90
whether exists, 182–4
informal international law-making, 199–210
challenges in building new bridges,
205–10
demands for hard participatory rights for
soft law, 202–5
development of soft participatory rights
for soft law, 200–2
informal international law superseding
formal international law, 199–200
Migration Pact, 200, 201, 202–5, 207–8,
211, 363
parallelism, 180, 182, 197, 198
concept of, 191–3
referendums, 194, 203, 207
granted if predefined criteria are met, 207
mandatory referendums, 192, 196–7
optional referendums, 191–3, 196–7, 206–7
Supreme Court, 184
Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), 4, 78
transboundary movements and effects
Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements, 331, 336
industrial sites, 3
transformative constitutionalism, 74, 83
transnational corporations, 63, 77
actors in international legal system, as, 10
changing attitudes towards, 63
collective participation rights, allowing, 84
colonization, and, 70
economic and political dominance of, 60–1
foreign investment. See foreign investment
human rights, and, 82–4
indigenous peoples, and, 73
informal instruments, creating, 200
international law-making, and, 181
internationalizing corporate obligations,
failure of, 82
nationalization of assets of, 72
not possessing international legal
personality, 181, 200
quasi-sovereign status, human rights
obligations and, 83–4
role of home states in extraterritorial
protection of human rights against
corporate misconduct, 82–3
soft-law code of conduct, 82
strong executive needed to confront, 71




bargaining tool in negotiations. See foreign
relations law as a bargaining tool
Conseil Constitutionnel, role of. See
Conseil Constitutionnel jurisprudence
on limitations of sovereignty
domestic law regulating competence to
consent to, 49
entering and exiting. See executive authority
in entering and exiting treaties
exercise of sovereignty, as, 167
foreign relations law, treaties dependent
on, 46
full powers doctrine, 53
impact of foreign relations law on treaty
negotiations, 30–1
informal agreements concluded by
signature, 48
law of treaties, domestic law, and. See under
domestic law
new actors excluded from formal
international law-making, 11
notification of consent, 49
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treaties (cont.)
executive authority as incident of
sovereignty, 48
legislative approval of treaties, 48–9
unilateral acts doctrine, 52–3
significant reduction in number of treaties,
198–9
source of international law, as, 5
sovereignty, and, 17
states as main actors in treaty-making, 208
VCLT. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT)
veto powers in treaty-making, 24
violations, 121–2
widening scope of treaty-making, 48
withdrawal, 53–8
parliamentary rights to participate, 54–5
UN Charter, 99–101, 225
domesticating decisions on military action,
impact on, 315
self-determination, 367–8
UN General Assembly, 60, 230, 362, 367
UN Security Council, 11, 248
Al-Qaeda, resolutions on, 153
military intervention
authorization as supplementary source of
authority, 352
decreasing role in deciding on, 311–13
military intervention not authorised, 311
Suez crisis, 308
targeted sanctions, 5
use of force, failure to act in, 307
unilateral acts, 52–3
creating treaty obligations through, 351
international law being developed at
domestic level, 316
unilateral acts doctrine
full powers doctrine for treaties, and, 53
use of force, 316
United Kingdom, 299–316
act of state doctrine, 141, 152, 217
big tech companies, concerns about, 76
Brexit. See Brexit
forum non conveniens doctrine, 151–2
parliamentary sovereignty, 148, 365–7





procedural requirements on foreign
relations issue, 148
use of force, 19
failure of Security Council triggering
domestication of decision-making, 307
implications for international law, 311–15
Iraq, 302–3, 304, 309–10, 313
major military action requiring explicit
parliamentary approval, 303–4
proportionality and necessity, 310–11, 316
role of international law in domestic
parliamentary discourse, 306–11
role of MPs, 301–6, 309–11
Suez crisis, 308
Syria, 304, 305, 308, 311, 313
War Powers Convention, 301, 307, 311,
312, 313
War Powers Convention, birth of, 303–6
who has power, 302–15
United States
American Law Institute, 26, 369
Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, 27
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, 27, 29, 33






sovereign immunity in US federal
courts, 81
Clean Air Act, 39, 41
Clinton administration, 32, 38, 351
congressional-executive agreements, 26,
32–4, 41




distribution of power in, 239, 241
international agreements, 241–2
treaty-making under, 31–4
uses of force, 241
foreign affairs, 6
foreign relations law, 109, 346
approach to, 12, 150–1, 156
Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 38
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development of, 26
distinguishing types of agreements,
33–4
executive treaty negotiations, 24–5, 31,
34–42, 47
history of, 7
important tradition of, 10, 23
manifestation of exceptionalism, as, 6
originating in United States, 61
Presidential power in. See United States
foreign relations, checks on
Presidential power in
Senate, role of, 32, 44
human rights treaties, endorsing, 32
International Court of Justice, and, 348
International Criminal Court, and, 351
Kyoto Protocol, 38, 39, 42
Obama administration, 24–5, 31, 32, 42–5, 251
non-bindingness of climate mitigation
commitments, and, 34–7
Paris Agreement. See under Paris Agreement
on Climate Change
political question doctrine, 34, 41–2




sole executive agreements, 33–4, 39
Supreme Court, 23, 251
Alien Tort Statute case law, 82, 151
international agreements, 33
narrowing scope of act of state doctrine,
150–1
rejection of Chevron approach in foreign
relations matters, 143
reluctance to judicialize foreign affairs,
25, 43
withdrawal from treaties, 41
Trump administration, 45, 80, 145, 247,
249, 251
use of force, 299
war on terror, 145
United States foreign relations law, checks on
Presidential power in, 18, 239–51
erosion of scope-based constitutional checks
on President’s foreign relations powers,
241–4
causes of rise in President’s powers, 243
President’s vast swathe of foreign affairs
powers, 241–2
scope-based limits, 243–4
meaning of scope-based and
process-based, 240
rise of process-based checks on Presidential
power, 244–50
Presidential power in age of process-based
checks, 242, 249–50
process-based checks grounded in
interface with international law, 6,
247–9
process-based checks grounded in U.S.
domestic law and practice, 245–7
scope of Presidential power, 239–40
scope, process, and comparative practice,
250–1
use of force. See under national parliaments;
UN Security Council; United
Kingdom
uti possidetis, 87
India, and. See under India
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), 47
Art 46, 29, 58
defect in state’s consent to be bound, 54
limited to internal law provisions on
competence, 56
manifest violations, 50, 52, 57, 351
never successfully pleaded, 30
possibility of invalidity of international
agreement, 2
security of treaty obligations, 57
Dayton Peace Agreement, 278
domestic law not justifying non-compliance
with international obligations, 2
establishing international law constraint on
foreign relations law, 50–1
international agreements, manifest violation
of domestic provision and, 2
subsequent practice, 227–8, 229
successive treaties, rules on, 229
treaties applying throughout entire territory
of parties, 353
unilateral acts, creating treaty obligations
through, 351
withdrawal from treaties, 53–7, 350–1
notice periods, 54
World Trade Organization, 155, 323
Dispute Settlement, 4
Zuma, Jacob. See under South Africa
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